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ABSTRACT
This is a legal impact study. Its concern is the effectiveness of WTO law and its focus 
is the compliance behaviour of developing countries. Article XVI:4 of the WTO 
Agreement provides: “Each Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, 
regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the 
annexed Agreements” In the light of this overarching compliance obligation, this 
thesis examines the behavioural impact of WTO law, and investigates the 
preconditions for its effectiveness. In doing so, the experiences of two developing 
countries -  South Africa and Nigeria -  are considered.
Through extensive research conducted both in these countries and in Geneva, 
involving thorough examination and analysis of national legislation and case law, 
WTO obligations and jurisprudence, archival materials and other documentary 
evidence, as well as interview data, this thesis gives systematic and detailed accounts 
of the compliance experiences of both countries, and identifies the sources of their 
behaviour.
The research revealed that South Africa substantially complied with its WTO 
obligations, although there were areas of obvious non-compliance and areas where 
compliance was unclear. Nigeria, on the other hand, was in substantial non- 
compliance, with no WTO implementation legislation introduced to date. The 
research showed that WTO law did not have independent compliance pull. Its 
effectiveness depended on a combination of legal and non-legal factors.
One important shaping factor was ownership or endogenous preference. It was clear 
that ex ante preference for any agreement induced better ex post compliance with it, 
and vice versa. Domestic-level structures and processes also had strong explanatory 
powers, as did market considerations. The main contribution of this thesis has been to 
add to the understanding of the factors that influence developing countries’ 
compliance with WTO law, and, therefore, of the conditions under which WTO law is 
likely to be effective in many of these countries.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION:
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
Background to the Study
On April 15 1994, in Marrakech, Morocco, ministers from over one hundred countries 
signed the Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation. This 
marked a turning point in the regulation of trade relations among sovereign states. 
Earlier cooperative efforts in the 1920s and 1930s, the interwar years, failed for lack 
of consensus among the major states. Although the post-war trade regime, under the 
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (the GATT), was inspired by the interwar 
experience, it was nevertheless minimalist in nature, both in terms of its subject 
matter scope, its legal enforcement, and its addressees.
The legal and institutional transformation brought about by the Uruguay Round 
Agreement is, however, considerable. The WTO Agreement is the most 
comprehensive, elaborate, detailed, and legally binding multilateral economic treaty. 
Its dispute settlement system is “more far-reaching than any multilateral arrangement 
for resolution of disputes among states in history”.1 WTO rules and disciplines extend 
beyond the traditional border measures to a significantly greater area of national 
regulatory activity. And, as a result of the single undertaking principle, developing 
countries, hitherto excluded from much of the earlier GATT disciplines, had to accept 
all the Uruguay Round multilateral rules as a condition of membership of the WTO.
The underlying philosophy of the new regulatory approach suggests that international 
trade relations are greatly dependent on and governed by legal forms and rules. The 
main assumption is one of behavioural constraints. WTO law is expected to constrain 
the behaviour of governments by imposing restraints on how they regulate trade and 
trade-related matters. Furthermore, WTO law is expected to trigger trade law reforms 
in countries where the quality of the legal and regulatory environment is deemed to be 
deficient or inadequate. Thus, Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement provides: “Each
1 Lowenfeld (1995).
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Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative 
procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements”. But what is 
the behavioural impact of this provision? Is there any significant relationship between 
the law and state behaviour, and if not why?
The overall thrust or concern of this thesis is the effectiveness of WTO law, and its 
specific focus is the implementation and compliance behaviour of developing 
countries. Two core research questions are posed:
• How and to what extent have some developing countries implemented and 
complied to date with their WTO treaty obligations?
• What factors have influenced their behaviour?
The first question seeks to answer the “effectiveness” question, the second focuses on 
the actual influences on the compliance behaviour of these countries. Thus, the thesis 
is not only concerned with the nature of the effectiveness of WTO law, but also the 
preconditions for its effectiveness. By investigating the sources of state behaviour, the 
thesis seeks to contribute to an understanding of the conditions under which WTO law 
is likely to prove more or less effective. The different terminologies or concepts are 
defined below.
Effectiveness, Implementation and Compliance
Effectiveness, used in different contexts, can mean a number of different things. 
According to Weiss and Jacobson, it relates to the question whether a treaty is 
effective in attaining its ultimate objectives.2 This is a problem-solving approach that 
examines the degree to which a treaty eliminates or alleviates the problems, such as 
protectionism, that prompts it. However, effectiveness can also be seen from the point 
of view of the behaviour of targeted actors rather than the attainment of a particular 
normative goal. In this legal approach, as Oran Young put it, effectiveness refers to 
the degree to which treaty obligations are met.4 It is this legal approach that is adopted 
in this thesis. The study defines effectiveness in the context of specific obligations set 
out in the WTO treaty.
2 Weiss and Jacobson (1998)
3 Victor, Raustiala and Skolnikoff eds. (1998)
4 Young ed. (1999).
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Implementation and compliance can be confused with each other but they actually 
mean different things. Implementation refers to measures that states take to make 
international agreements effective in the domestic law.5 It comprises the myriad 
implementing acts of governments, including enactment, application and 
enforcement.6 Compliance, however, goes beyond implementation. It refers to 
whether countries, in fact, adhere to the provisions of the international agreement in 
question.7 A government may introduce national legislation to implement its 
international commitments; yet it cannot be assumed that the implementing legislation 
fully conforms to or complies with the provisions of the treaty in question.
o
Measuring compliance is more difficult than measuring implementation. In the 
absence of judicial authority, assessing the extent of compliance is, in the end, a 
matter of judgement.9 In this thesis, the focus is both on implementation and 
compliance. How this is achieved is explained in the section on methodology below. 
It is necessary, first, however, to explain the relevance and importance of the thesis.
Relevance of the Thesis
The legalisation of the WTO and the deepening and widening of its rule base have 
attracted considerable attention from a wide range of analysts and commentators. 
Several have focused on the development dimension of the legal transformation.10 
However, little empirical analysis has been undertaken to systematically examine how 
developing countries are implementing and complying with their WTO obligations, 
and what factors are affecting their responses.11
Yet, claims are often made about the effectiveness of the WTO law that are not 
empirically substantiated. For instance, Deborah Cass argues that, “it would seem that 
a habit of obedience to the WTO system is developing, illustrated by the high number
19of ratifications of the agreements”. She also adds that, “the level of acceptance of
5 Weiss and Jacobson (1998, p. 4)
6 See Snyder (1993)
7 Weiss and Jacobson (1998, p. 4)
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 See, for example, Ostry (2000); Finger and Schuler (2000); and Srinivasan (1999)
11 For studies on the implementation of WTO agreements, see: e.g., Shin (1996), Finger (2001) and 
Kusumadara (2002)
12 Cass (2005, p.54).
15
WTO law and system is widespread”. She admits, however, that socio-legal research
1 'Iis needed to prove these claims.
Clearly, the increasing number of accessions to the WTO may indicate the importance 
that countries attach to the organisation, but it is not necessarily suggestive of their 
willingness to fully implement its rules or adhere to the principles of pacta sunt 
servanda and good faith fulfilment. This is because states’ treaty commitments and 
their compliance interests are not necessarily in congruence. The legal commitments 
made by governments may not be as dependable as their binding legal form would 
suggest. A legal impact study is, thus, useful to assess the law in terms of its success 
in achieving its goals rather than solely in terms of its formal legalistic structure.
Implementation and compliance research, focusing on developing countries, is also
tViparticularly relevant for the following reasons. Developing countries constitute 4/5 
of WTO membership14, yet, since its inception in 1995, the WTO has been crisis- 
ridden, with at least two failed ministerial conferences (Seattle, in 1999 and Cancun, 
in 2003), stemming mainly from the unhappiness of most developing countries about 
the Uruguay Round bargain and its aftermath.15 It would be useful to investigate 
whether these countries are faithfully implementing, partially implementing, or, 
indeed, resisting the implementation of these agreements in their national contexts. It 
is also useful to establish the factors that are actually influencing their behaviour.
Compliance research on WTO law is also relevant and important because of the 
expansionist agenda of the WTO. Despite the controversial nature of the Uruguay 
Round Agreement, there have been increasing pressures to expand the scope of the 
WTO.16 The Doha Round, launched in 2001, came about because of proposals to 
expand WTO rules and to strengthen or amend existing rules. If and when
13 Ibid, p. 55.
14 They account for approximately 120 out of the 150 members.
15 The launch of the Doha Development Agenda in 2001 was partly due to concerns of developing 
countries that the Uruguay Round was unfair, unjust and inequitable, leading to calls for renegotiating 
the WTO treaty and redressing its imbalances.
16 For instance, proposals to broaden the WTO rules resulted in the so-called Singapore issues, which 
included competition, investment, trade facilitation, and transparency in government procurement. 
Although only trade facilitation has been included in the ongoing Doha Round, the demand to broaden 
the WTO agenda has not subsided, some resulting from the in-built agenda in the WTO treaty itself, 
others flowing from the offensive interests of WTO members.
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completed17, the round will result in another trade treaty that is bound to increase the
1 ftcommitments of all members, including developing countries. By examining 
compliance with the existing treaty, this study aims to add to the understanding of the 
conditions under which both present and future agreements are likely to be effective.
Normatively, the study also seeks to contribute to the wider debate about the legal and 
institutional reform of the WTO, particularly with respect to systemic issues such as 
rule making and rule application. For instance, are there merits in forcing all WTO 
members to sign up to the same sets of agreements ab initio under the single 
undertaking principle? What are the limits of centred decision-making and decentred 
implementation as a governance strategy? Is an overly legal view of the WTO system 
desirable or should there be a more nuanced conception of international trade law? 
Indeed, is law being unduly privileged over other governance structures as 
determinants of the economic behaviour of states? Based on findings from the case 
studies, some normative conclusions would be made in respect of these questions.
The Theoretical Argument
The basic argument of this thesis is that, despite the legalisation of international trade 
norms and the traditional reliance on the principle of pacta sunt servanda as their 
binding force, international trade law does not, in fact, have independent compliance 
pull; its effectiveness in shaping the behaviour of states will depend on a complex 
interplay between legal and non-legal factors.19 Law matters, but often only to the
17 In July 2006, the Doha Round was suspended after the failure of WTO members to make progress on 
the negotiating issues. On 24 July, the Director-General, Pascal Lamy, told the Trade Negotiations 
Committee meeting that it was necessary “to suspend the negotiations across the Round as a whole to 
allow serious reflection by participants” (the D-G’s statement is available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/news e/news06 e/tnc dg sta 24iulv06 e.htm). On 27 July, the General 
Council supported the suspension (see
http://www.wto.org/english/news e/news06 e/gc 27iuly06 e.htrri). Although the suspension of the 
negotiations did not signal death of the Doha Round, efforts to restart the round have so far led to no 
breakthrough.
18 The least-developed countries are not expected to make tariff concessions in the Doha Round. 
However, other developing countries are under pressure to make significant concessions with respect to 
non-agricultural market access (NAMA), which covers industrial goods. They are also under pressure 
to accept significant commitments under the agreement on trade in services (GATS), and to accept 
some obligations with respect to trade facilitation measures. In addition, WTO rules are to be further 
tightened, especially with respect to trade remedies. In short, the scope of the existing WTO treaty is 
likely to be broadened.
19 The pure theory of law and traditional legal scholarship tend to ignore the role of non-legal factors. 
For instance, Hans Kelsen, who propounded the “pure theory” of law, believed that the existence, 
validity and authority of law had nothing at all to do with such non-legal factors as politics and
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extent that non-legal forces work complementarity to the same end of rule 
compliance.
Furthermore, the principles of good faith fulfilment cannot be viewed in isolation of 
complimentary legal principles, such as fairness and equity. A law or regulation may 
be more or less effectively depending on the value that people place on the legal 
processes that produced it and whether or not they believe that both the processes and 
the outcomes are fair and just. These perception-based principles are essential 
preconditions for the effectiveness of international law generally and international 
trade law in particular, given its normative bias, distributional consequences, and 
adjustment costs.
The approach used in this thesis is inter-disciplinary. There is precedent for this 
approach in jurisprudence, where, for example, economic and sociological 
jurisprudential methods are used to assess the behavioural impact of law.20 However, 
the methodological approach is not solely socio-legal. The thesis involves technical 
legal analyses of the compatibility of national implementing laws with the substantive 
WTO treaty obligations, and of national and WTO jurisprudence. The theoretical and 
explanatory chapters, core parts of the thesis, however, apply multidisciplinary 
theories and methodologies drawn from law and the social sciences.
The Empirical Focus
The empirical anchor for the theoretical arguments is the implementation of and 
compliance with certain WTO obligations by South Africa and Nigeria. To answer the 
core empirical question of how and to what extent WTO law affects the behaviour of 
certain developing countries, this thesis employs a set of dependent variables, namely
morality. However, this theory has been described as “useless as a device for understanding the 
complexities of laws and legal systems” (see Honderich [ed], 1995). The analytical approach of this 
thesis departs from the Kelsenian logic.
20 While sociological jurisprudence seeks to determine the extent to which the creation and operation of 
law are influenced and affected by social interests, economic jurisprudence investigates the effects on 
the creation and application of the law of various economic phenomena. A political jurisprudential 
research uses legal and political variables to explain the form and content of law and its impact or 
consequences (see Danelski, 1983). Professor Hudec’s analytical approach of “transcending the 
ostensible” in assessing the creation and effect of international trade law is based on its social, 
economic and political contexts (See Hudec, 1987; see also Kennedy & Southwark, eds. 2002).
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compliance with the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement, the TRIPS Agreement, as 
well as WTO rules on trade remedies and non-tariff measures.
Figure 1: The empirical focus consists of two countries and selected WTO agreements
Dependent Variables
The WTO Customs 
Valuation Agreement
The TRIPS 
Agreement
WTO Rules on Trade 
Remedies and Non- 
Tariff Measures
SOUTH AFRICA • Implementation and compliance records
• Legal and non-legal determinants of regulatory responses
NIGERIA • Implementation and compliance records
• Legal and non-legal determinants of regulatory responses
In examining the implementation experiences and compliance records of these 
countries, the thesis examines extensively and systematically how and to what extent 
they have implemented the various agreements in their domestic laws, and have met 
the specific obligations set out in the agreements. Having established the compliance 
records of these countries in respect of these agreements, the thesis then attempts to 
explain their compliance behaviour, using the explanatory variables derived from the 
literature survey in chapter 2. The selection of the specific WTO agreements and of 
South Africa and Nigeria, however, needs to be justified, as well as the methodology 
used in the case studies and analysis.
Why Customs Valuation, TRIPS, Trade Remedies and NTMs?
The selection of the agreements studied in this thesis involves some choices. First, the
preference is for agreements that involve a high depth of cooperation in terms of the
legal and institutional changes that members are required to make in order to be in full
conformity with their WTO obligations. In this regard, the Customs Valuation
agreement, the TRIPS agreement, the trade remedy rules, particularly the agreements
on anti-dumping (ADA) and subsidy-countervailing measures (SCM), as well as the
agreements on sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) and technical barriers to
trade (TBT) have frequently been singled out as the WTO agreements that impose the
01most significant implementation and compliance challenges.
21 See, generally, Finger and Schuler (2000) and Finger (2001). On the implementation challenges of 
the agreements on anti-dumping and subsidies and countervailing measures, see, for example, Qureshi
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These agreements impose “second generation” obligations, which, unlike mere tariff
00reductions that can be done with a stroke of a minister’s pen , require significant 
legal, regulatory and administrative changes. For some developing countries these 
institutions would have to be created de novo; for others substantial changes have to 
be made in existing structures. Putting these agreements into practice often entails a 
complex process of adjusting domestic laws to conform to specific systemic rules.
The second consideration in the selection of the agreements is the degree of their 
acceptance or ownership by developing countries. One of the key hypotheses of this 
thesis is that ex ante preference for an agreement will induce better ex post 
implementation, and vice versa. Clearly, the negotiations of the Customs Valuation 
and TRIPS agreements, as well as the rules on trade remedies and non-tariff 
measures, were difficult and contentious.
While the developed countries were the main demandeurs of these agreements, most 
developing countries initially resisted their introduction. For instance, most 
developing countries did not accept many of the 1979 Tokyo Round codes until they 
became mandatory under the Uruguay Round Single Undertaking rule. Only three 
developing countries -  India, Brazil and Argentina -  acceded to the Tokyo Round 
valuation code at the outset and each invoked the code’s Special and Differential 
Treatment provisions.23 Before the completion of the Uruguay Round, only about 10 
developing countries had acceded to the code.24
The Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping and Subsidies codes also had few developing 
country signatories. As for the TRIPS agreement, the negotiating history is legendary. 
Most of the developing countries initially resisted vehemently its introduction, and 
only later grudgingly accepted the agreement after some arm-twisting and side-
*yc
payments by the developed countries.
(2000). On the customs valuation agreement, see, e.g. Shin (1996). On TRIPS: see, for example, Primo 
Braga and Fink (1998).
22 Ibid.
23 For the negotiating history of the customs valuation agreement, see: Rege (1999) and WTO 
document G/VAL/W/95.
24 Finger (2001)
25 See Abbott (1998).
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The general view is that these agreements are exogenous because of the ‘do-it-my- 
way’ manner in which the developed countries imposed them during the Uruguay 
Round. The agreements are good candidates for compliance research. Exogenous 
law often raises the compliance issues that would normally not arise in respect of 
endogenous law. Given the seeming lack of ownership by most of the developing 
countries, it is useful to know whether or not they are adhering to the principles of 
pacta sunt servanda and good faith fulfilment of the obligations imposed by these 
agreements. It is also useful to establish the factors that are actually shaping their 
behaviour. In doing so, two developing countries, namely South Africa and Nigeria, 
are specifically examined.
Why South Africa and Nigeria?
The choice of South Africa and Africa is dictated by two factors. The first is the 
similarities and differences in their institutional and political economy structures. The 
second is their unique configurations, which should allow for some generalisations to 
be made about the likely behaviour of different categories of developing countries. In 
terms of the similarities, both countries are relatively large developing countries and 
regional powers, with South Africa the dominant economy in Southern Africa (and 
indeed sub-Saharan Africa), and Nigeria the dominant economic power in the West 
African sub-region.
There are also some similarities in the social indicators of these countries. Both have 
high levels of poverty, unemployment, inequalities, and are ravaged by the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic. Furthermore, while South Africa has a better public administration or 
bureaucracy than Nigeria, it is still generally beset by problems of capacity. These 
similarities should point to some convergence in the regulatory behaviour of the two 
countries. However, the two countries differ in some important respects.
First, South Africa has far more successful economy than Nigeria. South Africa’s 
GDP of $213 billion in 2004 qualifies it as an upper middle-income country, while 
Nigeria’s GDP of $72bn ranks it as a low-income country, according to the World 
Bank. Further, with a per capita income of about $3,650 (World Bank, 2004), South
26 Finger (2000).
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Africa is a relatively rich country, while Nigeria’s per capita income of $400 places it 
among the poorest countries in Africa and the world. South Africa also has a far more 
sophisticated and diversified economy, and is often described as a “First World 
Country in the Third World”. South Africa also enjoys greater macro-economic and 
political stability than Nigeria.
Institutionally, South Africa has far more sophisticated “hard” and “soft” 
infrastructure than Nigeria. For instance, South Africa’s financial, telecommunication, 
and legal, systems are among the best in the world. Furthermore, there are policy 
differences between the two countries. They both took different approaches during the 
Uruguay Round. While South Africa was more supportive of most of the negotiations, 
seeing its offers as a mechanism to lock in its ongoing unilateral domestic reforms, 
Nigeria saw the whole process more as an imposition. These differences should show 
some variation in the compliance behaviour of the two countries.
However, the structures of the two countries also allow for some generalisations to be 
made about the behaviour of other developing countries. In some respects, both 
countries can serve as representatives of a cross section of developing countries. 
South Africa is clearly a cross between a developed country and a developing one, 
particularly in terms of institutional development. Nigeria, on the other hand, has the 
characteristics of both developing and least-developed countries. These mixed 
characteristics should allow for some generalisations about the possible compliance 
behaviour of different categories of other developing countries. However, to further 
aid comparison and generalisation, each of the main case studies includes a shadow 
study of the implementation experiences of developing countries in general as gleaned 
from their reviews by the different WTO bodies.
Methodology
The thesis has two phases of enquiry resulting from the two research questions. The 
first phase aims to establish the implementation and compliance records of South 
Africa and Nigeria with respect to all the agreements considered, and the second 
phase sets out to explain the compliance behaviour of these countries by identifying 
the sources of their behaviour. The first part largely adopts a black letter law, 
expository methodological approach, as its focus is the extent of compatibility of
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substantive national laws with WTO treaty provisions.27 In doing so, all the 
compliance obligations of the WTO agreements and relevant WTO jurisprudence are 
first identified and examined.
Then, the relevant trade and trade-related laws and regulations of the two countries 
are thoroughly examined for their seeming consistency or inconsistency with the 
provisions of the agreements considered. The aim is also to identify the changes made 
since the WTO treaty entered into force, and the extent to which these changes can be 
said to be in conformity with the provisions of the relevant WTO agreements. The 
administrative and judicial practices of these countries are also examined. To this end, 
judgements of courts and administrative decisions, where available and relevant, are 
examined for their consistency or otherwise with the provisions of the specific WTO 
agreements.
Furthermore, all the relevant notifications and communications by both countries, and 
concerning them, are examined to identify the implementation and compliance issues 
that have been raised by the WTO Secretariat and by other WTO members, and the 
responses or explanations that both countries have provided. For the same purpose, 
the minutes of the meetings of the relevant WTO committees or councils from 1995 to 
December 2005 are examined, and any mentions of the two countries in these minutes 
are analysed.
While the first part reveals the compliance record of each of these countries, the 
second part seeks to explain their behaviour and identify its sources. As an 
explanatory phase, the second part adopts a socio-legal methodology. It relies 
considerably on interviews, ministerial briefings and other government official 
statements, records of parliamentary debates, news accounts, legal opinions and 
judgements of courts, as well as reports from NGOs, including business organisations.
27 The Appellate Body in the India-Mailbox case said that “in public international law .. .municipal law 
may constitute evidence of compliance or non-compliance with international obligations” (Appellate 
Body Report, India -  Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural and Agricultural 
Chemical Products -  Complaint by the United States, adopted 16 January 1998, WT/DS50/AB/R). 
Thus, by examining the municipal laws of South Africa and Nigeria vis-a-vis their WTO obligations, it 
is possible to establish their compliance records.
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Reliance is also placed on interview and observation data collected at the WTO 
Secretariat in Geneva and interactions with the trade community in Geneva, including 
meetings and interviews with the WTO representatives of the two countries and other 
trade diplomats in Geneva. Inter-subjective evidence, that is, shared or common 
understanding, derived from complaints from other WTO members about national 
compliance by the two countries, as well as the responses provided by them, was also 
helpful in explaining their behaviour. In all, about 40 officials, trade diplomats and 
lawyers, academics, interest group representatives, both in Geneva and the capitals, 
were interviewed.
The Structure of the Thesis
Chapter 2 sets the subject matter of this thesis in historical and theoretical context, by 
describing the historical development of the GATT/WTO legal system; the nature and 
scope of the GATT/WTO obligations; and the theories of international rule 
compliance. The explanatory variables used in explaining the behaviour the two 
countries are derived from the extensive survey of literature in chapter 2. Chapter 3 
focuses on domestic-level structures and processes and provides a snapshot of trade 
governance in South Africa and Nigeria. This is an essential background chapter that 
offers useful insights into the factors that might influence the internalisation of, or 
adjustment to, WTO rules and disciplines by the two countries.
Chapter 4 examines the implementation of Customs Valuation Agreement in South 
Africa and Nigeria. Chapter 5 does the same with respect to the TRIPS Agreement. 
Chapter 6 considers compliance by the two countries with the WTO rules on trade 
remedies and non-tariff measures (NTMs). The aim of chapter 6 is to complement the 
earlier case study chapters by examining more generally compliance with other WTO 
agreements. This is intended to provide a broader picture or completeness in the 
empirical investigation. Although the treatment of the agreements covered in chapter 
6 is not extensive, the chapter should nevertheless confirm the patterns of behaviour 
established in the more detailed case studies.
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are essentially legal analyses. They examine the conformity or 
otherwise of the provisions of the national implementing laws with those of the
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relevant WTO agreements in the light of their ordinary meaning, context, and the 
object and purpose of these agreements.
Chapter 7 goes beyond legal analysis, however. It sets out to explain the compliance 
behaviour of both countries in the light of the findings, using some legal and non- 
legal explanatory variables. In short, chapter 7 employs the variables derived from the 
literature survey in chapter 2 and the insights gained from the analysis of the domestic 
structures of the two countries in chapter 3 to explain their overall compliance 
behaviour, as revealed by the case studies in chapters 4, 5, and 6.
Chapter 8 is the concluding chapter. It draws together the lessons or insights that 
emerge from the case studies. In particular, the chapter highlights the implications of 
the findings for the future of rule-making and rule implementation in the WTO, as 
well as for future inter-disciplinary research in international economic and trade law. 
It also makes some normative conclusions.
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PART I: SYSTEMIC AND DOMESTIC CONTEXTS
CHAPTER 2
The Nature, Role and Effectiveness of International Trade Law
The purpose of this chapter is to set the subject matter of this thesis in historical and 
theoretical contexts by examining the historical development, role and effectiveness 
of international trade law. This overview is essential for the contextual analysis in the 
subsequent chapters. The chapter begins with a brief discussion on the nature and 
functions of international economic and trade law, and then its historical 
development, focusing on the modem system that emerged in the immediate post-war 
period with the creation of the Bretton Woods system and more recently the 
establishment of the WTO. This is followed by a description of the nature and scope 
of the WTO legal system and treaty obligations. Finally, the focus shifts to a survey of 
the literature on international law compliance. The aim is to develop a set of variables 
for explaining the compliance behaviour of the two case-study countries.
Introduction: Nature of International Economic Law
International economic law is that sub-system of public international law1 that 
regulates trade and commercial relations among states. Its sources are diverse, 
although it is often associated with state-made law , notably treaties and conventions, 
which can be bilateral, regional, or multilateral. The instruments include hard law, 
soft law and, indeed, softer or non-law3. The subject matter of international economic 
law itself is not well defined, as many scholars in this field of study have noted.4 
Professor Jackson observes that “90 per cent of international law work is in reality 
international economic law in some form or another”.5 This is a broad definition that
1 Private international law or, as it is also known, conflict of laws, regulates commercial transactions 
between private actors from different nations or jurisdictions. See Dicey & Moris on the Conflicts o f  
Laws (1993); Cheshire & North’s Private International law (1992).
2 A predominant feature of global economic governance is, indeed, the increasing diversity of inter­
connected law-making processes, which has prompted some scholars to refer to a “system of global 
legal pluralism” (Snyder, 2002). Thus, the approach that recognises only a state-centred system is 
wrong, since non-state and sub-state actors are playing increasing role in the development and 
enforcement of global economic regulatory instruments (Nowrot, 2004).
3 Snyder (1999) and Mistelis in Fletcher et al  (2001)
4 See, e.g. Petersmann (1991), who noted that writing a book on international economic law is “like 
trying to describe a landscape while looking out the window of a moving train ...” at p.l. See also 
Jackson (1998) at p. 25; Qureshi, (1999, p.4); Cass (2005 at p. 86).
5 Ibid, p.8
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embraces both the “public law” and “private law” aspects of international commerce. 
A narrow definition limits the scope to the public international law aspect, that is, 
rules governing the economic relations between states.6
This thesis focuses on WTO law, arguably the core aspect of international economic 
law. WTO law straddles several activities that belong in the wide net of international 
economic law, including trade in goods, trade in services (including financial services, 
telecommunications, electronic commerce etc), customs matters, intellectual property, 
as well as aspects of investment measures and competition rules. Indeed, given its 
strong enforcement mechanism, the tendency has been to expand the scope of the 
WTO by bringing every “trade-related” issue7 within the ambit of its legal system.8 
Why, then, do states sign up to international economic treaties, and what functions are 
these treaties supposed to serve? The next subsection explains briefly the purpose 
behind international economic and trade law.
Rationales for International Economic Regulation and Law
There is a reciprocal relationship between law and economic globalisation.9 The 
integration of the global economy has gone hand in hand with the rise of law and law­
making in the fields of trade and commercial relations.10 As Loukas Mistelis put it, 
“the era of globalisation of law11 will inevitably accompany the globalisation of
19economy”. Oran Young argues that, “the growth of interdependence increases the 
capacity of all relevant actors to injure each other”.13 Such failure of cooperation or 
collective rationality can result in the classic “tragedy of the commons”14, as the
6 Qureshi (1999).
7 On the question of “trade-relatedness” and linkages in the WTO, see various contributions in 
American Journal o f International Law, Volume 96, issue 1 (Jan., 2002)
8 Broncker (1999) argues that this broad coverage has led to the WTO being referred to as an “embryo 
world government”, a sort of a global economic code (p.548).
9 For work on the relationship between economic globalisation and the law, see, e.g. the special issue of 
European Law Journal (Vol. 5, No.4 December 1999); Shams (2004); Fletcher et al (2001). On the 
general subject of global governance and international law, see: e.g. Harlow (2006); Nowrot (2004).
10 Pistor (2000)
11 The term globalisation of law or global law refers to laws that apply, at least formally, if not de facto, 
uniformly across national boundaries and to most sovereign states. In terms of public international 
economic law, such global laws arise through binding multilateral conventions or treaties.
12 Mistelis in Fletcher et al (2001, p.6). Mortensen (2000) argues that “globalisation and governance are 
mutually constitutive phenomena” (p i76).
13 Young (1982).
14 Buchanan and Yoon (1999)
27
unilateral policies of self-interested governments harm the economic interests of other 
countries and reduce global welfare.
One explanation for the willingness of states to “share sovereignty” and accede to
international trade treaties that constrain their regulatory authority is the shared
concerns about such externalities. Increased integration and the possibility of
externalities thus generate demand for cooperation.15 In other words, according to the
collective goods theory, rational, egoistic state actors favour international rules in
order to avoid the suboptimal outcomes of non-cooperation16, and to attain higher
levels of collective welfare.17 As Clive Schmitthoff remarks, the global integration of
international trade law has progressed rapidly because “trading nations appear to
realise that in our shrinking world the global unification of international trade law is
18of immense practical benefit to the international business community”.
However, although the globalisation of law, viewed from a functionalist perspective19, 
has obvious benefits, there are nevertheless pitfalls or drawbacks, at least from a 
development perspective. Normatively, all international regimes are biased. They 
establish hierarchies of values, emphasising some and discounting others. From an 
economic point of view, market failure provides the social efficiency rationale for 
legal intervention, and trade policy and regulations are among the areas where law is 
deemed to have economic objectives.21 The main object of international trade law,
15 Milner, (1997).
16 For a comprehensive discussion o f the relationship between rationality and rule creation and rule- 
following, see Keohane (1982/1984), Buchanan and Yoon (1999), Rittberger ed. (1995), and Abbott 
and Snidal (1998).
17 Indeed, other potential sources of gains from international cooperation are economies of scale. By 
sharing resources through, e.g., coordinated rule-making and surveillance, states may achieve 
efficiencies that are unlikely to exist in situations of detrimental regulatory competition and unjustified 
regulatory disharmony (see Dunloff and Trachtman, 1999, p. 16).
18 Schmitthoff (1990), p.vii.
19 The functionalist school stresses that international trade rules have important operational functions, 
such as increasing the predictability, certainty and stability needed for efficient global trade and 
investment flows (Jackson, 1998). The harmonisation of trade and commercial laws and practices also 
help to facilitate commerce by reducing regulatory disparity and barriers, and other forms of 
transaction costs.
20 Puchala ahd Hopkins (1982).
21 For an understanding o f the basic principles in economic approach to law, see Posner (1977) and 
Burrows and Veljanovski (1981). For the economic analysis of international law, see, e.g. Dunloff and 
Trachtman (1999).
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99therefore, is to legitimise the economic theory of comparative advantage and to
91
elevate economic liberalism. While developing countries often clamour for equity, 
fairness and justice, the aim of international economic law is mainly to produce an 
efficient24 rather than a just and equitable regime.
Furthermore, the world trade regime is a projection of the asymmetrical distributions
9c
of power and resources in the world economy. The developed countries have been 
far more successful than the developing ones in pursuing their domestic policy
9  &objectives and commercial interests through the multilateral trade order. The failure 
of international trade law to take sufficient account of the interests and preferences of 
developing countries has led to the view, widely held by most of these countries and
97shared by several commentators , that the law does not serve a developmental 
purpose, and, therefore, produces little gains for developing countries, while at the 
same time constraining their policy and regulatory autonomy.
However, as Hudec has argued, “the normative concepts that underlie the notion of
90
fairness ... are simply not coherent when applied to international trade law”. This is 
because international trade rules are shaped by policy choices and interests, not
90natural law. Self-interest, not altruism, is at the heart of most international trade
negotiations. Yet, the tendency of international trade law to create normatively
biased, one-size-fits all, rules, while failing effectively to address issues of distributive
22 For detailed discussion of the theory of comparative advantage, see, e.g. Krugman and Obstfeld 
(2000).
23 Muchlinski (2003) cited in Harlow (2006) distinguishes several variants or degree of economic 
liberalism, which include hard libertarianism, neo-liberalism, and regulatory functionalism. It is 
accepted that international economic or trade law is largely informed by the neo-liberal approach, 
which focuses on eliminating cross-border impediments and ensuring that market mechanisms operate 
unhindered (see Qureshi, 1999).
24 There is, however, a gap between the developed countries free trade rhetoric and actual trade policy 
particularly with respect to the reform and liberalisation of their agricultural sector. Furthermore, the 
economic rationale of some WTO rules, such as those relating to the TRIPS agreement, is often 
questioned (see chapter 5 for a discussion o f TRIPS).
25 Mortensen (2000).
26 Developed countries, under pressure from their corporate actors and driven by their economic 
interests, were the instigators of virtually all the key WTO agreements, including the TRIPS agreement.
27 See, e.g. Ostry (2000); Nogues (2002); Michalopoulos (1999). See also, Oxfam (2002), “Rigged 
Rules and Double Standard”.
28 Hudec (2002, p.279)
29 Ibid.
30 Keohane (1984) cautions against viewing regimes through the prism of altruism, arguing that 
regimes are largely based on self-interest. However, as Dunloff and Trachtman (1999), point out, self 
interest can sometimes include behaviour “that seems or is normative, altruistic, or self-abnegating” 
(p.H).
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justice and equity, has continued to produce tensions, and has made the rule-making 
process often difficult and contentious. The following section traces the origins and 
evolution of rule making in the international trading system.
Origins and Evolution of the Modern System of International Trade Law
The GATT Era
The 1920s and 1930s were characterised by a breakdown of international economic 
cooperation.31 The 19th century regimes that ushered in monetary stability and the 
“golden era of free trade”32 virtually collapsed under the pressures of the First World 
War and the Great Depression, and were replaced by beggar-thy-neighbour economic 
policies. However, regimes often arise against the background of earlier attempts, 
successful or not, at cooperation.34 Clearly, the post-war international trade regime 
emerged in response to the experiences of the interwar period. In Robert Hudec’s 
words, “[t]he post-war design for international trade policy was animated by a single- 
minded concern to avoid repeating the disastrous errors of the 1920s and 1930s”.36
Trade was, however, not the only concern of the post-war economic planners. There 
were also the issues of monetary stability and post-war reconstruction. Extensive 
negotiations led to the adoption of the Articles of Agreement of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (“World Bank”) at the Bretton Woods Conference of 1-22 July 1944. 
In addition to these two, the International Trade Organisation (ITO) was to be 
established specifically to administer the rules governing international trade.
Simultaneously, as the ITO negotiations continued, 23 of the 50 participants decided 
in 1946 to negotiate the GATT to reduce and bind customs tariffs.37 But the GATT 
was a mere agreement, not an organisation. It was conceived only as a temporary
31 For detailed accounts for the failure of international economic cooperation during the interwar 
period: see, e.g. Kindleberger (1976) and Gardner (1980).
For a discussion of the trade regime in the 19th century: see, e.g. Polanyi (1944), McKeown (1999); 
Stein (2000).
33 Kindleberger (1976)
34 Keohane (1984, p. 14)
35 On the normative consensus around the post-war trade arrangements, see Ruggie (1982) and 
Ikenberry (1992).
36 Hudec (1989, p.5)
37 These 23 countries became the founding GATT “contracting parties”.
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measure pending the formation of the ITO. The draft ITO charter was completed at 
the Havana Conference in 1948, but never came into being because of the reluctance 
of the US Congress to ratify Charter, which led the President to withdraw it from 
Congress.38
The death of the ITO thus aborted attempts to create a permanent institution, similar 
in status to the IMF and the World Bank, for the management of international trade. 
Nevertheless, the GATT emerged to fill the vacuum. The GATT itself had entered 
into force in January 1948, while the ITO was still being negotiated. This was 
possible because of the Protocol of Provisional Application (PPA) signed by eight of 
the twenty-three original signatories. Under the PPA, the eight signatories agreed to 
apply the GATT “provisionally on and after 1 January 1948”, while the remaining 
members would do so soon after.39
However, the GATT survived as the de facto replacement for the ITO not only 
because of the PPA but also, perhaps more importantly, as a result of the 
commitments of the Contracting Parties, whose constant meetings and negotiations 
under the aegis of the GATT gave it the appearance of a formal organisation, even 
though it was not. For nearly 50 years, the GATT, metaphorically speaking, furnished 
the ‘highway rules’ for the free flow of the ‘traffic’ of world trade.40 Between 1947 
and 1994, eight multilateral negotiations, known as “rounds”41 were held under the 
auspices of the GATT.
However, the GATT’s proper status was still shrouded in uncertainty. Its legal 
obligations were qualified by “provisional application”, with no carefully designed 
procedures for interpreting the agreement.42 Furthermore, although, as a treaty, the 
GATT created legal obligations under international law, there was no effective
38 For detailed accounts of the intertwining preparatory histories of the ITO and GATT and the legal as 
well as the political economic factors that led to the non-ratification of the ITO charter by the US 
Congress, see Gardner (1980), Milner (1997), Jackson (1998) and Hudec (1989).
39 Jackson (1998), p. 40.
40 Shearer (1994).
41 These “rounds” include, Geneva round (1947), Annecy round (1949), Torquay round (1950-1), 
Geneva round (1955-6), Dillion round (1960-1), Kennedy round (1963-7), Tokyo round (1973-9), 
Uruguay round (1986-94). Each of these rounds contributed to substantial reductions in tariffs.
42 Hudec (1989, p.52); Jackson, 1998.
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mechanism for the management and enforcement of its rules.43 The legal system was 
based on what Hudec described as a “diplomat’s jurisprudence”, that is, it was created 
and operated by diplomats rather by lawyers, blending the tools of diplomacy with 
those of the law.44 The force of the GATT legal system rested almost entirely on 
normative pressure as well as other verbal and symbolic devices of moral suasion.45 
Indeed, the GATT had no Legal Division or what was termed “Office of Legal 
Affairs” until in 1981, about 34 years after its inception.46
The aim of the compromise between legality and diplomacy was to promote better 
government compliance.47 To some, this weakly legalised system worked well. 
Goldstein et al argue that “(t)he GATT system was relatively effective at deterring
AQ
opportunism, in spite of its political nature”. Furthermore, a detailed review of all 
GATT disputes between 1948 and 1989 found a success rate for valid complaints 
(resulting in full or partial satisfaction of the complainant) of 88% ... and the 
compliance record of about 81%.49
Despite this record, the GATT was handicapped, according to Professor Jackson, by 
its “birth defects”. Its lack of a formal structure prevented it from operating 
effectively, as its workings were too often subject to the vagaries of international trade 
diplomacy.50 The practice of requiring consensus before GATT panels were set up 
and before panel reports were adopted also meant that some important disputes could 
not be promptly resolved because of “foot-dragging”, while in some cases the process 
was blocked at every step by a determined opponent.51 The lack of a single integrated 
rule system permitted GATT a la carte and forum shopping. Addressing these “birth
43 For instance, the GATT 1947 says nothing about interpretation and did not regulate in any detail the 
process of dispute settlement, except with respect to Article XXII (the right to consultation) and Article 
XXIII (authorisation o f withdrawal of concessions in cases of “nullification and impairment” of 
benefits).
44 Hudec (1970)
45 Ibid.
46 Petersmann (1991 :XXIX)
47 Hudec, (1970)
48 Goldstein et al. (2000)
49 Trebilcock and Howse, (1995: 396).
50 Jackson (1998).
51 One example was the Beef Hormones case between the EU and the US, which began in the 1980s but 
could not be resolved because both parties kept blocking each other’s request for the establishment of a 
GATT panel. It was eventually dealt with under the WTO.
52 Jackson (1998).
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defects” and other institutional imperfections became the raison d ’ etre of the 
Uruguay Round
The Uruguay Round and the WTO
The Punta del Este Declaration of 20 September 1986 contained a broad agenda for 
the Uruguay Round. This included 15 original negotiating subjects. Apart from the 
traditional issues of tariff and non-tariff barriers, new issues, namely trade-related 
aspects of intellectual property rights (including trade in counterfeit goods), trade in 
services, and trade-related investment measures were included in the agenda. All the 
original GATT articles were up for review, and the functioning of the GATT System 
(FOGS) became a subject for negotiation.54 Dispute Settlement, unsurprisingly, made 
it to the agenda, with the aim of making GATT rules and disciplines more effective 
and enforceable, as well as facilitating compliance with adopted recommendations.
A total of 123 countries participated in the negotiations. All accounts show that the 
negotiations were difficult and contentious. For instance, the round took seven and a 
half years, almost twice the original schedule. Between September 1986, when the 
Uruguay Round was launched, and April 1994, when the Uruguay Round Agreement 
was signed, there were several instances of impending failure.55 Key disagreements 
were between developed and developing countries on the new issues and the Tokyo 
Round codes. However, negotiations among the developed countries, particularly the 
US and the EU, also deadlocked on the issues of agricultural market access and the 
creation of a new institution.
While the EU was defensive and largely isolated on the agriculture negotiations, the 
US did not favour the creation of a new organisation, which the EU and Canada
53 These were: tariffs, non-tariff barriers, tropical products, natural resource-based products, textiles 
and clothing, agriculture, GATT Articles, Tokyo Round codes, Anti-dumping, Subsidies and 
countervailing measures, intellectual property, investment measures, services, dispute settlement, and 
the GATT system.
54 This was to focus, inter alia, on enhancing the surveillance in the GATT to enable regular 
monitoring o f trade policies and practices, and improving the overall effectiveness and decision­
making of the GATT.
55 For instance, both the Montreal ministerial mid-term review in Canada in 1988 and the Brussels 
“closing” ministerial meeting in 1990 ended in deadlock. Several deadlines came and went, and 
“negotiation-fatigue was felt in trade bureaucracies around the world” (WTO, 2003, p. 19)
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supported.56 In the end, the WTO was created as a result of a series of trade-offs 
between the principal actors and groups. As for the tensions between the developed 
and developing countries, these were resolved, apparently unsatisfactorily, through
co
trade offs as well as the use of political, economic and diplomatic pressure.
On 15 April 1994, the Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organisation was signed by ministers from most of the 123 participating governments 
in Marrakech, Morocco. The end-game dynamic described above raises the question, 
posed by Lowenfeld: “(h)ow was it that more than one hundred states, each 
trumpeting its sovereignty, each giving ‘concessions’ only grudgingly, each claiming 
to be the best ‘poker player,’ came together on a system of international dispute 
settlement tighter than international law has known in any field, let alone in the 
ambiguous arena of trade?”59
For this thesis, the question is whether, with respect to certain developing countries, 
the legal commitments made by these governments are as dependable as their binding 
legal form would suggest. Are the states’ WTO treaty commitments and their 
compliance interests in congruence? Does WTO law have any significant impact on 
their behaviour? What factors are actually shaping their regulatory responses? These 
are the questions that this thesis aims empirically to answer. Before doing so in 
subsequent chapters, it is useful, first, to describe the scope of the GATT-WTO 
obligations and the status of the obligations under international law, and, second, to 
discuss theories of international law compliance.
The Scope, Nature and Implications of the WTO Obligations60
The WTO Legal System: Sources o f  Law
The results of the Uruguay Round negotiations occupy about 23,000 pages of a 
document, which covers detailed schedules of tariffs, services trade and other
56 Jackson (1998); Winham (1998)
57 Winham (1998). The name World Trade Organisation (WTO) was proposed by Canada, while the 
EU had proposed the Multilateral Trade Organisation (MTO).
58 For instance, former Secretary-General o f UNCTAD, Rubens Ricupero, was quoted as saying: “[t]he 
developing countries were given two choices on TRIPS -  being boiled or fried” (see Abbott in 
Kennedy and Southwark eds. (2002, p.316).
59 Lowenfeld (1995)
60 The specific agreements examined in the case studies are discussed in detail under the relevant 
chapters.
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concessions. The “Legal Texts”, which contain the basic legal rules and obligations of 
the WTO treaty, include about 60 agreements, annexes, decisions and 
understandings.61 The agreements fall into a simple structure with six main parts. In 
addition to the Marrakech Agreement Establishing the WTO, which is the umbrella 
treaty, there are six annexes, covering several other agreements.
Annex 1A covers the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, and includes the 
following: the General Interpretative Note to the annex; the GATT 1994, together 
with 6 Memoranda of Understanding (interpretation of certain articles of GATT 
1994), the Marrakech Protocol annexed to the GATT 1994, as well as Schedules of 
Tariff Concessions; and 12 specific agreements . Annex IB covers the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Schedules of Specific Commitments, as 
well as lists of MFN Exemptions. Annex 1C, covers the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).63 Annex 2 covers the Memorandum 
of Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
otherwise known as the dispute settlement understanding (DSU). Annex 3 embodies 
the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), while annex 4 covers the four 
plurilateral agreements.64
The WTO is no doubt the only global economic institution with such an elaborate set 
of rules. On the three dimensions of legalisation, namely, obligation, precision and 
delegation65, the WTO is a highly legalised institution because it administers a 
remarkably detailed set of legally binding international agreements; and it operates a
61 On the basis o f Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice on the sources of 
international law, it is argued that there are other potential sources of WTO law beyond the covered 
agreements and their annexes (see Palmeter and Mavroidis, 1998).
62 These are the Agreements on: Agriculture; the Applications of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS); Textiles and Clothing; Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT); Trade-Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMs); Implementation o f Article VI (Anti-Dumping Agreement); Implementation of Article VII 
(Customs Valuation); Pre-shipment Inspection; Rules o f Origin; Import Licensing Procedures; 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM); and Safeguards.
63 The TRIPS Agreement incorporates by reference several prior existing treaties administered by the 
World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO). So the agreement must be read with the relevant 
texts of the Conventions on Intellectual Property Rights.
64 These are the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft; the Agreement on Government Procurement; the 
International Diary Agreement; and the International Bovine Meat Agreement.
65 See special edition o f International Organisation 54(3) (Summer,2000) on the subject of 
international legalisation. According to the authors, there are three elements of legalisation. Obligation 
means that states or other actors are bound by a rule or commitment; precision means that rules 
unambiguously define the conduct they require, authorise, or proscribe; delegation means that third 
parties have been granted authority to implement, interpret, and apply the rules.
35
well-developed dispute settlement mechanism, including an appellate tribunal with 
significant authority to interpret and apply those agreements in the course of resolving 
particular disputes.66 Andreas Lowenfeld describes the WTO’s system of dispute 
settlement as “more far-reaching than any multilateral arrangement for resolution of 
disputes among states in history”.
While the earlier GATT system had been designed to be negotiation-based rather than 
being very legalistic, the WTO system marks a shift away from politics to law. 
Although the WTO is still a forum for trade negotiations69, such negotiations are now 
conducted with knowledge of the strict legal force of the outcomes. The rigorous 
dispute settlement system is, however, not the only major transformation in the legal 
framework of the world trading system. The legal disciplines have been expanded to 
cover a significantly greater area of national regulatory activity.70
Thus, unlike the traditional subject matter of the GATT, which was primarily 
confined to the reduction of conventional trade barriers, such as tariffs, quotas, 
discriminatory international taxes and regulations, as well as trade remedies, the WTO 
Agreement broadens the rule base to cover non-traditional subjects such as
66 The core elements of the dispute settlement procedures are (i) compulsory jurisdiction: the right to 
panel procedure upon second request (DSU Article 4:3); (ii) deployment of the ‘reverse consensus’ 
principle and quasi-automatic decision-making procedures; (iii) the establishment of panels (DSU 
Article 6:1), adoption of panel reports (DSU Article 16:4), adoption of appellate reports (DSU Article 
17:4) and the granting of requests for suspension of concessions (DSU Article 22:6); (iv) integrated 
dispute settlement system: created in order to prevent ‘forum shopping’, increase predictability, and 
promote rule-integrity; (v) the provision of an appeal procedure: final legal interpretation which 
functions as the ‘legal quality control’, qua the explicit requirements of who are qualified to serve in 
panels and of impartiality (DSU article 17:3); and (vi) improved effectiveness: stricter time-limit 
throughout the process (DSU 12:8, 12:9, 16:1, 16:4). See Petersmann (1997)
67 Lowenfeld (1995)
68 Article 3.2 of the DSU provides that the provisions of the WTO agreements shall be clarified “in 
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law”. This has been 
interpreted to refer to “general mle of interpretation” contained in Article 31, as well as Article 32, of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See US -  Gasoline, where the Appellate Body held that 
WTO law could not be “read in clinical isolation from public international law” (Appellate Body 
Report, United States -  Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 
adopted 20 may 1996). On treaty interpretation by the Appellate body, see Georges (2006).
69 Article III.2 of the WTO Agreement states that “(t)the WTO shall provide the forum for negotiations 
among its Members ...”
70 The Uruguay Round did not only result in the legal transformation of the world trading system, it 
also changed its post-war normative underpinning. For instance, the immediate post-war trade regime 
(i.e. the GATT) was based on what Ruggie (1982) described as embedded liberalism, which was a 
mixed system of liberalism and welfare state. However, at the time of the Uruguay Round, the 
pendulum had shifted decisively in favour of the efficiency model, with less tolerance of government 
interventions. See Dunoff (1999); Kitschelt et al (eds) (1999); and Howse (2002) for a discussion of the 
breakdown of the post-war social contract and institutional arrangements.
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intellectual property (TRIPS), trade in services (GATS), product standards and 
technical regulation (TBT), as well as well as sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
(SPS).
The basic principles of the GATT-WTO Agreement remain non-discrimination in 
international trade (as embodied in the core obligations of most-favoured-nation
71 77(MFN) status , the national treatment (NT) principles ); prohibition on the use of
77quantitative restrictions ; as well as observance of binding levels of tariff 
concessions, in respect of trade in goods, and of specific commitments, in the case of 
the trade in services. The transparency of trade policies is also a major principle of the 
GATT-WTO Agreement.74
These principles are however subject to the right to waive them, in certain 
circumstances and under certain conditions.75 These rights thus constitute waivers or 
exceptions to the basic principles, although the invocation of the exceptions or 
flexibilities is tightly regulated in the agreements76 and narrowly interpreted by WTO 
panels and the Appellate Body.77
While non-discrimination obligations remain central to the WTO Agreement, the 
regulatory philosophy of international trade law also shifted during the Uruguay 
Round in favour of positive harmonisation, i.e. requiring states to base their domestic
71 Article 1 of the GATT; Article II of GATS; and Article 4 of TRIPS.
72 Article III of GATT. The principle also applies, with some differences, to trade in services (Article 
XVII of GATS) and IPR protection (Article 3 of TRIPS).
73 Article XI of GATT prohibits the use of quantitative restrictions.
74 Article X of GATT is the main transparency obligation of the agreement, but all the WTO 
Agreements contain specific transparency requirements.
75 The main exceptions are: GATT Article VI (anti-dumping measures); Article XII (safeguard 
measures for balance of payments); Article XVI (subsidies); Article XIX (emergency safeguard 
measures); Article XX (general exception); Article XXI (security exceptions); Article XXTV (customs 
unions and free trade areas); Article IX.3 of the WTO Agreement (waivers); and Part IV of GATT 
(preferential treatment of developing countries).
76 Goldstein and Martin (2000) argue that the increased stringency in the use of escape clauses and 
other mechanisms of flexibility “may be misplaced”, because the constraints on the use of these 
exceptions “may bind states more tightly than intended” (p.626).
77 For instance, Footer (2001) points out that developing countries feel that there is “a trend towards 
stricter interpretation of the special and differential treatment (SDT) provisions in various WTO 
Agreements. For examples of such narrow interpretation, see India -  Quantitative Restrictions on 
Imports o f Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, complaint by the United States, WTO 
Document WT/DS90/R (6 April 1999) (Panel) and AB-1999-3, WTO Document WT/DS90/AB/R (23 
August 1999) (Appellate body), adopted on 22 September 1999. See also Brazil -  Export Financing 
Programme for Aircraft, complaint by Canada, WTO Documents WT/DS46/R (panel) and AB-1999-1, 
WT/DS46/AB/R (2 August 1999) (Appellate body), adopted on 20 August 1999.
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regulatory measures on relevant international standards. The new agreements that 
impose harmonisation obligations include the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT), the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (the SPS Agreement), and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
A breach of any of these agreements does not simply require a finding of 
discrimination. A member may be found to be in violation if it has failed to comply
no
with the harmonisation obligations in the agreements. While the original GATT 
aimed mainly at reducing trade-restricting border measures and eliminating 
discrimination in international trade (negative harmonisation), the new regulatory 
regime reflected in the TBT, SPS and TRIPS agreements is orientated towards 
positive harmonisation. Indeed, the TRIPS Agreement does not only require 
harmonisation with existing international IP treaties, it imposes minimum 
international IP standards.
Critics of the harmonisation approach argue that rather than encourage regulatory 
competition, increased regulatory harmonisation reduces local-content regulation and 
promotes a “one-size-fits-all” regulatory philosophy, which is unsuited to a fast- 
moving global market economy, and particularly to an asymmetrical world economy,
70where countries are at different stages of development. Petersmann argues that the 
increasing focus of WTO law on harmonisation of rules beyond the trade policy area 
“constitutes new ‘constitutional challenges’, which call for additional ‘constitutional 
reforms’ of WTO law”.80
78 This harmonisation interpretation has been confirmed by WTO panels and the Appellate Body (AB) 
in a number o f cases. For instance, in the EC-Sardines case, the Panel found the EU Regulation at issue 
in breach o f Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement because the technical regulation was not based on the 
Codex Stan 94, the international standard set by Codex Alimentarius Commission (Panel Report, 
European Communities -  Trade Description o f Sardine, WT/DS231/R, para. 4.2). In EC-Hormones, 
the AB held that a WTO member must base its SPS measure on an existing international standard 
(under Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement) unless its adoption of a higher standard is based on a 
scientific justification and risk assessment (in accordance with Article 5). See: Appellate Body Report, 
EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) -  Complaints by the United States, 
WT/DS26/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998.
79 Howse in Coicand and Heiskanen, eds, (2001)
80 See Petersmann in Kennedy and Southwark eds (2002, p.51).
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There are two other specific features of the new WTO legal system that are also 
relevant to the contextual analysis in this thesis and, therefore, also worth mentioning. 
The first is that the WTO agreements are a single, integrated, treaty instrument, which 
imposes a single undertaking on all WTO members. Secondly, the compliance 
obligations imposed on members are positive in nature, that is, they require 
members to take positive steps to ensure legal, regulatory and administrative 
compliance. A brief discussion of these issues follows.
Single Undertaking Principle
Article II of the WTO Agreement provides that “(t)he agreements and associated legal 
instruments included in Annexes 1,2 and 3 (hereinafter referred to as “Multilateral 
Trade Agreements”) are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members”. 
This article establishes the WTO agreements as a single treaty instrument. The 
Appellate Body in Brazil -  Dessicated Coconut affirmed the “single undertaking” 
nature of the WTO Agreement, stating that “within this framework, all WTO 
members are bound by all the rights and obligations in the WTO Agreements and its 
Annexes 1, 2 and 3”.81
The single undertaking principle owes its origins to the Uruguay Round negotiations 
and has continued to underpin negotiations in the WTO. It makes virtually every item 
of negotiations part of a whole and indivisible package, which cannot be agreed 
separately, and it is based on the rule that “nothing is agreed until everything is
O '}
agreed”. While reservations are part of a ‘normal’ multilateral treaty , the WTO 
Agreement is lex specialis in this regard in the sense that it makes the application of 
the treaty in its entirety between all the parties an essential condition of membership 
of the WTO.83
81 See Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Measures Affecting Dessicated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, 
adopted 20 March 1997, DSR 1997:1. See also Argentina -  Footwear, where the AB held that the 
GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards “are both ‘integral parts’ of the same treaty, the WTO 
Agreement, that are ‘binding on all members’” (Appellate Body Report, Argentina -  Safeguard 
Measures on Imports o f Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000).
82 See Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
83 The only exceptions to the principles of non-reservation in the WTO Agreements are provided in the 
following articles: Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 (Anti-Dumping 
Agreement), Article 18.2; Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT 1994 (Customs 
Valuation Agreement), Article 21 and paragraph 2 of Annex III; Article 15.1 of the TBT Agreement; 
Article 32.2 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement); and 
Article 72 o f the TRIPS Agreement.
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The single undertaking principle has profound implications for developing countries, 
because, as a condition of WTO membership, most of them had to accept agreements, 
which they had earlier rejected during the Tokyo Round or were unhappy with during 
the Uruguay Round. Michael Finger suggests that without the single undertaking 
approach, developed country negotiators would, perhaps, have succeeded in 
persuading only a select list of about 20 developing countries to sign up to most of the 
Uruguay Round commitments. However, the single undertaking rule emboldened
OA
them to insist that all developing countries must accept all the commitments.
Yet, as Patrick Low argues, the single undertaking principle “has considerably
o r
strained the absorptive and compliance capacity of many developing countries”. The 
principle significantly increases the depth of cooperation required from developing 
countries. While much of the legal, regulatory and administrative requirements of the 
WTO agreements reflect the standards and practices already established in the 
developed countries, for most developing countries there was a need to either 
substantially reform their existing institutions or create them de novo. As the next sub­
section shows, non-compliance with these obligations has significant implications.
The Nature o f the Compliance Obligation
The legal force of the rules of international law is derived from the principles pacta 
sunt servanda and good faith fulfilment, as set out in article 26 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). The first principle places strong 
emphasis on compliance; the second requires states to do so in good faith. The choice 
of ways to implement international rules in the domestic sphere is normally left to the 
discretion of each individual state.86 But Article 27 of the VCLT prohibits states from 
invoking their national law as justification for failure to perform obligations imposed 
by a treaty. It has been suggested that there is no “general duty” to bring national law 
into conformity with international obligation, only that national law cannot be used to 
justify non-observance of international obligation.
84 Finger (2000, p. 434).
85 Low (1999, p. 53)
86 For a discussion of the relationship between national and international economic law, see: Hiff and 
Petersmann eds. (1993); Cottier and Schefer, (1998); Jackson (1992); Qureshi (1999).
87 Some legal scholars, such as Brownlie (1998, p.35) argue that states have a general duty to ensure 
conformity, while others deny the existence of any such duty (e.g. Cassese, 2001, p. 167). Bhuiyan
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The situation is, however, different in the case of WTO obligations. The overarching 
compliance obligation is contained in Article XVI.4 of the WTO Agreement, which 
provides that “(e)ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and 
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed
QQ
Agreements”. WTO jurisprudence supports this positive obligation. For instance, 
where a statute merely provides a government with the discretion to act inconsistently 
with WTO rules rather mandating a WTO-inconsistent action, the ‘discretionary
O Q
statute’ as such could be deemed to constitute a violation of WTO law.
Thus, to understand the nature of WTO obligations, it is important to recognise that 
WTO law requires the adoption of national legislative or other measures to ensure the 
conformity of laws, regulations and administrative procedures with the WTO 
obligations. A failure to do so amounts -  without more, i.e. without any resulting 
injury -  to a breach.90 Indeed, Article 3.8 of DSU creates an automatic presumption 
of a prima facie case of nullification or impairment once a provision of a covered 
agreement is breached.
Related to the principles pacta sunt servanda and good faith fulfilment are those of 
state responsibility, under which a state in breach of an international legal obligation 
triggers state responsibility vis-a-vis the impaired party.91 In the WTO context, a 
losing party in any litigation92 is automatically required to bring its inconsistent 
national law or measure into conformity with the covered agreement deemed to have
(2004, note 14, p. 127) concludes, however, that “(i)t seems that the view that there is no such general 
duty is both supported by state practice and logically more consistent”.
88 Each annexed agreement also contains corresponding compliance obligations.
89 The Panel in US -  Section 301 Trade Act held that “(a)s a general proposition, GATT acquis, 
confirmed in XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement and recent WTO panel reports, make it abundantly clear 
that legislation as such, independently from its application in specific cases, may breach GATT/WTO 
obligations (Panel Report, United States -  Sections 301-310 o f the Trade Act o f 1974, WT/DS152/R, 
adopted 27 January 2000, paras. 7.41-7.42). See also Appellate Body Report, United States -  Anti- 
Dumping Act o f 1916 -  Complaint by Japan, WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R, adopted 26 
September 2000.
90 Bhuiyan (2004, p. 129). See also Fukunaga (2006).
91 For the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, see Crawford (2002).
92 However, in respect of non-violation complaints, there is no obligation to withdraw the measure in 
question; the ‘losing party’ is only required to make “mutually satisfactory adjustment” (Article 26.1(b) 
DSU).
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been violated. Furthermore, “prompt compliance” with this recommendation or 
ruling is obligatory.94
The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) allows for compensation by the losing 
party or, failing that, retaliation (i.e. suspension of concessions) by the winning 
party.95 However, the DSU goes on to state that neither compensation nor retaliation 
is “preferred to full implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into 
conformity with the covered agreements”.96
Some international trade law scholars disagree on the correct interpretation of this 
provision. In the famous debate between Professors John Jackson and Judith Hipler 
Bello, both scholars took contrasting views as to the legal status of a WTO ruling. 
According to Hipler Bello, compliance, in the sense of changing an offending national 
law or measure, was “voluntary or elective”.97 The choices that any losing party had,
QO
she argued, were “to comply, to compensate or to stonewall and suffer retaliation”. 
However, Professor Jackson disagreed, arguing that the DSU created a strong 
preference for changing the offending measure over compensation.99
93 DSU Article 19. Compliance often takes the form of complete withdrawal of the offending measure 
or modifying it by excising or correcting the offending portion. If the measure is a statute, a repealing 
or amendatory statute is commonly needed; if it is an administrative regulation, a repealing or 
amendatory regulation is commonly required (see Argentina -  Measures Affecting the Export o f Bovine 
Hides and the Import o f Finished Leather, Award of the Arbitrator, WT/DS155/10).
94 DSU, Article 21. Where immediate implementation is not possible, the member shall be granted a 
“reasonable time to do so”, which “should not exceed 15 months from the date of the adoption of a 
panel or AB report” (Article 21.3). However, immediate or prompt compliance is the primary objective 
of the DSU and only in compelling cases would exemption from this obligation be allowed (see e.g. 
Australia -  Measures Affecting Importation o f Salmon, Award of the Arbitrator, WT/DS 18/9; Canada 
-  Patent Protection o f Pharmaceutical Products, Award of the Arbitrator, WT/DS 114/13). Only legal 
considerations relating to compliance will normally be considered in deciding on the reasonable time to 
comply. Extraneous matters relating to domestic economic and political factors will normally not be 
taken into account (see Canada -  Patent Protection o f Pharmaceutical Products, Award of the 
Arbitrator, WT/DS114/13). However, in respect of developing countries, special circumstances, such 
as deteriorating economic conditions may be taken into account (see Indonesia -  Certain measures 
Affecting the Automobile Industry, Award of the Arbitrator, WT/DS54/15).
95 DSU, Article 22 (1)
96 Ibid.
97 Bello (1996, p.417)
98 Ibid, p. 418
99 Jackson (1997, p. 61).
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WTO jurisprudence, however, appears to support the Hipler Bello view.100 In the 
European Communities -  Hormones case, the arbitrator states that “[ajlthough 
withdrawal of an inconsistent measure is the preferred means of complying ..., it is 
not necessarily the only means ... An implementing Member, therefore, has a measure 
of discretion in choosing the means of implementation, as long as the means chosen 
are consistent with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB and the with the 
covered agreements”.101
However, it is clear that Article 22(1) explicitly favours full implementation as the 
best compliance option. Secondly, full compliance is, in the final analysis, in the best 
interest of a losing party because compensation must not only be consistent with the 
covered agreements; it must also be extended on an MFN basis to other members of 
the WTO.102 The non-discriminatory nature of compensations should make full 
compliance more attractive. Furthermore, Article 22(3) of the DSU allows for cross­
retaliation, whose aim is to “ensure that the impact of that suspension is strong and 
has the desired result, namely to induce compliance by the Member which fails to 
bring WTO-inconsistent measures into compliance with DSB rulings within a 
reasonable period of time”.103
In sum, WTO law imposes binding obligations, requires positive compliance actions, 
and provides for specific remedies, including trade sanctions. The nature of WTO law 
raises specific questions about its effectiveness. What impact does it actually have on 
state behaviour? What factors shape the behaviour of states? It cannot be assumed that 
the strong enforcement regime is the only or even the main factor that affects the 
behaviour of states. The task in the remainder of this chapter is to identify, through a 
literature survey, the factors that shape states’ compliance with international law.
100 The debate about the bindingness of the DSB recommendations is sometimes linked to the ‘efficient 
breach’ theory, which posits that there are circumstances when breach of contract is more efficient than 
performance. However, several international legal scholars have argued that encouraging “efficient” 
breaches of treaties would undermine the fundamental rule of pacta sunt servanda (see Dunloff and 
Trachtman (1999).
101 EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Award of the Arbitrator, 
WT/DS26/15, para. 38 at pp 12-16.
102 DSU, Article 22.1. See also Appellate Body Report, European Communities -  Measures Affecting 
Importation o f  Certain Products, WT/DS69/ABR, adopted 23 July 1998.
103 European Communities -  Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution o f Bananas, Recourse 
to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU.
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Theories of International Law Compliance 
Perspectives on the Effectiveness o f International Law
One dominant view in the compliance literature104 is that there is a propensity to 
comply with international law and that any non-compliance is “benign”, i.e. not as a 
result of a deliberate decision to violate an international undertaking on the basis of a 
calculation of interests.105 Louis Henkin, in his frequently repeated comment, notes: 
“almost all nations observe all principles o f  international law and almost all o f  their 
obligations almost all o f the time ”.106 Robert Keohane argues that “in the world 
political economy, we observe a good deal of compliance even when governments 
have incentives, on the basis of myopic self interest, to violate the rules”.107 This 
rather sanguine view about compliance contrasts with the rational choice and Realist 
perspective that rests on the background assumption that compliance is based on a
10Scalculation of costs and benefits and the perception of national interests.
The assumption about a “propensity to comply” appears to lack strong empirical 
evidence or, as Downs et al argue, may be contaminated by endogeneity and selection 
problem.109 A treaty may involve too little depth of cooperation, i.e. requiring states to 
make only modest departures from what they would have done in the absence of an 
agreement.110 As Lukashuk points out, when safeguarding such paramount values as 
peace and security, international law has proven to be insufficiently reliable in 
restraining states.111 Furthermore, the post-war trade and monetary regimes both 
became weaker during the 1970s due to domestic protectionist and economic 
pressures in the US and Western Europe.112
104 Broadly, the question of compliance with international law has been addressed by international 
relations and international legal scholars, including Henkin, 1979; Franck, 1990; Chayes and Chayes, 
1995; Koh, 1996; Weiss and Jacobson, 1998; Byers, 1999; Keohane, 1992; Simmons, 2000.
105 See, e.g. Chayes and Chayes (1993/1995).
106 Henkin (1979, p.47).
107 Keohane (1985, p.98)
108 Goldsmith and Posner (2002); Strange (1982)
109 Downs et al (1996, p.380)
1,0 Ibid
111 Lukashuk, 1989. See also Kennedy (2003) who argues that “many of the most significant 
aspirations expressed by international judgements and encoded in international instruments have not 
been implemented” (p.839). Wild (1938) posits that international law may fail to be of service in 
guiding the policies of states in matters of grave moments.
1,2 Keohane (1985)
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In recent years, the reluctance of both the EU113 and the US114 to comply with difficult 
and politically sensitive WTO rulings further suggests that states are not routinely 
abandoning their self interests in favour of rule-following. It is also the case that 
compliance is rarely ever complete. Although international agreements are drawn for 
full compliance, no state complies fully.115 While there is no prevalence of barefaced 
or headlong disobedience of international law by states in all cases, there is what 
Snyder describes as “the new challenge of compliance”.116 This occurs when states 
adopt different strategies such as self-serving interpretations, as well as selective or 
creative compliance.117 Thus, any claim about compliance needs to be empirically 
established, and should control for endogeneity and depth of cooperation.
The remainder of this chapter examines the literature on international law compliance 
so as to derive some variables for explaining the compliance behaviour of South 
Africa and Nigeria with respect to their WTO obligations. In line with the recurring 
theme in this thesis, the explanatory theory is divided into two broad categories: legal 
and non-legal variables. Legal variables are those derived from the nature of the law 
or related to legal principles. Non-legal variables are those exogenous to the law but 
which can affect its operation. The key variables and their linkages are discussed.
Compliance as a Function o f Legal Considerations
The legal explanations as to why states comply or do not comply with international
| 1 Q
law are varied. In one book, twelve of those factors are listed ; in another, the 
authors list six variables.119 The dominant factors in the literature can, however, be
113 One example is the Beef Hormone case. See Princen (2004), who analyses the EU’s compliance 
behaviour in this case. See also van den Broek (2003).
1,4 Evidence shows that while the US has a generally good compliance record, in difficult rulings that 
require Congressional intervention to ensure full implementation, compliance has been problematic. 
Such cases include the US -  Antidumping Act o f 1916, US-Section 110(5) o f the US Copyright Act, and 
US-Tax Treatment o f Foreign Sales Corporation, see: van den Broek, (2003)
115 Brednar (2005), Weiss and Jacobson, (1998)
116 Snyder (1993)
117 According to Pistor (2000) creative compliance refers to where the law is observed formally but 
circumvented in practice. This can also be described as de jure rather than de facto compliance.
1,8 Schachter ed. (1971) cited in Qureshi (1999, p. 16) lists the following: (i) consent; (ii) customary 
practice; (iii) juridical conscience: (iv) natural law: (v) social necessity: (vi) consensus of the 
international community; (vii) direct (or “stigmatic”) intuition; (viii) common purposes of the 
participants; (ix) effectiveness; (x) sanctions; (xi) systemic goals; (xii) shared expectations as to 
authority; and rules of recognition.
119 Macaulay, Friedman and Stookey eds. (1995), list the following as reasons why people obey the 
law: (i) legal sanctions (ii) peer groups, (iii) conscience, (iv) moral appeal, (vi) embarrassment and
shame, (vii) legitimacy.
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reduced to the following: enforcement and sanctions; reputational concerns; 
endogenous preference; normative commitment; domestic regime type; autopoiesis 
and conflict of legal norms. Each of these is briefly discussed below.
Compliance under the “shadow o f the law”
Compliance is often said to take place “in the shadow of the law”. Such “in the 
shadow of the law” issues that are believed to induce compliance include the
190  •possibility of litigation, rule enforcement and legal sanctions. Enforcement is, 
indeed, central to the economic analysis of law or the rational choice school, which 
focuses on how law, as enforced, affects behaviour.121 Thus, to scholars in the 
enforcement school, enforcement is one of the strongest conditions of compliance. 
The background assumption is that states are motivated in their actions by the 
calculation of interests; therefore, it is only by manipulating the burdens and benefits
1 9^defined in terms of those interests can compliance be improved.
Enforcement in this regard refers to direct mechanisms such as sanctions, a credible 
threat of sanctions and other forms of punishment regime. The principle function of 
international law, according to the rational choice school, is to eliminate opportunistic 
behaviour through the enforcement instruments.124 In the WTO context, as shown 
earlier, the dispute settlement system creates a strong enforcement or punishment 
regime that should induce compliance.
19c
However, the managerial school takes a dim view of enforcement measures. As 
Chayes and Chayes argue, sanctioning authority “is rarely granted in treaty, rarely
19 Aused when granted and likely to be ineffective when used”. Compliance is better
121 See Goldsmith and Posner (2002); Ricardo Faria (1999).
122 Downs et al (1996)
123 Ibid.
124 The command or imperative theories of law are based on the common assumption that international 
law should be examined as a system of coercive norms controlling the actions of state. The classical 
imperative theorists are Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), John Austin (1790-1859) and Hans Kelsen 
(1881-1973). For the modem theorists, see, e.g., Morgenthau (1961) and Grieco (1978). “Rrealists”, 
however, also view international law as epiphenomenal to the powers and interests of states.
125 Constructivists generally tend not to emphasise the constraint or social control function of law, but 
rather argue that there are other functional equivalents, including in particular its constitutive and 
communicative roles, which can influence outcomes without exerting direct causal impact. See, e.g. 
Coplin (1965); Yusuaki, (2003); and Kratichwil, (2003).
126 Chayes and Chayes (1995, pp32 and 33)
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induced, according to this view, through a number of “instruments of active 
management” such as transparency, reporting, data collection, verification and
1 77monitoring, capacity building, and technical and financial assistance”. The 
managerial or legal process approach is, indeed, based on dialogue, persuasion,
178argumentation and technical assistance rather than pressure and conditionality.
17QSuch systems for compliance or implementation review exist in the WTO. For 
instance, one of the objectives of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) is “to 
focus on improved adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines and commitments 
made under the Multilateral Trade Agreements”.130 Although the TPRM is not 
designed to serve “as a basis for the enforcement of specific WTO obligations” , 
Qureshi argues that it is, indeed, an instrument of enforcement, defined broadly as a 
process that includes “all mechanism that promote direct or indirect, immediate or
117over a given period of time, conformity to certain norms”.
In addition to the TPRM, the transparency requirements under Article X of the GATT 
and the other agreements impose publication, notification and reporting obligations. 
Furthermore, WTO councils or committees are charged with monitoring members’ 
compliance with specific agreements. These bodies provide regular opportunities for 
peer review, where members use legal arguments to challenge the WTO compatibility 
of each other’s measure or to offer defence of such measures.
There are linkages between the enforcement and managerial variables. For instance, 
as Koh notes, the managerial model “sometimes succeeds not solely because of power 
of discourse but also because of the shadow of sanctions, however rare or remote that 
possibility might be”.133 Persuasion and dialogue may fall on deaf ears, while pressure 
and manipulation of incentives may induce compliance.134 Yet, the power of sanctions 
should not be overstated. Threat of penalties or sanctions may not always deter
127 Ibid.
128 Checkel (2005).
129 Victor, Raustiala and Skolnikoff eds (1998).
130 See Annex 3, paragraph A (1), of the WTO Agreement.
131 Ibid.
132 Qureshi, (1999, p.492). For a discussion of the TPRM as an enforcement mechanism, see also 
Qureshi (1995/1996)
133 Koh (1997, p.391)
134 Checkel (2005)
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governments from bending or breaking regime rules. Nevertheless, the “in the 
shadow of the law” variables are important in explaining state behaviour.
International Law as a Reputational Mechanism
Reputational concerns are also rational choice variables, and are often accorded pride
of place in the compliance literature. Indeed, as Downs and Jones put it, “the
dominant view in the literature is that reputation plays an extremely important role in
1promoting compliance”. One of the strongest proponents of the reputational
variable is Robert Keohane, who argues that, “having a good reputation is valuable
even to the egoist”.137 Given that hard law instruments are partly inspired by the
desire for credible assurances , it follows that post-contractual defection or
1opportunism is likely to create reputational or credibility problems for the defector.
Treaties are both the products and the instruments of iteration and issue linkage. 
Furthermore, they encourage the use of both specific and more diffuse forms of 
reciprocity, as in the case of the WTO, which provides for cross-measures. All of this 
enables parties to escape perennial Prisoners’ Dilemmas by replacing short-term 
calculations of interest with long-term strategic analysis and mutual reliance on long­
term reputation.140 In other words, the combined effects of continuous iteration, issue 
linkages and reciprocity accentuate the reputational problems of a defector, thereby 
making rule compliance more likely.141
Yet, reputational concerns are not absolute. Down and Jones introduce the concept of 
multiple reputations, and argue that reputation varies according to the nature of the
135 Strange (1982) argues that “states have all their defences at the ready to reject even the most modest 
encroachment on what they regard as their national prerogatives” (p.480)
136 Downs and Jones (2002, p. S99).
137 Keohane (1987, p.85).
138 Abbott and Snidal (2000)
139 Reputational concerns have broader ramifications than future relationships. According to Oran 
Young, the forces of “social opprobrium” and “the sense of shame or social disgrace” will work to 
induce treaty compliance (cited in Downs and Jones (2002, p.SlOO)). Chayes and Chayes also argue, in 
their “new sovereignty” theory, that the desire to remain a participant in the international policy­
making process may engender compliance, as country that compromises its reputation as a reliable 
partner “jeopardises its ability to continue to reap organisational benefits” (Chayes and Chayes, 1995, 
p. 152).
140 Alvarez (2002).
141 Ibid, see also Keohane (1987).
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agreements.142 As the authors put it, “even in an increasingly integrated international 
system, reputational concerns cannot by themselves begin to ensure a high level of 
compliance with every international agreement”.143 The agreements that get the most 
reputational help are those that states value the most. If an agreement is of little value 
to a state, the slightest increase in compliance cost would lead to defection.144 
However, do values and moral commitment play any role in a state’s compliance 
decision?
Normative Commitment and a Sense o f Obligation
The “in the shadow of the law” and reputational variables rest on an external system 
of legal pressure, direct or indirect, to compel or induce states to comply with their 
international obligations. However, scholars of the constructivist bend tend to 
emphasise the role of values and normative or moral commitments in shaping states’ 
compliance with international law. Compliance is not induced by concerns about legal 
sanctions or reputational costs; rather, states comply with international law because of 
their normative commitment to the system and a desire to behave appropriately to 
support the regime rather than undermine it.145 The logic of appropriateness and a 
general sense of duty are stronger than the logic of consequences and the explicit 
calculations of costs and benefits.146
In criticising the command or imperative theory of law, H.L.A Hart argues that rather 
than an external system of coercion, it is the internal element of legal obligation that 
leads a state to obey international law even when there is no threat of force 
compelling them to comply.147 While the external element cannot be ignored, it is the 
“internal point of view”, which makes people or states feel a sense of obligations to 
obey the law. However, as Hart also points out, this sense of obligation arises from a 
state’s respect for the legitimacy of the law.148 Given the significance of the 
legitimacy theory, it is discussed below.
142 Down and Jones (2002).
143 Ibid, p. S98.
144 Ibid.
145 This is also a “value of the regime” argument as Keohane (1987) puts it.
146 Young (1979)
147 Hart, 1961.
148 Ibid.
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The Role o f Legitimacy in Compliance Behaviour
Legal scholars have long focused on legitimacy as an essential source of obligation 
and “compliance pull” in law. For instance, Thomas Franck argues that the 
compliance pull of international law results from the legitimacy and distributive 
justice of the rules that it embodies.149 Voluntary compliance with international law 
would be improved insofar as the law instantiates both procedural and substantive 
fairness.150 A state’s perception that the structure of rules of the system is unjust is 
likely to affect its compliance decision.151
Consent and ownership are critical legitimacy factors that affect a state’s compliance 
1behaviour. Unless the addressees of international rules appreciate the benefits of,
and the necessity for, the rules and accept responsibility for them, there is likely to be
1little internal commitment on the part of those charged with their implementation. 
Thus, while the enforcement and reputational variables and the normative 
commitment arguments are important as explanatory variables, pervasive and 
fundamental values such as fairness, equity and ownership appear to have stronger 
explanatory powers.
Legal positivists argue that consent154 bridges the chasm between sovereignty and 
legal restraint under international law.155 Consent is the only way to establish rules 
that legally bind sovereign states.156 However, international law is always the end 
product of a political process in which the weak can be disadvantaged because of 
unequal bargaining power.157 Lack of ownership would however make compliance 
difficult to achieve ex post. Non-compliance is likely to be endemic if the original
149 Franck (1995). On legitimacy as compliance pull, see also Finnemore and Toope (2002), who argue 
that “law that adheres to legitimacy values is more likely to generate a sense of obligation and 
corresponding change than law that ignore these values” (p. 239).
150 Ibid. Pauwelyn (2005) describes this as “input and output legitimacy”.
151 North (1997, p.45).
152 Broughton and Mourmouras (2002); Finger (2000).
153 Ibid.
154 The traditional consent-oriented view of the law treaties, however, has its critics (see, e.g. Shearer, 
1994, pp 21-24)
155 Wild (1938).
156 Lukashuk (1989). One of the grounds that can invalidate a treaty is coercion or force (Vienna 
Convention, arts. 51-52). This has been interpreted as capable of denoting economic and political 
pressure. See Henkin et al (1987, pp 464-466).
57 Indeed, process matters only to the extent that powers relations are more balanced. Where there are 
major differences in economic and political powers and influence, these power structures are likely to 
be the shaping factors in any rule-making process (see Bayne and Woolcock, 2003 and Levi, 1974)
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bargain did not adequately reflect the interests of those that would be living under
• 1SR •it. Yet, legitimacy alone does not guarantee compliance; there are domestic legal 
variables that can also affect the compliance process.
The Role ofDomestic Rule o f Law and Legality
While the foregoing analysis relates to the nature of, and perceptions about, particular 
international agreements, the present variable concerns the nature of the pre-existing 
domestic legal and institutional environment in which implementation is to take place. 
Pistor argues that pre-existing conditions can make or mar international law in the 
domestic setting.159 One of such conditions is the domestic regime type. Several 
scholars take the view that the domestic regime type is essential to understanding 
international law compliance.160
Regime-type scholars argue that a state’s propensity to comply with international law 
is a function of whether it has a democratic government, whether or not it shows a 
strong commitment to the rule of law and legality, and whether it has an independent 
judiciary161 The affinity argument is that respect for domestic rule of law and legality 
would translate into respect for international rule of law. Simmons argues, for 
instance, that "governments that have invested in and rest on a stable legal framework 
at home are unlikely to jeopardise this reputation by lightly flouting international legal 
obligations".162
Yet, while a strong commitment to domestic rule of law is likely to contribute 
positively to international law compliance, it may be far too simple to assume that, 
even in a rule-of-law state, there will be a smooth transition from existing laws and 
legal institutions to new ones through a process instigated by international rules.163 
The legal explanation for such inconsistent behaviour by an otherwise liberal state 
may be found in the last of the legal variables considered in this chapter.
158 Chayes and Chayes (1993, at p. 183).
159 Pistor (2000).
160 See: Young (1979) Slaughter (1993/1995), Moravsik (1997) and Haggard (1990).
161 Slaughter (1993/1995) and Carney (2000).
162 Ibid. (p299).
163 Harding (2002)
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Clash o f  Legal Cultures, Tradition and Institutions
Apart from treaty imprecision and constructive ambiguity, which may lead to 
different and sometimes self-serving interpretations that are inconsistent with good 
faith observation of the treaty obligation164, the clash of legal culture, tradition and 
institutions may make full compliance difficult to achieve. Two concepts are 
particularly relevant here: these are legal pluralism and legal autopoiesis. Legal 
pluralism suggests a multitude of legal orders located and produced at different 
structured sites around the world: domestic, regional, international, state as well as 
non-state sites.165 The relations among these sites can be mutually constitutive or 
autonomous or even dialectical.166
1 f d  •However, the theory of legal autopoiesis suggests operational closure. Autopoietic
1 Aftsystems, such as law, state and economy , construct their images of other systems 
only through the distorting lens of their own perceptual apparatus169, and can only 
become open to other systems through structural coupling resulting from 
perturbations or “productive misreading”.170 Yet, internal constraints can render 
mutual constitution or structural coupling highly selective. These constraints can 
result from “the local specialities of the diverse discourses involved” as well as
171“resistance of presently existing structures”.
It is these local specialities and resistance that often create disharmony between 
international law and domestic law, which, in some respects, can be described as two 
independent autopioetic systems. Established domestic legal practices and cultures, 
which are fully embraced by the domestic legal intermediaries, including legislators, 
courts, judges and lawyers, are unlikely to be readily abandoned in favour of 
conflicting international norms.172 Often in international negotiations, powerful states 
try to sell or even impose their domestic legal and regulatory practices on the rest of
164 See Chayes and Chayes (1993 for the effect of treaty ambiguity on compliance.
165 Tuebner (1992); Snyder (1999).
166 Ibid.
167 Tuebner (1992).
168 For the view that law, state and economy are autopoietic systems, see Tuebner (1992), Teubner and 
Febbrajo eds (1992)
169 Black (2004, p4).
170 Tuebner (1992)
171 Ibid, p. 1456.
172 See Mistelis in Fletcher et al (2001) for the role legal traditions can play in limiting the international 
harmonisation of law.
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1 7^the world. Virtually all states seek to protect their established legal norms and 
cultures. Where pre-existing domestic legal rules and norms are perceived as serving 
a legitimate purpose, any conflicting international norm is likely to be internalised 
only slowly, if at all.174
In sum, the legal factors that can affect state compliance with international law are 
varied, ranging from legal sanctions and reputational concerns to normative 
commitment, legitimacy, domestic regime type, and autopoiesis. Yet there are other 
factors that do not owe their sources to legal considerations, broadly defined, but 
which can nevertheless be influential or even decisive in shaping the compliance 
behaviour of states. These are broadly defined as non-legal variables, and it is to these 
that the next subsection turns.
Compliance as a Function of Non-legal Phenomena175
The main non-legal factors shaping state’s responses to international economic law 
obligations are social, economic, political and cultural in nature. As Robert Hudec’s 
scholarship teaches, to understand or appreciate international trade law and its 
operation one needs to understand the culture, environment, and political economy of
1 7 Athe states that are subject to its rules and disciplines. In this section, the main 
variables discussed are: domestic circumstances and policy choices; globalisation and 
market forces; institutional quality and capabilities; and the role of domestic actors.
Domestic Circumstances and Policy Objectives
The economic and socio-economic conditions that a country faces and the perceptions 
of government officials as to the appropriate policy responses to these conditions will 
play a significant role in shaping how that country responds to the opportunities and 
constraints of international law. For instance, countries may be less likely to comply 
with international economic law under conditions of macroeconomic and political
173 Bayne and Woolcock (2003, p30)
174 Broek, 2003
175 This subsection draws heavily from social science theories, such as political economy, institutional 
economics, as well as rational and public choice theories.
176 Hudec’s analytic approach o f ’’transcending the ostensible” often looks beyond obvious legal factors 
to explain to how the WTO law and institutions operate. See, e.g. Hudec (1987). For work on the 
political economy of international trade law, see Kennedy and Southwick eds. (2002).
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instability177 as well as poor socio-economic conditions such as the prevalence of 
unemployment, poverty and disease.178 However, economic crisis may generate
170demands for reforms and more willingness to conform to international norms.
The structure of a country’s economy and external trade is also a major factor likely 
to shape its attitude to international economic law obligations. As Milner argues, there
i anis a positive relationship between international cooperation and openness. Trade 
dependence and openness should thus positively influence better adherence to 
international trade rules.181 The existence of export opportunities may also provide a
i a?favourable climate for outward-oriented policies and international rule compliance, 
while lack of such opportunities may reduce the incentives to embrace international 
trade rules.
The role of ideas or ideology in shaping national policies and the behaviour of
i a igovernments has also been highlighted by a number of scholars. According to the 
ideational view, compliance will depend on the underlying ideological norms or 
consensus prevailing in a particular country. Thus, where trade liberalisation 
objectives enjoy only very tenuous political and normative support in home capitals, 
the legal commitments made by governments would often be less dependable than
1 84their binding legal form would suggest.
As Sikkink argues, “[international and domestic constraints and opportunities do not 
exist outside of the individual cognition; rather they are perceived by policy makers 
based on their conceptual frameworks”.185 Thus, without prior normative commitment 
to reforms at home, compliance with international trade obligations that clash with 
perceived national policy objectives is unlikely to be routine or voluntary.186 Yet, the
177 Ho (2002. p.9),
178 As Rodrik (1996) argues, in hard times and under domestic pressures, the typical pattern is for 
governments to respond by tightening their restrictions.
179 The crisis hypothesis is discussed in Williamson (ed) (1994).
180 Milner (1997)
181 Ibid. Simmons (2000).
182 See Haggard and Webb (1990)
183 For the ideational perspective, see, e.g. Rohrlick (1987), Sikkink (1991), Goldstein (1993) and 
Woods (1995).
184 Kennedy ef al (2004)
185 Sikkink, 1991, p.25)
186 Norton in Fletcher et al (2001).
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domestic circumstances and policy orientation argument should not ignore the role of 
systemic imperatives or perturbating events.
The Role o f Exogenous Factors: Economic Exigencies and Power Pressures 
One of the consequences of economic globalisation is the increasing power of the 
market and, arguably, the retreat of the state.187 The literature on globalisation and 
national regulatory processes addresses how international pressures affect the national 
policy and institutional environment.188 Arguably, few states can maintain long-term 
resistance to global pressures for trade and investment liberalisation. The desire for 
access to global markets, for foreign direct investment, for debt relief, or, indeed, for 
some political and diplomatic advantages, can motivate some developing countries to
1 fiQcomply with international legal norms.
The incorporation of law reform requirements in structural reform packages and the 
continuous monitoring of implementation of such reforms by international financial 
institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, as prerequisites to receipt of 
ongoing multilateral finance assistance have become modem realities of economic 
markets.190 Furthermore, multinational corporations use compliance with these 
systemic standards as a ‘stability factor’ in evaluating potential international finance 
and trade opportunities.191 Thus, non-legal phenomena such as purely economic
109calculations and sheer pressures of power may serve as perturbations and linkage 
institutions that induce the responsiveness of otherwise operationally closed domestic
1 QTregimes to international rules.
187 Strange (1976) argues that “the impersonal forces of world markets are ... more powerful than the 
states”.
188 This is a systemic or structuralist view that suggests that international structures, such as global 
markets and international regimes, shape actors identities, interests and choices. The basic assumption 
is one of behavioural conformity to structural demands (see Wendt, 1987; Frieden and Rogowski, 
1996)).
189 Carney (2000)
190 Norton (2001) in Fletcher et al (2001).
191 Ibid.
192 Tuebner (1992) suggests replacing perturbation with “productive misreading” because in legal 
pluralism, the legal discourse is not only perturbated by processes of social self-production, “but law 
productively misreads other social discourses as ‘sources’ o f norm production” (p. 1447).
193 Tuebner (1992); Ho (2002)
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Yet, the role of globalisation and international influences should not be overstated. 194 
There are instances where states may have the desire to pursue certain policies 
regardless of external pressures.195 Internal constraints can make rule convergence 
impossible or highly selective.196 Furthermore, two crucial domestic variables can 
have shaping roles. These are institutional quality and capabilities, and domestic 
interest groups.
Capacity and Institutional Quality
Several scholars treat state capacity as an intervening variable or a background
107condition in explaining the effects of international law on state behaviour. Capacity
is at the heart of the managerial thesis, which argues that incidence of non-compliance
108 • • is largely traceable to deficit in domestic regulatory capacity. Civil servants provide
an important interface between policy formulation and implementation; therefore, the
administrative and technical capacities of the public sector are a critical factor in the
compliance process.199
Institutional variables also include the broader issue of government effectiveness, 
particularly with respect to legislative efficiency and the operational independence of 
the Executive.200 For instance, where there are gridlocks between the executive and 
legislative arms of the government or tensions between central and provincial 
governments, the domestic impact of international agreements is likely to be 
hampered.201
The “bureaucratic politics” theory of decision-making (the Allison model) also 
suggests that policy formulation and implementation can be affected by organisational
194 While admitting a role for international influences, several scholars question the dominant role 
attributed to globalisation constraints in the literature. They argue that, in fact, domestic factors are 
more significant in explaining state behaviour and national policies. For the domestic perspectives, see, 
e.g. Garrett and Lange (1996), Leblang (1997), Garrett (1998), Haggard (1990) and Cortell and Davis 
Jr (2000).
195 See Cohen (1990) and Garrett (1998)
196 Tuebner (1992)
197 VanDeveer and Dabelko (2001). See also Haas, Levy, and Keohane (1993)
198 Chayes and Chayes (1993)
199 Weiss and Jacobson (1998).
200 Ho (2002)
201 Ibid.
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9 09process and governmental politics. For instance, considerable gap can exist 
between the formulated decision and its implementation because of poor coordination
90^among government departments, due to differences in goals and objectives. 
Persistent corruption can also result in regulatory compliance failures.204 Corrupt and
90Srent-seeking governments are less likely to respect systemic rules. There can also 
be legislative and regulatory capture by special interests, as discussed below.
Compliance Constituencies, Resister Groups and Government Officials 
It is virtually impossible to complete a discussion of the factors influencing state 
behaviour without consideration of the role of interest groups and compliance 
constituencies. As Koh puts it, “the process of treaty compliance transpires in a two 
level game, in which a member’s relations with its treaty partners occur on one 
chessboard, while its bargaining about compliance with its internal domestic 
constituencies transpires on a domestic chessboard”.206
The implementation and enforcement of international law involves processes of 
negotiation with a wide range of actors, whose behaviour does not necessarily change
9 0 9simply because governments adopt international commitments. Thus, while 
international agreements can always be reached, they can only be fully implemented
908if key domestic actors concur. Special interest groups and rent-seekers are given 
prominence in much of the political economy literature.209
Yet, the effect of domestic pressure by those opposed to compliance should not be 
overestimated. First, a compliance constituency of actors who support compliance can
91 neffectively countervail the pressure from the resister group. The ability of a “pro­
treaty coalition” of domestic and international groups with an interest in or a 
preference for compliance to successfully countervail the resister group should not be
202 See Rosati (1981) for a discussion and critique of the Allison model.
203 Ibid.
204 Damania (2003).
205 Ho (2002)
206 Koh (1997), see also Putnam (1988).
207 Victor et al (1998) and Snyder (1993)
208 Milner (1992); Keohane and Milner (1997).
209 See, e.g. Krueger (1974), Bhagwati (1989) and Grossman and Helpman (1994/1995).
210 See Kahler (2000); Goldstein and Martin, (2000); Irwin (2002).
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911ignored. Secondly, the domestic institutional design and government officials can 
play important roles in producing compliance.212 The domestic structures of law can 
empower the compliance constituencies and disadvantage the resister groups. 
Special interests opposed to compliance can be excluded from the decision-making 
process 214
However, insights from the public choice theory and the new political economy 
suggest that policy makers, i.e. politicians and bureaucrats, can seek to maximise their
<^ 1 r
short-term interests rather than promote the general good. Thus, policy makers may 
collude with resister groups for personal or political gains, and hinder rule 
compliance. The attitude of government officials and the kind of the decision­
making institutions, therefore, do matter.217 Compliance with international law is thus 
likely to depend largely on the existence of a powerful compliance constituency or 
pro-treaty coalition, as well as institutional supporters within government.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined a wide range of literature on the nature, role and 
effectiveness of international trade law. Public international trade law has evolved 
from the minimalist and flexible structure of the immediate post-war period to an 
unprecedented international economic treaty that can constrain sovereign states the 
way no other international treaty can. WTO law imposes legal obligations that are 
binding; that require positive compliance actions from governments; and that, at least 
in theory, can be rigorously enforced, with the possibility of legal sanctions.
In light of the nature of the compliance obligations, this thesis aims to examine 
compliance by two developing countries, and then to explain the sources of their 
behaviour. Several possible explanatory variables have been identified from the 
literature survey in the foregoing sections (see Table 1). Clearly, none of these
211 See Young (1979); Moravsik (1997); and Benvenisti (2001).
2,2 Princes (2004)
213 Finnemore and Toope (1997, p.27).
2,4 Victor et al (1998) argue that the extent of participation o f non-state actors in the implementation 
process and particularly their access to information can shape outcome.
15 See Williamson (ed) (1994)
216 Ibid; Grossman and Helpman (1994/1995).
217 For the public choice view, see: Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Brennan and Buchanan (1985) and 
Besley (2002).
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variables alone can explain the behaviour of these countries. Compliance is likely to 
be the outcome of the combination of several variables, which suggests that there are 
linkages between them.
Table 1: Explanatory variables and Definitions
Variable Description
Legal Variables
Shadow of the law This refers to a set of variables that include legal enforcement/sanctions, 
and “instruments of active management” or “systems of implementation 
review”, such as monitoring, surveillance and transparency requirements
Reputational factors Refer to concerns about loss of reputation and credibility
Normative Commitment Refers to actor’s normative commitment and sense of obligations.
Endogenous preference Refers to principles such as fairness, justice and equity. It relates to 
actor’s perception about the legitimacy and ownership of rules.
Domestic regime type This variable covers domestic governance elements such as democracy, 
rule of law, legality etc
Clash of legal culture, norms and 
institutions (autopoiesis and legal 
pluralism)
Relate to the role of pre-existing domestic legal rules and institutions, 
and the attitude of legal intermediaries.
Non-legal variables
Domestic circumstances and policy 
objectives
This variable refers to domestic economic and socio-economic 
conditions and the government’s ideas and policy choices
Globalisation: exogenous/external 
influences
This refers to the role of external economic pressure, including donor 
conditionalities, market forces, as well as political and diplomatic 
pressures.
Institutional variables The variable refers to institutional quality and capabilities
Domestic interest groups This variable examines the role of special interests opposed to or in 
favour of compliance, and the mediating role of government officials.
It is these variables and the data derived from them that will underpin the analysis and 
explanations of the compliance behaviour of South Africa and Nigeria. The aim is to 
assess the relative roles played by the variables in explaining the behaviour of both 
countries, as established from the case studies of their implementation and compliance 
records. Before focusing on the case studies and the explanations, it is necessary to 
present a broad overview of the domestic structures and processes for trade 
governance in the two countries. The domestic trade governance structures are crucial 
for a proper understanding of the behaviour of these countries. The next chapter 
addresses these governance issues.
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CHAPTER 3
Trade Governance in South Africa and Nigeria: An Overview
The previous chapter considered broadly the systemic issues arising from WTO law and 
the compliance obligations that the law imposes. The discussions in that chapter are 
relevant for the contextual analysis in the subsequent core chapters of this thesis. The 
present chapter is also important for the same reason. Its aim is to present an overview of 
the domestic structures and processes for the foreign trade policy of South Africa and 
Nigeria. Compliance with international trade law is a decentralised process, taking place 
at the national level. Therefore, in order to examine how a country has implemented its 
WTO obligations and to explain its behaviour, it is necessary to look, first, at its domestic 
governance structures and processes.
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first focuses on South Africa, the second on 
Nigeria. Each part consists of four sections. Section 1 examines the institutional 
framework, concentrating on the constitutional, legal and regulatory structures. Section 2 
looks at the national trade decision-making and surveillance processes, focusing on the 
administrative structures as well as the role of governmental and non-governmental 
actors. Section 3 discusses the foreign trade policy framework, and section 4 focuses on 
the Uruguay Round participation and commitments of these countries, as well as their 
post-Uruguay Round strategies and activities in the WTO. The chapter concludes with a 
brief comparison of the experiences of both countries.
South Africa’s Domestic Structures and Processes 
Institutional Framework for Trade Policy
Constitutional, Legal and Regulatory Structures
The new South African Constitution was approved by the Constitutional Court in 
December 1996, and took effect in February 1997. The Constitution has real and 
potential impact on the development and implementation of national policy in the 
country. It contains several provisions relating to the roles and functions of the 
different spheres of government and organs of state, and deals with the status of 
treaties in domestic law.
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The Parliament consists of the National Assembly and the National Council of 
Provinces (NCOP). Although both participate in the legislative process, they have 
different functions. For instance, the former is elected to represent the people and to 
provide general oversight of the exercise of executive powers, while the latter 
represents the provinces “to ensure that provincial interests are taken into account in 
the national sphere of government”.1
National laws affecting the provinces must in general be approved by the NCOP. 
Furthermore, although the National Executive may intervene in provincial 
administration to maintain national standards or economic unity, such intervention 
must end unless the Council approves it within 30 days of its first sitting after the 
intervention began. Equally, national legislation affecting the provinces can 
effectively be vetoed by the NCOP unless overridden by a two-thirds majority in the 
National Assembly.
Given that there are many functional areas of concurrent national and provincial 
legislative competence , the apparent constitutional limitations on the extent of 
national executive or legislative intervention in provincial administration suggests that 
certain WTO obligations, in which the Provinces have vested interests, may be 
hindered by poor implementation at the provincial level.4 Potentially, this is a source 
of political constraints, which could hinder the effective implementation of 
international obligations. The Constitution, however, enshrines the “principles of 
cooperative government and intergovernmental relations”5, and the Intergovernmental 
Relations Framework Act of 1995 provides for mechanisms and procedures to 
facilitate intergovernmental relations and settlement of disputes.
1 Section 42 (4).
2 Section 100 (1) and (2).
3 Schedule 4 of the Constitution lists all the areas, which include agriculture, animal control and 
diseases, consumer protection, education, environment, health services, industrial promotion, tourism 
and trade. Indeed, agriculture is specifically classified as a provincial competency under the Marketing 
of Agricultural Products Act of 1996. This has resulted in disconnect between national and provincial 
structures for agriculture (Kirsten, 2006).
4 WTO Agreements contain what has been described as “federal clauses”, which appear to recognise 
the effect of constitutional distribution of competence between federal and sub-federal units. These 
provisions, can be found in Article XXIV: 12 of the GATT 1994, Article 13 of the SPS Agreement, 
Articles 3, 4, and 7 of the TBT Agreement , and Article 1:3 of the GATS. They require members to 
take only “reasonable measures” to ensure observance by regional and local government and 
authorities within their territories (See Bhuiyan, 2004 for a discussion on the federal clauses of the 
WTO law).
5 Section 41. All spheres of government are enjoined to settle differences amicably and in good faith.
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The Role o f Parliament, Courts and Other Organs o f  State
Apart from the constitutional distribution of competence between the national and 
provincial governments, there is also separation of power between the executive and 
the legislative branches. The President, together with his Cabinet, is charged with the 
responsibility for developing and implementing national policy, while Parliament is 
required to consider, pass, amend or reject legislation, as well as provide for 
mechanisms “to ensure that all executive organs of state in the national sphere of 
government are accountable to it, and to maintain oversight of the exercise of national 
executive authority ...and (of) any organ of state”.6 The National Assembly and the 
Provinces (represented by the NCOP) could potentially undermine the 
implementation of South Africa’s international trade treaties, since they could refuse 
to ratify such treaties or approve relevant implementing legislation.
However, while the separation of powers can result in executive constraints and a 
divided government due to tension between the legislative and executive branches, 
this has not been the case in South Africa. According to Polity IV, in its 2003 country 
report, South Africa scored 7 out of a maximum score of 10 points in the executive 
constraint indicator.7 This suggests that the Executive enjoys a high degree of 
operational independence and, therefore, can introduce policies with minimal chance 
of a legislative veto or gridlock.
Parliament is widely seen as playing a marginal role in the policy formation process, 
while the Executive plays a dominant role. This is attributed to the confluence of two 
political factors: the ruling party’s electoral dominance8and the party-list system, 
which helps to ensure party discipline and loyalty.9 The result is that although 
government bills are scrutinised by the relevant Parliamentary Portfolio Committees, 
they are, in general, routinely passed into law. While the closed nature of executive 
policy and the limited legislative oversight suggests a lack of transparency and 
democratic accountability of South Africa’s trade policies, the centralisation reduces 
the possibility that the implementation of South Africa’s international obligations may 
be impeded by legislative hindrances.
6 Section 55 (1) and (2).
7 See http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/politv/Safl.htm (accessed 14/10/2005)
8 The ANC had 70 percent of the national vote at the last elections.
9 Draper (2005)
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South Africa’s constitutional structure also affects the manner in which treaties may 
be given effect in national law. The negotiating and signing of all international 
agreements, including trade treaties, is the sole responsibility of the national 
executive.10 However, an international agreement will not have effect in South Africa 
unless ratified by the Parliament,11 but an agreement of a technical, administrative or
1 9executive nature is, however, binding without approval by Parliament. Furthermore, 
the Constitution provides that a self-executing provision of any agreement approved 
by Parliament is binding without further legislative act, unless it is inconsistent with 
the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.13
The South African Parliament approved the ratification of the Uruguay Round 
Agreement in 1995. However, most of the provisions of the WTO agreements are not 
self-executing.14 Thus, even though Parliament has ratified the WTO treaty, the 
covered agreements do not form part of South Africa’s public law and cannot be 
directly invoked in the courts.15 This is because, although relevant existing statutes 
were amended to implement several of the obligations in the WTO agreements, the 
covered agreements were not themselves specifically promulgated.16
However, the South African Constitution requires the courts to adopt the principle of 
consistent interpretation. Section 233 states that “(w)hen interpreting any legislation, 
every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is 
consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent 
with international law”. This suggests that WTO law could serve as a reference and 
aid in the interpretation of the relevant domestic statute.
10 South Africa has roughly 1800 treaties in force (Botha in Hollis et al, 2005).
11 Section 231. South Africa is a thus dualist state, since treaties do not become part of domestic law 
unless ratified by Parliament.
12 Although such an agreement must be tabled in the National Assembly and the Council within a 
reasonable time (Section 231(3)).
13 Section 231(4). This provision gives direct effect to self-executing provisions of a ratified treaty.
14 A treaty is self-executing where its language is precise enough that it does not require an added 
governmental action to implement it. The WTO agreement, in fact, explicitly requires such 
governmental action (see Article XVI.4 of the WTO Agreement).
15 This is similar to the situation in the United States, where the “Uruguay Round Agreements Act” 
(1994) amends various aspects o f US law to comply with obligations emanating from the Uruguay 
Round Agreement, but precludes the Agreement itself from being directly invoked in US courts. 
Similar situation applies in the EU, where the WTO Agreement has no direct effect (see Jackson, 1998, 
for the status of WTO law in US and EU law).
16 Joubert (2005). For a discussion of the interface between the South African Constitution, trade 
agreements and national trade law, see also Erasmus (2003).
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However, one important feature of South Africa’s legal system is the constitutionally 
guaranteed Bill of Rights, which provides for an extensive array of socio-economic 
rights “that are designed to change South African society fundamentally”.17 
According to section 8 of the Constitution, “(t)he Bill of Rights applies to all laws, 
and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state”. Several 
rights are created, including freedom of expression18, access to health care services19
9ftand access to information . All of this also has implications for South Africa’s 
compliance with its international obligations.
The adoption of justiciable constitution and democratic constitutionalism has given
91law pride of place in the post-apartheid South Africa. The result is increased 
pressure group litigation and social activism by lawyers, who use the Constitution in
99attempts to achieve reform and to establish rights. In this respect, the courts may be 
asked to test the implementation of South Africa’s international obligations against
9^
the constitutionally guaranteed social and economic rights.
South Africa’s constitutional order has also increased the role of courts and judges in 
the political process. Judges are widely believed to have the power to revise 
government’s laws and channel them into new directions, based on their convictions 
and values.24 Many cases and dicta demonstrate a desire on the part of the judiciary 
to adapt the law to contemporary needs and the prevailing ethos of freedom, equality 
and the rule of law.25
17 Du Bois in Zimmermann et al eds. (2004, p.3). See also Klug (2000); Corder (2001); and Andrews 
and Ellman eds (2001).
18 Section 16
19 Section 27
20 Section 32, which states, inter alia, that “(e)very one has the right of access to ...(a) any information 
held by the State, and (b) any information that is held by another person and that is required for the 
exercise or protection of any rights”. The Constitution requires the government to enact legislation to 
give effect to this right. In 2000, Parliament passed the Promotion of Access to Information Act. See
http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2000/a2-00.pdf
21 Klug (2000).
22 Du Bois in Zimmermann et al eds. (2004).
23 Mr Justice Harms, speech to the Second Session o f the WIPO Advisory Committee on Enforcement, 
June 28 to 30, 2004; document WIPO/ACE/2/4 Rev.
24 Du Bois in Zimmermann et al eds. (2004, p.6).
25 For instance, Marais, J A stated in Cape Town Municipality v Bakkerud 2000 (3) SA 1049 (SCA) at 
para 15 that “[tjhere are many areas of the law in which courts have to make policy choices. See also 
Zimmermann et al eds. (2004)
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The tendency of judges to play the role of political actors could, however, have 
implications for the implementation of WTO law in that judges may be less inclined 
to support faithful implementation of obligations that are perceived to have adverse 
effects on the socio-economic rights of the citizens. However, s. 39, which deals 
with the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, states that “...a court, tribunal or forum 
.. .(b) must consider international law”.
Another important constitutional provision that may also shape the government’s 
compliance behaviour is that on “just administrative action”. Section 33 states that 
“(e)very one has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair”. It goes on to provide that “(e)very one whose right has been 
adversely affected by administrative action has the right to be given written reasons”. 
National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights.28 This provision 
complements many of the WTO provisions on transparency, and suggests that 
domestic legality can serve indirectly the same end as WTO legal obligations.29
In addition to the constitutional provisions, several trade and trade-related laws and 
regulations define the legal and regulatory structures of South Africa’s foreign trade. 
With respect to trade in goods, the main laws are the International Trade 
Administration Act of 2002, the Anti-Dumping Regulation of 2003, and the Customs 
and Excise Act, 1964, as amended.31 Several laws govern the main areas of 
intellectual property.32 The Competition Act of 1998 has potential far-reaching impact 
on South Africa’s trade regime, as are the various labour and social laws, designed to 
address historical injustices.
26 The courts’ interpretations of a number of WTO obligations are considered in the case studies.
27 This does not necessary mean, however, that a court will consider only international trade law. 
Indeed, it is more likely to consider all relevant international legal instruments, including international 
human rights law, see Berger (2002).
28 Section 33(3). In 2000, parliament enacted the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act to give effect 
to the constitutional provision. See: http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2000/a3-00.pdf
29 One view, however, is that there is a significant gap between the law and its effectiveness in South 
Africa (see du Bois in Zimmermann et al eds, 2004, at p.4)
30 The list of South Africa’s trade laws and regulations is available at www.dti.gov.za
31 Chapters 4 and 6, dealing respectively with the implementation of the customs valuation agreement 
and the WTO trade remedy rules will discuss these statutes.
32 South Africa’s IP regime, together with that o f Nigeria, is the subject o f chapter 5 of this thesis.
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In sum, the institutional framework for trade in South Africa rests in part on a 
constitutional structure that appears to impose constraints on the exercise of 
governmental discretion. The constitutional structure, the administrative and public 
laws that derive from constitutional principles, as well as the social, economic and 
political rights guaranteed by the constitution, are all factors that are likely to play a 
significant role in shaping the government’s responses to its international obligations. 
South Africa’s constitutional order is premised on democracy, the rule of law and the 
pursuit of equality. Consequently, the role of the Constitution and the courts will be 
important in explaining South Africa’s compliance behaviour.
National Trade Decision-making and Surveillance Mechanisms
Governmental structure
The key organ of state responsible for the formulation and coordination of trade 
policy is the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). However, given the cross­
cutting nature of trade, initiatives on trade issues may come from the Departments of 
Finance (or the National Treasury), Agriculture, National Health; Mineral and Energy 
Affairs, and the South African Reserve Bank. The Department of Foreign Affairs 
(DFA) and the Justice Department play a marginal role.34
South Africa’s Permanent Mission at the WTO is also an important part of the trade 
policy process, both in respect of negotiations in Geneva and compliance with the 
notification requirements. The Permanent Mission reports to the DTI in the capital. It 
consists of a “WTO Ambassador and Permanent Representative” and a “Head of 
Delegation”. In addition to the ambassador and the HOD, the Mission has four other 
delegates that are dedicated to the WTO. Although coordination between Geneva and 
the capital is relatively effective, and South Africa has been able to meet much of its 
notification obligations, the participation of the Geneva delegates in WTO activities is 
hampered by lack of adequate resources and capacity.
Apart from the above frontline departments, several government agencies have some 
jurisdiction over various aspects of trade policy. For example, while the DTI
33 WTO (2003).
34 Draper (2005).
35 As observed by this author, there were several WTO committee and council meetings at which no 
delegate from South Africa attended.
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formulates trade policies and negotiates trade agreements, the key implementing 
agencies include the International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC), the 
South African Revenue Service (SARS) , the Companies and Intellectual Property 
Registration Office (CIPRO), and the Directorate of Food Control, and the South 
African Bureau of Standards (SABS), which deal with the SPS and TBT issues 
respectively.
Trade Policy Coordination and Capacity
Faithful implementation of international rules depends crucially on government 
effectiveness, including optimal coordination among relevant departments and 
agencies.37 According to the Kaufmann ratings38 for 2004, South Africa has a point
score of 0.74 on government effectiveness indicator , while UNCTAD, in its 2005
Trade and Development Index (TDI), gave it 2 points (from a scale of 0-4).40 With 
respect to corruption, South Africa ranked 46 out 148 and had a score of 4.5 points 
out of a maximum point of 10, according to the Transparency International (TI) 
corruption index for 2005.41 In the same corruption category, UNCTAD gave South 
Africa a score of 2.67 point (from a scale of 0-6)42
What the foregoing shows is that South Africa’s record is not spectacular on
government effectiveness 43 Indeed, inefficient bureaucracy is often cited as one of 
the barriers to trade in South Africa, in addition to excessive regulation among 
others.44 According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), “concerns exist over the 
capacity of the bureaucracy at the various levels of government” 45 The government 
itself admits that there are deficiencies in state organisation, capacity and leadership.
In its recent Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative, South Africa states: “certain 
weaknesses in the way government is organised, in the capacity of key institutions,
36 Customs and Excise is a division of SARS.
37 See Rosati (1981) for a discussion of the “bureaucratic politics” model of decision-making.
38 The World Bank governance index.
39 The indicator can take values between -2.5 and 2.5. A higher score indicate better institutions.
40 UNCTAD (2005).
41 Global Corruption Report 2006, Transparency International.
42 UNCTAD (2005).
43 This is, however, far better than what obtains in most other African countries.
44 USTR (2005).
45 The Economist, 2006
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including some of those providing economic services, and insufficient decisive 
leadership in policy development and implementation, all constrain the country’s 
growth potential”.46 Thus, South Africa has capacity problems, although not as acute 
as those of many other developing countries, including Nigeria.
Trade Consultative and Surveillance Mechanisms
The consultative mechanism, designed to encourage consensus-building on economic 
issues is the National Economic Development and Labour Council, NEDLAC, 
established in 1995. As a statutory body, NEDLAC is formally involved in discussing 
trade and industrial policy.47 DTI officials are mandated to present specific issues in 
trade negotiations to the body through its Trade and Industry Chamber. In practice, 
however, the NEDLAC process is largely government-driven, with labour and 
business merely following the lead of government officials. This is due to capacity 
constraints and government’s top-down approach to policy formulation.
Apart from the NEDLAC process, Parliamentary hearings also provide opportunities 
for stakeholders’ input into the legislative process. Indeed, sections 59 and 72 of the 
Constitution mandate the National Assembly to facilitate public involvement in all its 
legislative and other processes. Interested stakeholders are frequently invited to make 
written submissions to the National Assembly or participate in public hearings 49 Yet, 
the effectiveness of such consultative process is often questioned.50 This is mainly 
because, as noted earlier, the policy process is largely state-centred, concentrated 
within the Executive, with even Parliament playing only a marginal role. The lack of 
constructive trade policy consultation and dialogue with non-state actors is seen as a 
major institutional weakness in South Africa’s trade policy framework.51
46 See Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA), available at 
http://www.info. gov.za/asgisa/asgisa.htm#top (accessed 18/6/2006).
47 See ss. 4 (1) ( c) and (d) of the NEDLAC Act, which sets out the functions of the body.
48 Monnakgotha (1998); Joubert (2005).
49 The Trade Law Centre (Tralac), the Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS) and the South 
African Institute o f International Affairs (SAIIA) are some of the most prominent civil society 
organisations that are active in making contributions to policy debate (see Draper, 2005).
50 The view of business, for instance, is that the Parliamentary hearings only serve to rubber stamp 
measures or policies that had already been decided upon. See: Joubert, 2005, citing the view expressed 
by the South African Chamber of Commerce (SACOB).
51 For a more detailed discussion on the role of non-state actors in South Africa’s trade policy, see 
Draper (2005)
68
According to the Polity IV country report in 2003, South Africa ranks very low in 
respect of civil society participation in the policy process, scoring 2 out of a 
maximum point of 1052. With respect to trade policy, government officials use the 
legal and technical complexities of trade issues, as well as the “extreme delicacy” of 
trade negotiations as reasons to avoid trade policy dialogue with civil society. As a 
result, there is hardly any debate on South Africa’s national trade policy, and 
consultations are believed to be merely perfunctory.54
However, while the closed nature of executive policy may suggest the absence of 
special interests’ capture of trade policy, interest groups are, in fact, not completely 
bereft of influence. For instance, global corporate actors and their local subsidiaries 
are very active with respect to the protection of intellectual property rights. Pressure 
group litigation is also prevalent. Through their litigious approach, NGOs, such as the 
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), have secured some court victories over the 
government on HIV/AIDS-related issues, which concern the TRIPS agreement.
The increasingly influential black middle class is partly the driver and certainly the 
focus of the government’s Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) programme, which 
permeates virtually every aspect of the government policy.55 The Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU), one of the tripartite-alliance that forms the ANC- 
led government56, has also been the driver of the labour laws passed by the ANC 
government since 199457. However, in the context of the traditional definition of 
interest group capture, there is little evidence of such in South Africa. The 
government’s overall attitude is shaped by policy considerations.
52 See http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/incr/polity/safl.htm.
53 Keet (2005).
54 Ibid.
55 Apart from redressing past injustices under apartheid, the government is using the BEE initiative to 
create the “missing middle” in South Africa (see “In search of the ‘missing middle’”, Mail & 
Guardian, 10.4.2003)
56 The alliance is made up o f the ANC, COSATU and the South African Communist Party (SACP).
57 The web of labour legislation is blamed for the rigidity of the South African labour market, which in 
turn is partly blamed for the high unemployment rate (IMF, 2005).
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South Africa’s Trade Policy Framework
South Africa’s trade policy was, for much of the 1970s and early 1980s, underpinned 
by the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategy.58 However, by the late 
1980s, there was a consensus among key political and business actors, including ANC 
politicians59, that a policy of trade liberalisation should replace the highly distorted 
system of protection. The early 1990s marked the beginning of serious attempts at 
trade liberalisation, a trend that continued following the end of apartheid rule in 
1 9 9 4  60 s ince then, South Africa has been characterised by a more open economy61 
and diversification of the structure of trade and foreign direct investment .
The underlying objectives of South Africa’s economic and trade policies remain 
strongly in favour of export-led growth and increased foreign direct investment. This 
has been the policy thrust since 1994, and was reinforced by the Growth Economic 
and Reconstruction (GEAR) policy framework of 1996 and the Global Economic 
Strategy document of 2000. Even the government’s recent Accelerated and Shared 
Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA), which is aimed at addressing domestic 
structural problems, stresses external trade orientation and international exposure.64 
Increased FDI and export trade are linked to the competitiveness of South Africa’s 
industries, economic growth, and job creation.65
58 Marais, (2001; Gelb, (1991).
59 In the 1980s, the ANC was threatening a socialist reconstruction of post-apartheid South Africa, with 
a policy of nationalisation. However, moderate and influential voices in the party prevailed on the 
leadership to back away from such a policy. Moderates, such as Alec Erwin, who later became Minister 
of Trade and Industry (and now Minister for Public Enterprises) under the ANC-led government, and 
Trevor Manuel, first Minister of Trade and, since 1996, Minister of Finance, were liberalisers, who 
supported the substantial lowering of protective tariffs as well as a constitutional guarantee for the 
independence of the Reserve Bank, South Africa’s Central Bank (Marais, 2001; Gelb, 1991).
60 For a discussion of the different phases of trade reform in South Africa, see Cassim et al (1993)
61 For instance, South Africa’s share of total trade to GDP increased from 36.71% in 1992 to an 
average of 56% between 2002 and 2004 (WTO, 2006)
62 The share of manufacturing in total exports was 65% in 2004, while fuels and mining products 
accounted for 27% and agriculture 7.9%.http://stat.wto.org/CountrvProfile/ZA_e.htm. (accessed 
7/6/2006)
63 Although South Africa is underperforming in terms of foreign direct investment, having attracted 
only between $0.5 -  0.9bn in 2003 as well as 2004, it leads the rest of Africa in terms of FDI outflows, 
as a result of cross-border acquisitions by trans-national corporations from South Africa, following an 
increasingly liberalised outward investment policy in the country (UNCTAD, 2005)
64 The ASGISA promises government interventions to address, inter alia, the issues of skills shortages, 
poverty and to eliminate the “second economy”. There will, however, be “no shift in economic policy”, 
based on macroeconomic stability and export orientation. The ASGISA document is available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/asgisa/asgisa.htm#top (accessed 18/6/2006).
65 See the Economic Cluster media briefing by Alec Erwin, in which he said the aim of the 
government’s economic policy was, inter alia, “to grow the economy” through a four-pronged
70
However, South Africa’s poor social indicators66 have, in recent years, been a 
constant source of domestic pressure for trade protection and direct government
(siintervention to address the social problems. The growing feeling is that while trade 
liberalisation may have boosted growth, it has not created that many jobs. The poor 
socio-economic circumstances and the government’s policy and regulatory responses 
to them are likely to make full compliance with certain WTO agreements particularly 
difficult. Recent attempts to slow down the pace of liberalisation, as well as South 
Africa’s more defensive positions in the on-going Doha Round negotiations on issues 
such as TRIPS, GATS69 and agriculture are clearly driven by competing domestic 
policy objectives.
Yet, given South Africa’s strong desire for market access and FDI, the government is 
acutely aware of the reputational costs of any significant defection from international 
economic norms. In 2003, a leaked draft version of the mining sector’s Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) charter prompted an exodus of portfolio investment 
in mining shares following rumours that the government would nationalise the sector. 
Threats of disinvestment by foreign banks and insurance companies also dogged the
70preparation of the BEE charter for the financial sector. The government responded 
by adopting a more cautious and consultative approach.
Thus, while South Africa’s regulatory responses to some domestic socio-economic 
conditions may lead to partial or delayed compliance with certain WTO obligations, 
its behaviour is also likely to be conditioned and constrained by exogenous factors,
approach that include increased levels of investment and exports: 
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/0502171411510001 .htm.
66 While South Africa has recorded macroeconomic and financial successes, thanks to sound policies 
and a favourable external environment, it faces challenges in terms of high unemployment, persistent 
inequalities, widespread poverty and high prevalence of HIV/AIDS (IMF, 2005 Article IV 
Consultation).
67 The rhetoric of ministers is actually in favour of targeted intervention to address the socio-economic 
problems. See, for instance, speech by Minister of Trade, Mr M Mpahlwa to Parliament on 16 
December 2005: http//www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/05021714451003.htm.
68 Employment still remains at 26%, although this is an improvement over the 32% of some years ago.
69 For instance, South Africa’s reluctance to join a consensus on GATS negotiations almost led to the 
collapse of the Hong Kong Ministerial conference of the WTO. South Africa led a coalition of 
countries such as Kenya, Jamaica, Venezuela and Cuba, which demanded that the draft text be changed 
to make it easier for countries essentially to opt out of the services negotiations and shield domestic 
industries. The group threatened to block a consensus on the entire Hong Kong declaration, (various 
media reports, e.g. New York Times, December 19, 2005).
70 See Reg Rumney, “Government treads policy tightrope” (Business Day, 24th January 2003)
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such the fear of upsetting international investors and its major trading partners. 
Globalisation or market forces are thus useful explanatory variables. The next section 
considers South Africa’s participation and activities in the multilateral trading system.
South Africa and the GATT-WTO system
Uruguay Round Participation and Commitments
South Africa’s initial participation in the Uruguay Round was weak due to the fact 
that it was still under apartheid rule, which led to domestic hostility and international 
isolation. However, following the commencement of the transitional negotiations 
between the apartheid government and the ANC in 1990, South Africa re-entered the 
Uruguay Round negotiations more actively under the auspices of the National 
Economic Forum (NEF) and the Transitional Government.
Socialisation engendered by the transitional negotiations , ideological shift within 
the ANC itself, as well as acceptance of stark economic realities were factors that 
caused the party to abandon its socialist rhetoric in support of the unilateral economic 
and trade reforms introduced by the apartheid regime in the early 1990s. This 
unilateral liberalisation played a major role in shaping South Africa’s offers in the 
Round. According to the GATT:
South Africa “looks to its results to support its own restructuring efforts, especially in 
improved market access for processed mineral products, light manufactures and agriculture. It 
also views the Round as an avenue for cementing the emerging change in policy direction, 
particularly with respect to lowering and binding tariffs”.74
South Africa’s offer made to the WTO in 1994 involved comprehensive trade policy 
reform. For instance, 96.5% of tariff lines in all products were bound, with 100% 
binding coverage for agricultural products and 96% for non-agricultural products (see
71 Keet (2005) argues that “South Africa’s positions in the WTO have mostly been characterised by a 
notable cautiousness, a general concern not to challenge but rather to re-assure the majors” (p. 11).
72 One of the representatives of business during the transitional negotiations was quoted as saying of 
the ANC’s positional shift: “[negotiation works. Rhetoric is dropped and reality prevails. The 
chemistry of negotiations changes people’s perception in the negotiating forum” (see Bond, 2002, p.57)
73 For a discussion of the interplay of forces that led the ANC to abandon its threat of a socialist 
reconstruction of post-apartheid in favour of a more pragmatic acceptance of the realities of the market 
economy, see, e.g. Gelb (1998); Marais (2001); Bond (2002).
74 GATT, 1993, p.45.
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Table 1). South Africa’s simple average tariff level dropped to 19%, with 40% on 
agricultural, and 16% on non-agricultural, products. South Africa’s tariff 
commitments are the strongest in Africa, and even stronger than those of some of the 
major developing countries, such as India and Mexico (table 1). However, like most 
developing countries, South Africa has large gaps between its bound and applied 
(actual) rates.75
Table 1: MFN bound and applied tariffs: selected developing countries
Binding coverage (% 
All Agr Non-agr
Simple average (%) 
(bound)
All Agr. Non-agr
Simple average (%) 
(applied: 2002)
All Agr. Non-agr
Total Average (%) 
Bound Applied
South Africa 96.5 99.5 96.0 19.1 39.8 15.8 5.8 9.1 5J 25 7
Other Africa:
Angola 100 100 100 59.2 58.8 60.1
00 
oo 9.7 8.7 59 9
Egypt 98.8 99.7 98.7 37.2 95.3 28.3 19.9 22.8 19.4 53 21
Nigeria 19.3 100 6.9 118.4 150 48.8 30 53.9 26.3 105 37
Other developing: 
Brazil 100 100 100 31.4 35.5 30.8 13.8 11.7 14.1 33 13
Chile 100 100 100 25.1 26.0 25.0 6.0 6.0 5.9 25 6
China 100 100 100 10.0 15.8 9.1 12.4 19.2 11.3 12 14
India 73.8 100 69.8 49.8 114.5 34.3 29.0 36.9 27.7 66 31
Mexico 100 100 100 34.9 35.1 34.9 18.0 24.5 17.1 35 19
Source: WTO (2006)
In addition to these GATT obligations, South Africa is also bound under the Single 
Undertaking principle by all the other multilateral agreements of the WTO, including 
the TRIPS Agreement and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 
where South Africa made specific commitments.76 A striking feature of South 
Africa’s Uruguay Round participation is that it negotiated as a developed country and
7 7thus has developed-country status in the WTO. Developed-country status means that
75 Large gaps between bound and applied rates mean that a country can move up and down within the 
bound level without being in legal breach of its obligation under Article II of the GATT. In Argentina -  
Textiles and Apparel, the Appellate Body held that provided that the duties imposed by a member are 
within the upper limited stated in its Schedule of concessions, it is not in breach of Article 11.1(b) of the 
GATT (Appellate Body Report, Argentina -  Measures Affecting Imports o f Footwear, Textiles and 
Apparel and Other Items, WT/DS56/AB/R, adopted 22 April 1998). In trade policy terms, such 
arbitrary adjustments create uncertainty, but crucially the Appellate Body has rejected the notion of 
“legitimate expectations”, saying that the only legitimate expectations of a trading partner are with 
regard to bound tariffs (see Appellate Body Report, European Communities -  Customs Classification 
o f Computer Equipment, WT/DS62/AB/R, adopted 22 June 1998).
76 South Africa’s compliance with its GATS obligations is briefly examined in chapter 6.
77 Many current ANC policy makers argued that having developed-country status in the WTO ignored 
the striking duality of the South African economy and society (interview, Pretoria, 2003). However, 
some who opposed it at the time later felt that “South Africa was fortunate to be treated as a developed 
country, by and large, for the purposes of the Uruguay Round negotiations” because it enabled the 
country to undertake deep reforms (Hirsch in Krueger ed, 1998, p.394)
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South Africa cannot invoke or benefit from the various Special and Differential 
Treatment (SDT) provisions in the WTO agreements.
Post-Uruguay Round Attitude
South Africa attitude to the WTO has been generally positive. Government officials
no
believe that multilateralism is the appropriate response to globalisation. 
Furthermore, a rules-based multilateral system offers the best protection for small 
states in their economic interactions with the major powers. It is thus in the country’s
70best interests to be fully engaged in the WTO. Despite its normative commitment to 
multilateralism, South Africa believes that the GATT-WTO system is imperfect, 
arguing that the outcome of the Uruguay Round reflected the concerns and interests of 
the industrialised countries.80
Thus, to South Africa, the Doha Round should be an opportunity to amend the 
imbalances and inequities existing in current WTO Agreements and to address 
decisively developmental issues.81 South Africa has also called for a renegotiation of 
provisions of the WTO agreements in areas where it has specific interests, such as 
anti-dumping, subsidies and intellectual property rights.
South Africa belongs to some of the key developing country coalitions in the WTO,
O -J  Q A
including the G20 , the Cairns Group , and the African Group. Furthermore, despite 
its avowed commitment to multilateralism, South Africa has also embarked on fairly 
aggressive strategy to conclude several bilateral and regional free trade arrangements
78 For instance, South Africa’s former trade minister, Alec Erwin, argues that the challenges posed by 
globalisation required new multilateral rules to manage its consequences {Business Day 13/06/2001)
79 Government officials underscore this by referring to the statement of former President Mandela 
during the event marking the 50th Anniversary of the GATT-WTO trading system in 1998. In the 
statement, cited in the WTO booklet, entitled, Doha Declarations, Mr Mandela said: “(w)e are firmly 
of the belief that the existence of the GATT, and now the World Trade Organisation, as a rules-based 
system, provides the foundation on which our deliberations can build in order to improve ...”
80 Alec Erwin: http://www.businessdav.co.za?Articles/TarkArticle.aspx?ID=142834 (19/10/2005)
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 The G20, formed during the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico, in 2003, is a coalition 
of countries pressing for ambitious reforms of agriculture in developed countries with some flexibility 
for developing countries. It is led by Brazil and consists of countries such as China, India, Egypt and 
Nigeria.
84 The Caims Group, formed in 1986 in Cairns, Australia, is a group of agricultural exporting nations 
lobbying for agricultural trade liberalisation.
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(FTAs). These linkages are likely to play a role in shaping the country’s compliance 
with its WTO obligations. The next part of this chapter focuses on the domestic 
structures and processes for trade governance in Nigeria.
Nigeria’s Domestic Structures and Processes 
Institutional Framework for Trade Policy
Constitutional, Legal and Regulatory Structures
or
Nigeria’s current Constitution was created in 1999 . The Constitution explicitly 
assigns responsibilities among the federal, state and local governments. The Executive 
Legislative List (ELL) contains 45 items upon which only the federal government
87may legislate , while the Concurrent List (CL) contains 29 items on which both the
OQ
federal and state governments may legislate. The Residual List contains matters 
reserved for state or local governments. However, federal law supersedes any state or 
local government law, where any inconsistency arises between a federal law and
OQ
state/local government legislation.
The extent of state governments’ involvement in Nigeria’s economic management is 
limited. All key economic decisions are taken at the national level. For instance, the 
exclusive legislative list excludes almost every important economic policy issue, 
including “international trade and commerce” from the control of sub-federal 
governments.90 Although “industrial, commercial or agricultural development” comes 
within the concurrent list, state laws that are inconsistent with federal legislation in 
these areas would be void. Furthermore, all civil causes and matters relating to
85 This chapter does not discuss South Africa’s regional trade agreements. Suffice it to say, however, 
that in additional to its traditional economic ties with its neighbours under the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU) and the Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC), South Africa 
has trade agreements with a number of other countries. Its most comprehensive free trade agreement 
(FTA) to date is, however, with the European Union, under the Trade and Development Cooperation 
Agreement (TDCA), which entered into force on 1 January 2000. The TDCA was notified to the 
WTO’s Committee on Regional Trade Agreements in November 2000. See WTO document 
WT/REG113/N/1 of 21 November 2000. South Africa also benefits from preferential trade with the US 
under African Growth Opportunities Act (AGOA).
86 Nigeria’s Constitution is available at: http://www.nigeria-law.org.
87 See Second Schedule, Part I, of the Constitution.
88 Part II, Second Schedule
89 Section 4(5) of the Constitution.
90 The list includes, for instance, all areas if intellectual property rights, trade and commerce.
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virtually all subject matters of international economic or commercial relations are 
placed under the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.91
To this extent, the implementation of Nigeria’s WTO obligations is constitutionally 
unaffected by the federal-state structure. Thus, the “federal clauses” in WTO law 
appear to have no relevance in the case of Nigeria, given that the “implementation of 
treaties relating to matters on the list”, which cover almost every area of WTO 
agreements, is itself exclusively reserved for the federal authorities.
The Role o f Parliament, Courts and Other Organs o f State
The Constitution also separates powers between the Executive and the Legislative 
branches of government. A bill becomes law only after the National Assembly has 
passed it and the President has assented to it, or in the event of the President 
withholding his assent, after each House has again passed the bill by two-thirds 
majority. The relationship between the Executive and the Legislature is, however, 
often very frosty because of Nigeria’s relatively young democracy94 and the failure of 
the two arms of government to delineate the boundaries of their respective authorities.
According to Polity IV, in its 2003 country report, Nigeria’s score on the executive 
constraints indicator, which measures the ability of the Executive to have its bills 
passed relatively smoothly by the legislature, was 5 out of a maximum score of 10. 
This compares less favourably to South Africa’s score of 7. Relatively few bills have 
been passed into law since 1999 when Nigeria returned to democracy after decades of 
military rule.95 In January 2006, the President wrote to the National Assembly, 
expressing concerns that at least 24 executive bills critical to the economic reforms 
had been “outstanding for so long”, and pleaded for priority to be given to the passage 
of these bills.96
91 See section 251 of the Constitution.
92 Part I, Second Schedule.
93 Section 58(5) of the Constitution.
94 Nigeria had been under military dictatorship for 28 out of its 45 years of independence from Britain 
in October 1960. It has, however, enjoyed uninterrupted democracy since May 1999.
95 For instance, a total of 459 bills were read on the floor of the Senate and House of Representatives 
between June 1999 and January 2005; while 179 bills were read between February and December 2005 
(http://www.nassnig.ng/bills'). Yet, only 20 bills have been enacted into law since 1999 
(http://www.nigeria-law.org').
96 See: http://www.thisdavonline.com/nview.php?=40181 (accessed 8/2/2006)
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As a dualist state, no treaty has the force of law in Nigeria except to the extent to
Q7 •which the National Assembly has enacted any such treaty into law. Nigeria signed 
the Marrakech Agreement Establishing the WTO in December 1994 along with other 
GATT Contracting Parties.98 However, to date, the Agreement has not been ratified 
by Parliament or incorporated into the domestic law. As a result, the legal status of 
WTO obligations in the Nigeria’s domestic law is not clearly established. The clear 
implication is that notwithstanding Nigeria’s accession to the WTO treaty, traders and 
investors cannot invoke WTO provisions in domestic courts.
Although the Constitution states, in section 19, that Nigeria’s foreign policy 
objectives “shall be ...(d) respect for international law and treaty obligations ...”, this 
provision does not appear to override section 12 on the implementation of treaties, 
since under this section only treaties ratified by Nigeria’s Parliament or given 
recognition by the enactment of relevant acts of parliament constitute Nigeria’s treaty 
obligations.99 Although the Nigerian courts will generally respect international 
conventions100, the Constitution does not explicitly provide for the principle of 
consistent interpretation.101 Furthermore, given Nigeria’s legal pluralism, its legal 
system is very complex.
In sum, Nigeria’s constitutional provision on the status of treaties in domestic law is 
narrow. This is unlikely to induce Nigeria’s compliance with its WTO obligations. 
Neither by incorporation nor direct application nor as aid to interpretation does WTO 
law appear to have any force of law in Nigeria. Furthermore, although there are
97 See s. 12(1) of the Constitution.
98 See GATT document Let/1957, 7 December 1994.
99 For instance, in General Sani Abacha & three Others v Chief Gani Fawehinmi [2000] SC, the 
Supreme Court held that the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights Treaty was not superior to 
the Constitution of Nigeria, and has no force of law in Nigeria
100 For the response of Nigeria’s courts to international economic law, see Belgore (1994) in Sodipo 
and Fagbemi (eds) (1994).
101 Section 233 of the South African Constitution provides for such principle. It is also a principle of 
statutory interpretation under the English law to prefer reasonable interpretation that is consistent with 
international law. See: Salomon v Commissioners o f Customs and Excise [1967]2 QB116. The US has 
the same principle: see The American Law Institute, Restatement o f the Law, Foreign Law of the US, 
1987, cited in Jackson (1998)
102 The sources of Nigerian law are the constitution, legislation, English law, customary law, Islamic 
law and judicial precedents. Although English law has a tremendous influence on the legal system, the 
multiple sources of law make the system complex. See: Obilade (1979) and “Guide to Nigerian Legal 
Information”, available at: http://www.nvulawglobal.org/globalex/Nigeria.htm (accessed 10/7/2006).
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several laws and regulations relevant to trade in Nigeria103, virtually all of these 
predate the WTO Agreements and none has, so far, been specifically amended to 
bring Nigeria into conformity with its treaty obligations under these agreements.
National Trade Decision-making and Surveillance Mechanisms
Governmental Structure
The Ministry of Commerce is the lead government body charged with the 
responsibility of formulating and implementing trade policy, and for preparing 
Nigeria for international trade negotiations. The Ministries of Industries and Finance, 
as well as government agencies such as the Central Bank and the Nigerian Customs 
Service, offer policy inputs and have some jurisdiction over trade and trade-related 
issues. For instance, the Ministry of Finance determines the tariff levels within its 
fiscal policy, and controls the Tariff Review Board, which deals with tariff petitions 
and review.
The External Trade Department (ETD) of the Ministry of Commerce is responsible 
for Nigeria’s external trade relations and participation in the WTO. The Nigerian 
WTO Mission in Geneva, known as the Nigerian Trade Office, is the overseas arm of 
the ETD. Its staff strength is pegged at six, but only four of these have delegate 
status, i.e. able to attend WTO meetings.104 The Trade Office suffers acute capacity 
constraints limiting its ability to participate in any effective manner in ongoing 
negotiations in the WTO. Coordination between the Geneva Mission and the capital 
in Abuja is also particularly poor. The flow of information is largely from Geneva to 
Abuja, with little or no feedback from the capital.105
Trade Policy Coordination and capacity
The mechanism for trade policy coordination within the government is usually 
through inter-ministerial meetings/committees coordinated by the Federal Ministry of 
Commerce. In August 2001, the government inaugurated an Enlarged National Focal
103 See Trade Policy o f Nigeria (2002), pp 85-88, for laws and regulations that directly or indirectly 
impinge on the trading system in Nigeria.
104 The Trade Office also handles all trade-related activities in Geneva, such as the activities of the 
World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), UNCTAD and the International Trade Centre (ITC).
105 Jerome (2005).
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Point (ENFP)106 to “provide Nigeria with an institutional framework for the effective 
coordination of the country’s participation in international trade negotiations, 
particularly the WTO.”107 This is in addition to the National Council on Trade, which 
meets once a year to coordinate trade policy formulation and implementation among 
the ministries and nationally.
However, despite these initiatives, trade policy coordination in Nigeria is extremely 
poor. For instance, since its re-launch in 2001, the ENFP met three times within that 
year in preparation for the 4th WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, and no other 
meeting was held until July 2003 in the run-up to the WTO Cancun Ministerial 
Conference. Preparations for the 2005 Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong did not 
commence until three months before the conference.
To be sure, Nigeria suffers from acute trade resource and capacity deficits.108 
However, these are a reflection of the country’s wider institutional weaknesses. 
Nigeria’s ratings on the key governance indicators are very low. On government 
effectiveness, the Kaufmann 2004 ratings109 gave Nigeria a point estimate110 of -1.02, 
while UNCTAD, in its 2005 Trade and Development Index (TDI) gave Nigeria a 
score of 1 (from a scale of 0-4) on the indicator of bureaucratic quality.
On corruption, the Transparency International (TI) index for 2005111 gave Nigeria a
119score of 1.9 points out of the maximum points of 10. Nigeria’s country ranking was
152 out of 158, making it, even with recent improvement, the sixth most corrupt
country in the world. UNCTAD’s score for Nigeria on the corruption indicator is 1 
11 ^
(from a scale of 0-6). Nigeria’s record on the rule of law and domestic legality is
106 Earlier, in 1994, the National Focal Point (NFP) was established to oversee Nigeria’s participation 
in the WTO and the implementation of its obligations. However, the body was moribund. The 
inauguration of the ENFP was an attempt to make the NFP active and functional.
107 The Minister o f Commerce in an address delivered at the inauguration of the enhanced NFP on 16 
August 2001.
108 Jerome (2005) captures the depth of Nigeria’s trade capacity deficits.
109 See http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/govemance/pubs/govmatters4.html
110 The indicator can take values between -2.5 and 2.5, with the higher value representing better 
institutions.
111 Global Corruption Report (2006), Transparency International.
112 10 equals “highly clean”, while 0 is “highly corrupt”.
113 UNCTAD (2005)
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also extremely poor.114 According to the USTR, “the sanctity of contracts is often 
violated, and Nigeria’s court system for settling commercial disputes is weak and 
sometimes biased”.115 Nigeria’s civil service is bloated, corrupt and inefficient. About 
70% of Nigeria’s civil servants belong to the unskilled, non-graduate levels, while 
over 60% are within the age brackets of 40 years and above.116
Trade Consultative and Surveillance Mechanisms
Government departments and agencies dominate trade policy formulation and 
implementation in Nigeria. The involvement of civil society or research institutes is 
virtually non-existent. According to Polity IV country report in 2003, Nigeria scored 2
117points out of 10 in the category of institutional structure for political expression. 
This suggests weak civil society participation in the policy process. In theory, non­
state actors, such as the Organised Private Sector (OPS)118, can participate in the trade 
decision process through the National Council on Commerce (NCC), the highest body 
where trade policy and issues are discussed. However, this formal process is 
ineffective, and lobbying and ad hoc interventions tend to be the preferred means of 
influencing policy.119
Nigeria’s trade regime relies more on administrative fiat rather than legislation to 
implement policies.120 As a result, special interest groups clamouring for more 
protection have frequently been able to bypass civil servants to secure trade restrictive 
measures often directly from the President.121 Trade policy dialogue, where it takes 
place at all, often excludes other non-governmental actors.122 In sum, the trade policy 
capacity, coordination and dialogue essential for building domestic support for WTO
114 For instance, Nigeria’s rule of law score in the Kaufmann ratings was -1.41 (values between -2.5 
and 2.5), while, according to Doing Business (World Bank, 2005), enforcing a contract in Nigerian 
court would normally take 730 days, making Nigeria the eight slowest of the 145 countries surveyed. 
Nigeria also had the worst record with respect to property registration.
115 USTR (2005).
116 The Head of the Federal Civil Service of Nigeria, Alhaji Yayale Ahmed, in an article entitled 
“Nigeria’s Civil Servants Aging” (ThisDay newspaper, 18 June 2002).
117 See http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/politv/nig 1 .htm.
118 The OPS includes: the Manufacturing Association of Nigeria (MAN); the National Association of 
Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture (NACCIMA); Association of Nigerian 
Exporters; National Association of Small Scale Industrialists; banking institutions; labour unions; and 
professional associations.
1)9 Jerome (2005).
120 IMF (2005)
121 Ministry of Commerce officials complain that this undermines their authority (interview, 2003).
122 WTO (2005).
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law are lacking. Attention now shifts to actual trade policies and practices, as shown 
by the policy framework and Nigeria’s participation in the multilateral trading system.
Nigeria’s Trade Policy Framework
Since 2003, Nigeria has embarked on comprehensive macro-economic and public 
sector reforms under the National Economic Empowerment and Development 
Strategy - NEEDS. However, the economic reforms are not complemented by 
Nigeria’s trade policy regime, which, according to the IMF, is “one of the most 
restrictive in the world”.124 In its 2005 Trade Policy Review of Nigeria, the WTO 
noted that Nigeria’s trade policy has not matched its economic reforms, and that
1 *>c
“since its last TPR in 1998, Nigeria trade regime has become more protective.” 
Indeed, the 2006 Index of Economic Freedom126 gave Nigeria the worst score of 5
1 9 7points, suggesting an extremely closed external trade sector.
With an average trade to GDP ratio of 67% from 2002 to 2004128, Nigeria can be 
described as a trading nation, where trade openness is defined in terms of total trade 
(imports and exports) as a percentage of GDP. However, unlike South Africa, with a 
continuing rise in the share of manufactures in total merchandise exports (65% in 
2004), the lion’s share of Nigeria’s merchandise exports is crude petroleum, which
1 9 0accounted for 97.9% in 2004, while manufactures accounted for just 2%.
Nigeria is Africa’s largest oil producer and the 6th largest exporter in the world.130 Its 
non-oil exports on a per capita basis, over the past decade, amounted to only 1 percent 
of the world’s average -  the fourth-lowest share in the world.131 As the IMF puts it, 
“Nigeria -  with more than 2 percent of the world’s population -  has a share of the
123 The NEEDS document is available at http://www.nigerianeconomv.com.
124 IMF (2005)
125 See WTO document WT/TPR/S/147.
126 The Index of Economic Freedom, published annually by the Wall Street Journal and the Heritage 
Foundation, measures countries against a list of independent variables divided into broad factors of 
economic freedom.
127 The scores range from 1-5 points, with 1 being the most desirable and 5 the worst. See note 99 
above.
128 http://stat.wto.org/CountrvProfiles/NG e.htm.
129 Ibid.
130 Current crude oil reserves are estimated at 31.5 billion barrels, with a daily output of about 2 million 
barrels.
131 Total exports of goods and services less oil exports for countries classified as fuel exporters in 
World Economic Outlook (WEO). According to the IMF, among 178 countries for which data are 
available, only Burundi, Ethiopia, and Rwanda had lower non-oil exports than Nigeria (IMF, 2005).
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world’s exports of about l/3rd of 1 percent, of which 90 percent is oil and gas 
exports”.132
Although Nigeria was the largest recipient of FDI in Africa in 2004 and has 
consistently attracted FDI flows within the range of $2bn annually133, the composition 
of its FDI inflows has not shifted significantly away from the natural resources or 
extractive sector, which has consistently accounted for about 90% of FDI inflows to 
the country. Indeed, as the IMF put it, “(e)xcept for investment in the oil and gas 
sectors, foreign investors have been largely absent from Nigeria”.134
The foregoing suggests that Nigeria’s global economic interests are largely limited to 
the world oil trade sector. The dominance of oil in the Nigerian external trade is 
clearly a major influence on its trade policy. Furthermore, the lack of effective 
export interests outside the oil and gas sector means that Nigeria has limited stakes in 
the WTO, which does not regulate global oil trade.136 Given a long-term policy 
objective to protect domestic industries and pursue import substitution strategies, the 
restraints imposed by international trade laws are unlikely to play any significant role 
in inducing Nigeria’s good faith fulfilment of its WTO obligations. Attention now 
shifts to Nigeria’s participation and activities in the multilateral trading system.
Nigeria and the GATT-WTO System
Uruguay Round Participation and Commitments
Nigeria became a Contracting Party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT 1947) at independence in I960.137 However, like most other developing
132 IMF (2005).
133 UNCTAD (2005).
134 Ibid. However, recent reforms have attracted some foreign investments into the telecommunications 
and financial sectors.
135 Indeed, oil has widely been described as a curse rather than a blessing for Nigeria. A recent IMF 
Working Paper, “Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria” (July 2003) 
attributes the poor performance of the Nigerian economy over the last three decades to the discovery of 
oil. It argues that some natural resources, particularly oil and gas, exert a negative and non-linear 
impact on growth via their deleterious impact on institutional quality.
136 Okoh (2004) argues that Nigeria’s non-oil export is price and income inelastic and, therefore, global 
integration is unlikely to result in improvement in the non-oil sector. According to the author, “(t)he 
greater openness of the Nigerian economy due to the implementation of the WTO agreements seems to 
be hurting the economy”.
137 As a former British colony, it was not obliged to engage in accession negotiations, but rather 
became a contracting party through sponsorship under Article XXVI, which was designed to facilitate 
the accession process for former colonies
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countries, it did not participate actively in the old GATT. Indeed, during the entire life 
of the GATT, Nigeria made only few firm commitments: it bound only one tariff item 
(stockfish) and was a signatory to two Tokyo Round plurilateral Agreements, namely, 
Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat and Agreement on Import Licensing 
Procedures. Nigeria’s participation in the Uruguay Round negotiations was also
11Qweak at the beginning , although it later participated actively in some negotiations, 
particularly those on the formulation of international rules on exports of domestically 
prohibited goods and other hazardous substances.140
Evidence from the negotiating history of the Uruguay Round, however, shows that 
Nigeria was generally not supportive of the direction of the negotiations on most of 
the issues, and appeared unhappy with the outcomes. In his statement at the GATT 
Ministerial meeting in Brussels in December 1990, the Nigerian Trade Minister 
warned against “the danger of running too fast in unfamiliar terrain”, and complained 
that Nigeria was being required “to make contributions inconsistent with our level of 
development”.141 This suggests that the outcomes of the negotiations did not represent 
the ex ante preference of Nigeria.142
Nigeria’s Uruguay Round negotiations were conducted under an authoritarian military 
regime, which shunned policy dialogue with key stakeholders.143 As a result, 
Nigeria’s negotiating position and offer lacked crucial domestic legitimacy or local 
ownership. Indeed, it was widely believed that the military regime, which was at the 
time facing international isolation because of its human and civil rights abuses, signed 
the Marrakech Agreement to buy off international support. As the former Chairman of 
House Committee on Industries put it, “when that government found itself in the
138 GATT (1991).
139 Indeed, until 1990, four years into the Uruguay Round negotiations, Nigeria had no national 
mechanism for the formulation of its positions on critical issues in the negotiations (Agah, 2003).
140 One of the issues that Nigeria pushed strongly during the Uruguay Round negotiations was the ban 
on domestically prohibited goods (see, for instance, document MTN.TNC/W/39). Nigeria was also 
active in the Negotiating Group on Tropical Products. However, these issues did not make it to the final 
agreement.
141 See document MTN.TNC/MIN(90)/ST/34 of 4 December 1990.
142 Nigeria’s view contrasted with that of the South African Minister of Finance, Trade and Industry, 
who stated: “I believe that the implementation of the results of the Uruguay Round will enhance 
international trade and that they will stand South Africa in good stead” (See GATT document 
MTN.TNC/MIN(94)/ST/99 of 14 April 1994.
143 According to the Chairman of the Nigerian Textile Manufacturers Association, “when we gave a 
presentation to the then minister (about the Uruguay Round), he said ‘the government has made up its 
mind’” {This Day, 20 March 2001)
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throes of international economic sanctions, it used the WTO to win political
144support.
Many Nigerian commentators argue that the country made commitments beyond its 
administrative and institutional capacity to implement.145 However, with respect to 
tariffs, Nigeria actually made largely symbolic concessions. It made only a minimal 
attempt to deepen the level of tariff binding during the Uruguay Round negotiations. 
Nigeria stated in its 1991 Trade Policy Review in the GATT that while it agreed in 
principle with tariff binding, “such action must be commensurate with the need to 
protect developing industries”.146
Table 2: MFN bound and applied tariffs: selected developing countries
Binding coverage (% 
All Agr Non-agr
Simple average (%) 
(bound)
All Agr. Non-agr
Simple average (%) 
(applied: 2002)
All Agr. Non-agr
Total Average (%) 
Bound Applied
Nigeria
Other Africa:
19.3 100 6.9 118.4 150 48.8 30 53.9 26.3 105 37
Angola 100 100 100 59.2 58.8 60.1 8.8 9.7 8.7 60 9
Egypt 98.8 99.7 98.7 37.2 95.3 28.3 19.9 22.8 19.4 54 21
Kenya 14.6 100 1.6 95.7 100 54.8 17 20 16.6 80 18
South Africa 96.5 99.5 96.0 19.1 39.8 15.8 5.8 9.1 5.3 25 7
Source: WTO (2006)
The binding offer that it made clearly reflected this thinking (see Table 2). For 
instance, only 19% of tariff lines in all products were bound, with 100% on 
agricultural products, and only a mere 7% on non-agricultural products. Nigeria’s 
total average bound rate is considerably high at 105%, while there are large gaps 
between bound and applied rates. Under the Single Undertaking principle, Nigeria is 
also bound by the other WTO agreements, including the TRIPS Agreement (discussed 
in chapter 5) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services, where Nigeria made 
limited commitments.147
Post-Uruguay Round Attitude
Nigeria attitude’s to the WTO has been mixed. Although it has participated in all the 
Rounds, its behaviour has not suggested a strong normative commitment to the 
organisation. For instance, Nigeria did not pay its annual subscription to the WTO for
144 ThisDay, 18 April 2001.
145 Jerome (2005).
146 GATT (1991, p.5)
147 Nigeria’s GATS commitments and implementation is briefly discussed in chapter 6.
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five years (2000-2005), and only paid up shortly before the Hong Kong Ministerial
14ftConference due largely to the carrot-and-stick strategy adopted by the WTO. 
Nigeria was appointed a Vice-Chairman for the Ministerial Conference, but WTO 
officials made it clear that it could be denied the honour unless it paid up its dues. 
After enormous diplomatic pressure, Nigeria finally paid up a few days before the 
conference.149
Nigeria is a member of all the developing country coalitions, set up either to resist 
pressure to make market access concessions or to put pressure on the developed 
countries to open up their own markets and extend preferences for developing country 
exports. For instance, it is a member of the G-33, also called “Friends of Special 
Products” in agriculture, and belongs to the G-90 coalition, the Africa Group, the 
ACP Group and the LDC Group150, all of which wanted the Doha Round to focus 
decisively on developmental issues. Unlike South Africa, Nigeria has not pursued any 
serious FT A strategy.151
Nigeria’s attitude to the WTO is set in the mould of the 1970s agitation for a new 
international economic order (NIEO)152, which called for a radical restructuring of the
1 ^ 3rules and institutions of international economic law. The general feeling is that the 
world trading system is unfair, inequitable and unjust; and therefore, does not serve 
the best interests of the country. Section 19 of the Constitution explicitly states that 
Nigeria’s foreign policy object “shall” include, inter alia, “(a) promotion and 
protection of the national interest ... and (e) promotion of a just world economic
148 Nigeria’s contribution to the WTO budget was 0.172% in 2006, compared to South Africa’s 0.466% 
during the same period, see: http://stat.wto.org.
149 In March 2006, Nigeria’s WTO Ambassador, F Y Agah, was appointed as chairman of the Council 
for Trade in Goods, one of WTO’s main decision-making bodies. This is a remarkable political or 
diplomatic gesture, considering Nigeria’s less than positive attitude the WTO.
150 The ACP represents African, Caribbean and Pacific countries; while the LDC stands for least- 
developed countries.
151 Its main regional trade agreement is with the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS). It, however, also enjoys preferential trade with the US under the AGOA and is currently 
participating as part of the ECOWAS group in negotiations for a reciprocal economic partnership 
agreement (EPA) with the EU. Although there are sundry other trade agreements with many other 
countries, these are by no means comprehensive and are not fully-fledged FTAs.
152 Indeed, in embracing the NIEO, Nigeria enacted various indigenisation laws from 1972 to 1989, 
requiring foreign investors to transfer all or part of the ownership o f their businesses to Nigerians. See 
Sodipo and Fagbemi (eds.) (1994).
153 For a discussion on the NIEO, see, e.g. Flory (1982), Shearer (1994) and Muchlinski (1995)
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order”. Taken together, these constitutional provisions arguably underpin the foreign 
economic policy of Nigeria and shape its attitude towards the WTO.
Conclusion
This chapter has sought to present a snapshot of foreign trade governance -  law, 
policy and practice -  of South Africa and Nigeria. The chapter makes for a very 
interesting comparison. Both countries have pursued sound macro-economic reforms, 
although South Africa has a solid record in this respect, while Nigeria’s experience is 
very recent. However, they differ significantly in terms of trade policy. Nigeria has 
chosen to adopt a different trade policy agenda, which is highly protective, while 
South Africa has pursued, since the early 1990s, a largely open trade policy.
The underlying assumptions and objectives of South Africa’s trade policy are geared 
towards ensuring the international competitiveness of domestic industries and 
promoting export-led growth. Nigeria, on the other hand, seeks to protect its domestic 
industries and promote local sourcing of raw materials. The structures of these 
countries’ economy and trade have led to the different attitudes to trade policy and to 
international trade rules disciplines. Normatively, South Africa is generally a 
multilateralist, while Nigeria’s commitment to multilateralism is not strong. Although 
both countries believe that WTO rules are unbalanced and inequitable, Nigeria 
accentuates these imperfections far more than South Africa.
The two countries also have differences in their domestic institutional and 
administrative structures, particularly with respect to the legal, regulatory and 
constitutional frameworks for trade policy and practices. Furthermore, although there 
are serious problems in South Africa with respect to government effectiveness and 
bureaucratic quality, the country performs better on these indicators than Nigeria, 
whose situation can be described as abysmal.
There are similarities, however, in the socio-economic conditions and circumstances 
in these countries, with respect to poverty, unemployment, inequalities and the spread 
of HIV/AIDS. There are also similarities in state-society relations in the two 
countries, although Nigeria is more prone to interest group capture particularly in the 
trade policy process. These institutional, social, economic and political factors are
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individually and collectively crucial for a proper understanding of the compliance 
behaviour of both countries.
The task in the remainder of this thesis is, first, to examine extensively and 
systematically the implementation and compliance records of these countries with 
respect to specific WTO treaty obligations, and, then, to explain and analyse their 
compliance behaviour in the light of the factors shaping them. The theoretical analysis 
in chapter 2 and the insights gained from the background analysis in this chapter will 
be useful in explaining, in chapter 7, the overall compliance behaviour of the 
countries. The next chapter begins the first of the case studies.
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PART II: CASE STUDIES
CHAPTER 4
Compliance with the WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation
The previous theoretical and background chapters serve as an essential lead-in to the 
core parts of this thesis: the case studies and explanations. These earlier chapters have 
set out the main themes and threads that underpin the empirical investigation and 
analysis. The present chapter examines the first of the three sets of case studies, 
namely national compliance with the Agreement on Customs Valuation (ACV). The 
aim is to examine whether and to what extent developing countries have implemented 
and complied with the key obligations of the Agreement, focusing particularly on the 
experiences of South Africa and Nigeria.
The chapter begins with a brief discussion of the interface between customs and trade, 
and the negotiating history of the customs valuation agreement. Section 2 examines 
the nature and scope of the obligations imposed by the agreement. Section 3 provides 
a snapshot of the implementation experiences of developing countries in general. 
Sections 4 and 5 examine respectively the implementation records of South Africa 
and Nigeria. Section 6 concludes.
The Trade and Customs Interface
Tariff reductions and bindings provide useful mechanisms for limiting tariff 
protection in international trade. However, the process of estimating the value of 
products at customs can be as important as the reduction of tariffs on imported goods 
in the first place. This is because governments can use a number of policy instruments 
to negate or offset indirectly the benefits of negotiated tariff concessions. The 
commonest of these instruments are customs-related measures such as incorrect 
classification of goods, inappropriate valuation of imports, discriminatory and 
complex rules of origin, and cumbersome customs formalities and procedures.
However, no single customs-related element has greater importance in the trade 
transaction process than the valuation of imported goods. The valuation system can be 
used arbitrarily to collect as much revenue as desired, regardless of the formally
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negotiated tariff schedule.1 As Finger points out, the manipulation of customs 
valuation has long been part of the arsenal of anti-import weapons. Customs 
valuation is thus one of the most fundamental elements of the trade facilitation 
environment. As the next section shows, however, negotiations on valuation rules 
have long been difficult and contentious.
The Negotiating History of the Customs Valuation Agreement
Article VII of the GATT 1947 was the first successful international agreement on the 
general principles of customs valuation. It was however not a widely used system. An 
alternative international system of valuation, known as the Brussels Definition of 
Value (BDV) , based on an entirely different concept, entered into force on 28 July 
1953. By the late 1960s, about a hundred governments had adopted the BDV either as 
parties to the Convention or as a matter of domestic law or practice, thus making it by 
far the most widely used system.4
However, the United States, Australia, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand did 
not use the BDV and used varying systems of valuation.5 In 1973, the GATT 
Secretariat prepared a study, titled “Trade Barriers Arising in the Field of Customs 
Valuation”6, which argued that the varying national valuation practices were 
inconsistent with Article VII of the GATT and constituted barriers to trade. The study 
laid the foundation for the negotiation of the Tokyo Round Valuation Code, whose 
aim was, inter alia, to harmonise and ensure uniformity in the application of valuation
n
rules so as to reduce the costs and delays associated with different valuation systems.
However, fundamental differences existed among the GATT CONTRACTING 
PARTIES, and the Final Draft, published in 1979,8 was not accepted by most 
developing countries.9 One of the most controversial matters involved issues
1 See Hoekman and Kostecki, 1995 at p. 99
2 See Finger (1995).
3 Also known as the Convention on the Valuation of Goods.
4 See WTO document G/VAL/W/95 of 19 March 2002.
5 Ibid.
6 See GATT document COM.TD/W/195, 2 August 1973
7 Jackson (1998).
8 See document MTN/NTM/W/229/Rev. 1 (Final draft, 8 April 1979, open to signature 12 April 1979).
9 Among the strong critics were India and Brazil. In document MTN/NTM/167/Rev.l, Brazil proposed 
changes to Article 7 to allow the costs of services such as "engineering, development, artwork, design
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concerning “related persons”, which developing countries argued should include sole 
agents, sole distributors and sole concessionaires. In March 1979, several developing 
countries circulated proposed amendments to the draft code.10
These countries, led by India and Brazil, concluded that unless the points in their 
proposals were included in the draft final agreement, they would be unable to accept 
the agreement.11 The developed countries, on the other hand, supported the text of the 
final draft and stressed that its adoption would form an important part of the global 
package in the negotiations. According to a statement by the delegations from 
developed countries “(t)he text represented the most that could be achieved by way of 
a multilateral solution...”
As a partial attempt to address the concerns of the developing countries on “related 
persons”, a Protocol was added to the Agreement.13 Despite this effort, however, 
when the Tokyo Round Valuation Code came into force on 1 January 1981, only three 
developing countries, Argentina, Brazil and India, acceded to it, and each of these 
countries invoked the provisions allowing them to delay implementation for five 
years. A few other developing countries, namely Peru, Mexico, Singapore, Turkey, 
Morocco and Zimbabwe, later acceded to the Agreement, but also invoked the 
provisions on delayed implementation. South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi 
joined the Tokyo Round Valuation Agreement without invoking the provisions.
Apart from these few countries, the rest of the developing country parties to the 
GATT did not accede to the Tokyo Round Valuation Code. Most of these countries
work, plans and sketches relating to the imported goods" to be included in the transaction value 
whether or not these assists originated from the country of export or of import. India proposed changes 
to Article 7, which allows the residual or fall-back method of determining customs value by arguing 
this method should be defined broadly to include "all residual eventualities". See document 
MTN/NTMAV/175/Rev. 1
10 See document MTN/NTM/W/222/Rev.l. See also WTO document G/VAL/W/95 page 8.
11 Ibid.
12 See document MTN/NTM/67, paras 3 and 4.
13 Paragraph 6 of the Protocol stated that the Parties to the Agreement: “Recognised that certain 
developing countries have expressed concern that there may be problems in the implementation of 
Article 1 of the Agreement insofar as it relates to importations into their countries buy sole agents, sole 
distributors and sole concessionaires. The Parties to the Agreement agree that, if such problems arise in 
practice in developing countries applying the Agreement, a study of this question shall be made, at the 
request of such countries, with a view to finding appropriate solutions”. See document 
MTN/NTM/W/229/Revl/Add 1. This provision is now Annex III paragraph 5 of the WTO Customs 
Valuation Agreement.
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cited concerns about the effect of the Code on the ability of their customs 
administrations to control under-valuation.14 They pointed out that acceptance of the 
valuation code could lead to their governments losing a serious amount of customs 
revenue, which would be difficult to generate by other taxation measures.15
The Uruguay Round Negotiations
The developing country concerns and reluctance remained in the lead up to the 
Uruguay Round negotiations that began in 1986. Three different ministerial decisions 
were subsequently adopted to address the three main areas of concern. The first was 
the Ministerial Decision Regarding Cases Where Customs Administrations Have 
Reasons to Doubt the Truth or Accuracy o f the Declared Value. This Decision allows 
customs administrations to reject the transaction value of imported goods if, after 
giving the importer reasonable opportunity to justify the value, they still remain 
doubtful as to the truth or accuracy of the declaration.
The other ministerial decisions were the Decisions on Texts Relating to Minimum 
Values and Imports by Sole Agents, Sole Distributors and Sole Concessionaires, 
which were designed to deal with the concerns relating to "minimum values" and 
"related persons". These provisions are now incorporated into Annex III of the WTO 
Valuation Agreement.16 The expectation of the adoption of these three Decisions
1 7was that they would facilitate application of the Agreement by developing countries.
However, apart from the Protocol and the drafting changes made to bring the Tokyo 
Round Code into legal consistency with the WTO Agreement, virtually no other 
changes were made during the Uruguay Round. The Customs Valuation Agreement, 
like other WTO agreements, became mandatory and binding on developing countries 
as a result of the Single Undertaking principle. According to Vinod Rege, who served 
on the GATT Secretariat staff to support the negotiations on the agreements on 
Customs Valuation and Pre-shipment Inspection, the developed country negotiators
14 See document G/VAL/W/95, p 9
15 Ibid, p. 29.
16 See paragraph 2 of Annex III for the provision on "minimum customs value" and paragraph 5 for the 
provision on "related parties".
17 See document G/VAL/W/95 plO.
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were unfamiliar with, and unwilling to learn, the conditions under which customs
1 o
officials in developing countries operated.
Given the lack of active developing country participation in the technical negotiation 
of the agreement,19 the failure of the developed country negotiators to gain better 
understanding of the views of their developing country counterparts thus creates the 
impression that the agreement was imposed. This seeming lack of ownership of the 
rules raises interesting questions, as with any exogenous law, about the ex post 
compliance behaviour of developing countries. However, before considering the 
implementation experiences of these countries, it is necessary, first, to describe the 
nature and scope of the obligations imposed by the agreement.
The Scope of the Customs Valuation Agreement
The aims of WTO Customs Valuation Agreement, as set out in its General 
Introductory Commentary are the establishment of "a fair, uniform and neutral 
system" of valuation and the prohibition of "the use of arbitrary or fictitious customs 
values". To achieve these objectives, Article 1 (see Table 1) establishes the basic 
method of valuation, namely, the “transaction value”, that is, “the price actually paid 
or payable” for the goods by the importer to the exporter. Crucially, however, Article 
1 must be read in conjunction with Article 8, which allows for a number of 
adjustments to the invoice price.
Table 1: WTO Rules on Customs Valuation
Key provisions Nature and Scope of Obligations
Article 1:
The basic method 
of valuation
• Sets out the basic method of valuation: the transaction value, i.e. "the price 
actually paid or payable for the goods when sold for export to the country 
of importation.
• This transaction value can be adjusted in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 8.
• The transaction value method applies in respect of related transactions, 
unless it can be shown that the relationship influenced the price, and the 
importer must be given a reasonable opportunity to prove that this is not 
the case.
• If the customs value of the imported goods cannot be determined under the 
provisions of Article 1 resort can be had sequentially to the provisions of 
Articles 2 through 7 (see table 2 below)
Article 8: •  Article 8 contains a list of elements that must be added to price actually 
paid or payable for the imported goods. These include commissions and
18 Rege (1999, p.74); see also Finger (2000, p.434)
19 See further Page (2003) for a discussion on the participation of developing countries in these 
negotiations.
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brokerage; the value of assists, i.e. "goods and services supplied directly or 
indirectly by the buyer free of charge or at reduced cost for the use in 
connection with the production and sale for export of the imported goods", 
if the value has not already been included in the invoice price (Art.8.1b); 
royalty and license fees related to the goods, which are payable by the 
buyer (Art. 8.1c).
•  These additions must be made only on the basis of objective and 
quantifiable data (Art. 8.3) and only as provided in the Article (Art. 8.4)
• Members have the option of adopting either the f.o.b or c.i.f concept in
20determining the customs value of imported goods.
Article 9 • Where the conversion of currency is necessary to determine the customs 
value, the rate of exchange used must be duly published i.e. transparent.
Article 10 • All confidential information provided for the purposes of customs 
valuation must be treated as strictly confidential and must not be disclosed 
without specific permission of the provider unless in the context of judicial 
proceedings
Article 11 • Each member must provide in their laws for a "right of appeal without 
penalty" in respect of any determination of customs value.
Article 12 • members must publish "laws, regulations, judicial decisions and 
administrative rulings of general application" giving effect to the 
Agreement in accordance with Article X of GATT 1994.
Article 13 • Where the final determination of customs value is being delayed, members 
must allow the goods concerned to be released if the importer provides 
sufficient guarantee in the form of a surety etc. Each member must provide 
in their law for such circumstances.
Article 14 • Each member must treat the Interpretative Notes at Annex 1 to the 
Agreement as an integral part of the Agreement, which must be read and 
applied in conjunction with their respective notes. Annexes II and III are 
also an integral part of the Agreement.
Article 15 • Defines the different concepts used in the Agreement, such as "customs 
value of imported goods", "identical goods", "similar goods" etc.
Article 16 • If the importer so requests in writing, the customs administration of the 
country of importation must provide a written explanation as to how the 
customs value of the importer's goods was determined.
Article 17 • States that the Agreement must not be construed as restricting the rights of 
customs administrations to satisfy themselves as the truth or accuracy of 
any statement, document or declaration presented for customs valuation 
purposes.
Procedural Obligations
Article 22 • Each member must ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and 
administrative procedures with the provisions of the Agreement (Art. 22.1)
• Each member must inform the Committee on Customs Valuation of any 
changes in its laws and regulations to the Agreement and in the 
administration of such laws and regulations (Art. 22.2)
Article 23 • The Committee on Customs Valuation is mandated to review annually the 
implementation and operation of the Agreement and to report annually to 
the Council for Trade in Goods.
Sources: extracted from the Agreement on Customs Valuation.
The transaction value method applies equally to arms-length transactions and those 
between related parties. However, although the transaction value method is the basic
20 Under the f.o.b (Free On Board) arrangement, the invoice price contains only the cost of the good, as 
the costs of carriage and insurance are borne separately by the buyer. However, under the c.i.f (Cost, 
Insurance and Freight), the invoice price contains the price of the goods, as well as costs of insurance 
and freight since carriage and insurance are arranged by the seller.
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and primary method of valuation, where this proves unrealistic in determining the 
value of the imported goods, members are allowed to use, in sequential order, other 
methods of valuation set out in Articles 2 to 6 of the Agreement. These alternative 
methods are the identical goods method, the similar goods method, the deductive 
value method, the computed value method, and the fall back method (see Table 2).
Table 2: Other valuation methods provided for in the Customs Valuation Agreement
Articles in sequential 
order
Basic provisions of the sequential Articles
Article 2: the transaction 
value of identical goods
Where the customs value cannot be determined on the basis of Article 1, 
it should established on the basis of the transaction value of identical 
goods sold at the same commercial level and in substantially the same 
quantity as the goods being valued, or sold under different 
circumstances, provided differential adjustments are made.
Article 3: the transaction 
value of similar goods
If the customs value cannot be determined on the basis of Articles 1 and 
2, then it must be determined on the basis of the transaction value of 
similar goods sold at the same commercial level and in substantially the 
same quantity as the goods being valued or, sold under different 
circumstances used provided differential adjustments are made.
Article 5: deductive value According to Article 4, if the customs value cannot be determined under 
the provisions of Articles 1, 2 and 3, it should be determined under 
Article 5 or, when this cannot be done, under the provision of Article 6. 
The importer may, however, request that the order be reversed i.e. 
Article 6 before Article 5. Article 5 provides for valuation determination 
on the basis of deductive method, which is based on the unit sales price 
in the domestic market of the imported goods being valued or of 
identical or similar goods after making deductions for such elements as 
profits, customs duties and taxes, transport and insurance and other 
expenses incurred in the country of importation.
Article 6: Computed value Article 6 provides for valuation determination on the basis of computed 
method. The computed value is determined by adding to the cost of 
materials and fabrication or other processing employed in producing the 
imported goods “an amount for profit and general expenses equal to that 
usually reflected in sales of goods of the same class or kind as the goods 
being valued which are made by producers in the country of exportation 
for export to the country of importation”. Article 6 requires the 
cooperation of authorities in the country of exportation to be effective.
Article 7: Fall back method Where Article 1 to 6, considered sequentially, cannot be used to 
determine the customs value of the imported goods, customs 
administrations are permitted to determine the customs value using 
"reasonable means consistent with the principles and general provisions" 
of the Agreement and on the basis of data available in the country of 
importation. This method is also subject to the conditions set out in 
Article 7(2)(a-g) and Article 7(3).
Source: extracted from the Customs Valuation Agreement
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In principle, the Customs Valuation Agreement attempts to balance the interests of the 
importers, with respect to fictitious and arbitrary valuation determinations, and those 
of WTO members, in relation to customs frauds and revenue losses. Thus, in Article 
16, the Agreement requires members to give the importer the right to a written 
explanation “as to how the customs value of the importer’s goods was determined”, 
while in Article 17, it establishes the rights of customs administration “to satisfy 
themselves as to the truth or accuracy of any statement, document or declaration
91presenter for customs valuation purposes”
Part II of the Customs Valuation Agreement establishes the Committee on Customs 
Valuation (Article 18), and provides for the establishment of “Technical Committee 
on Customs Valuation” (TCCV) under the auspices of the World Customs 
Organisation (WCO). Article 19 contains provisions on consultations and dispute 
settlement. Like other WTO Agreements, the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU) is applicable to consultations and the settlement of disputes under the Customs 
Valuation Agreement.
Special and Differential Treatment
The Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) provisions in the Customs Valuation 
Agreement are mainly limited to the traditional transitional periods for implementing 
commitments. Part III and Annex III of the Agreement contain these provisions, many 
of which are time bound. Article 20.1 provides for delayed application of the 
provisions of the Agreement for five years, up till 1 January 2000, for developing 
members who were not party to the Tokyo Round Valuation Code. Members invoking 
the provision of Article 20.1 were required to notify the Director-General of the WTO 
accordingly.
21 Article 17 should also be read with the Ministerial Decision Regarding Cases Where Customs 
Administrations Have Reasons to Doubt the Truth or Accuracy o f the Declared Value (also known as 
the Decision on Shifting the Burden of Proof).
22 The TCCV addresses technical questions raised by members or the Committee on Customs 
Valuation. As a result of the work of the TCCV many valuation issues have been resolved without the 
need of members to invoke the dispute settlement procedures.
23 There have been no cases to date resulting in the establishment of panels, although there have been 
few consultations initiated under the Dispute Settlement Understanding, but none of these have gone 
into the panel stage.
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Annex III, paragraph 1, of the Agreement allowed developing country members who 
felt that the five-year delayed implementation period was insufficient to request an 
extension of the five-year delay period before the expiry of that period, that is, before 
1 January 2000. Article 20.2 allows developing country members who were not party 
to the Tokyo Round Code to delay the application of paragraph 2(b)(iii) of Article 1 
and Article 6 (that is, the computed value method) for a maximum period of three 
years from when they began to apply other provisions of the Agreement.
Annex III, paragraph 2, incorporates the Ministerial Decision on minimum customs 
value, and allowed developing country members, which prior to the entering into 
force of the Agreement, valued goods on the basis of officially established minimum 
values to make a reservation to enable them to retain such values on “limited and 
transitional basis under such terms and conditions as may be agreed to by the 
Members”. Thus, the provisions of Annex III, paragraph 2 could only be invoked with 
the support of other members.
Annex III, paragraph 3 allows developing countries to make reservation regarding 
reversal of the sequential order of Articles 5 and 6. Under Article 4, an importer could 
request that the order of application of Articles 5 and 6 be reversed. Annex III.3 
allows developing countries to make a reservation regarding the provisions of Article
4. Finally, Annex III, paragraph 4 allows developing countries to make a reservation 
to apply Article 5.2 whether or not the importer so requests.
The task in this chapter, as stated earlier, is to find out how and to what extent South 
Africa and Nigeria have implemented this Agreement. However, before focusing 
exclusively on the experiences of these two countries, it is useful to present evidence 
of the behaviour of developing countries in general as gleaned from the review and 
assessment of their implementation by the Committee on Customs Valuation.
Overview of Developing Countries’ Implementation Experiences
Like all WTO Agreements, the Agreement on Customs Valuation requires each 
member to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative 
procedures with the provisions of the Agreement (Article 22.1). Further, Article 22.2 
requires each member to inform the Committee on Customs Valuation of any changes
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in its laws and regulations relevant to the Agreement and in the administration of such 
laws and regulations. WTO members fall into two categories with respect to the 
procedural obligations.
Those who were party to the Tokyo Round Valuation Code and had notified their 
customs laws under that agreement, and had not changed the laws since then24, were 
not required to make any further notifications under the WTO Agreement, since both 
agreements do not differ in any substantive manner. However, WTO members who 
were not party to the Tokyo Round Code were required to make notifications of their 
implementing laws not later than the date in which they were required to apply the 
provisions of the Agreement.
The Committee on Customs Valuation has the mandate to review the implementation 
and operation of the Agreement in the light of its objectives, and to report annually to 
the Council for Trade in Goods. At its first meeting in 1995, the Committee agreed on 
procedures for the notification of national legislation.25 Furthermore, at the same 
meeting, the Council agreed on procedures for the submission of a checklist of issues 
drawn from the compliance obligations imposed by the Agreement.
Virtually all developing countries that were not party to the Tokyo Round Valuation 
Code invoked the provision of Article 20.1 of the WTO Valuation Agreement, which 
allowed them to delay implementation of the Agreement until 1 January 2000. About 
nine developing countries27, which had signed up to the Tokyo Round Code but had 
invoked the provisions on delayed implementation for five years continued the 
remainder of the transitional period under the WTO Valuation Agreement pursuant to
Q
a General Council Decision of 31 January 1995.
24 15 of the Tokyo Round group indicated that their laws remained valid under the WTO Customs 
Valuation Agreement. 13 of this group, including Canada, the EC, India, Mexico, Singapore and South 
Africa submitted new laws (see document G//VAL/12 of 6 November 1997.
25 See document G/VAL/M/1, paragraphs 29-35, 71 and 72.
26 See document G/VAL/M/1, paragraph 36-39.
27 These countries are Argentina, Brazil, India, Malawi, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Turkey and 
Zimbabwe.
28 See the Decision on "Continued Application under the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement of 
Invocation of Provisions for Developing Countries for the Delayed Application and Reservations 
Under the Customs Valuation Agreement 1979" (document WT/L/38).
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The Article 20.1 delayed period expired on 1 January 2000. By December 1999, 
before the five-year delay period finally came to an end, about 13 developing
9 0countries requested an extension of this period. These countries gave various 
reasons for their requests, but essentially they indicated that they were not yet in a 
position to fully assume their obligations. In 1999, Peru, which had acceded to the 
Tokyo Round Code in 1994, asked for an extension for a period of two years, citing 
"exceptional circumstances". The Committee later granted all the requests.
Many developing countries also invoked other Special and Differential Treatment 
provisions. For instance, as of December 1996, 47 developing countries invoked
91Article 20.2, which provided for delayed application of the computed value method.
31 countries invoked Annex III, paragraph 2 that allowed developing country 
members, which prior to the entery into force of the Agreement, valued goods on the 
basis of officially established minimum values to make a reservation to enable them 
to retain such values on “limited and transitional basis under such terms and 
conditions as may be agreed to by the Members”. About 53 developing countries 
invoked the provisions of Annex III, paragraph 3 on reservation concerning reversal 
of sequential order of Articles 5 and 6, and 50 invoked Annex III, paragraph 4 
concerning reservation to apply Article 5.2 whether or not the importer so requests.
This widespread invocation of the Special and Differential Treatment provisions of 
the Customs Valuation Agreement by most developing countries was indicative of 
how these countries perceived the challenges that the implementation of the 
agreement posed for them. As of December 2004, no member maintained the Article
20.1 Special and Differential Treatment provision, which allowed for the five-year 
delayed application of the Agreement, and no member is entitled to an extension of 
the five-year delayed period.34
29 Those that requested extensions included Cote d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Jamaica, Kuwait, Mauritania, Myanmar, Paraguay, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Tunisia.
30 See document G/VAL/M/11 of 19 October 1999
31 See document G/VAL/10 of 8 January 1997. This rose to 49 by the end of 1997. See document 
G/VAL/13 of 18 December 1997.
32 See document G/VAL/13 of 18 December 1997.
33 See document G/VAL/W/136.
34 All the approved requests or waivers in respect of such requests have expired in 2004. See document 
G/VAL/W/136 of 21 October 2004.
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In theory, given that the delay period has expired for all developing countries, and that 
no further extension is possible, all WTO members should now be implementing the 
Agreement. However, according to the Committee on Customs Valuation, in its 2005 
annual report, 56 members have so far not notified their national implementing 
legislation, and several have not responded to the checklist of issues.35 Only 18 
African members of the WTO have made notification of their national legislation, and 
only 8 of these have responded to the checklist of issues.36
The behaviour of some of the advanced developing countries did not suggest their 
faithful implementation of the agreement. India has been at the forefront of campaigns
'1*7
for a renegotiation of the Customs Valuation agreement. It argues that its own 
practical experience of implementing the agreement for several years has led it to 
conclude that the agreement was flawed in some respects.38 For many years, India 
argued in the Committee on Customs Valuation that it was entitled to extend its 
Tokyo Round reservation to continue the use of minimum prices to determine 
customs valuation on the basis that it required “time to gain sufficient experience with 
the implementation of the Agreement”.39
However, the US and many other developed countries rejected India’s claim that it 
had a valid reservation since there was never a consensus in support of such 
reservation.40 Indeed, the US, which regards customs valuation as a major issue for its 
exporters, has frequently complained about “apparent increasing use of minimum 
prices”41 India has also introduced changes in its customs laws, which some members 
considered to be creating additional criteria for acceptance of a transaction value.42
35 See documents G/VAL/W/135 of 12 October 2004 and G/VAL/W/136 of 21 October 2004.
36 See document G/VAL/W/139.
37 For India’s proposals, which include relaxing the provision of Articles 7 and 8.1(b)(iv) of the 
Customs Valuation Agreement, see WTO documents Job (99)/5868/rev. lo f  19 October 1999 and 
G/VAL/36 of 7 December 2000.
38 See, for example, WTO document G/VAL/M/10 of 19 October 1999.
39 Ibid
40 Ibid
41 Ibid.
42 See WTO document G/VAL/W/133 for the questions posed by the EC and the US and India’s 
replies. India claims that the changes were to check valuation frauds such as under-valuation resulting 
in heavy leakages of revenue.
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Other major developing countries also appear to find the implementation of the 
agreement particularly problematic. For instance, some members believe that Brazil’s 
customs laws still provide for the establishment of minimum import prices even 
though Brazil was required by the Tokyo Round Valuation Committee to abolish 
officially established minimum values and reference prices not later than July 1988.43 
Brazil argued that it did not use minimum prices but rather use "reasonable prices" for 
the purpose of "combating fraud and circumvention."44 On 30 May 2000, the US 
requested consultations with Brazil concerning the use of minimum import prices for 
customs valuation. No panel was, however, established and no settlement was notified 
to the WTO 45
Mexico claimed that it had encountered major problems from duty evasion and, in 
response, introduced the concept of "estimated prices" and post-importation 
verification of exporters.46 The US has particularly challenged the WTO compatibility 
of these measures through series of questions and follow-up questions to Mexico.47 
On 22 July 2003, Guatemala requested consultations with Mexico concerning, inter 
alia, the use of officially established prices for customs valuation. However, no panel
AQ
has been established, and no settlement notified by both parties.
The foregoing shows that some developing countries have difficulties implementing 
the Customs Valuation agreement. As mentioned earlier, as at the end of 2005, over 
56 developing country members had not notified their national implementing laws or 
responded to the checklist of issues, and, therefore, arguably are not fully 
implementing the agreement, if at all. Many of the advanced developed countries 
appear to be using minimum prices for valuation purposes, even though this is
43 See document G/VAL/M/10 of 19 October 1999 at p. 5.
44 Ibid.
45 See Brazil-Measures on Minimum Import Prices -  Compliant by the United States, WT/DS197/1. 
See also http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu e/cases e/ds!97 e.htm for up-to-date summary.
46 See Mexico's notification of these amendments in document G/VAL/W/121 of 10 June 2003.
47 See documents G/VAL/W/132 and G/VAL/W/138 for US's questions and Mexico's replies.
48 See Mexico-Certain Pricing Measures for Customs Valuation and Other Purposes -  Complaint by 
Guatemala, WT/DS298/1. See also http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu e/cases_e/ds298 e.htm 
for summary of the dispute to date.
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explicitly prohibited by the agreement.49 Yukyun Shin also highlights the many 
problems that Korea and other ASEAN countries faced in implementing the ACV.50
Against the background of the foregoing discussion on the implementation 
requirements and challenges of the customs valuation agreement, and the attitude and 
behaviour of developing countries generally, the remainder of this chapter focuses 
specifically on the implementation experiences of South Africa and Nigeria. These 
countries’ notifications to the WTO as well as other communications by and about 
them in the Committee on Customs Valuation were examined. Their customs laws 
and regulations51 were also examined, in addition to relevant administrative and 
judicial decisions, where available. South Africa’s implementation record is examined 
first, followed by that of Nigeria. The chapter concludes with a brief comparison of 
their experiences.
South Africa’s Implementation of the Customs Valuation Agreement 
Pre-Uruguay Round situation
The Tokyo Round Valuation Agreement was adopted in 1979 and entered into force 
on 1 January 1981. South Africa implemented the agreement on 1 July 1983, making 
it one of the few developing countries and of only six African states to accept the 
valuation agreement before it became mandatory under the WTO. Furthermore, unlike 
most of the other developing countries, including Argentina, Brazil, India and 
Mexico, South Africa did not invoke the Special and Differential Treatment 
provisions, which allowed delayed application of the agreement for five year.
This was because South Africa always viewed itself as a developed country in GATT, 
and was consistent with the approach that it adopted during the Uruguay Round, 
during which it negotiated as a developed country and assumed developed country
49 Article 7 (2)(f) states that “[n]o customs value shall be determined ...on the basis of minimum 
customs value; or (g) arbitrary or fictitious values”.
50 See Shin (1996). The implementation challenges are also encapsulated in a compilation by the WTO 
Secretariat of discussions in various WTO bodies, see: WTO document G/VAL/W/97 of 26 March 
2002.
51 For South Africa's laws, see http://www.inf.gov.za/documents/index.htm. More information on 
customs matters can be accessed through the website of the South African Revenue Service (SARS), 
which administers customs. See http://www.sars.gov.za. Nigeria’s customs laws are available at: 
http://www.nigeriacustoms.gov.ng.
52 The others were Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Morocco.
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levels of obligations.53 Yet, it cannot be assumed that South Africa’s developed 
country status and its history of applying valuation rules automatically translate into 
full implementation of the agreement, especially in the context of the implementation 
requirements and challenges highlighted above and the experiences of some of the 
advanced developing countries. Thus, the next sections look at the experience of 
South Africa in implementing the agreement, beginning with the procedural 
obligations.
Compliance with the Procedural Obligations
As South Africa was a party to the Tokyo Round Valuation Code and had notified its 
customs laws under that plurilateral agreement, it was not required, unless it had 
changed the laws since the original notification, to make any further notification 
under Article 22.2 of the WTO Customs Valuation agreement. The same applied to 
responses to the "checklist of issues", which were deemed to be valid unless changes 
had occurred since they were notified under the Tokyo Round regime.
In August 1996, South Africa notified the Committee on Customs Valuation of 
changes in its national legislation, the Customs and Excise Act of 1964 and other 
rules relating to customs valuation. This notification replaced its earlier notification 
under the Tokyo Round Customs Valuation Agreement.54 South Africa indicated, 
however, that its reply to the "checklist of issues", given under the Tokyo Round code 
"remains valid".55 Although a question was posed by the EC about the definition of 
the term “seller” in s.66(2)(c) of the Customs and Excise Act56, given that the CVA 
has used the term “supplier”, this was not considered material enough to prevent 
concluding the examination of the legislation. Consequently, the Committee agreed to 
conclude the examination of South Africa’s legislation.57
Thus, by notifying changes in its valuation laws and providing responses to the 
checklist of issues, and since no member raised objection to the conclusion of the 
examination of the laws, South Africa was deemed to have complied with the
53 See chapter 3 for a discussion of South Africa’s participation in the Uruguay Round.
54 See WTO document G/VAL/N/1/ZAF of 30 August 1996.
55 Ibid. For the reply to the checklist, see document VAL/2/Rev. 1/Add. 13.
56 See document G/VAL/M/4 of 29 November 1996 at p. 6
57 Ibid.
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procedural obligations of the Customs Valuation Agreement. However, this does not 
necessarily imply that South Africa's laws and their application are fully compatible
CO
with the provisions of the Valuation Agreement. The next section examines the 
extent of the substantive compliance.
Compliance with the Substantive Obligations
Article 22.1 of the Customs Valuation Agreement requires each WTO member to 
"ensure, not later than the date of application of the provisions of (the) Agreement for 
it, the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with the 
provisions of (the) Agreement”. Given its developed country status, South Africa was 
expected to implement the agreement when it entered into force on 1 January 1995.
To be in compliance, members have to make provisions in their national laws to 
implement the mandatory obligations under the various articles of the agreement (see 
Table 1). This clearly requires putting in place WTO-compatible, valuation-specific, 
national laws and associated administrative procedures, guidelines and instructions, as 
well as valuation rulings and appeal systems. How has South Africa performed in 
implementing these obligations?
The Basic Valuation Method: The Transaction Value
The valuation laws and regulations of South Africa are contained in the Customs and 
Excise Act, No 91 of 1964, as amended, as well as in the Customs and Excise Rules. 
The Act and the Rules together contain nearly eighty sections or sub-sections, dealing 
with specific provisions of the Agreement.59 The relevant provisions of the Customs 
and Excise Act implementing Articles 1 through 8 of the Valuation Agreement are 
sections 65, 66 and 67.
Section 65 (1) provides, as in Article 1 of the Agreement, that the value for customs 
duty purposes of any imported goods shall be "the transaction value thereof', which is 
defined in s 66 (1) as "the price actually paid or payable for the goods ... adjusted in
58 Reviews are designed, inter alia, to identify deficiencies in notified laws and regulations. However, 
if deficiencies are considered commercially insignificant, other members may choose not to raise 
objections or prevent the conclusion of a review. Yet, this does not suggest that the laws and 
regulations are fully in conformity with the provisions of the agreement.
59 The Correlation Table on page 45 of the Valuation Guide correlates Article of the Valuation 
Agreement with corresponding provisions of the Customs and Excise Act.
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terms of s. 67". Section 67, entitled "Adjustments to Price Actually Paid or Payable", 
merely repeats, almost verbatim, Article 8 of the Agreement, which lists specific 
elements or considerations that "shall be added" to the price actually paid or payable 
for the imported goods to the extent that are incurred by the buyer or paid to the seller 
but are not included in the transaction value. South Africa adopts the f.o.b concept for 
the purpose of customs valuation (s. 67.2).60 Further, under s. 67, the costs of assists61, 
if incurred within South Africa, are deductible from the transactions value, in 
conformity with Article 8(l)(b)(iv) of the Agreement.
Related Party Transactions
Article 1 of the ACV provides that notwithstanding the existence of a relationship 
between the seller and the buyer, the transaction value method must be applied to the 
goods involved unless the customs administration has grounds for considering that the 
relationship influenced the price, and in that case must communicate the grounds to 
the importer in writing, if so requested, and give the importer a reasonable 
opportunity to respond (Article 1.2(a)). The burden of proof to demonstrate that the 
relationship influenced the price clearly rests on the customs administration. 
Furthermore, members must accept the transaction value whenever the importer 
"demonstrates" that such value closely approximates to one of the situations set out in 
Article 1.2(b).
South Africa's customs law and regulations make provisions for related party 
transactions. S. 66 (3) provides that the fact that a buyer and a seller are related "shall 
not in itself be a ground for not accepting the transaction value, where -  (a) such 
relationship did not influence the price paid or payable; or (b) the importer proves that 
the transaction value closely approximates to one of the following values..." This 
provisions appear to conform to those of Article 1 (2)(a)and(b). However, there is no 
specific provision for communicating the grounds for regarding a relationship as 
influencing the transaction value in writing if the importer so requests, as required in 
Article l(2)(a), third sentence.
60 Article 8.2 of the CVA requires members to stipulate in their laws whether they adopt the c.i.f or the 
f.o.b concept.
61 These refer to services such as engineering, development and design work associated with the 
manufacture of a product.
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Other Valuation Methods
Articles 2 through 7 provide methods of determining the customs value whenever it 
cannot be determined under the provisions of Article 1, that is, where the transaction 
value for valid reasons cannot form the basis for determining the customs value of the 
imported goods. The provisions of Articles 2 through 7 must, however, be applied 
sequentially (see Table 2 above).
South Africa’s customs law and regulations implement the provisions of Articles 2 
through 7. Section 66 (4) of the Act provides for determination on the basis of 
identical goods, where value cannot be determined on the actual price paid or payable 
for the imported goods in question. Section 66(4)(c) provides, as required under 
Article 2 (3), that if more than one transaction value of the identical goods is found, 
“the lowest such value shall be the transaction value of the goods to be valued”.
Section 66 (5) of the Act provides for valuation on the basis of similar goods, as 
required under Article 3 of the Agreement. S.66(6) provides for valuation 
determination on the basis of the deductive method (s.66(7)) and the computed 
method (s. 66(8)), but allows the importer an option to reverse the order of application 
of subsections 7 and 8 provided a request for such a reversal is made in writing. These 
provisions broadly conform to those of Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the Agreement.
S. 66(9) of the Customs and Excise Act implements Article 7 of the Valuation 
Agreement. It provides for value determinations on the basis of a previous 
determination or absent such previously determined customs values, by such 
application as the Commissioner may deem reasonable of any of the other valuation 
methods. This broadly accords with the provision of Article 7(1), which requires that 
customs value be determined “using reasonable means”, and of Note 1 to Article 7, 
which states that value determination under the provisions of Article 7 should “to the 
greatest extent possible, be based on previously determined customs value”.
The more noticeable part of Article 7, however, is the elements it excludes from value 
determination under the provisions of the Article. S. 66 (9) is in full conformity, as it 
excludes explicitly the same elements, which include: the selling price in South 
Africa; a system which provides for the acceptance for customs purposes of the higher
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of two alternative values; the selling price of goods on the domestic market of the 
country of origin or of exportation of the imported goods; the price of the goods to a 
country other than South Africa; a system of minimum values or arbitrary or fictitious 
values.
In sum, South Africa appears to be in almost full compliance with the provisions of 
Articles 1 through 8 of the Customs Valuation Agreement, which sets out the essential 
valuation methods. However, the power granted to the Commissioner by the Act to 
determine the transaction value of “any imported goods” (s. 65.4(a)(i)) and to “amend 
any determination or withdraw it and make a new determination” (s.65.5) may raise 
concern about how such power is used. Although, as will be shown below, there are 
provisions for administrative and judicial review of even the Commissioner’s 
determinations, businesses, particularly small- and medium-sized ones, are often less 
emboldened to challenge customs decisions in court.
The US challenged similar provisions in Thailand’s Customs Act, which states that, 
“the Director-General shall have the power to determine the customs value”. Thailand 
replied that the “D-G never uses his authority to determine the customs value”, and, as 
a result the provision would be repealed. Although South Africa’s courts would 
normally prevent the arbitrary use of such powers, the Thailand’s experience shows 
that the authority given to the Commissioner to determine customs value may raise 
concerns among some WTO members. Notwithstanding this, however, it is the case 
that South Africa is in near-complete compliance with the obligations under the 
valuation methods. Attention now shifts to the other provisions.
Subsidiary provisions o f the Valuation Agreement
Apart from the main provisions of Articles 1 through 8 of the Valuation Agreement, 
which establish the basic and other standards of valuation, there are subsidiary 
provisions that concern the administration of the valuation system (see Table 1 
above). These include the provisions on the currency conversion (Article 9); 
confidentiality of information (article 10); right of appeal and due process (article 11); 
transparency (article 12); and the availability of surety system (article 13).
62 See WTO document G/VAL/W/130 of 23 February 2004.
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Currency conversion
Section 73 (1) and 2 was inserted in the Customs and Excise Act of 1965 was 
amended in 1995 to provide for currency conversion. According to the section, 
conversion of foreign currency for the purpose of calculating customs value would be 
“at the selling rate at the date of shipment of the goods as determined by the 
Commissioner, in consultation with the South African Reserve Bank, or if no such 
rate is determined for such date, the latest rate determined before that date shall be 
used”.
At least in theory, this provision appears to leave the determination of the conversion 
rate to the Commissioner in consultation with the Reserve Bank. This is arguably not 
in full conformity with Article 9, which appears to require a market-determined rate 
by stipulating that the exchange rate must reflect “the current value of such currency 
in commercial transactions in terms of the currency of the country of importation”. 
The rates of exchange are duly published on the Customs website, as required under 
Article 9. However, this does not resolve the seeming WTO incompatibility of 
allowing the Commissioner to determine the rate of exchange rather than leaving it to 
market forces.
Confidentiality o f information
With respect to the protection of confidential information provided for the purposes of 
customs valuation, section 4(3) of the Customs and Excise Act states that no customs 
officer “shall disclose any information relating to any person, firm or business 
acquired in the performance of his duties”. But an officer can disclose such 
information, inter alia, “when required to do so as a witness in a court of law” 
(s.4(3)(b)), or to the Commissioner ... for the purposes of any law with the 
administration of which he is charged” (s.4(3)(c)).
This provision goes further than Article 10, which creates only one exception, i.e. 
disclosure “in the context of judicial proceedings”. Clearly, if confidential information 
provided by traders and foreign governments for the purposes of customs valuation
63 For the SARS rates of exchange, see https://commerce.sars.gov.za/roe/default.htm.
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can be disclosed in other unrelated legal contexts, other than in judicial proceedings, 
the object and purpose of Article 10 would arguably be undermined.
Right o f  appeal and due process
The provision of the Valuation Agreement on rights of appeal (Article 11) is 
implemented in s. 65 (6) of the Customs and Excise Act, which provides that an 
appeal against any value determination shall lie to the High Court. Final appeal is to 
the Supreme Court of Appeal. However, s.95A of the Act provides for an internal 
administrative appeal. This is in line with the provision of Article 11(2) of the 
Agreement, which states that an initial right of appeal may be to “an authority within 
the customs administration”, provided there is the right in the final instance to a 
judicial authority.
Article 11, however, states that the right of appeal must be “without penalty”. This is 
described in the Note to Article 11 to mean that the importer “shall not be subject to a 
fine or threat of fine merely because the importer chose to exercise the right of 
appeal”. The legal effect of s. 65 (4)(c)(iii) of the Customs and Excise Act could be 
interpreted to amount to a “penalty”. Paragraph (c)(iii) provides that whenever a court 
amends or orders the Commissioner to amend any determination, “the Commissioner 
shall not be liable to pay interest on any amount which remained payable (to the 
importer) for any period during which such determination remained in force”.
Given that the importer is required under s. 65 (4)(c)(i) to make full payment of 
assessed customs duty notwithstanding that an appeal has been filed, and given that an 
appeal may last several months, if not years, the decision not to pay interest on any 
refund ordered by the court may be deemed to constitute a “fine” and therefore a 
violation of Article 11 of the Agreement, as explicated by its Interpretative Note. 
Such a decision could also serve as a threat factor, which could discourage some 
importers from choosing to exercise the right of appeal. In this regard, the provision 
in South Africa’s customs law dealing with the rights of appeal is arguably not in full 
conformity with the provision of Article 11 of the Customs Valuation Agreement.
Indeed, the appeal process is also often highly criticised. In theory, the process 
provides adequate safeguards for the trader. A trader can challenge penalties or other
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Customs decisions administratively, through an internal procedure, or judicially, 
through the High Court. However, the administrative procedure is not independent of 
Customs, which is the enforcement agency.64
Initial appeals are always to the officers who made the decision in the first place and 
the outcomes of such appeals are often predictable. Divisional managers rarely 
reverse their initial decisions; the constant refrain appears to be: “sorry, but that is my 
decision”.65 Often, too, the headquarters review of referrals from Branches simply 
confirms the facts of the declaration and then issues a determination to that effect.66 
According to a 2003 consultant report for SARS, “[i]t is important for Customs to
f%1develop and publish a complete guideline on how the appeal process is to operate”. 
Transparency o f  customs and trade regulations
Article 12 on transparency requires that laws, regulations, judicial decisions and 
administrative rulings of general application giving effect to the agreement must be 
published in conformity with Article X of GATT 1994. Article X is the main 
transparency obligation of the GATT, and has been interpreted and applied by WTO 
panels and the Appellate Body.
For instance, in US -  Underwear , the Appellate Body describes Article X:2 as 
embodying "a principle of fundamental importance”, namely, that of ” promoting full 
disclosure of governmental acts affecting Members and private persons and 
enterprises, whether of domestic or foreign nationality”69 The panel in Argentina -
70Bovine Hides notes that private traders are the main beneficiaries of the Article X 
transparency obligations.
64 Article X:3(b) of the GATT provides that administrative tribunals or procedures “shall be 
independent of the agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement”. The aim is to ensure an 
objective and impartial review of administrative action relating to customs matters.
65 This view is shared by most of the importers interviewed and confirmed by some Customs officials 
(interview with the valuation team, 2003).
66 J Mark Siegrist, Consultant Report for the South African Revenue service (SARS) 8 April 2003
67 Ibid, p 10.
68 Appellate Body Report, United States -  Restrictions on Imports o f Cotton and Man-Made Fibre 
Underwear, WT/DS24/AB/R, adopted 25 February 1997, DSR 1997:1, 11.
69 Ibid, para.21
70 Panel Report, Argentina -  Measures Affecting the Export o f Bovine Hides and the Import o f Finished 
Leather, WT/DS155/R and Corr. 1, adopted 16 February 2001, DSR 2001 :V, 1779
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South Africa's trade laws, administrative guidelines and judicial decisions are 
generally available on the Internet. There are several guidelines, operating procedures 
and instructions for valuation staff and importers. Part II of the Valuation Guide 
contains “Notes for the guidance of importers”. The South African Revenue Service’s 
(SARS) Intranet and external websites as well as several Circulars are further means 
of providing guidance on valuation practice in a number of specific areas.
However, while all this represents attempts to comply with the publications and 
transparency requirements of the WTO valuation agreement, a consultant’s report has
H1noted that SARS could go much further. Furthermore, the report highlighted the 
need to update customs circulars, many of which were several years old, and make 
them readily available to importers and agents. According to the writer of the report, 
“the practice must be that anything a customs officer can see with respect to goods 
importation, the importer/agent can see”. In terms of compliance with the 
transparency obligations of Article 12 of the CVA and Article X of the GATT, this 
report suggests that while progress had been made, more needed to be done.
The establishment o f  a surety system
Article 13 of the CVA obliges members to establish a guarantee or surety system, 
whereby goods must be released on the provision by the importer of sufficient 
guarantee. The last sentence of Article 13 requires members to make provisions in 
their laws for such circumstances. Although goods can be released on a “special 
bond” in South Africa73, there is no provision in the Customs and Exercise Act, or any 
regulation, explicitly implementing the provision of Article 13 of the CVA.
The South African Customs authorities describe the implication of Article 13 in Note 
35 of “Notes for the Guidance of Importers”. According to this Note, Article 13 only 
arises where Customs needs additional documentation (as part from the normal 
clearing documents) and where reasonable doubt exists about the invoice value but 
relevant information is not available at the time of importation. Only then could a 
provisional release be made on the basis of a guarantee. The Note emphasises that
71 J Mark Siegrist, Consultant Report for the South African Revenue service (SARS) 8 April 2003.
72 Ibid, p.3
73 See for example Standard General Insurance Company Limited v. Commissioner for Customs an4 
Excise 2004 (02) SA 622 (SCA)
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Article 13 is not intended to cover “cases which involve violations of Customs Laws 
or fraud”, in which case, the release of the goods or the provision of guarantee in 
relation to possible penalties “will fall in the discretion of Controllers”.74
It would appear that South Africa has adopted a cautious approach to implementing 
the provision of Article 13, which some WTO members regard as a key provision of 
the CVA. For instance, the US argued that Article 13 has been recognised as best 
customs practice under the International Chambers of Commerce (ICC) guidelines, 
and is an important element of trade facilitation.75 The Panel in US -  Certain EC  
Products confirms that Article 13 allows for a guarantee system to be used when there
H(\is uncertainty regarding the customs value of the imported products. It is arguable 
that situations where fraud or a violation of customs laws is merely alleged but not yet 
proved may be covered by a guarantee system.
To complete the examination of South Africa’s legislative compliance with the 
provisions of the Customs Valuation Agreement, it should be noted that South Africa 
incorporates the Interpretative Notes of the Agreement, in accordance with Article
7 7  7814, and adopts the definitions of terms set out in Article 15 of the Agreement. 
Further, it implements the provision of Article 16, which requires members to make 
provision in their laws requiring customs authorities to give an explanation in writing, 
upon written request by the importer, as to how the customs value of the importer’s 
goods was determined. In implementing this provision, Rule 65.03 of the Customs 
and Exercise Rules provides that “(i)f any importer so requests, he shall be advised in 
writing of the method used in determining the customs value of his goods”.
In sum, the evidence presented above shows that South Africa is in substantial 
compliance with the WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation, to the extent that it has
74 See Customs and Exercise Valuation Guide, February 2002.
75 See US’s intervention in meeting of the Committee on Customs Valuation, see WTO document 
G/VAL/M/9 of 28 January 1999.
76 See: Panel Report, United States -  Import Measures on Certain Products from the European 
Communities, WT/DS165/R, adopted 10 January 2001.
77 See section 74A(1) of the Customs and Exercise Act, which provides that the interpretation of 
sections 65, 66 and 67 shall be subject to the Agreement, “the Interpretative Notes thereto, the 
Advisory Opinions, Commentaries and Explanatory Notes, Case Studies and Studies issued under the 
said Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the GATT”.
78 See sections 65 and 66 of the Customs and Exercise Act.
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implemented in its national laws most of the provisions of the Agreement. There are 
however areas of non-compliance, particularly, with respect to the establishment of a 
guarantee or surety system. Although, this may exist in practice, there is no law 
explicitly providing for such a system, as required under the last sentence of Article 
13, which states that “the legislation of each member shall make provisions for such 
circumstances”.
There are also areas where compliance is not clear, especially with respect to the 
contemporaneity of the rate of exchange used for the determination of customs value, 
the protection of confidential information provided for the purposes of customs 
valuation, and the fact that rights of appeal must be without direct or indirect penalty. 
In each of these cases, the power of intervention given to the Commissioner may lead 
to a suggestion of lack of full compliance with the obligations imposed by the relevant 
provisions of the Agreement.
It is, however, the case that, at least on paper, South Africa almost fully implements 
the provisions on the essential valuation methods, as set out in Articles 1 through 8 of 
the CVA. South Africa’s almost complete legal transposition of the WTO valuation 
rules into its domestic law is particularly significant considering, as shown earlier, the 
apparent unhappiness of some of the major developing countries with certain 
provisions of the CVA.
70Clearly, while South Africa has the same problems of valuation malpractices as 
countries such as India, Brazil and Mexico, it has not, unlike these countries, dealt 
with the problems through tinkering with the valuation system, which is substantially 
in conformity with the provisions of the Customs Valuation Agreement. Nevertheless, 
while there appears to be little problems with the legal framework, there are practical 
and administrative problems affecting implementation.
From a legal standpoint, the burden of proof encompasses both the burden of 
producing evidence, and the burden of persuasion. Once an importer has satisfied the
79 The often cited malpractice is transfer pricing, resulting from related party transactions involving 
multinational corporations. There have also been problems with treatment of royalties and license fees. 
For example, this was the issue in The Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Delta 
Motor Corporation (Proprietary) Limited 2002 SA 297 (SCA).
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burden of going forward with evidence, it is incumbent upon the customs 
administration to accept the evidence supplied or come forward with other evidence to 
rebut it.80 The customs administration bears the burden of proof that the customs
o 1
value declared by an importer is untrue and inaccurate as a matter of evidence law. 
Yet the ability of customs to provide this rebuttal evidence depends on being able to 
gather necessary information and to look beyond the normal clearing documentation.
Like in most other WTO member countries, over 90% of value determination in South 
Africa is based on the transaction value method. However, although this method is 
predicated upon the ability of customs to obtain the right information, this 
information-gathering capacity is deficient in the field enforcement units. There is 
also lack of uniformity and standardisation of valuation decisions countrywide, as a 
result of which importers have been known to shop for entry points where they are 
most likely to obtain more favourable treatment.
The aim of the Customs Valuation Agreement is a valuation method that leads to the 
correct import duty.84 Striking the correct import duty would mean that the importer 
is paying no more and no less duty than required and that customs is collecting no 
more and no less duty than is due to the State. It is not certain that this balance is 
being achieved in South Africa. The administrative process, rather than the legal 
framework, appears to be the main weakness of South African implementation of the 
valuation agreement. The focus now shifts to the compliance record of Nigeria.
Nigeria’s Implementation of the Customs Valuation Agreement 
Pre-Uruguay Round situation
For many years, Nigeria has been using the Brussels Definition of Value (BDV) for 
the valuation of imported goods. Unlike South Africa, it was not a signatory to the 
1979 Tokyo Round Valuation Code. During the Uruguay Round, Nigeria was one of 
the developing countries that did not support negotiations on customs valuation and 
pre-shipment inspection, both of which could affect how imported goods are verified
80 Shin (1996, p. 190)
81 Ibid.
82 Interviews with senior staff members of SARS (2003).
83 See SARS HQ Consultant Report, 2003, p.6.
84 See the General Introductory Commentary to the Agreement on Customs Valuation.
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and valued. In his speech at the GATT ministerial meeting at Brussels in December 
1990, the Nigerian Trade Minister complained that Nigeria was “constrained to
negotiate its programme of pre-shipment inspection which is not a non-tariff
86measure .
He argued further, in respect to the valuation system, that he could not understand 
why the developed countries refused “to accept a price verification procedures based
o*7
on a broad spectrum” , as would be possible under the BDV but not under the GATT 
Valuation system. However, all the protestation did not matter since the Single 
Undertaking principle turned most of Tokyo Round plurilateral codes into mandatory 
and binding WTO multilateral agreements. So, then, how has Nigeria fared with its 
implementation of the CVA? The focus is first on the procedural obligations.
Compliance with the Procedural Obligations
Like most other developing country members of the WTO, Nigeria invoked Article
20.1 to delay application of the provisions of the ACV for a period of five years. It 
also invoked Article 20.2, which allowed it to delay application of the computed value 
method for a period of three years from the date of application of all other provisions 
of the Agreement. Finally, Nigeria reserved the right to provide that Article 5.2 of the
oo
Agreement shall be applied whether or not the importer so requests. Under Annex 
III, paragraph 1 of the ACV, Nigeria could request an extension of the five-year 
period. Nigeria made no such request and, therefore, as of January 2000, it should 
have notified its implementing laws and provided replies to the checklist of issues.
Nigeria has done none of these. At its First Session in 1995, the Committee on 
Customs Valuation indicated that it would take a more active role in monitoring new 
Members’ progress towards implementation of the agreement, and, thus, introduced a 
new agenda item entitled “Progress on implementation”. In 1997, Nigeria informed 
the Committee about the progress it was making towards implementation and the 
technical assistance it had received.89 In 1998, Nigeria indicated that it had forwarded
85 See Page (2002).
86 See GATT document MTN.TNC/MIN(90)/ST/34 of 4 December 1990.
87 Ibid.
88 WTO document WT/Let/106, 20 August 1996.
89 See WTO document G/VAL/M/6 of 19 November 1997.
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its draft legislation and draft valuation procedures to the World Customs Organisation 
(WCO) for review, and had received advice.90
Despite these assurances and despite having benefited from technical assistance and 
capacity building initiatives, particularly under the WCO/USAID valuation 
programme,91 Nigeria has, as of October 2005, failed to comply with the procedural 
obligations set out in Article 22 of the Agreement. The lack of notification of its 
implementing legislation raises the question as to whether, in fact, Nigeria is applying 
the agreement. It is therefore necessary to examine compliance with the substantive 
obligations.
Compliance with the Substantive Obligations
As noted earlier, prior to the entry into force of the WTO customs valuation 
agreement, Nigeria was using the Brussels Definition of Value for customs valuation. 
The fact, however, is that it still, in practice, uses the BDV. Nigeria’s customs laws 
are contained in the Customs and Excise Management Act (CEMA) CAP 84 1990 and 
subsidiary legislation, such as the Customs and Excise (Dumped and Subsidised 
Goods) Act and the Pre-Shipment Inspection Decree of 1979, as amended. The 
provisions on valuation for customs purposes are set out in the First Schedule of the 
CEMA, and these are based on the BDV.
Paragraph 1(1) of the First Schedule provides that “the value of any goods imported 
for use in Nigeria shall be taken to be the normal price, that is to say, the price which, 
in the opinion of the Board such goods would fetch at the time when the duty becomes 
payable on a sale in the open market between a buyer and a seller acting independent 
of each other” (emphasis added). Paragraph 5 provides that currency conversion for 
valuation purposes are to be based on “the current official rate of exchange in 
Nigeria”. These provisions are clearly at odds with those of the customs valuation 
agreement.
90 See WTO document G/VAL/M/7 of 17 June 1998; see also WT/TPR/M/39/Add.l of 12 November 
1998.
91 See WTO document G/VAL/M/37 of 30 April 2004, at p. 16.
92 See WTO document G/VAL/W/150 of 10 October 2005.
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Other practices also put Nigeria in breach of its WTO customs valuation obligations. 
For instance, the use of differential exchange rates to value “official” and private 
sector imports is a violation of GATT Article VII and the Agreement on Customs 
Valuation, since both methods could not be considered to meet the requirement of 
first use of “transaction value”. Nigeria also uses reference prices for customs 
valuation, which is absolutely prohibited by GATT Article VII and the ACV. 
Furthermore, Nigeria uses a pre-shipment inspection system, under which importers 
are required to pay ad valorem fee of 1% of fob value on all imports, which is 
inconsistent with Article VIII of the GATT.94 It is thus clear that with respect to 
customs valuation and pre-shipment inspection, Nigeria is in breach of key WTO 
obligations.
Recent Developments: Enactment o f  the Customs and Excise Amendment Act 
In June 2003, the Nigerian Parliament adopted legislation for the implementation of 
the Customs Valuation Agreement. This legislative act brought Nigeria closer to 
compliance with the key obligations of the customs valuation agreement. However, as 
of December 2005, the new legalisation had not been notified to the Committee on 
Customs Valuation because it had not come into effect. The obligation to notify arises 
only after an implementing act has entered into force. Nigeria’s failure to make the 
new legislation effective has thus delayed its notification. Nevertheless, the legislation 
itself is examined below for its compatibility with the provisions of the Customs 
Valuation Agreement. As with the section on South Africa above, the implementation 
of the key obligations of the agreement are considered systematically.
The Basic Valuation Method: The Transaction Value
The 2003 Amendment Act substitutes a new Schedule for the First Schedule of the 
CEMA, 1990, which deals with the valuation system. Paragraph 1 of the new 
Schedule replaces the BDV with a system based on the transaction value. The 
provision and exceptions in paragraph l(a)-(c) are similar to those contained in 
Article 1 of the ACV. The same paragraph provides for adjustments to the invoice 
price, i.e. the price actually paid or payable for the goods, in accordance with
93 See WTO document WT/TPR/M/39/Add.l.
94 Article VIII requires that fees and charges (other than tariffs and other taxes within the purview of 
Article III of GATT) imposed in connection with exportation or importation must be limited in amount 
to the approximate cost o f services rendered.
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paragraph 7(1) of the Schedule. Again, paragraph 7(1) repeats almost verbatim the 
provisions of Article 8 of the ACV, particularly with respect to what elements can be 
added to the transaction value.
Members are required to stipulate in their laws whether they adopt the cif or fob 
concept for valuation purposes (Article 8.2). Nigeria adopts the cif concept, as 
indicated in paragraph 7(2) of the Schedule. For good measure, the Schedule states 
that additions to the transaction value shall be made “only on the basis of objective 
and quantifiable data”, and as provided for in the Schedule (paragraph 7(3)). This 
conforms to the requirement of Article 8 (3) and (4) of the ACV.
Related Party Transactions
Article 1.2(a) of the ACV states that “the fact that the buyer and the seller are related 
... shall not in itself be grounds for regarding the transaction value as unacceptable”. 
Once the importer has provided information, Customs needs to show grounds for 
considering that the relationship influenced the price, and communicate such grounds 
to the importer, who must be given a “reasonable opportunity to respond” (Article 1.2 
(a-c)). The ACV thus places the burden of proof in respect of related transactions on 
the customs administration because it needs to provide grounds for considering that 
the relationship influenced the price.95 However, the language of paragraph 1(d) of the 
amended First Schedule appears to reverse the burden by requiring the importer to 
“prove to the satisfaction of the Board” that the relationship did not influence the 
price. Furthermore, the safeguards in Articles 1:2 (a-c) are not reflected in the 
Amendment Act.
Other Valuation Methods
Articles 2 through 7 of the ACV provide for alternative methods of valuation, which 
must be applied in a sequential order, in the event that the transaction value method 
cannot be applied. The alternative methods are the transaction value of identical 
goods (Article 2), the transaction value of similar goods (article 3), the deductive 
value (article 5), the computed value (article 6) and the fall-back or reasonable-value 
method (article 7).
95 See Shin (1996).
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The Nigerian Amendment Act provides for all of these alternative methods. For 
instance, paragraph 2 provides for the transaction value of identical goods; paragraph 
3, the transaction value of similar goods; paragraph 4, the deductive value; paragraph 
5, the computed value; and paragraph 6, the reasonable value. These provisions 
broadly conform to the obligations of Articles 2 through 7 of the ACV. However, 
there appears to be non-conformity with Articles 2 and 3 of the ACV, which require 
that if more than one transaction value of identical or similar goods is found, “the 
lowest such value shall be used to determine the customs value of the imported 
goods”. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the First Schedule provide, in the same context, that 
“higher value or figure shall be used as the customs value of the goods being valued”. 
This is likely to result in additions to the invoice prices of the imported goods.
Subsidiary Provisions of the Customs Valuation Agreement
Specific provisions of the ACV create obligations in respect of subsidiary issues 
relating the administration of the valuation system. These include the provisions on 
the currency conversion (Article 9); confidentiality of information (article 10); right 
of appeal and due process (article 11); transparency (article 12); and the availability of 
surety system (article 13). How are these obligations implemented in the Nigerian 
legislation?
Currency conversion
As noted earlier, the First Schedule of CEMA 1990 provides that currency conversion 
for valuation purposes are to be based on “the current official rate of exchange in 
Nigeria”. However, paragraph 9 of the new First Schedule now provides, as required 
by Article 9 of the ACV, that the rate of exchange to be used the conversion of 
currency shall be that duly published by the Federal Ministry of Finance and shall 
reflect “the current value of the currency in commercial transaction in terms of the 
naira”. However, according to the new Guidelines on Destination Inspection, 
published by the Nigerian Customs Service, import duty payment is still based on the 
exchange rate on the approved Form M96 rather than at the time of actual exportation 
or importation, as stipulated in Article 9 of the ACV.
96 The Form ‘M’ is the primary document in the import process and it is normally issued long before 
the actual exportation or importation of the goods.
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Confidentiality o f Information
Paragraph 11 of the amended First Schedule broadly conforms to Article 10 of the 
ACV, with respect to confidential information provided for the purposes of customs
q n
valuation. However, while Article 10 provides for only two exceptions to the 
confidentiality requirement, namely disclosure with the permission of the provider 
and in the context of judicial proceedings, paragraph 11 adds a third: “to the extent 
required by the Board in satisfying itself as to the truth or accuracy of any statement, 
document or declaration presented for customs valuation purposes”. It may be argued 
that this third exception is broader than anticipated by the provisions of Article 10.
Right o f Appeal and Due Process
Article 11 of the ACV requires the legislation of each member to provide in regard to 
a determination of customs value for the right of appeal, without penalty. Article X 
(3)(b) of the GATT 1994 also requires each member to maintain or institute judicial, 
arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for prompt review and correction of 
administrative action relating to customs matters. However, as the WTO puts it, the 
Nigerian “customs regulations do not contain provisions concerning appeal of 
customs decisions”.98
There is a general tendency in Nigeria’s customs laws to protect customs officers 
from litigation. Thus, for instance, while s. 149 of the Customs and Excise 
Management Act (CEMA) allows customs officer to stop and search a vehicle or ship 
suspected to be carrying prohibited goods, sub-section 3 states that “no officer or 
police officer shall be liable to any prosecution or action at laws on account of any 
stoppage or search in accordance with the provisions of this section”. The same 
immunity is provided in s. 150(2) in respect to search of individuals suspected to be 
carrying any prohibited article. This general legal protection clearly breaches several 
provisions of WTO law, which requires judicial review of administrative actions.
97 See also section 7 of the Customs and Excise Management Act, which provides that “... all 
information and documents supplied or produced in pursuance of any requirement of customs and 
excise laws shall be and shall be treated as confidential”.
98 See WTO document WT/TPR/S/147 at p.28.
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Transparency o f customs and trade regulations
The transparency obligations of the ACV are contained in Article 12 of the 
agreement, which mirrors the provisions of Article X of GATT 1994. It requires that 
laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application 
concerning customs and valuation matters must be published promptly and in such a 
manner as to enable governments and traders to be acquainted with them. As the 
panel in Argentina -  Bovine Hides makes clear, these provisions are designed to 
benefit private traders.
For many years, access to customs information by private traders proved particularly 
difficult as such information was only available in paper form and manually. Recent 
reform initiatives have, however, made the Nigerian customs more open in its 
operations. A website was set up in 200499, which contains useful information, such 
as press releases, media reports, circulars, notices, guidelines and customs laws. 
Customs also runs a weekly television programme, called “Customs Duty”, which 
carries customs news. The customs administration also plans to operate “e-services”, 
whereby traders can, with security codes and password, gain access to many of 
services provided by customs. These are all novel ideas and their efficiency and 
sustainability are not certain, especially given the institutional and capacity deficits of 
the customs administration.
The establishment o f  a security system
As noted earlier, Article 13 of the ACV requires members to provide in their laws and 
in practice a guarantee or surety system, whereby goods must be released on the 
provision by the importer of sufficient guarantee. Paragraph 10 of the amended First 
Schedule deals specifically with circumstances of delayed valuation, and provides that 
if it becomes necessary to delay the final determination of the customs value of 
imported goods, the importer shall be permitted to clear and take possession of the 
goods on the payment of adequate surety or any form of guarantee. This is broadly in 
conformity with the provisions of Article 13 of the ACV. However, the guarantee
99 See http://www.nigeriacustoms.gov.ng.
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system requires a sophisticated financial system100, which is yet not in place in 
Nigeria, despite the recent reform in the banking sector.
In implementing the interpretative provisions in Article 14 of the ACV, paragraph 14 
of the First Schedule states that “(f)or purposes of the interpretation of customs 
valuation under this Act, the provisions of Article VII of the GATT 1994 as contained 
in the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VII, together with all the notes to 
the Articles, and all the Annexes to those Articles, shall apply”. This provision 
effectively transposes or incorporates by reference the entire Article VII of GATT 
1994 and the entire WTO Customs Valuation Agreement into Nigeria’s customs law.
Yet, the provision appears to be misleading. As mentioned in chapter 3, the Nigerian 
Constitution does not require the courts to adopt the principle of consistent 
interpretation. Furthermore, the WTO treaty itself and its annexed agreements have 
not been ratified by the Nigerian Parliament, which raises questions about their legal 
status in Nigerian domestic law. It is thus not clear how, in interpreting the Customs 
and Excise Management (Amendment) Act, the court would have recourse to 
Customs Valuation Agreement, notwithstanding the wording of paragraph 14 of the 
First Schedule. This is symptomatic of the general incoherence in the Nigerian legal 
system, where the provisions of one statute can contradict those of another equally 
relevant one.
For instance, as some senior Nigerian customs officers have argued, despite the 
changes to the CEMA, the Customs Valuation Agreement could not be implemented 
unless the Act establishing the pre-shipment inspection system was repealed. As one 
put it, “if we do not repeal the Pre-shipment Inspection Decree No 11 of 1996, 
establishing the PSI scheme, we cannot begin to implement the GATT Valuation 
Agreement”.101 The PSI Decree remains, however, part of the legal framework of the 
Nigerian customs administration. It is thus necessary to discuss the PSI system in the 
light of the Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection.
100 Malone (2002)
101 Interview, Nigerian Customs Officer, 2003.
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Nigeria’s Pre-shipment Inspection Regime102
Nigeria has used the pre-shipment inspection system intermittently for over 25 years 
as a means of dealing with the widespread problems of valuation malpractices, such 
as under-invoicing, concealment and forgery. In April 1999, after over 20 years of 
operating the PSI system, the government replaced it with the destination inspection 
scheme. However, it reintroduced the PSI system in September 1999 due to lack of
1 A 'lappropriate structures to support destination inspection.
As mentioned earlier, Nigeria took a defensive stance during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations on the Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection, but nevertheless became 
subject to the agreement under the Single Undertaking principle. The agreement 
recognises developing countries’ need for the use of PSI system to prevent loss of 
customs revenue from undervaluation of goods, but at the same time provides for 
safeguards against abuse of the PSI system by user countries.
However, Nigeria’s PSI regime was inconsistent with many of the provisions of the 
PSI Agreement. For instance, Nigeria did not apply the pre-shipment inspection 
activities on an equal basis to all WTO members104, contrary to the MFN provision of 
Article 2.1 of the agreement. Furthermore, although PSI activities are to be carried out 
in the exporting country (Article 2.3), Nigeria introduced, in 2002, 100% examination 
of goods at destination in addition to pre-shipment inspection in the country of export. 
This has created significant delays and increased the burden on importers.
Price verification under the PSI Agreement must be based on the contract price agreed 
between an exporter and an importer (article 2.20(a)), and the price can only be 
rejected following a verification process that conforms to the guidelines set out in 
Article 2.20 (b) through (e), which include comparison of the export price with the 
price(s) of identical or similar goods. Indeed, the PSI Agreement states that “[t]he 
obligations of user Members with respect to the services of pre-shipment inspection
102 South Africa does not operate a PSI system. So this subsection was not covered in the section on 
South Africa above.
103 See “Government Confidence in Pre-shipment Soars” (article in ThisDay newspaper, 17/01/2001)
104 Some countries were exempted from the scheme. See WTO document WT/TPR/S/39 at p.32.
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entities (in connection with customs valuation) shall be the obligations which they 
have accepted” under the Agreement on Customs Valuation.105
What this means is that the use of the PSI system by any WTO member is not an 
excuse for deviating from the valuation system mandated under the Customs 
Valuation Agreement. However, Nigeria continued to use the BDV system, which is 
based on notional rather than actual price paid or payable for the goods. The PSI 
companies frequently refused to issue Clean Report of Findings (CFR) to nearly 50% 
of importers.106 Furthermore, the Nigerian customs administration could reject the 
customs duty determined by the PSI companies and may determine a higher (but not 
lower) rate of duty.107 Frequently, importers were issued Debit Notes, requiring them 
to pay higher duties.108
This is a clear violation of WTO rules. Customs cannot automatically determine a 
higher dutiable value without following the sequential methods prescribed in the 
Valuation Agreement.109 Thus, while Nigeria was entitled to use the PSI system, it 
nevertheless failed to comply with much of the provisions of that agreement, 
particularly with respect to price verification and the determination of dutiable value. 
Nigeria’s PSI system was regularly criticised by other WTO members110, and many 
regard the use of the BDV as unacceptable.111
The adoption of new legislation in June 2003 to implement the Customs Valuation 
Agreement and the introduction of the destination inspection scheme to replace the 
PSI system on 1 January 2006 are, in theory, positive steps designed to bring Nigeria 
into conformity with its WTO obligations in these areas. However, as mentioned 
earlier, the 2003 Amendment Act, flawed as it is in some areas, has yet to come into 
force and has not been notified to the WTO. Also, the new destination inspection 
scheme does not appear to address the problem of customs valuation in Nigeria.
105 See Article 20 (footnote 4).
106 WTO document WT/TPR/S/39 at p.32.
107 Ibid.
108 See article, “Pre-shipment Inspection is the Problems at the Ports”, available at: 
http://www.thisdavonline.com/archive/2001/05/18/2001Q518bus28.html (accessed 03/01/2003).
109 Business Guide to the World Trading System, ITC/Commonwealth Secretariat, 1999, p.78
110 See, e.g., WTO document WT/TPR/147.
111 For instance, the US states that it attaches importance to the issue because the use o f the BDV is 
unfavourable to its exporters. See WTO document G/VAL/M/20 of 6 August 2001 at p.l 1.
123
Countries implementing the Customs Valuation Agreement would normally produce
11^detailed valuation guidelines for importers and customs officers. The Destination 
Inspection Guidelines, published by the Nigerian Customs Service, contain no such 
valuation guide.113 The only reference a valuation procedure is the requirement that 
the importer must submit, inter alia, a pro-forma invoice and a Combined Certificate 
of Value and Origin (CCVO), which must be duly attested to by the Chamber of 
Commerce of the exporting country. Scanning Companies (SCs) are contracted to 
generate Risk Assessment Reports (RARs) from these documents. Then, a 
Verification and Query process is conducted, using the ASYCUDA ++ system114, 
with emphasis on the values of the imported product. Where any discrepancy is 
found, a Demand Notice is issued for any additional payment.
The process relies mainly on automation and technology, but is likely to be beset by 
significant resource and capacity problems. The existence of competent legal and 
operational personnel, with full knowledge of the valuation system is a sine qua non 
for a successful implementation of the Customs Valuation Agreement. The agreement 
is largely incompatible with the use of the PSI scheme, since it requires the active 
involvement of the customs administration. Yet, Nigeria’s lack of confidence in its 
customs is the main reason why it has used the PSI system for decades and why the 
recent adoption of the destination inspection scheme may be short-lived. It is doubtful 
whether Nigeria’s implementation of the valuation agreement, if at all, can fully 
conform to the letter and spirit of the agreement.
Conclusion
This chapter has considered the implementation of the WTO Customs Valuation 
Agreement by South Africa and Nigeria. As table 3 shows, there are significant 
differences in the compliance records of South Africa and Nigeria, with South Africa 
in substantial compliance and Nigeria in virtual non-compliance. On the different 
valuation methods, South Africa’s laws are fully in conformity with the provisions of 
the CVA. South Africa’s valuation rules broadly conform to the subsidiary provisions
112 See, for example, South Africa’s Valuation Guide (Notes for the Guidance of Importers), as well as 
Valuation Audit Manual.
113 The Guidelines are available at: http://www.nigeriacustoms.gov.ng. The Guidelines are, however, 
subject to frequent changes.
114 ASYCUDA or Automated System for Customs Data and Management, is a system developed by 
UNCTAD for use by customs administrations in developing countries.
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of the agreement. However, there are areas where compliance is unclear in respect to 
these obligations, especially given the Commissioner’s discretionary power of 
intervention. The study further shows that while there is little problem with the legal 
framework, there are some practical and administrative problems of implementation.
Table 3: CVA - Formal Compliance by South Africa and Nigeria (as of July 2006)
South Africa Nigeria
Procedural Obligations
• Notification of 
implementing 
laws
• Responses to 
checklist of 
issues
• Review of laws
Have notified all laws 
Have notified responses 
Review concluded
No notification to date 
No notification to date
Review not yet undertaken due to non­
notification
Substantive Obligations
• Basic valuation 
method
• Other methods
Laws broadly conform 
Laws broadly conform
No compatible law in force (BDV probably still 
being used)
No compatible law in force
Subsidiary provisions
• Currency 
conversion
• Confidentiality 
of information
• Rights of appeal 
and due process
• Transparency of 
laws and 
regulations
• Surety system
Partial compliance: 
Commissioner has 
broad power to 
determine rate 
Partial compliance: 
information can be used 
in non-judicial setting 
Available, but process 
may discourage traders 
Internet-based 
information, guidelines, 
notices, but may be out 
of date
Not explicitly provided 
for
No law in force or notified
No law in force of notified
No law in force or notified (not even contained 
in recent amendment act)
Intemet-bases access, but still rudimentary 
No law in force or notified
In the case of Nigeria, there is so far no compliance. The Amendment Act of 2003 is 
flawed in many areas, principally for failing to provide for a right of appeal and 
failing to comply with the principle of procedural due process. The Act itself has not 
been notified to the WTO because it has yet to come into force. Thus, Nigeria is, to 
date, not implementing its obligations under the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement, 
even though the date of application of the provisions of the agreement for Nigeria was 
1 January 2000. Nigeria is thus in breach of its procedural and substantive obligations 
under the agreement. The next chapter considers the implementation by South Africa 
and Nigeria of another WTO agreement, namely the TRIPS agreement
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CHAPTER 5
Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement
The preceding chapter examined the implementation of the Customs Valuation 
Agreement by South Africa and Nigeria. That chapter showed significant differences 
in the compliance records of these countries. The purpose of the present chapter is to 
consider the compliance experiences of both countries with respect to another WTO 
agreement, namely the TRIPS Agreement. As in the previous case study, the aim is to 
examine empirically whether and to what extent these countries have given effect in 
their national laws to the provisions of the agreement.
The chapter is divided into six sections. Section 1 briefly places intellectual property 
rights in some theoretical context. Section 2 provides a snapshot of the negotiating 
history of the TRIPS Agreement. Section 3 discusses the implementation experiences 
of developing countries in general. Sections 4 and 5 examine respectively the 
compliance records of South Africa and Nigeria with respect to three areas of TRIPS 
obligations -  procedural, substantive and enforcement. Section 6 concludes with a 
brief comparison of the experiences of the two countries.
Intellectual Property Rights in Context
Legal and Economic Perspectives
Intellectual property law is that area of law that concerns legal rights associated with 
creative efforts. It involves legal rights granted by the State, conferring on the holder 
certain exclusive or monopoly ownership over his creative or intellectual works. It 
creates largely negative rights, that is, a legally enforceable power to exclude others 
from using a resource.1 The rationales and justifications for the legal protection of IP 
are founded on many theories , the most potent, perhaps, is the incentive theory, 
especially because it is more forward looking than the others. The incentive theory 
links IP protection to the future, i.e. as an incentive to make new inventions and to
1 See Landes and Posner (1988)
2 The natural law or moral rights theory is based on the Lockean “fruit of the labour” argument that 
posits that people should own the fruits of their labour. The communitarian rights view, however, 
criticises the fruit of labour argument on the account that “only radically novel creative acts are 
genuinely individual ... [and other] creative acts are one step in a historical continuum and usually not 
attributable to a specific person (see Srinivasan, 2002, citing Cohen and Noll, 2000).
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invest the necessary time and capital. It is thus quid pro quo and the law strives to 
strike a balance between conflicting private and public interests to reach a justifiable 
compromise.
Legally speaking, the patent system, for example, is a bargain or contract between the 
inventor and the State, both parties bringing consideration to that contract.4 For the 
limited exclusive rights granted by the State, the inventor in return gives total and 
complete disclosure of the details concerning the invention and accepts, in addition, 
certain risks, including the possibility that the State, acting in the public interest, may 
impose certain conditions that may limit his enjoyment of the exclusive rights.5 The 
same logic underpins copyright protection, which is subject to the exceptions of fair 
use or fair dealing. There are also limited exceptions in respect of trademarks.
However, intellectual property rights are highly controversial, especially when viewed 
from an economic perspective.6 The arguments in favour of strong IPRs are often 
linked to their predicted effects on trade flows, foreign direct investment, creation and 
diffusion of technology, and, generally, other areas of international commercial 
activity. Yet, most commentators agree that there is paucity of reliable empirical data 
upon which to base these claims.7 As some commentators put it, “most positive and 
normative effects of IPR reforms are theoretically ambiguous and dependent on
Q
circumstances”. Some have also argued, for instance, that IPRs do not play an 
important role in influencing total international transactions of major developed 
countries such as the US9, and that “more empirical research is needed to gain more 
insight regarding the IPR-trade link”.10
3 Bainbridge (1996)
4 Ibid.
5 The risk that an investor must be willing to accept includes that details of invention are available for 
public inspection: that some things can be done during the life of the patent (i.e. non-infringing acts) by 
others: that the invention may be vulnerable to a compulsory licence: that competition law may impose 
restrictions on the exploration of the patent; and the risk that the invention may be appropriated by the 
state (ibid, p. 12)
6 For recent economic research on intellectual property and economic development, see Fink and 
Maskus (eds) (2005),
7 Maskus, 2000.
8 Fink and Maskus (eds) (2005), p.6
9 Fink (2005) in Fink and Maskus (eds) (2005).
10 Fink and Primo Braga in Fink and Maskus (eds) (2005).
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Indeed, it is with regard to the trade-relatedness of intellectual property that the 
TRIPS Agreement has attracted some of its sharpest criticisms. For instance, 
Professor Oddi declares that, "TRIPS rests on no solid theoretical or empirical 
foundations whatsoever".11 Another strong critic, Professor Bhagwati argues that IP 
"is not a 'trade' issue", and criticises what he regards as the "pseudo-intellectual
1 9justification" that suggests otherwise. Other commentators have, however, sought to 
justify the trade-relatedness of IP by arguing that widespread piracy, counterfeiting 
and infringement of IP rights constitute a barrier to trade in that the availability of
1 “Xsuch goods diminishes market access for legitimately traded goods.
With respect to developing countries, it is generally agreed that in static efficiency 
terms, most developing countries, as net importers of traded IP products, would derive 
little immediate benefits from strengthened IPRs. Clearly, rents from royalties, 
license fees and profit repatriation will, at least in the short term, flow away from 
these countries as IP users to developed countries as IP producers.14 However, in 
dynamic efficiency terms, the benefits of stronger IP could produce positive effects on 
imports of high-technology goods, FDI, and inward technology transfer, although 
these outcomes will depend on the existence of complementary or collateral policy 
and institutional reforms.15 Thus, even the dynamic gains are uncertain or at best 
conditional.16
The Uruguay Round Negotiations
It was against the background of such conflicting claims on the costs and benefits of 
IPRs that the Uruguay Round negotiations on the TRIPS agreement took place. While 
the traditional reciprocal exchange of tariff concessions that underpinned GATT 
negotiations was generally welcome because it typically yielded benefits to all the
11 See Reichman (1996), at. 370.
12 Professor Bhagwati argues that putting TRIPS into the WTO legitimates the use of the WTO to 
extract royalty payments (Bhagwati, 2002, p i27). See also Srinivasan (2005).
13 Maskus, 2000, p .I l l ,  although he goes on to say that, "identifying how IPRs affect international 
trade is empirically difficult" (Ibid).
14 In addition to the net outflows of royalty payments, there are the compliance costs associated with 
the prohibitive prices of IP products such as medicines, as well the administrative costs of setting up 
efficient systems for the acquisition, maintenance, and enforcement o f intellectual property rights.
15 Maskus, 2000.
16 See UNCTAD-ICTSD, 2005.
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parties involved, the same could not be said of negotiations to strengthen IPRs, which
17were, in any case, designed to protect rather than liberalise trade in IP products.
Nevertheless, the impetus for increasing the normative standards of IP and for 
bringing the international regulation of IPRs into the GATT became stronger in the 
late 1970s, as the developed countries began to question the ability of the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), traditionally the global regulator of IPRs,
1 ftto provide for effective protection and enforcement of IPRs. They expressed 
concerns that the standards in some of the WIPO treaties were weak and vaguely 
specified, and that the WIPO system did not provide adequate mechanisms for 
enforcing obligations. Furthermore, given resistance from the developing country 
members of WIPO, it was difficult to renegotiate the conventions rapidly and 
flexibly.19
To be sure, global pharmaceutical, software and recorded entertainment industries 
played a critical role in pushing the IP issue into the trade agenda. As many 
commentators have noted, TRIPS was a producer/technology-owner driven
71agreement. Duncan Matthews notes that: “without the global corporate consensus
77there quite simply would have been no TRIPS Agreement”. Intense pressure from 
these global corporate actors, which had clear commercial interests in the worldwide 
stronger protection of IPRs, particularly in developing countries, forced their
71
governments to adopt a much tougher negotiating position.
17 See T.N. Srinivasan in Kennedy and Southwick (eds)(2002); Fink and Reichenmiller (2005).
18 See Maskus (2000); UNCTAD -  ICSTD, 2005.
19 Ibid.
20 See, for example, Abbott (2004) and Matthews (2002).
21 For a discussion of the political economy of intellectual property rights, particularly the extent to 
which powerful interest groups influence and shape the political dynamism underlying the field of 
IPRs, see Pugatch (2004)
22 Matthews (2002, p 13).
23 For instance, there is evidence that the US was willing initially to accept a plurilateral agreement on 
TRIPS, that is, a code that applied to a limited group of GATT contracting parties, notably all the 
developed countries and a select few developing countries. See UNCTAD-ICSTD, 2005, at p. 4. See 
also US’s initial proposal of November 1987, GATT document MTN.GNG/NG11/W/14, 20 October 
1987, November 3, 1987.
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Despite the initial strong protestations by the Group of Ten developing countries, led 
by Brazil and India24, which had been quite active and vociferous on the IP issue, the 
TRIPS Agreement finalised in 1993 largely reflected the position of the developed 
countries, and was particularly modelled on the demands of US, EC and Japanese 
business interests.25 The weakening and ultimate dissipation of the initial resistance 
by the leading developing countries was due to a number of factors.
Clearly, pressure from the US and other developed countries such as the EC and 
Japan, played a critical role. The US’s strategy entailed the use of trade incentives 
plus threat of trade sanctions. Trade concessions in terms of promises to liberalise 
the agricultural and textile and clothing markets were coupled with threats that the US 
would continue to pursue section 301 actions, and might even abandon the GATT
onaltogether, if its negotiating agenda was not accepted. As Petersmann puts it, “the 
unilateral trade sanctions applied under Section 301 of the US Trade Act in response 
to violations of intellectual property rights in foreign countries were instrumental for 
the negotiation and conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement”.28
However, while the TRIPS agreement has been strongly criticised by several 
commentators as being detrimental to the interests of most developing countries and
OQas being imposed against their wishes , there are those who argue that, in the end, 
perhaps reluctantly, developing countries came to see the TRIPS Agreement as an 
acceptable part of an overall package and appreciated the perceived value of IP 
protection to their countries. The late 1980s and early 1990s were also a period 
when many developing countries embarked on unilateral trade and economic 
liberalisation, a situation that arguably also contributed to a willingness to join a 
consensus on the TRIPS Agreement.31
24 The ten countries are Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania, and 
Yugoslavia.
25 In 1988, US, EC and Japanese corporate interest groups jointly presented a 'manifesto' entitled 'Basis 
Framework of GATT Provisions on Intellectual Property, designed to form the basis of a GATT 
intellectual property code. See Matthews (2002) and Drahos, 1995.
26 Abbott in Kennedy and Southwick (2004).
27 Ibid.
28 In Kennedy and Southwark (eds), 2004, p.33
29 Critics of the TRIPS agreement from a development perspective are legion and cannot be cited here, 
but see, e.g. Matthews (2002), Braga and Fink (1998) and Abbott (1998).
30 Abbott in Kennedy & Southwick (eds), 2002, p.315, citing Professor John Jackson.
31 Maskus (2000).
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What is clear, however, is that the formulation and promulgation of the TRIPS 
Agreement occurred largely without the active participation of developing countries. 
Given their defensive stance, these countries had little contribution to make to the 
final text of the Agreement. Arguably, therefore, the TRIPS Agreement, like the 
Customs Valuation Agreement, is another exogenous law for most developing 
countries. Indeed, as a general proposition, most developing countries are dissatisfied 
with the Agreement, and some have been clamouring for its renegotiation. 
Furthermore, it is generally believed that the costs and difficulties of implementation 
are beyond what these countries had foreseen.33
All of this raises valid empirical questions as to whether these countries are adhering 
to the principle of pacta sunt servanda in their implementation of the TRIPS 
obligations. The fact that the agreement imposes a high depth of cooperation and 
arguably did not represent the ex ante preferences of most developing countries 
qualifies it for empirical compliance research (Table 1 shows the scope of the TRIPS 
substantive obligations and Table 2 for the enforcement obligations). Before, focusing 
on the compliance records of South Africa and Nigeria, it is useful to provide a 
snapshot of the experiences of developing countries in general, as gathered from the 
compliance reviews at the Council for TRIPS.34
Overview of Developing Countries’ Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement
One of the main preoccupations of the TRIPS Council since its first meeting on 9 
March 1995 has been the monitoring of Members’ compliance with their procedural 
obligations, as well as reviews of national implementation legislation. Article 63.2 of 
the TRIPS Agreement requires Members to notify their IP laws and regulations to the 
Council for TRIPS in order to assist the Council in its review of the operation of the 
agreement. Members are also required to respond to a Checklist of Issues on
32 See Abbott in Kennedy & Southwick (eds), 2002. This view, of course, is shared by most 
commentators (see Reichman, 1996), and can be deduced from the behaviour of most developing 
countries.
33 See, e.g. Braga and Fink (1998); Abbott (1998); Finger and Schuler (2000); and UNCTAD-ICSTD 
(2003).
34 The review is seen as an important dispute-avoidance vehicle, and has specific benefits, including: 
the clearing up o f misunderstandings about a country’s legislation; the identification of deficiencies in 
notified laws and regulations; the identification of differences in interpretation; and, for developing 
countries, “the insights into how their trading partners are understanding and implementing the 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, and which aspects appear to be more particularly sensitive” 
(Often, 1998, pp 525-526)
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Enforcement. At its meeting of 9 May 1996, the Council agreed the procedures for 
review of national legislation35, and began the review of the legislation of the 
developed countries whose transitional period ended on 1 January 1996. So, how did 
the developing countries perform with respect to their procedural obligations?
Article 65 of the TRIPS Agreement grants every WTO Member a general transitional 
period of one year from when the WTO Agreement came into force on 1 January
1995, thus the TRIPS Agreement was not due to be implemented until 1 January
1996. However, paragraph 2 of Article 65 grants developing countries and transitional 
economies36 a further period of four years, meaning that they were required to
7^implement the agreement by 1 January 2000. The purpose of the transitional period 
is, however, not so much to postpone the adoption of TRIPS compliant laws but to 
phase in the changes in law gradually.
Yet, many developing countries and transitional economies paid little attention during 
this period to introducing necessary changes in their IP laws, as evident from their 
attitude to the notification and review exercises. This appears to be the case with both 
the small and the more advanced developing countries. For example, the attempt by 
the US to get some advanced developing countries or transitional economies to make 
early notifications and to participate early in the review exercise was rebuffed by 
these countries. Poland38, one of the countries targeted by the US, retorted that it “was 
enjoying the transitional period to which it was entitled under the TRIPS Agreement” 
(emphasis added).39
Furthermore, rather than seeing the review of the developed countries’ legislation as a 
good learning process, most developing countries showed little interest in the
35 See document IP/C/M/7, paragraph 6
36 See S. 65.3, which grants transitional economies the same delayed implementation period as 
developing countries.
37 However, under Article 66.1, the least-developed countries were granted a delayed implementation 
period of 10 years, until 1 January 2006. Further, based on the Doha Ministerial Decisions, least- 
developed countries have been granted up to 2016 to implement Sections 5 and 7 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, dealing patent protection for pharmaceutical products and protection of undisclosed 
information. On 29 November 2005, the Council for TRIPS agreed to extend the TRIPS 
implementation period for the least-developed countries to 1 July 2013. See 
http://www.wto.org/english/news e/pres05 e/pr424 e.htm for the text of the decision.
38 Poland was a transitional economy and therefore was not classified as a developing country.
39 See WTO document IP/C/M/11 page 9. The countries targeted by the US were Turkey, Singapore, 
Mexico, Kuwait, Korea, Israel, Hong Kong and Poland (see document IP/C/M/8).
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exercise. With the exception of India and, to some extent, Brazil, many developing 
countries treated the reviews as if it was nothing to do with them.40 This was due to a 
combination of factors, including lack of interest, lack of full understanding of the 
issues, and lack of capacity. For instance, while the developed countries normally 
send their IP specialists from Geneva and the capitals to the TRIPS Council meetings, 
developing countries’ representatives are mainly Geneva-based trade diplomats who 
are only generally broadly familiar with key IP issues 41
The implementation challenges posed by the TRIPS Agreement are difficult to 
underestimate. The burden of compliance was too much for some countries. The 
March 1999 market survey conducted by the Managing Intellectual Property journal 
found that several developing countries were “sailing close to the wind on the TRIPS 
deadline”. In December 1999, shortly before the deadline for full implementation 
expired, the Indonesian government declared that it could not implement the TRIPS 
Agreement because of the prevailing circumstances in the country.42 Venezuela asked 
for an extension of the 1 January 2000 implementation deadline.43
In November 2001, Senegal informed the Council that it was reverting to its least- 
developed country status and invoked the provisions of Article 66.1 and any further 
extensions that might be granted under it. The US expressed concerns and entered a 
reservation pending further analysis of the situation and consultation with Senegal on 
its status.44 Although other less advanced developed countries did not adopt such a 
radical approach, many of them indicated that they were facing significant difficulties 
in implementing even the basic procedural obligations of the TRIPS Agreement.
40 For example, while the developed countries subjected the IP laws and regulations of developing 
countries to close scrutiny, only three developing countries posed questions to developed countries 
with respect to their IP laws and regulations. India posed questions to the US and the EC (document 
IP/CAV/54); Korea posed questions to the US (document IP/Q/USA/l/Add.l) and Brazil posed 
questions to Australia (document IP/C/M/13).
41 Also, while some developed countries have up to six representatives assigned to the TRIPS Council 
meetings, most developing countries have only one. For instance, according to a list of members’ 
representatives to the TRIPS Council meetings, prepared by the WTO Secretariat, the EC and its 
member states have 27 representatives; the US (7); Japan (6); Canada (4); Malaysia (4); Nigeria (1); 
South Africa (1).
42 Kusumadara (2002, pi 87)
43 Ibid.
44 See documents IP/C/24 and IP/C/M/34. Senegal is one of the countries listed by the United Nations 
(UN) as a least-developed country (LDC).
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Cameroon noted that implementation required considerable time and effort and thus it 
“would appreciate it if the Council could grant a period of delay enabling (its) 
Government to carry out the necessary legal reforms ...”45 Democratic Republic of 
Congo cited “domestic political and administrative reasons” for its delegation’s 
inability to prepare the necessary documents within the deadline for the review of its 
legislation or to come to Geneva for the review meeting.46
For many developing countries, the desire, perhaps, to comply with their legal 
obligations was severely limited by lack of capacity. For some, there is clear evidence 
of lack of enthusiasm or willingness to prioritise the issue of compliance. The fact that 
in 2005 there were still outstanding notifications and responses by countries that 
should have been implementing the TRIPS Agreement by 1 January 200047 suggests 
that, for some developing countries, the TRIPS Agreement lacks compliance pull, 
due, perhaps, to lack of ownership by many of these countries of the agreement.
However, there is also evidence that the law’s impact was not completed muted. For 
instance, most of the countries with problems of delayed and partial notifications 
eventually complied. Many developing countries’ reviews have been deleted from the 
agenda. The practice of keeping a country’s review on the agenda until all outstanding 
questions were answered served as a normative pressure that appeared to have 
worked. The flexibility in the Council’s modus operandi, particularly with respect to 
the time period and deadlines provided for notifications and responses to questions, 
also induced ultimate compliance with the procedural obligations.
Against the background of the broader picture and context presented above, the focus 
now shifts specifically to the implementation experiences of South Africa and 
Nigeria. The case studies, however, look beyond the procedural obligations and 
explore compliance with the substantive and enforcement obligations by the two 
countries. Archival materials from the WTO Secretariat, including minutes from 
TRIPS Council meetings and other communications to the WTO by and about the two
45 See documents IP/C/M/30 and 34.
46 See document IP/C/M/30 at p.5.
47 See document IP/C/M/47 of 3 June 2005.
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countries, were examined to gain an understanding of their compliance with the 
procedural obligations of the TRIPS agreement.
The IP laws and regulations of the two countries were examined for their TRIPS 
compatibility or incompatibility. In the case of South Africa, all the IP statutes were
AC>
accessed through the government webpage , while in the case of Nigeria, the relevant 
IP statutes were accessed through a Nigerian law webpage.49 The enquiry also 
examines the application of the IP laws by the domestic courts of the two countries to 
establish their consistency with the TRIPS commitments. Judgments of the South 
African Supreme Court of Appeal are available on the Internet and it was possible to 
access all the IP related cases, since 1999.50 Few IP cases are reported in Nigeria51,
C 'J  ___ ^
because very few IP cases go to court; most are settled out of court, if at all. The 
case studies also rely on interview and observation data, gathered both in Geneva and 
the capitals of the two countries.
Each of the two country analyses below begins with a brief history of the IP regime in 
each country, focusing on the situation pre-TRIPS. This is followed by an analysis of 
how and to what extent each country has complied with the three areas of TRIPS 
obligations described earlier.53 Tables 1 and 3 below contain respectively a brief 
outline of the mandatory substantive and enforcement obligations.
48 All South African statutes are available at: http://www.info.gov.za/acts
49 See Nigeria-law.org/LFNMainPage.htm. The following acts are available on the webpage: Trade 
Marks Act, 1990; Copyright Act, 1990; Patents and Designs Act, 1999; Copyright (Amendment) 
Decree, 1992 and Copyright (Amendment) Decree, 1999.
50 For judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal (from 1999) see 
http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/scrtappeal/scaindex.html. For researching South African law in 
general, see http://www.llrx.com/features/southafrica.htm.
1 For judgements of some Nigerian courts, see Nigeria-law.org/LawReporting.htm.
52 US Department of State Report, 2005.
53 The issue of compliance with the TRIPS agreement is particularly difficult to tackle. This is because 
of “constructive ambiguities” in the agreement. Some commentators have argued that the ambiguities 
or flexibilities give developing countries ample room for manoeuvre in their implementation of the 
agreement (see UNCTAD-ICSTD, 2005; Reichman, 1998). However, several WTO panels and the 
Appellate Body have adopted a narrow or literal interpretative approach, which, in a sense, limits the 
so-called flexibilities. For example, with respect to Article 1.1, which grants members freedom to 
determine the appropriate method of implementation within their own legal system, the Appellate Body 
in the India-Mailbox case has held that that freedom does not preclude a panel from examining whether 
or not the method of implementation used by a country derogates from its TRIPS obligations. See 
Appellate Body Report, India -  Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 
Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998, DSR 1998:1, 9
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Table 1: TRIPS substantive obligations
PART n  OF TRIPS: SUBSTANTIVE OBLIGATIONS
IP Area Articles Scope of Obligation
Copyright and Related Rights 9
10 
11 
12
13
14
incorporates Articles 1 through 21 of Berne Convention.
Computer programmes and databases to be protected as literary works 
Rental rights to be granted to authors of computer programmes etc 
Copyright to be protected for 50 years
Limitations and exceptions must not prejudice legitimate interests 
Related rights, i.e. of performers, sound recordings and broadcasts 
must be protected for at least 50 years (performers) and 20 (broadcast) 
Article 14.6 requires rights o f performers and producers of sound 
recordings to be protected retroactively as required under the 
provisions of Article 18 of the Berne Convention (1971)____________
Trademarks 15
16
18
19
21
Signs, including combination of colours to be registrable; actual use 
not a filing application for registration; service marks to be registrable 
(Article 15.4): trademark must be published promptly (15.4) 
Trademark owner must have exclusive right to prevent unauthorised 
users, but rights must not prejudice existing prior rights (16.1). Well- 
known trademarks must be protected (as under Article 6bis of the 
Paris Convention).
Protection for initial 7 period of years and then renewable indefinitely 
Cancellation solely for non-use must only be after an uninterrupted 
period of three years of non-use, and certain valid reasons, including 
those relating to government intervention, must be recognised 
Right to assign trademarks. No compulsory licensing of trademarks.
Geographical Indications 22
23
Members must provide the legal means for interested parties to 
prevent the use of GIs in a manner, which misleads the public as to 
the true origin of the good as well as acts of unfair competition. 
Members must refuse or invalidate the registration of trademarks 
containing a GI of goods that are misleading as to the true place of 
origin (22.3)
Additional protection must be granted for GIs for wine and spirits. 
Members are obliged to provide the legal means to interested parties 
to prevent the use of a GI identifying wines for wines or spirits for 
spirits not originating in the place indicated even where the true origin 
is indicated or the GI is used in translation or accompanied by 
expressions such as “kind”, “type”, “style”, “imitation” or the like. In 
principle, under the Article 23 protection, there is no need to show 
that the public has been misled as to the true origin of the good or that 
an act of unfair occurred (See WTO, 2004)._______________________
Industrial designs 25
26
Independently created industrial designs that are new and original are 
to be protected, through industrial design law or through copyright 
law. Requirements for protecting textile designs, including cost, 
examination or publication must create unreasonable impairment.
The owner of protected industrial deigns must have the right to 
prevent unauthorised third parties from certain acts. Industrial designs 
must be protected for at least 10 years (26.3).______________________
Patents 27
28
Patents must be available for any inventions, whether products or 
processes, in all fields of technology (27.1). Patents must be available 
and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to place of 
invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported 
or locally produced (27.1).
Members must patent micro-organisms and non-biological and 
microbiological processes (27.3b). They must patent plant varieties 
(either by patent or by an effective sui generis system or by any 
combination thereof)(23.3b).
A patent confers exclusive rights to prevent unauthorised third parties 
from making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing (unless in 
respect of parallel importing (see Art 6) the patented product.________
29 Applicant must disclose sufficiently clear and complete information 
about the invention
30 The limited exceptions must not conflict with normal exploitation of 
the patent or unreasonably prejudice legitimate interests_____________
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31
32 & 33 
34
• Unauthorised use by the government or third parties authorised by the 
government must satisfy certain conditions, including merits; (31a), 
prior negotiations54 (31b); limited scope and duration (31c); non­
exclusivity of licence (3Id); non-assignability (31e); use to be 
predominantly for the domestic market (3If); use must be terminated 
if  circumstances change (3 lg); patentee must be paid adequate 
remuneration (3 lh); the legal validity of any decision to grant a 
compulsory licence must be subject to judicial review or other 
independent review by a distinct higher authority (3 li); any decision 
relating to remuneration must be subject to judicial review etc (3 lj). 
The grant of dependent patents must meet the conditions set out in 
Article 31.1 (i, ii & iii).
•  There must be an opportunity for judicial review of any decision to 
revoke or forfeit a patent (32), and a patent must be granted for a 
minimum period of 20 years counted from the filing date (33)
• Burden of proof in respect of process patent must be reversed in civil 
proceedings.
Layout-designs 
(Topographies) o f Integrated 
Circuits
35-38 • Requires layout designs to be protected, but leaves members free 
to determine the form of protection either under a sui generis regime 
or under existing modalities of IP right. Protection must be for at least 
10 years counted from the date of filing an application for registration
Protection of Undisclosed 
Information
39 • State agencies in control o f undisclosed information must be able 
to prevent it from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others 
without their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial 
practices, provided such information is secret, have commercial value 
and reasonable steps have been taken to keep it secret (39. la-c). Test 
data submitted for marketing approval for pharmaceutical or 
agricultural products must be protected against unfair commercial use 
and against disclosure except where necessary to protect the public 
(39.3)
Control o f Anti-competitive 
Practices in Contractual 
Licences
40 • Members may enact anti-trust regulations or other competition 
legislation to prevent licensing practices or conditions pertaining to 
IPRs which retrain competition and which may have adverse effects 
on trade or impede the transfer and dissemination of technology (40.1)
Source: extracted from the TRIPS Agreement
South Africa’s Implementation Experience
A Brief Overview of IP Regime in South Africa: Situation pre-TRIPS
South Africa is widely believed to have had a relatively strong IP regime prior to the 
advent of the TRIPS Agreement in 1995. With respect to patents, a study by the 
Frazer Institute, which measures global patent protection in 1970, 1990 and 1995 (all 
pre-TRIPS years), using five categories of indicators55, rated South Africa at 3.37 
(1970), 3.57 (1990) and 3.57 (1995).56 These scores compare favourably with those of 
developed countries such as the United Kingdom, which scored 3.04, 3.57 and 3.57
54 But prior negotiations are waived in the case of national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use (Article 31(b).
55 These were: extent of coverage, membership of international patent agreements, provisions against 
loss of protection, enforcement mechanisms, and duration.
56 The index of patent rights ranges from 0 to 5, with higher numbers reflecting stronger protection 
levels. The value of the index is obtained (per country, per time period) by aggregating scores in the 
five equally weighted categories. The score in each category ranges from 0 to 1 and reflects the extent 
of legal features in that category available in a particular country at a particular time. See 
http://oldfraser.lexi.net/publications/forum/1999/03/patent protection.html (date accessed: 
13/07/2005).
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during the same periods, and advanced developing countries, such as Israel, with 
ratings of 3.57, 3.57 and 3.57 respectively. Only the United States had the highest 
scores at 3.86, 4.52 and 4.86 during the same periods. Indeed, India performed 
considerably lower at 1.42, 1.48, and 1.17 in the periods in question.57
Despite this relatively strong IP regime, however, the TRIPS Agreement exposed the 
deficiencies in the South African IP laws and regulations. Furthermore, while South 
Africa’s IP laws were always relatively strong on paper, enforcement was historically 
weak. Judged by the substantive and enforcement provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement, South Africa thus needed to make a number of changes to its pre-existing 
IP laws in order to bring them into conformity with the Agreement. How has South 
Africa fared in making these changes? This is the focus of the next sections, which 
begin with the procedural obligations.
Compliance with the TRIPS Procedural Obligations: Notifications and Reviews 
South Africa negotiated in the Uruguay Round as a developed country and therefore 
has developed country status in the WTO.58 This meant that unlike advanced 
developing countries such as India, Brazil and Israel, which had up till 2000 to 
implement the TRIPS Agreement, South Africa was obliged to implement the 
agreement by 1 January 1996 at the same time as the developed countries, such as the 
US, EC, Japan and Canada.
South Africa notified its existing IP laws relatively promptly in a communication to 
the Council in February 1996.59 These included its main dedicated IP laws and 
regulations and "other laws and regulations", as well as copies of the statutes and 
regulations. Notifications, however, are only the first step. In addition, South Africa 
had to provide responses to a checklist of issues and submit to a rigorous review 
exercise, including providing responses to questions posed by other countries.
57 Ibid.
58 See chapter 3 for the explanations for this decision.
59 See document IP/N/l/ZAF/1.
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The review of South African substantive IP laws began in July 199660, with questions 
and follow-up questions from mainly the EC and its member states, the US, Japan and 
Switzerland. Responses to some of these questions were provided promptly, others 
were delayed. However, the main challenge was with respect to responses to the 
checklist of issues on enforcement and the review of the legislation on enforcement. 
South Africa could not meet the deadline for the submission of these responses.
While pleading for more time, the South African delegate said that although his 
country was proud to be the only developing country to assume full and immediate 
TRIPS obligations, it had come to appreciate the difficulties of undergoing a 
legislative review process within the context of major domestic institutional and 
legislative reform. TRIPS issues required "great circumspection" due to the nature of 
the obligations stipulated and because dealing with them was resource-intensive.61
South Africa’s representative pointed out that the nature and number of the questions 
posed by other countries and the level of detail required were demanding for his 
delegation given huge capacity constraints. Although South Africa eventually notified 
its responses to the Checklist before the Council meeting of 24 February 1998, its 
delegation informed the Council that it was not ready to have its national legislation 
on enforcement reviewed at that meeting, citing difficulties of "an institutional 
nature". South Africa's review remained on the Council's agenda up till April 1999 
when it was deleted after the outstanding responses were finally provided. This 
shows that despite South Africa’s developed country status in the WTO, it faces much 
of the developmental challenges experienced by many developing countries. The 
following section focuses on South Africa’s compliance with the substantive 
obligations.
60 South Africa's copyright laws were reviewed at the TRIPS Council's meeting of 22 to 25 July 1996 
(see document IP/C/M/8); its legislation on trademarks, geographical indications and industrial designs 
was reviewed in the meeting of 11 to 15 November 1996 (document IP/C/M/11), the legislation in the 
fields of patents, layout-designs of integrated circuits, protection of undisclosed information and 
control of anti-competitive practices in contractual licences was reviewed at the meeting of 26-30 may 
1997 (document 1P/C/M/13). The review of legislation on enforcement took place at the meetings of 24 
February 1998 and 12 May 1998 (see document IP/C/M/17 and IP/C/M/18).
61 See document IP/CM/18 at p.4
62 See document IP/C/M/23
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Compliance with TRIPS Substantive Obligations
This section examines the IP laws of South Africa and their consistency with the 
substantive provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. For completeness, the mandatory 
provisions of all the eight IP areas covered in Part II of the TRIPS Agreement, and set 
out in Table 1 above, are examined. The aim is to see what changes, if any, South 
Africa has introduced in order to bring its national laws into conformity with the 
relevant TRIPS provisions, and what changes, if  any, have not been made.
Copyright and Related Rights
Section I of the TRIPS Agreement establishes substantive obligations in the areas of 
copyright and related rights. The main mandatory obligations are set out in Articles 9 
to 14 (see Table I above). South Africa’s pre-TRIPS laws on copyright and related 
rights were deficient in several areas with respect to these TRIPS provisions. The 
obvious gaps included: the adherence to Articles 1 through 21 of the Brussels (1948) 
text of the Berne Convention rather than Article 1 to 21 of the Paris (1971) text, as 
required under Article 9.1 of TRIPS; the non-protection of computer programmes and 
databases as literary works (Article 10 of TRIPS); the lack of rental rights for authors 
of computer programmes and cinematographic works (Article 11); and the failure to 
grant performers and broadcasters the exclusive right to communicate their work in 
the public (Article 14.1).64
Furthermore, the fair dealing exceptions in South Africa’s copyright law were very 
broad, arguably contravening Article 13 of TRIPS, which provides that limitations 
and exceptions to copyright protection must not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the right holder. In addition, performers’ rights were protected for only 20 
years rather than 50 years as required under Article 14.5 of TRIPS; and performances 
and sound recordings were not protected retroactively, as required under Article 14.6 
of TRIPS, read with Article 18 of the Berne Convention (1971). Finally, contrary to 
the National Treatment provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, sound recordings were 
not accorded National Treatment; rather protection was based on reciprocity. These
63 The South African IP statutes referred to in this chapter can be found on the South African 
Government website: http://www.info.gov.za/documents/index.htm.
64 Until 2002, when the law changed, South Africa was the only country in the world without a 
copyright law governing the broadcast of a public of sound recording. See: "State steps in to protect 
musicians". Available at:
http://www.bisinessday.co.za/Articles/TarkArticle.aspx?=ID449984 (Accessed: 19/10/2005).
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discrepancies clearly required that changes be made in South Africa laws on copyright 
and related rights if they were to be TRIPS-compatible.
The Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act of 1997, which was South Africa’s 
first major attempt to implement its TRIPS obligations, addressed some of these 
issues. The Act amended, inter alia, the Copyright Act of 1978, as well as the 
Performance Protection Act of 1967. With respect to the deficiencies in the Copyright 
Act identified above, the following changes were introduced. The definition of 
literary works was broadened to include “tables and compilations, including table and 
compilations of data stored or embodied in a computer” (s.l(l)(g) of the Act); a 
TRIPS-compatible term of protection (50 years) was provided for copyright in a 
cinematography films, photographs and computer (s.3(2)); and the scope of copyright 
in computer programme was extended to include exclusive rights to do or authorise 
the “letting or offering or exposing for hire by way of trade, directly or indirectly, a 
copy of the computer programme” (s. llB(h)). This section appears to grant rental 
rights to authors of computer programmes.65
With respect to the Performers’ Protection Act, s.7 was amended to extend the term of 
protection of performers’ rights from 20 years to 50 years, in accordance with Article 
14.5 of TRIPS, and s. 14 was amended to grant full retroactivity to pre-existing rights 
of performers and producers of sound recordings, as required under Article 18 of the 
Berne Convention (see also Article 14.6 of TRIPS).66 Further changes were 
introduced in the amendment acts passed in 2002.
The Copyright Amendment Act, 2002 and the Performers’ Protection Amendment 
Act, 2002, create additional TRIPS-compliant rights in respect of sound recordings 
and performance, including a “broadcasting” right, a right of “transmission in a 
diffusion service” and a right to “communicate the sound recording (or the
65 It is unclear, however, whether this amounts to rental rights as envisaged in Article 11 of TRIPS. 
Furthermore, the right is not extended to authors o f cinematographic works. Teljeur (2003) argues that 
“there is no system for rental rights” in South Africa’s IP laws.
66 However, the retroactivity of South Africa’s copyright law is a very complex issue (see section 
43(a)(ii) of the Copyright Act) “Works of a technical nature”, “published editions” and “computer 
programmes” may not be protected retroactively. See WTO document IP/Q/ZAF/1 of 4 October 1996 
at pp 8-10 for South Africa’s explanation. See also Dean (1989) and Appleton & Another v 
Hamischfeger Corporation & Another 1995 (2) SA 247 (A) for the legal authority.
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performance) to the public”.67 Specifically, the performer is granted the right to 
prevent unauthorised persons from, inter alia, reproducing and broadcasting or 
communicating to the public the performance. These acts cannot be done for 
commercial purposes without payment of a royalty.
However, despite these TRIPS compliant amendments, South Africa’s copyright laws 
are not fully in conformity with the agreement. South Africa still adheres only to 
Articles 1-21 of the Brussels (1948) text of the Berne Convention, rather than Article 
1-21 of the Paris (1971) text, contrary to Article 9 of TRIPS.68 South Africa’s 
copyright law does not make provision for the “droit de suite ”69 referred to in Article 
\Ater of the Berne Convention (1971). Also, although the scope of copyright in 
computer programmes has been extended, computer programmes are still not 
protected as literary works, as required by Article 10.1 of TRIPS.
Section 1 of the Copyright Act specifically states that literary work "shall not include 
a computer programme". The exclusion of a "computer programme" from the 
definition of "literary work" was introduced in 1992 when the sui generis category of
nr\
copyrightable work, namely, "computer programme" was created. According to the 
South African authorities, the objective was to make "computer programmes" and 
"literary work" mutually exclusive categories.71 However, this represents lack of 
formal compliance with the provisions of Article 10 of TRIPS.
67 See s. 9 of the Copyright Amendment Act, 2002,and s.3 of the Performers' Protection Amendment 
Act, 2002.
68 South Africa acceded to Berne Convention, Paris Act (1971), on December 24, 1974, but opted out 
of Articles 1 to 21, incorporated by Article 9 of TRIPS. For South Africa’s Beme Accession 
Notification, see: http://www.wipo.int/edocs/notdocs/en/beme/treatv beme 64.html (accessed 
30/11/2005). It can be argued, however, that by virtue of Article 9 of TRIPS, South Africa’s non­
accession to the Paris Act (1971) does not matter, since the TRIPS Agreement makes the Act binding.
69 Article 14 of the Beme Convention identifies droit de suite as one of the "author's rights" comprised 
in copyright. Also known as resale royalty right, droit de suite gives artists the legal right to receive a 
share of the profits made on the second and subsequent sales of their works during the duration of the 
copyright.
70 Prior to 1992, computer programme was protected as a species of literary work and recognised by the 
courts as such. See: Northern Office Microcomputers (Pty) Limited & Others v Rosenstein [1981](4)
SA 123 (C). For the protection of computer programmes in South Africa, see Webster (1996).71 See WTO document IP/Q/ZAF/1, page 10. Other reasons given for creating this sui generis category 
were "the difficulty of proving authorship of a computer programme as a literary work for purposes of 
litigation, the nature of some of the infringing acts, the necessity to make provision for the making of 
back-up copies and the practicalities of instituting copyright infringement litigation together with the 
burden of proof under South African litigation procedures" (IP/Q/ZAF/1, p. 10)
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The limitations and exceptions to copyright under the fair dealing provisions remain 
fairly broad , thus arguably incompatible with the provision of Article 13 of the 
TRIPS Agreement.73 The Panel in US-Section 110(5),74 held that the conditions in 
Article 13 apply cumulatively, in other words, limitations and exceptions must be 
confined to "special cases", must not "conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work", and must not "unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right 
owner". The Panel stated that the tenor of Article 13 is a narrow one: to provide for 
exceptions or limitations only of a limited nature, and that an exception will only be 
allowed if its scope is de minimis.15 This suggests that any broad fair dealing 
exception could amount to a violation of Article 13 of TRIPS.
With regard to the non-discrimination principle, s. 4 of the Performers' Protection 
Amendment Act, 2002, has now extended protection of performers' rights to 
performers in WTO member countries in accordance to the MFN provision of Article 
4 of the TRIPS Agreement. However, this protection is still not based on National 
Treatment but on reciprocity. The Appellate Body has stressed the fundamental 
nature of the National Treatment provision of the TRIPS Agreement.77 In the EC  -  
Protection o f  Trademarks and GIs case78, the Panel held that the EC Regulation in 
question violated Article 3(1) of TRIPS and Article 111(4) of the GATT because its 
reciprocity and equivalence conditions modified the effective equality of 
opportunities available to right holders in all WTO member states.
One other area of non-compatibility often highlighted by the International Intellectual 
Property Association (IIPA) is the lack of legal presumptions relating to copyright
n q
subsistence and ownership in South Africa's copyright law. While the copyright act
72 See sections 12 to 19 of the Copyright Act.
73 See also Beme Articles 2bis(2), 9(2), 10(1), and 10bis(l).
74 Panel Report, United States -  Section 110(5) o f the Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R, adopted 27 July 
2000, DSR 2000: VIII, 3769.
75 See paras 6.93 and 6.97
76 S. 4 provides that the right conferred to performances in South Africa shall only be granted to 
performances in other WTO member countries if those countries extend corresponding protection to 
South African performances in their countries.
77 See Appellate Body Report, United States -  Section 211 Omnibus Appropriation Act o f 1998, 
WT/DS176/AB/R, adopted 1 February 2002, DSR 2002:11, para 297.
78 Panel Reports, European Communities -  Protection o f Trademarks and Geographical Indications for  
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS174/R, WT/DS290/R, adopted 20 April 2005.
79 See s. 26 (12) of the Copyright Act. According to the IIP A, the withdrawal in 2000 of proposed 
amendments, which would have introduced further changes into the Copyright Act "demonstrated
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provides for various presumptions, the copyright owner is still required to adduce 
evidence in court and can be subpoenaed. The lack of evidentiary presumption 
appears to be inconsistent with article 15 of the Beme Convention, which is 
incorporated by reference in article 9.1 of TRIPS. The focus now shifts to trademarks.
Trademarks
The key TRIPS provisions on trademarks can be found in Articles 15 to 21 of the 
Agreement (see Table 1 above). South Africa's pre-TRIPS trademark law conformed
OA
to some of these provisions ; however, there were areas of inconsistency or 
ambiguity. In particular, trademarks were not being published promptly (Article 
15.4); there was no statutory provision for a presumption of likelihood of confusion in 
the case of use of an identical sign for goods and services (Article 16.1)81; there were 
ambiguities regarding certain rights of owners of well-known marks, particularly with 
regard to how to determine whether a trademark is well known (Article 16.2 read with 
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention); and there was lack of clarity as to the 
implementation of Article 19 of TRIPS, which deals with the conditions for 
cancellation of trademarks.
The Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act of 1997 (s.35) amended the Trade 
Mark Act with respect to the determination of whether a trademark is well known. In 
1996, the Supreme Court of Appeal laid down the criteria in the MacDonald’s case , 
where a local business appropriated the name of the popular restaurant McDonald. 
However, despite this ruling, there was still confusion as to when a trademark would
South Africa's non-committal attitude to compliance with the TRIPS Agreement" (see the IIPA's 2001 
Special 3001 Report on South Africa).
80 Particularly with respect to the protectable subject matter (Article 15), the registration of service 
marks and well-known marks (Article 15.4), as well as the duration of trademark protection (Article 
18) For instance, Article 18 requires that trademarks be protected for initial period of 7 years and then 
renewable indefinitely. Under the South African Trade Marks Act, trademarks are protected for an 
initial period of 10 years and then renewable indefinitely.
81 In the EC -  Protection o f Trademarks and GIs case (WT/DS174/R), Australia claimed that the EC 
Regulation in question was inconsistent with TRIPS Article 16.1 “because it does not ‘provide for’ or 
‘implement’ the presumption of a likelihood of confusion in the case of use of an identical sign for 
identical goods”. However, the Panel held that there is no requirement in Article 16.1 that national law 
should explicitly provide for this presumption. This case will be discussed in some detail in the section 
on geographical indications below.
82 In 1996, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court (now known as the Supreme Court of Appeal) 
held in the MacDonald's case (unreported, dated 27 August 1996) that a mark will be considered well- 
known in South Africa if it is known to a substantial number of persons interested in the goods or 
services in question. In terms of common law, therefore, Article 16.2 of TRIPS was applicable in South 
Africa, the amendment act gives it a statutory basis.
144
O '!
qualify as well-known . To clear the confusions, s. 35 of the 1997 act brought South 
Africa’s law into conformity with Article 6bis of the Paris Convention read with 
Article 16.2 of TRIPS, although the lack of retroactivity in the law is believed to be 
inconsistent with the obligations of Article 2 of TRIPS, to the extent that it 
incorporates Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, and of Article 16.2 and 16.3 of 
TRIPS.85
South Africa argued that the provision was included in the Act because of the general 
necessity in terms of South African common law to save vested rights and not to 
legislate retroactively.86 Furthermore, South Africa contended that since it only 
acceded to the TRIPS Agreement in 1995 and given that the provisions of the 
Agreement "are not retroactive in effect", the provision of s. 36(2) of the Trade Marks 
Act was thus not TRIPS incompatible.87 South Africa also invoked the limited 
exceptions allows under Article 17 of TRIPS in support of this provision.
There are other areas in which the amendments to the Trade Marks Act did not appear 
to ensure full compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. For instance, trademarks are 
not promptly published, as required by Article 15.5 of TRIPS.88 Also there is still
83 According to Article 6bis of the Paris Convention read with Article 16.2 of TRIPS, this should be 
based on knowledge of the trademark "in the relevant sector of the public including knowledge which 
has been obtained as a result of the promotion of the trademark"
84 See s. 36(2) of the Trademark Act, which denies retroactivity to well-known mark used bona fide 
from a date anterior to 31 August 1991. However, bona fide use means honest use, and it is argued that 
the use of a well-known mark with the intention either to deceive or to make use of another trader’s 
goodwill is not a honest use (see English case: Baume & Co Ltd vA  H  Moore Ltd [1958] RPC 226)
5 See document IP/C/W/47 of 11 November 1996, where the US questioned South Africa on this 
issue.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid, at p. 3. In the US-Havana Club case (WT/DS176/AB/R) the Panel and Appellate Body treated 
the task of interpreting the Paris Convention as equivalent to interpreting the TRIPS Agreement, and 
confirmed that all the substantive provisions of the Paris Convention would be applicable in 
interpreting the TRIPS Agreement. In Canada-Terms o f Patent Protection the Panel and the AB 
rejected Canada's argument that it could not grant retrospective extension of term of patent issued 
before the TRIPS Agreement entered into force. The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding that 
Article 70.1 of TRIPS does not exclude Old Act patents from the scope of the agreement (Appellate 
Body Report, Canada-Term o f Patent Protection, WT/DS170/AB/R, adopted 12 October 2000, DSR 
2000:X, 5093). It could thus be argued that South Africa's argument that it was only bound to offer 
protection to rights acquired after the WTO entered into force may not be supported by WTO case law 
unless this is expressly stated in the agreement.
88 To illustrate the problem, in one case, a plant breeders' right was granted in February 1996 but was 
not gazetted as required by law until February 2002. The Registrar pointed to "a lack of funds within 
the Department". According to Harms JA of the Supreme Court of Appeal, "It does not enhance the 
image of a country that wishes to become a major economic force if, in spite of binding international 
obligations and parliamentary laws, some state department is unwilling to find or expend a minimal
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lack of clarity as to the formal implementation of Article 19.1 of TRIPS. S. 27(1) of 
the South African Trade Marks Act permits cancellation of a trademark registration if 
the mark is not used. However, pursuant to s. 27(4) of the Act, the owner of a 
registered trademark may only prevent cancellation where the non-use is "due to 
special circumstances in the trade and not to any intention not to use or abandon the 
mark".
This appears to fall short of the provision of Article 19.1 of TRIPS, which requires the 
recognition of "valid reason for non-use", namely "circumstances arising 
independently of the will of the owner of the trademark which constitute an obstacle 
to the use of the trademark, such as import restrictions on or other government 
requirements for goods or services protected by the trademark". To a question on this 
issue by the US, South Africa argued that the phrase "special circumstances" in the 
Act encompassed the safeguards in Article 19 of TRIPS, although it admitted that it 
did not know how the courts would interpret the provision.89 In sum, South Africa's 
trademark law is not fully in compliance with TRIPS provisions or needs to be 
clarified through further amendments. Attention now shifts to the protection of 
geographical indications.
Geographical Indications
Article 22.2 of TRIPS establishes a minimum standard of protection for all 
geographical indications (GIs), requiring members to provide "the legal means for 
interested parties" for GIs in order to avoid misleading the public as to the true origin 
of the good, and to prevent unfair competition. Article 22.3 further requires that a 
member must, whether on its own initiative, if allowed by its legislation, or at the 
request of an interested party, refuse or invalidate the registration of a trademark, 
which contains misleading geographical indications. The provisions of Article 22.2 to 
22.4 apply to all products without exceptions.
However, Articles 23 establishes a higher or enhanced level of protection for GIs for 
wines and spirits, and obliges members to provide additional or special protection for
amount of money". See Welteverede Nursery (Pty) and other v. The Registrar o f Plant Breeders' 
Rights, 2002, SA, at para 16.
89 See document IP/C/W/47 at p.4
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geographical indications for these products. The enhanced level of protection means 
that geographical indications for wines and spirits, which do not reflect their true 
origins must not be used even with expressions such as "kind", "type", "style", 
"imitation" or the like. In other words, only wines and spirits produced in their area of 
provenance should carry such geographical names. Under Article 23, such 
geographical indications must be protected even if misuse would not cause the public 
to be misled or result in unfair competition.90 Mere incorrect usage is sufficient to 
trigger a complaint and, unlike under Article 22, the complainant will not have to 
establish that the unauthorised use of a GI is misleading or constitutes unfair 
competition.91
However, Article 23.3 provides that where two geographical indications are 
homonymous, i.e. having the same name, spelling or pronunciation, both should be 
accorded protection, and each member must then determine how the homonymous 
indications in questions are differentiated from each other. Further exceptions to both 
Articles 22 and 23 are provided for in Article 24. For instance, Article 24.3 prohibits 
Members from diminishing the level of GI protection that existed at the time of entry 
into force of the WTO Agreement. Article 24.4 allows the continued and similar use 
of GIs for wines and spirits by whomever has used that indication on any goods or 
services continuously for at least ten years -  or less if in good faith -  before the date 
of the Marrakech Agreement establishing the WTO.
Article 24.5 provides for the “co-existence” of GIs and prior trademarks, by stating 
that where a trademark has been applied for or registered in good faith or where rights 
to a trademark have been acquired through use in good faith before the protection of a 
GI, the prior trademark should not be invalidated on the account that it is identical
Q'y
with, or similar to, a geographical indication. Article 24.6 exempts members from 
protecting common or generic terms.
90 See WTO (2004) for a more comprehensive treatment of the protection of GIs under the TRIPS 
Agreement, as well as a discussion on the economic theory of geographical indications.
91 That essentially is the main difference between the requirements under Article 22 and 23. In the case 
of the former, a complainant must adduce evidence as the “public confusion and deception” of the 
offending article, while in the case of the latter, a complainant only needs to prove the usage is 
incorrect.
92 One example that is often given is the name "Parma", which is a type of ham from the region of the 
city o f Parma in Italy, but which is a registered trademark in Canada for ham made by a Canadian 
company.
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The recent Panel Reports on the EC -  Protection o f Trademarks and GIs93 case 
provide the only WTO jurisprudence to date on the protection of GIs under the TRIPS 
Agreement. One interesting aspect of the Panel findings, for the purpose of the 
discussion in this chapter, is with respect to the means of implementing the obligation 
to protect GIs. Articles 22 and 23 require members to provide "legal means” of 
protection. The Panel held that the assessment of the conformity of implementation 
measures with Members’ obligations generally requires an assessment of the manner 
in which they confer rights or protection on private parties.
In this respect, to be in conformity, a Member must provide legal means to protect 
GIs. However, the Panel goes on to say that a Member may use other means to 
implement Article 22.2, and that in order successfully to challenge the TRIPS 
compatibility of the other means used by a member, the member challenging must 
demonstrate that “these other measures ... are inadequate to provide protection for 
interested parties nationals of other Members as required under Article 22.2 of the 
TRIPS Agreement”.94
This ruling supports the view that members could employ a wide variety of legal 
means to protect geographical indications. However given that geographical 
indications have a specific legal meaning under Articles 22.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement and that Article 22.2 imposes specific obligations, it would appear that 
such alternative means must offer protection for GIs as defined by Article 21.1 and as 
required under Article 22.2 of TRIPS.
The three forms of protection often highlighted are: protection under laws focusing on 
business practices, protection under trademark law, and special protection.95 Laws 
focusing on business practices generally relate to unfair competition, passing off, 
consumer protection, trade descriptions etc. Such laws do not normally protect 
geographical indications specifically. On the other hand, trademark law may provide 
protection for geographical indications either by providing protection against the
93 Panel Reports, European Communities -  Protection o f Trademarks and Geographical Indications for  
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS174/R, WT/DS290/R, adopted 20 April 2005.
94 US Report, paras. 7.747-751.
95 See "Review Under Article 24.2 of the Application of the Provisions of the Section of the TRIPS 
Agreement on Geographical Indications -  Summary of the Responses to the Checklist of Questions", 
Council for TRIPS, 19 September 2000.
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registration and use of geographical indications as trademarks or by protecting 
geographical indications specifically through mechanisms such as collective, 
certification or guarantee marks.96 Special protection, however, provides for laws that 
are specifically dedicated to the protection of geographical indications, and the 
protection provided is generally stronger than that available under the other two 
categories of means of protection.
In its notification to the TRIPS Council in 199697, South Africa stated that it had no 
specific law on the protection of geographical indications, although geographical 
indications are protected under laws focusing on business practices, such as the 
Merchandise Marks Act of 194198 and the Liquor Products Act of 198999. 
Furthermore, sections 42 and 43 of the Trade Marks Act of 1993 provide for the 
protection of registered certification trademarks. Indeed, s. 43(2) of the Act 
specifically states that, “[geographical names or other indications of geographical 
origin may be registered as collective trademarks”
It is thus clear that, like many other WTO members, South Africa protects 
geographical indications through laws focusing on business practices and by way of 
collective or certification marks. Furthermore, under section 10(2)(b) of Trade Mark 
Act, any mark, which consists exclusively of a sign or an indication which may serve 
in trade to designate, inter alia, geographical origin of goods will not be registered as 
trademarks, and, if registered, will be liable to be removed from the register. Thus, 
there is protection against the registration and use of geographical indications as 
trademarks.
96 A collective mark protects distinguishes the goods or services of members of an association or a 
group of enterprises, which owns the mark from those of other undertakings. A certification or 
guarantee mark is a mark indicating that the goods or services on which it is used are certified by the 
proprietor of the mark in respect of geographical origin, material, method of manufacture of goods, 
standard of performance of services, quality, accuracy, or other characteristics.
97 See document IP/N/l/ZAF/1 of 16 April 1996.
98 Section 6 of this Act prohibits the false application of a trade description, which applies to inaccurate 
geographical indications. Section 7 of the same Act prohibits the sale of goods with false descriptions, 
again, including false geographical indications.
99 Section 12 of this Act prohibits false or misleading descriptions of liquor products. According to the 
authorities “Geographical indications pertaining to liquor products are, in fact, descriptions of such 
products and, therefore, if they are false or misleading, this Section may be used to deal with the 
situation” (see document IP/N/l/ZAF/1 of 16 April 1996).
149
However, South Africa has no law specifically dedicated to the protection of GIs and 
does not appear to offer enhanced or special protection for wines and spirits. Indeed, 
trademarks enjoy stronger protection under South African law than geographical 
indications, with the effect that trademark protection cannot be refused or invalidated 
based on geographical indications.100 All of this raises the issue of South Africa’s 
compliance with Article 22 and 23 of the TRIPS Agreement.
The questions posed to South Africa by the EC and US during the review of its IP 
legislation indicated that these countries did not believe that South Africa offered 
protection for geographical indications in the context of the TRIPS Agreement.101 
South Africa’s response to the question whether its laws provide adequate protection 
for geographical indications within the context of the definition of Article 22.1 of 
TRIPS was as follows:
“there is no specific provision in South African legislation providing a definition of 
geographical indications in line with the definition in Article 22.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
However, the scope of protection of existing South African law (common law and statute)... 
is considered to be wide enough to include geographical indications as defined in Article 22. 
1 of the TRIPS Agreement.”102
However, in a response to a follow-up question from the EC, South Africa stated that, 
“the (1997) amendments will ensure that South Africa complies with its obligations 
under Articles 22 and 23 of the TRIPS Agreement”.103 This was an acceptance that 
further work needed to be done to make South Africa existing laws conform fully 
with WTO rules on protection of geographical indications. However, despite this 
promise, the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act of 1997 that changed several 
existing laws to ensure their substantial compliance with the TRIPS Agreement did 
not introduce any law to protect geographical indications. Indeed, the widely held
100 Teljeur (2003). Indeed, in South Africa unregistered trademark rights exist side by side with the 
system of registration and may prevail over registered rights.
For instance, the EC asked: “until now, South Africa has not taken any step to implement in its 
legislation the provisions of Section 3 of Part II (“Geographical Indications”) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
How and when does South Africa intend to afford this protection?” In another question, the EC asked: 
“is there any provision in the South African legislation which provides for a protection of geographical 
indications in line with the definition in Article 22.1 of the TRIPS Agreement?” The US asked: “Please 
explain how the obligation in TRIPS Articles 22 and 23 with respect to geographical indications are 
implemented in the South African law” (see document IP/CAV/47 for these questions and South 
Africa’s responses.
102 See document IP/CAV/47 at p. 8.
103 See document IP/Q2/ZAF/1 of 12 May 1997 at p.7.
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view, even in South Africa, is that the country does not protect geographical 
indications in the context of the TRIPS Agreement.104
Industrial Designs
Industrial designs are protected in South Africa through designs law and copyright 
law, although the main protection is under the Designs Act of 1993. The Act protects 
industrial designs that are new and original (s 14.1), which are divided into aesthetic 
designs and functional designs, the former is protected for fifteen years, and the latter 
for ten years (s. 22.1). The rights granted to owner of a protected designs include the 
right to exclude others from “making, importing, using or disposing of any article” 
embodying the protected design (s. 20.1). This conforms broadly with the provision of 
Article 26.1 of TRIPS.
Section 21 of the Act provides for the grant of compulsory licences in the case of 
“abuse of rights”, which cover a wide range of circumstances. These provisions 
arguably go beyond the limited exceptions allowed under Article 26.2 of TRIPS, and 
may lead to suggestion that the South African design law is not fully TRIPS 
compatible. Article 5B of the Beme Convention prohibits forfeiture of industrial 
design “under any circumstance” either by reason of failure to work or by reason of 
importation. Although compulsory licensing is not the same thing as forfeiture, it is 
clearly not a limited exception.
Patents
This sub-section examines South Africa’s compliance with the TRIPS obligations on 
patent protection. The main provisions are contained in Articles 27 to 34 of the TRIPS 
Agreement (see Table 1 above). As mentioned earlier, South Africa’s pre-TRIPS 
patents law conformed to the provisions of the agreement in some respects.105 For 
example, the Patent Act of 1978 provides patent protection for all fields of technology 
and for both products and process (Article 27.1 of TRIPS), as well as for micro­
organisms and all non-biological and microbiological process and products (Article
104 See Teljeur, 2003. However, South Africa protects geographical indications in a bilateral agreement 
with the European Union.
105 Apart from the WTO (TRIPS), South Africa is also a member of WIPO and acceded to two patent- 
related treaties, namely, the Paris Convention (Industrial Property), in December 1947 and the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT), in March 1999. It is also a member of the International Union for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) since 1978
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27.3b).106 The Patent Act also reverses the burden of proof in process patent as 
required under Article 34(1 )&(2) of the TRIPS Agreement. Furthermore, the Plant 
Breeders' Rights Act No 22 of 1964107 offers protection for plant varieties, in 
accordance with Article 27.3b of the TRIPS Agreement. Finally, patents are protected 
for 20 years from the date of filing (Article 33).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Patents Act was nevertheless not in complete 
conformity with the TRIPS Agreement. For example, while Article 28 of TRIPS 
grants a patentee exclusive rights to prevent unauthorised third parties from, inter 
alia..."offering for sale, selling or importing", s. 45(1) of the Act referred only to
i n$?"disposing o f' and did not mention "importing". Section 55 on "dependent patent" 
did not conform to the provisions of Article 31(1). Also, s. 56 on abuse of patent rights 
differed significantly from Article 31 (a) (d) (e) and (g), which set out conditions for 
grant of compulsory licensing.
Article 27.1 of TRIPS provides that "patents shall be available and patent rights 
enjoyable without discrimination as to whether products are imported or locally 
produced". However, s. 56 (2)(a) of the Act allows for compulsory licence to be 
granted where the patented invention "is not being worked (locally) on a commercial 
scale or to an adequate extent." Section 56 (2)(b) permits the grant of a compulsory 
licence in circumstances where the working of the invention is prevented or hindered 
by the importation, and under s.56 (2)(e) a compulsory licence can be granted where 
the patented product is being imported and the price of such patented product is 
"excessive".
106 These are areas where most developing countries have strong defensive interests. India is the 
strongest advocate both at TRIPS Council meetings and outside for the non-patentability of life forms.
107 The 1976 Act was amended through the Plant Breeder's Rights Amendment Act 15 of 1996. See 
also WTO document IP/C/W/273/Rev.l of 18 February 2003 for South Africa's responses to a 
checklist of questions on the implementation of Article 27.3b of TRIPS. South Africa confirmed in 
responses to the questionnaire that it is possible to obtain a patent in the country on a micro-organism 
that is novel, involved an inventive step and is capable of industrial application. It also confirmed that 
its laws provide for a sui generis form of protection for a new plant variety. As noted above, South 
Africa is a member of UPOV.
108 South Africa said in answer to a question from the EC that it was not clear how the South African 
courts would interpret the phrase “disposing o f ’; therefore “to remove any uncertainty” it was 
necessary to use accurate words to reflect the letter and spirit of Article 28 of TRIPS (see document 
IP/Q3/ZAF/1 of 2 October 1998).
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All the above provisions and discrepancies were highlighted during the review of 
South Africa's patent law by the TRIPS Council, and several questions were posed by 
the EC, the US and Japan on the compatibility of these provisions with South Africa's 
TRIPS obligations.109 South Africa indicated in its responses that it would introduce 
changes to bring its patents law into conformity with TRIPS Agreement. To this end, 
the Intellectual Property Law Amendment Act of 1997, which made wide-ranging 
TRIPS-compliant changes in existing IP laws, actually amended over 20 provisions of 
the Patent Act.
S. 45 (1) was amended to comply with Article 28.1 of TRIPS. The whole of s.55 on 
dependent patent was amended to incorporate almost verbatim the provisions of 
Article 31(1) of TRIPS. Equally, s. 56 on abuse of patent rights was changed to reflect 
the provisions of Article 31 (a)(d)(e)&(g). Section 56(2)(b), which allows compulsory 
licences to be granted if local working was being prevented or hindered by 
importation was deleted. Further amendments were made through the Patents 
Amendment Act of 2002, which, for instance, implements Article 29 of TRIPS by 
amending s. 32 of the Patents Act of 1978 so that patent applicants are required to 
disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete rather than to fully  
describe the invention as previously prescribed in the Act.
However, despite these amendments, South Africa retains all the broad procedures 
and conditions for issuing compulsory licences, including s.56 (2)(a) on local working 
of patented inventions on a commercial scale or to an adequate extent, as well as s. 
55(2)(e), which allows for the grant of a compulsory license where the patented 
product is being imported and the price is excessive. South African officials justified 
the retention of these provisions on the ground that granting compulsory licenses in 
these circumstances would be in the public interest.
Furthermore, they argued that granting a compulsory licence where there is a failure 
to work the patented invention on commercial scale within prescribed time limits is in 
compliance with Article 5(2) and (4) of the Paris Convention. However, TRIPS does 
not contain such a clear and express authorisation. Indeed, under Article 27.1, the
109 See document IP/Q3/ZAF/1 of 2 October 1998 for questions put to South Africa and its responses.
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agreement provides that importation is sufficient to serve local working requirements. 
Indeed, the Panel in the Canada -  Pharmaceutical Patents case appeared to suggest 
that imposing non-working conditions would be TRIPS inconsistent.110
In January 2001, the US launched a challenge against Brazil’s legislation that 
authorised the grantof compulsory licenses and parallel imports in instances when 
“patents are not locally worked”.111 However, both parties later made a notification of
119mutually agreed solution following Brazil’s undertaking not to use the provision 
against any US patent holder without consultation with the US. Many ambiguities in 
the TRIPS provisions leave their precise interpretation open to considerable doubt. 
However, the US-Brazil case suggests that “non-working” conditions could be subject 
to challenge under Article 27.
Reflecting TRIPS Flexibilities: The Medicine Act Case
One of the questions often asked in the literature is the extent to which developing 
countries have reflected the legal flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement in their
1 1 -j
national IP laws. South Africa appears, at least de jure if not de facto , to have 
reflected some of the flexibilities in its national IP legislation. For instance, apart from 
retaining the broad provisions on issuing compulsory licenses, as noted above, it has 
also introduced the "early working" or "Bolar exceptions".114 These exceptions are 
allowed under the "limited exceptions" provisions of Article 30 of TRIPS.115 The 
Patents Amendment Act of 2005 contains specific provisions requiring patent
110 Panel Report, Canada -  Patent Protection o f Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, adopted 7 
April 2000, DSR 2000: V, 2289. According to the Panel there are three ways of working a patent, (a) 
by selling the product in a market from which competitors are excluded or (b) by licensing other to do 
so, or (c) by selling the patent right outright. It states in para. 7.55 that "the specific forms of patent 
exploitation are not static ... for to be effective exploitation must adapt to changing forms of 
competition die to technological development and the evolution of marketing practices".
111 See Brazil -  Measures Affecting Patent Protection (United States -  Brazil), Request for the 
Establishment of a Panel by the US, January 9 2001, WT/DS199/3
112 See Brazil -  Measures Affecting Patent Protection, Notifications o f Mutually Agreed Solution, 
WT/DS199/4, G/L/454, IP/D/23/Add. 1 July 19,2001).
113 See, e.g. UNCTAD-ICTSD (2005) and the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (Study 
Paper 7), which both focused on the issue of flexibilities.
114 S. 16 of the Patents Amendment Act of 2002 inserted a new S.69A in the Patent Act o f 1978 to allow 
the non-infringing "Bolar exception". The act, however, prohibits stockpiling.
1,5 The Panel in the Canada -  Pharmaceutical Patents case held that the "Bolar Exception", which 
allows a patented invention to be used for the purposes of seeking regulatory approval for marketing of 
a product after the expiration of a patent, is not an infringement of a patent and is allowed under Article 
30 of TRIPS. However, a stockpiling provision, which allows the production and stockpiling o f a 
patented invention prior to the expiry of the patent would be inconsistent with TRIPS provisions.
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applicants to provide information relating to indigenous biological resource, genetic 
resource or traditional knowledge.
In 1997, the South African government passed the Medicines and Related Substances 
Control Amendment Act, which contains, inter alia, three provisions116 that proved to
117be controversial, although the general view of most legal commentators is that 
these provisions are consistent with the flexibilities allowed by the TRIPS
1 1 Q
Agreement. However, others argue that South Africa has gone beyond the 
flexibilities allowed in the agreement.119
However, for three years, 39 pharmaceutical companies, under the umbrella of the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) of South Africa, were engaged in a 
legal battle in the domestic courts with the South African government over these
1 70provisions, alleging constitutional and TRIPS inconsistencies. The case collapsed 
in April 2001, when the pharmaceutical companies withdrew their action in the 
Pretoria High Court.
The Medicine Act case was a classic example of where the complicated relationship 
between legal and non-legal factors played out so prominently. While the 
pharmaceutical companies may have won part of their arguments had the case been
116 Section 15C allows parallel importing; s. 22F allows for generic substitution for patented products; 
and s. 22G, which provides for a pricing committee to regulate the prices of patented drugs.
117 See, for example, Fredrick Abbott in Kennedy and Southwark (eds), 2004, and UNCTAD-ICSTD, 
2005.
118 With respect to parallel importing in the context of Article 6 of TRIPS, there is a view, however, 
that Article 6 of TRIPS only removes parallel imports from the dispute settlement process but is 
otherwise governed by substantive requirements in functional IPR cases (Cottier, 1998, cited in 
Maskus, 2000). It is also the view of the US that Article 6 does not authorise parallel imports. In its 
intervention during the TRIPS Council’s Special Session on TRIPS and Access to Medicines, the US 
delegation argued that “Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement does not authorise parallel imports”, adding, 
“members must remember that Article 6 does not alter the substantive obligations of the TRIPS 
Agreement, particularly those contained in Part II of the Agreement” (see document IP/C/M/31 at 
p.40). The general view, however, is that Article 6 permits parallel imports (See Maskus, 2000; Abbott, 
1998; and the views of most WTO members reported in the document referred to above).
119 For instance, the main criticism of the pharmaceutical firms is not that the flexibilities in the 
Medicines Act are not allowed under the TRIPS Agreement, but that the domestic regulations excluded 
the safeguards and restraints provided by the TRIPS Agreement, for example, by giving the minister an 
unfettered power to override patents without following due process, including compensation and 
judicial review. See PMA Annual Report, May 2001 -April 2002, pp.4 and 5.
120 See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association o f SA: In re Ex parte President o f the RSA 2000 (3) 
BCLR.
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1 01pushed through the domestic courts, a variety of non-legal factors eventually 
1shaped the outcome. The role of local and foreign media, as well as international 
and local NGOs such as the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), in mobilising world 
opinion against the companies was significant.123 The intervention of the UN 
Secretary General, Kofi Annan also played a role.124
Layout Designs o f  Integrated Circuits
The protection of layout designs is provided for under Articles 35 to 38 of the TRIPS
Agreement (see table 1). South Africa provides protection for integrated circuit and
integrated circuit topographies though Designs Act of 1993. The provisions broadly
accord with Article 36 of TRIPS with respect to the scope of protection125, as well as
1Article 38, which requires protection to be provided for at least 10 years. However, 
the pre-TRIPS Designs Act fell short in terms of Articles 37, with respect to 
infringement by a third party for private purposes and by an innocent infringer. The 
pre-TRIPS act was also inadequate with respect to Article 37(2) of TRIPS, which 
covers the issue of compulsory licensing.
However, South Africa later amended the Designs Act through the Intellectual 
Property Laws Amendment Act of 1997. Section 14 of the Designs Act was amended
121 See the recent case Pharmaceutical Society ofSA and Others v. the Minister o f Health and Another, 
2004, SCA, 542, in which the Supreme Court of South Africa described S. 22G, which permits 
regulations that introduced a ‘transparent pricing system’, as flawed. The court declared as invalid and 
of no force and effect the Regulations that fixed a ‘single exit price’, defined as the manufacturer’s 
price, for all medicines sold in South Africa
122 Although not mediated through the WTO dispute settlement system, the South African case 
eventually led to a clarification of and a change in the TRIPS Agreement. For instance, at the 4th 
Ministerial Conference in Doha 2001, WTO ministers “re-affirmed the rights of members to use, to the 
full, the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility” to protect public health (see 
WTO document WT/Min(01)DEC/2, paragraph 4). Also, in December 2005, the General Council 
agreed to amend Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement to allow, subject to certain conditions, countries 
with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities to import cheap generic drugs, notwithstanding the 
limitations imposed by Article 31(f) (see WTO document WT/L/641 of 8 December 2005. This 
followed earlier decision of the General Council in August 2003 to grant such a waiver (see WTO 
document WT/L/540 of 2 September 2003).
123 For instance, 300,000 people from 130 countries signed a petition against the court case.
124 Peter Piot, head of UNAIDS, the United Nations co-ordinating body for HIV/AIDS was said to have 
helped to broker a secret deal that brought leading pharmaceutical groups together with South African 
leaders, through the intervention of Kofi Annan, head of the UN (see article in Financial Times of July 
22 2005 at p.8)
125 See s. 20(1) of the Act.
126 Integrated circuits are registered as functional designs and are protected for 10 years (see s. 22(1) of 
the Design Act.
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to give greater protection to layout designs than to any other design.127 A new s. 
20.3(a) was inserted so that the making of an integrated circuit for private purposes or 
for the sole purpose of evaluation, analysis, research or teaching is not regarded as an 
act of infringement in line with Article 35 of TRIPS read with Article 6(2) of the IPIC
1 ?o
Treaty . Further, a new s. 20.3(b) makes allowance for an innocent infringer, but 
requires, in accordance with Article 37 of TRIPS, that the innocent infringer must pay 
to the right holder "a sum calculated on the basis of a reasonable royalty which would 
have been payable by a licensee".
In addition, s. 21 of the Designs Act was amended to include a new subsection 14 (a) 
to (d), which implements Article 37.2 of the TRIPS Agreement, with respect to the 
conditions for granting compulsory licences as set out in subparagraphs (a) through 
(k) of Article 31 of TRIPS, which apply, under Article 37(2) mutatis mutandis to 
layout-designs. Nevertheless, the amendment still retains fairly broad conditions for 
granting compulsory licences, as in the case of patents.
Undisclosed Information
Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement treats undisclosed information, including trade 
secrets and know-how, as a form of IP and requires it to be protected by actions 
against unfair competition or dishonest commercial practices. WTO members are also 
required under Article 39(3) to protect against unfair commercial use of confidential 
test data submitted in the process of securing regulatory and marketing approval of 
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products.
South Africa has no statute explicitly protecting undisclosed or confidential
1 90information, although such information is protected under common law. However, 
test data submitted with applications for marketing approval of pharmaceutical and
127 Article 14 provides that integrated circuit topography shall not be considered to be new unless an 
application for the registration of such design is lodged within two years, whereas the period allowed 
for any other design is six months.
128 The Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits
129 Protection under common law leaves a matter to judicial discretion, as common law is a judge-made 
law. However, statutory protection offers greater protection since it limits, although not completely 
removes, the exercise of discretion by judges. It can be argued that WTO law and, in particular, the 
TRIPS Agreement require Members to provide legislation to implement their obligations, where such 
statutory provisions do not exist. In that case, an argument that an obligation is met under common law 
may not indicate full compliance.
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agricultural chemical products are protected against disclosure under existing laws. 
For instance, s. 34 of the Medicines and Related Substance Control Act No 101 of 
1965 and s. 17 of the Fertilizers, Farm Feeds, agricultural Remedies and Stock 
remedies Act No 36 of 1947, both of which provide for “preservation of secrecy”. 
These statutes do not, however, specifically protect against unfair commercial use, so
i init is unclear whether second applicant can rely on prior data. Article 39.3 of TRIPS
requires that if undisclosed information or data is disclosed protect the public, there 
must be protection against unfair commercial use.
Control o f Anti-competitive Practices
The TRIPS provisions on the control of anti-competitive practices in contractual 
licences allow members to introduce legislation or regulations to control anti­
competitive practices, such as exclusive grant-back conditions, conditions preventing 
challenges to validity and coercive package licensing. However, although Article 40 
gives members considerable latitude in setting such regulation, it provides that such 
competition rules must be consistent with the other provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement. All competition measures are thus subject to the consistency requirement.
Section 90 of the South African Patents Act of 1978 prohibits the inclusion of certain
restrictive conditions in licensing agreements. Whereas the old Maintenance and
Promotion of Competition Act contained a provision that the act was not to be
interpreted so as to limit IPRs, the new Competition Act of 1998 provides for no
1^1special treatment of IPRs . South Africa’s competition law and principles are likely
to impinge on IPRs. Section 4(l)(b)(ii) of the 1998 act, prohibits licensing agreements
between competitors in a market. Such practices fall within per se prohibitions,
meaning that there is no need to prove anti-competitive effect.132 This outright
111prohibition of licensing is arguable in breach of the proportionality requirement of 
Article 8.2, as well as the consistency requirement of Article 40 of TRIPS.134
130 Thorpe (2003).
131 Although section 10(4) of the Act provides that an intellectual property owner can apply for an 
exemption in respect of a particular conduct falling foul o f the Act.
132 See article by Tim Ball in http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/TarkArticles.aspx7IEN1500784 
(Accessed 19/10/2005)
133 Article 8.2 requires anti-trust measures to be “appropriate” and “needed” to prevent the abuses and 
practices covered by the provision (see also UNCTAD-ICSTD, 2004)
134 See UNCTAD-ICSTD, 2004, chapter 29.
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Further, the Act contains several provisions, which prohibit an agreement or 
arrangement, where intellectual property rights are concerned, which can have the 
effect of increasing or fixing prices. For example, s.7 of the Act defines when a firm 
can be deemed to have dominant market position. The whole of s.8 is concerned with 
abuse of dominant position or market power. In 2003, the Competition Commission 
held that in some circumstances the definition of a market could be based on a patent, 
such that the patentee could be dominant in that market solely by virtue of the 
patent.135
Given the broad provisions on anti-competitive practices in the TRIPS Agreement it is 
difficult to argue that the South African laws and administrative rulings are 
incompatible with the TRIPS Agreement. However, per se prohibitions of licensing 
agreements or the definition of market power by a patent with the effect that the 
patentee can be deemed to be dominant in a market solely by virtue of the patent 
would arguably amount to a circumvention of the monopoly right that a patent 
naturally confers on a patent owner. In Canada -  Patent Protection,136 the panel 
stressed that, “patent laws establish a carefully defined period of market exclusivity as 
an inducement for innovation, and the policy of those laws cannot be achieved unless 
patent owners are permitted to take effective advantage of that inducement once it has 
been defined” Any competition measure that overlooks the nature of IPRs may thus 
be deemed to be inconsistent with the spirit of the TRIPS Agreement.
Table 2: A synopsis of South Africa’s compliance with TRIPS substantive obligations
TRIPS obligations Compliance
status
Comments
Copyright
•  Art 3.1 X No national treatment for sound recordings, conditions of reciprocity applies
•  Art. 9: X South Africa does not adhere to the Paris text
•  Art. 10 9 Computer programs are not protected as literary work, although databases are
•  Art. 11 ? Rental rights provided in computer programs, but not in cinematographic works
• Art. 12 V Copyrights protected for at least 50 years
•  Art. 13 9 Broad limitations on protection, probably contrary to Article 13
• Art. 14.1 V Performances and sound recordings protected
• Art. 14.2 V Term of protection for broadcasts increased to 50 years
• Art. 14.
V Rights of performers etc now protected retroactively.
Trademarks
• Art. 15 V Goods and service marks protected
• Art. 15.4 ? Trademarks not published promptly
135 See Competition Commission Press Release entitled "Competition Commission finds 
pharmaceutical firms in contravention of the Competition Act", 16 October 2003.
136 See Canada-Patent Protection o f Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS/114/R, para. 7.55
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• Art. 16.1
• Art. 16.2
• Art. 18
• Art. 19
V
V
V 
?
Exclusive rights granted to owners of trademarks
Well-known trademarks protected; determination based on "the relevant sector of 
the public". But no retroactivity.
Protection for 7 years and renewable indefinitely
No TRIPS compliant provision; lack of clarity about compliance
Geographical Indications
• Art. 22 ? Some protection under laws on business practices and trademark law, but not within 
the explicit definition in Article 21
• Art. 23 X No special protection for wines and spirits. GIs on wines and spirits will not be 
registered.
Industrial Designs
V• Art. 25 Protected provided for industrial designs. Textiles can be protected as aesthetic 
designs
• Art. 26 V Rights owners granted TRIPS compliant rights; however there are broad 
compulsory licence conditions. Protection for 10 years
Patents
• Art. 27 V Patents for products/processes and all fields of technology
• Art. 27.1 ? Lack of clarity regarding local working conditions
• Art. 27.3b V Microorganisms etc protected. Plant variety protected
• Art. 28 V Exclusive rights granted to patentee
• Art.29 V Provision changed to conform to Article 29
• Art.30 ? TRIPS flexibilities reflected, but lack of clarity remains
• Art. 31
? Several TRIPS compliant changes have been made, but there remains questions 
regarding local working conditions and compulsory licenses
•  Art. 33 V Term of protection (20 years) TRIPS compliant
•  Art. 34 V Burden of proof in process patents reversed
Layout Designs
V• Art. 35 Layout-designs protected
• Art. 36 V Scope of protection TRIPS compliant
•  Art. 37 V TRIPS compliant changes have been made
• Art. 37.2 V Provisions on compulsory licenses amended
• Art. 38 V Term pf protection (10 years) TRIPS compliant
Undisclosed Information
• Art. 39.2 ? No statutory protection for confidential information; only in common law
• Art. 39.3 V Test data protected but not against unfair commercial use
Competition measures
• Article 40 ? Per se  prohibition o f some licensing arrangements and the invalidation of the 
market exclusivity and monopoly rights of IP owners may violate the consistency 
requirement in Article 40
In sum, South Africa's compliance record with the substantive obligations of the 
TRIPS Agreement, as described in the foregoing section, presents a mixed picture 
(see table 2 for summary). South Africa has taken significant steps to bring its 
national intellectual property laws into substantial compliance with the provisions of 
the agreement, but there are still some areas of obvious non-compliance and areas 
where compliance is not clear due in part to different interpretations resulting from 
the ambiguities in the TRIPS provisions. Attention now shifts to the enforcement 
obligations.
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Table 3: TRIPS Enforcement obligations
PART III OF TRIPS: ENFORCEMENT OBLIGATIONS
Types of obligations Articles Scope of Obligations
General Obligations 41 Members must provide for enforcement procedures in their 
national law that permit effective action against any act o f IP 
infringement, including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements 
and remedies that constitute a deterrent to further infringements
(41.1). Procedures for IP enforcement must not create barriers to 
legitimate trade and safeguards must be provided against abuse (41.1). 
Procedures must not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail 
unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays (41.2).______________
Civil and Administrative 
Procedures and Remedies
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
Right holders shall have the right to civil judicial enforcement 
procedures; there must be no overly burdensome requirements 
concerning mandatory personal appearances; there must be a means to 
identify and protect confidential information, unless this would be 
contrary to existing constitutional requirements
Members’ courts must be given the authority to order an 
opposing party to a case to produce evidence in his procession, 
subject to the protection of confidential information
The courts must be given the authority to grant an injunction 
ordering a party to desist from an infringement or to prevent the 
entry of infringing goods immediately after customs clearance o f such 
goods.
Members must give their courts the authority to order the 
infringer to pay the right holders adequate compensation to the right 
holder. This must include other expenses, such appropriate attorney’s 
fees. Members may give their courts the authority to order recovery of 
profits and/or payment of pre-established damages by an innocent 
infringer (45.2)
Members must give their courts the authority to order that 
infringing goods be disposed of outside the channels of commerce or 
to be destroyed (unless this would be contrary to existing 
constitutional requirements. The courts must also be given the 
authority to order the disposal or destruction of materials and 
implements to minimise the risks of further infringements.
• Members may grant their courts the authority to order an 
infringer to identify third persons involved in the infringing acts 
Members must give their courts the authority to order a party 
who has abused the enforcement procedures to provide to a party 
wrongfully enjoined or restrained adequate compensation for injury 
suffered. Public authorities and officials must not be exempted from 
such liability unless their actions are taken or intended in good faith
(48.2)
Administrative procedures must conform to principles equivalent 
to those set forth in the foregoing provisions.______________________
Provisional Measures 50 Members must give their courts the authority to order prompt 
and effective provisional measures to prevent an infringement and to 
preserve relevant evidence relating to alleged infringement (50. la&b) 
Member must give their courts and judges the authority to adopt 
provisional measures inaudita altera parte  where delay could cause 
irreparable harm to the right holder or where there is a demonstrable 
risk of evidence being destroyed (50.2)___________________________
Special Requirements related 
to Boarder Measures
51
5 2- 60
Members must adopt procedures that enable a right holder with 
valid grounds for suspecting that the importation of counterfeit 
trademark or pirated copyright goods may take place to lodge a 
written application with the competent authorities for the suspension 
by customs authorities the release into free circulation of such goods.
Cover provisions regarding application (52), security or 
equivalent assurance by the applicant (53), notification of the importer 
and the applicant of the suspension (54), duration of suspension (55), 
indemnification of the importer and the owner of the goods (56), the 
right of the right holder to inspection and information of suspended 
goods (57), ex officio action by competent authorities (58). Public 
authorities and officials must not be exempted from liability unless
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where actions are taken or intended in good faith. Members must give 
their courts and judges the authority to order the destruction or 
disposal of the infringing goods (59). The above provisions may not 
apply to small quantise of goods of a non-commercial nature (60)
Criminal procedures 61 • Criminal procedures and penalties must be provided for wilful 
trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale. 
Remedies available must include imprisonment and/or monetary fines 
sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistent with the level of penalties 
applied for crimes of a corresponding gravity. In appropriate cases, 
remedies available must also include seizure, forfeiture and 
destruction of the infringing goods and of any materials and 
implements the predominant use of which has been in the commission 
of the offence.
Source: extracted from the TRIPS Agreement
Compliance with TRIPS Enforcement Obligations
The “constructive ambiguities” in the TRIPS agreement are more prevalent in the 
sections on enforcement, where vague words or terms, such as “effective” or 
“reasonable” can give rise to different, sometimes self-serving, interpretations. 
Unfortunately, there has been, to date, no WTO jurisprudence of significance on the 
enforcement provisions of the agreement.137 Nevertheless, it is the case that 
enforcement procedures and remedies must at least be formally consistent with
11fispecific requirements of the TRIPS Agreement. A WTO panel or the Appellate 
Body is likely to interpret these requirements strictly or narrowly.139
The approach used in this section is based on literal comparisons of the enforcement 
legislation of South Africa with the enforcement provisions of the TRIPS agreement. 
Given the institutional flexibility allowed under Article 41.5 of TRIPS, it serves no 
useful purpose, in a legal sense, to focus on enforcement in terms of the institutional 
capacities of the enforcement agencies, such as customs and the police. The focus, 
therefore, is mainly on the national enforcement laws rather than on their actual
137 In the recent EC -  Protection o f Trademarks and GIs case (WT/DS174/R, WT/DS290/R), Australia 
claimed that the EC Regulation at issue in the case "is inconsistent with Articles 41.1,41.2,41.3 and 42 
of the TRIPS..." (General Obligations and Civil and Administrative Procedures and Remedies under 
Part III of the TRIPS Agreement), but the Panel rejected these claims arguably on technical grounds 
because Australia's claims related to the acquisition of intellectual property rights under the Regulation 
and therefore should have been brought under Part IV of the TRIPS Agreement rather than Part III as 
Australia did (Australia Report, paras, 7.729 -  731). In the US's claims, it also invoked Articles 41.1, 
41.2, 41.4, 42 and 44.1. The Panel declined to rule on these claims due to judicial economy (See US 
Report, paras. 7.759 -  761).
138 Otten (1998).
139 As Reichman (1998) argues, “deference to local law and strict construction of treaties have become 
the pedestal on which the Appellate Body’s TRIPS jurisprudence rests” (p. 596). However, this does 
not suggest that national governments have a carte blanche; rather their implementing laws will be 
measured against the black letter rules and spirit of the agreement. Although the judicial policy of strict 
constructivism is followed by the Appellate Body, with a great emphasis on words, much of the 
reasoning in interpretation is nevertheless still informed by context, as well as the object and purpose 
of the covered agreements (see Abi-Saab, 2006)
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operation on the ground. The key enforcement obligations are discussed under the 
five main heads, namely, civil and administrative procedures and remedies, 
provisional measures, special requirements related to border measures and criminal 
remedies (see table 2).
Civil and Administrative Procedures and Remedies
Various courts have jurisdiction over IPR infringement cases in South Africa. These 
include the provincial and local divisions of the High Court (in cases of trademark, 
copyright and design infringement) and the Court of the Commissioner of Patents (in 
cases of patent infringement). The Commissioner of Patents is appointed from the 
ranks of High Court judges and has the powers and jurisdiction of a single judge in a 
civil action in the High Court. The Registrar of Trademarks performs some judicial 
functions but these only deal with registration and not enforcement issues. Final 
appeals on IPR cases lie to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
However, although Article 41.4 of TRIPS requires that at least the legal aspects of 
initial judicial decisions on the merits of a case be subject to a judicial review, in 
South Africa, interlocutory injunctions ordered by the High Court are neither review- 
able nor appeal-able. According to the South African authorities, this position is not in 
conflict with Article 41.1 because the decisions on interlocutory injunctions are not in 
relation to the merits of a case.140
Other specific obligations under the section on civil and administrative procedures 
and remedies (s.2 of Part III) relate to: standing and appearances before courts and 
protection of confidential information (Article 42); the court’s authority to order 
parties to produce evidence (Article 43); injunctions (Article 44); payment of 
damages, including by an innocent infringer (Article 45); other remedies such as the 
destruction of infringing goods (Article 46); the court's authority to order an infringer 
to identify third persons (Article 47); liability against abuse of procedures and against
140 One of the conditions for granting an injunction is the strength of the applicant’s case, that is, there 
must be a real possibility of success at the trial. Necessarily the question as to whether there is a serious 
case to be tried will arise, and this will touch on the question of merits. See the British House of Lords’ 
case of American Cyanamid Co v. Ethicon Ltd (1975) A.C 396. However, in South Africa, the key 
requirement is whether there is a prima facie case. Arguably, given the low threshold, decisions on 
interlocutory injunctions do not entail enquiring into the merits of the case because the requisites for 
the right to claim are different.
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public authorities and officials actions are not in good faith (Article 48); and 
administrative measures (Article 49). How have these obligations been implemented 
in South Africa’s enforcement laws?
Right holders and, generally, licensees have locus standi in South African courts as 
provided in the various IP statutes. There is no requirement for mandatory personal 
appearances as parties can be represented in court, although where a party needs to 
give oral evidence personal appearance would naturally be expected. Courts also have 
the inherent jurisdiction to protect information presented in the course of a hearing. 
Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, the judicial authorities can order an opposing 
party to produce evidence in his possession during the discovery stage of litigation.
Civil remedies for IPR infringement are provided in the relevant Acts as well as under 
the Rules of the High Court and of the Court of the Commissioner of Patents. Various 
remedies may be ordered, including temporary and final injunctions141 (known in 
South Africa as interdicts); damages or in lieu of damages, the payment of a 
reasonable royalty; costs, including attorneys fees, are normally awarded; and 
delivery-up of infringing material or goods. Article 45.2 provides that members may 
authorise the judicial authorities to order recovery and/or payment of pre-established 
damages from innocent infringer. In South Africa, a right holder cannot recover 
damages from an innocent infringer.142
Furthermore, South African courts have no authority to order the infringer to name the 
third persons involved in the infringing acts (Article 47 of TRIPS). South African 
officials argued that the judicial authorities are “very hesitant” to order any party to 
disclose the identity of third persons, as such a practice in civil proceedings would be 
unconstitutional in terms the constitutional law.143 South Africa argued further that 
Article 47 was not peremptory and, therefore, it was not obliged to implement it.144
141 The requisite for the right to claim a final injunction (interdict) are: a clear right; an injury actually 
committed or reasonably apprehended; and the absence of similar protection by any other ordinary 
remedy. Final interdicts are granted as a matter of course in IP cases in South Africa unless in 
pharmaceutical patent cases where because of public health concerns, a court may consider whether or 
not to leave the rights holder to a damages claim instead of a final interdict. See speech by Mr Justice 
Harms to WIPO’s Advisory Committee on Enforcement, WIPO/ACE/2/4 Rev of May 19 2004.
142 Profits or pre-established damages in cases of innocent infringement will not, generally, be awarded: 
see Patents Act (s.66(l)); Copyright Act (s.24(2)), and Designs Act (s.35(6)).
143 See document IP/N/6/ZAF/1 at p.3.
144 See response to question by the EC (document IP/Q4/ZAF/1 of 30 April 1999 at p.4.
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The power to order a party to disclose the identity of third persons, however, exists in 
criminal trials.
Article 48 of TRIPS requires members to give their courts the authority to order a 
plaintiff to pay adequate compensation to a defendant wrongly enjoined. No specific 
safeguard or indemnification provisions against abuse of enforcement procedures 
exist under South African law; it is up to each defendant to seek compensation in such 
circumstances. Public authorities and officials in South Africa are also generally 
exempted from liability unless their actions are taken in bad faith.
Provisional Measures
Article 50 of TRIPS requires members to provide their courts with the authority to 
order prompt and effective provisional measures to prevent an infringement and to 
preserve relevant evidence in regard to the alleged infringement. They are also 
obliged to provide their courts with the powers to adopt provisional measures inaudita 
altera parte145 where, for example, any delay is likely to cause irreparable harm to the 
right holder or where there is a demonstrable risk if evidence being destroyed (Article 
50.2). The judicial authorities must, however, also have the authority to impose 
requirements on the applicant of a provisional measure, including the provision of “a 
security or equivalent assurance sufficient to protect the defendant and to prevent 
abuse” (Article 50.3)
South Africa’s courts have the authority to grant urgent, interim, injunctive relief in 
cases of IPR infringement where urgency exists and where the “balance of 
convenience” favours the applicant. To protect the defendant and prevent abuse, the 
applicant is normally required to furnish security for costs and/or damages. However, 
although an Anton Piller order (a search and seize order) exists in common law, South 
African courts have traditionally been conservative in their approach to common law 
Anton Pillar. In Shoba146, the leading case on common law Anton Pillar orders, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal adopted a rather strict approach to granting such orders.147
145 Latin for “Without hearing the other Party” also referred to as ex parte, Latin for “one-sided”
146 See Shoba v. OC, Temporary Police Camp, Wagindrift Dam, 1995 (4) SA 1 (A).
147 To obtain the order an applicant must prima facie establish that: (a) it has a cause of action against 
the respondent that it intends to pursue; (b) the respondent has in its possession specific (and specified) 
documents or objects that constitute that constitute vital evidence in substantiation of the applicant’s
165
IP industry lobbies have frequently criticised the high cost and delays in obtaining 
common law ex parte Anton Piller order in South Africa. They claim that to obtain 
an Anton Piller order, the right holder is required to provide a detailed affidavit signed 
by a current employee of the target with direct information about the infringement. 
According to the IIPA, "... ‘whistle blowers’ are reluctant to provide signed 
statements, making it difficult for the right holder to satisfy the evidentiary threshold 
for a civil order”.148 The IIPA also puts the costs of obtaining Anton Piller orders at 
about $20, 000.149 However, under the Counterfeit Goods Act of 1997 statutory Anton 
Pillar orders are now possible, but only in respect of offences under the Act.
The TRIPS agreement leaves members free to decide the method of implementation 
in their domestic laws150, which suggests that in a common law jurisdiction, such 
protection may be in common law. However, it is argued that the “effectiveness” 
requirement in the agreement can also be understood to mean that the obligation on 
members to give their judicial authorities certain powers arguably refers to statutory 
powers rather than powers merely existing in common law or in the inherent 
jurisdiction of the courts.151
In separate complaints against Sweden152 and Argentina153, the United States alleged 
that both countries violated the TRIPS Agreement by not authorising their courts to 
grant provisional measures. The complaints were settled during consultations. 
However, Sweden later introduced an amendment to several IP laws authorising the 
judicial authorities to grant provisional measures, including ex parte.154 Argentina 
also agreed to introduce amendments to confer statutory powers on its courts to order 
provisional measures. These cases show that the failure to grant explicit statutory
cause of action; and (c) there is a real and well-founded apprehension that this evidence may be hidden 
or destroyed or in some manner spirited before discovery or by the time the case comes to trial (Ibid).
148 See IIPA 2002 Special 301 Report on South Africa.
149 Ibid
150 Article 1.1, but see the Appellate Body ruling in the India-Mail box case
151 The TRIPS Agreements clearly imposes the enforcement obligations in considerable detail. It tells 
states when injunctions are to be made available in IP cases; what the scope of a state’s discovery and 
appellate review procedures should be; what action to criminalise, and how customs agents should treat 
cultural and manufactured goods at the point of entry to a country (Reichman, 1998, p586). These 
obligations, it is argued, are not to be based primarily on judge-made laws; but rather are to be 
provided primarily in statutes, even though there is no guarantee that the courts or judges will use the 
powers or authority.
152 See WT/DS86/1 of 2 June 1997
153 See WT/DS196 of 30 May 2000
154 See WT/DS86/2 of 11 December 1998
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authority to courts and judges may be deemed to be violations of the relevant 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreements.
Special Requirements Related to Border Measures
Articles 51 to 60 of TRIPS create a whole range of obligations with respect to border 
measures. Essentially, the obligations require members to enable a right holder with 
valid grounds to suspect that the importation of counterfeit trademark or pirated 
copyright goods may take place to apply to the competent authorities for the 
suspension of release of such goods. In South Africa, section. 15 of the Counterfeit 
Goods Act No 37 of 1997 deals specifically with the suspension of release of 
imported counterfeit goods.
The Commissioner of Customs and Excise is the competent authority with respect to 
border measures. He is required to respond promptly upon receiving a written 
application for suspension of release of suspected counterfeit goods being imported 
into the country and must give valid reasons for refusing such applications 
(s .15(3)&(5)). The Commissioner is empowered to act on his own initiative (i.e. ex 
officio) in relation to any act or conduct believed or suspected to be an act of dealing 
in counterfeit goods.
However, South African law requires security from the applicant only for the 
purposes of indemnifying the customs authorities and their members against any 
liability (s. 15(7)). No specific indemnification is conferred upon the importer and 
owner of goods, which have been wrongfully suspended, contrary to Article 56 of 
TRIPS. Furthermore, public authorities and officials are exempted from liability for 
their actions unless they have been “grossly negligent” or acted in bad faith. Article 
58 (c) of TRIPS requires that public authorities should only be exempted from 
liability where actions are “taken or intended in good faith”. The threshold of “grossly 
negligent” is arguably higher than the standard in Article 58(c). Equally, it may be 
argued that proving good faith is easier than establishing bad faith.
The basic approach of the Counterfeit Goods Act appears to be to reduce as far as 
possible the potential liability of public authorities and officials with respect to seizure 
or detention of counterfeit goods. The risk of action being taken against a public
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officer for unjustified seizure and detention of goods is reduced, while the 
complainant or applicant is made to bear the full responsibility for the action taken in 
the seizure and detention of goods.155
Criminal Procedures
Article 61 of TRIPS requires members to provide for criminal procedures and 
penalties at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a 
commercial scale. Remedies available must include imprisonment and/or monetary 
fines “sufficient to provide a deterrent". In appropriate cases remedies available must 
also include seizure, forfeiture and destruction of the infringing goods and of any 
materials and implements the predominant use of which has been in the commission 
of the offence.
In South Africa, counterfeiting of trademarks has historically been dealt with by 
different Merchandise Marks Acts156, while s.27 of the Copyright Act of 1978 
provides for criminal sanctions in the case of copyright piracy. However, the 
Counterfeit Goods Act of 1997 provides far more elaborate provisions for the 
enforcement of IPRs. The Act was introduced to provide for “streamlined and 
effective enforcement measures” and to bring South Africa’s enforcement laws into
1 57compliance with the enforcement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. Indeed, it 
has been described as “the manual for dealing with the problem of counterfeit goods” 
in South Africa.158 The Act creates a principal offence known as “dealing in 
counterfeit goods” (s.2).
The penalties for counterfeiting offences range from R5000 to RIO, 000 for each item 
to which the offence relates or a maximum jail term of 5 years or both fine and
155 Dean (1997) argues that this approach should dispel the reluctance of laws enforcement agents to 
take effective action in IP enforcement matters, while at the same time inhibiting right holders from 
acting irresponsibly in enforcing their rights or perceived rights. However, in terms o f Article 58(c) of 
TRIPS, it may be argued that this amounts to effectively exempting public authorities and officials 
from liability for improper or reckless action.
156 The Merchandise Marks Act 12 of 1888; Merchandise Marks Law of 1888; Merchandise Marks 
Ordinance 47 of 1903. These were replaced by the Merchandise Marks Act 17 of 1941, which is, partly 
still in force.
157 South Africa’s response to a checklist on issues on enforcement, see WTO document:
158 See Dean (1997). However, the provisions of the Act apply only to trademarks and copyrights and 
not to patents and designs. Thus, it appears that there are no criminal sanctions for infringements of 
patents and designs.
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imprisonment. A person convicted of a subordinate offence, such as failure to comply 
with an order given by an inspector or giving misleading information, is liable to a 
fine of up to R1000 or to imprisonment for a period of up to 6 months (s. 19(2)). In 
addition, the Act gives the courts the authority to make a number of orders, including 
ordering the accused or the defendant to disclose the source from which counterfeit 
goods have been obtained as well as the identity of third persons involved in 
committing the infringing act (s. 10(1)).
As mentioned earlier, such an order to disclose the identity of a third person is 
unlikely to be given in a civil context. The Act, however, creates a criminal basis for 
it. The Courts also have the powers to order the destruction of counterfeit goods and 
their packaging and, where applicable, any tools used by the convicted person (see 
Article 61 of TRIPS). However, as an alternative to destruction, the courts may 
declare the counterfeit goods in question to be forfeited to the state (s.20(l)).159
By far the strongest evidence of the intention of South Africa to create a strong 
(criminal) enforcement regime, at least de jure  if not de facto , is the provision in the 
Counterfeit Goods Act, which rewards a person who purchased counterfeit goods and 
later assisted in a conviction being obtained against the seller of the goods. The court 
is obliged to issue an order making a monetary reward in favour of such individuals 
known as “aggrieved persons”. The reward consists of a sum of money three times the 
amount of the price paid by the buyer for the counterfeit goods. The seller will be 
ordered to make the payment of the reward to the aggrieved person, in addition to any 
conventional fine imposed on him by the court (s.20(2)).160
159 The requirement to destroy the infringing goods under Article 61 of TRIPS is qualified with the 
phrase “in appropriate cases”, which suggests that a domestic court has the discretion to determine 
those appropriate cases. Therefore, the powers of the South African courts to forfeit infringing goods to 
the state rather than destroying them may be accommodated within the flexible provisions of Article 
61, although it raises a different issue if, as the copyright industry groups have alleged, the infringing 
goods are later released by state officials to the infringers or into free circulation.
160 According to Dean (1997), this reward system can make ‘bounty hunters’ out of members of the 
public and it can be a very effective anti-counterfeiting measure. Ample incentive is provided to 
members of the public to seek out and purchase counterfeit goods and then to collaborate with the 
police or inspectors to secure a conviction for dealing in counterfeit goods and in return obtain a 
generous reward.
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Parts of the Counterfeit Goods Act have, however, been criticised by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal. In a recent case161, the Court noted that some provisions of the Act 
went beyond what was required by the TRIPS Agreement. In defining trademark 
counterfeiting, the Act in Section 1 refers, inter alia, to an infringing act “calculated 
to be confused with” the protected goods. Quoting copiously from the TRIPS 
Agreement, Mr Justice Harms said that the definition in the Act appeared to equate 
trademark infringement with counterfeiting, “something contrary to TRIPS and 
something completely unnecessary”. According to the judge, “the minimum 
requirement of TRIPS art 61 is the criminalisation of wilful counterfeiting. South 
Africa went further and criminalized negligent counterfeiting”. The Court held that 
being a penal statute, the Counterfeit Goods Act “must be interpreted restrictively 
without doing violence to the wording”.164
Table 4: A synopsis of South Africa’s compliance with TRIPS enforcement obligations
TRIPS Obligations Compliance
status
Comment s
Civil/administrative 
procedures and measures
• Art. 42
• Art. 43
V
X
Right holders have access to the courts; no requirements regarding mandatory 
personal appearance
No provisions giving courts the power to order a party to produce evidence in 
his possession, but courts have inherent powers
• Art. 44
• Art. 45
• Art. 45.2
• Art. 46
V
V
X
X
Courts have statutory powers to grant injunctions etc
Courts have statutory authority to order the infringer to pay damages to the
rights owners.
Courts have no statutory authority to order recovery of profits/damages by an 
innocent infringer
No statutory powers given to courts to order the destruction o f infringing goods
•  Art. 47 X Courts have no statutory powers to order an infringer to identify third persons
• Art. 48 X Courts have no statutory powers to order a party or public authorities to indemnify a party wrongfully restrained
Provisional measures 
•  Art. 50 V Courts have statutory power to grant Anton Piller order in cases of trademark 
counterfeiting and copyright piracy, but only common law Anton Pillar in 
other IP cases.
Border measures
• Arts. 51 to 61 V South Africa's laws conform to the provisions on border measures, but there is 
no provision on the indemnification of the importer (Art. 56) and general 
exception o f liability for public authorities and officials (Art 58.b)
Criminal procedures 
•  Art. 61 V South Africa's law conforms to the provisions on criminal procedures. 
Remedies for counterfeiting and piracy offences are stringent and arguably 
“sufficient to provide a deterrent”.
161 A MMoola Group Limited and Another v. The GAP, Inc and Another, 2004 (3), SCA
162 Ibid (para 7).
163 See speech at WIPO, document WIPO/ACE/2/4 Rev. at p. 5, n. 34
164 Ibid, para 11.
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In sum, South Africa's compliance with the enforcement obligations of the TRIPS 
Agreement, like its compliance with the substantive obligations, presents a mixed 
picture (see table 4). In the civil context, where TRIPS requires members to give the 
authority to their courts to do certain things, many of such powers only exist in the 
inherent jurisdiction of the courts and not statutorily, thus leaving the required 
measures at the discretion of courts and judges. For instance, South African law does 
not provide for judicial review of at least the legal aspects of initial judicial decisions 
on the merits of a case, as required under Article 41.4 of TRIPS; it does not empower 
its courts to order an innocent infringer to pay damages to the rights owner, as 
encouraged under Article 45.2 of TRIPS, or to order an infringer to identify a third 
person, as provided under Article 47.
Furthermore, there is a tendency to give public authorities broad exemptions from 
liability for inappropriate actions taken in enforcing IP rights, and there are no 
statutory provisions with respect to the indemnification of a party wrongly enjoined or 
restrained (Article 48). The legislation on border measures and criminal procedures 
is, however, very strong; in some respects even arguably TRIPS plus. The remaining 
part of this chapter examines the compliance record of Nigeria, using the same 
analytical structure as in the foregoing part on South Africa.
Nigeria’s Implementation Experience
A brief Overview o f IP Regime in Nigeria: Situation pre-TRIPS
Prior to the entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement in 1995, Nigeria was generally 
believed to have a relatively comprehensive and strong IP regime.165 For instance, 
according to the Fraser Institute survey referred to earlier, Nigeria's rating for 1970, 
1990 and 1995 was 3.05 point for each year.166 It had the 19th highest scores of the 
120 countries surveyed, and was only beaten in Africa by South Africa at 3.37, 3.57
165 Apart from the WTO (TRIPS), Nigeria is member of several WIPO treaties, including the Paris 
Convention (Libson text), the Berne Convention, and the Rome Convention. Nigeria became a member 
of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) in May 2005, and acceded to the Patent Law Treaty in April 
2005. Nigeria is also a signatory to the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC).
166 The index of patent rights ranges from 0 to 5, with higher numbers reflecting stronger protection 
levels. The value of the index is obtained (per country, per time period) by aggregating scores in the 
five equally weighted categories. The score in each category ranges from 0 to 1 and reflects the extent 
of legal features in that category available in a particular country at a particular time. See 
http://oldfraser.lexi.net/publications/forum/1999/03/patent protection.html (date accessed: 
13/07/2005).
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and 3.57 for 1970, 1990 and 1995 respectively and Zambia, with the rating of 3.52 for 
each of the three years.
However, that was before the introduction of the TRIPS Agreement, which, with new 
and strengthened IP obligations, leaves Nigeria’s IP regime inadequate in many 
respects. To be fully TRIPS-compliant, Nigeria, like most other developing countries, 
needed to make significant changes in its IP laws and regulations. The next sections 
examine Nigeria's efforts, if any, in introducing these changes, beginning with the 
procedural obligations.
Compliance with TRIPS Procedural Obligations: Notifications and Review 
Nigeria notified its existing IP legislation to the TRIPS Council in September 2000, as
1 f t lrequired under Article 63.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. This was clearly a delayed 
notification given that Nigeria was obliged to implement provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement on 1 January 2000.168 The notification of its responses to the Checklist of 
Issues on Enforcement was also delayed. The review of Nigeria's legislation took 
place at the March 2002 meeting of the TRIPS Council, but replies to questions posed 
remained for over two years, while some answers given appeared to be conflicting 
and incomplete.
The Geneva-Capital coordination was very weak, and sometimes the Geneva-based 
delegates provided sketchy answers, while "still liaising with the relevant 
government agency". As pressure for responses increased, the answers became 
perfunctory. At the Council meeting of June 2003, the representative of Nigeria said 
that responses to outstanding questions would be provided "by the following 
week"169; by the meeting of November 2003, the answer was "shortly"170; however,
171by the meeting of March 2004, the response had become "in the near future". 
Nigeria's regular review, which began in March 2002, was not deleted from the
167 For laws and regulations notified by Nigeria under Article 63.2 of the TRIPS Agreement, see WTO 
documents IP/N/l/NGA/1 and 2; IP/N/l/NGA/C/1 to 5; IP/N/1NGA/D/1; IP/N/l/NGA/I/1 to 3; 
IP/N/l/NGA/P/1; IP/N/l/NGA/T/1 and 2.
168 With the exception of patent protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural products, which it was 
not required to grant until 1 January 2005.
169 See document IP/C/M/40 of 22 August 2003 at p. 3.
170 See document IP/C/M42 of 4 February 2004, at p. 4.
171 See document IP/C/M/43 of 7 May 2004 at p.3
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i noTRIPS Council agenda until September 2004, when responses to all outstanding 
questions were eventually provided.
Compliance with TRIPS Substantive Obligations
This section examines Nigeria's compliance with the substantive obligations set out in 
the main areas of IP covered by the TRIPS Agreement. The purpose is not to examine 
Nigeria's IP laws per se, but to concentrate on the TRIPS compatibility of these laws 
and the changes that Nigeria has made or not made since it came under a legal 
obligation to apply the TRIPS provisions. These substantive obligations are set out in 
Table 1 above.
Copyright and Related Rights
The main TRIPS obligations on copyright and related rights are found in Section 1, 
Articles 9 to 14 of TRIPS. Nigeria's pre-existing copyright law, the Copyright Act of
1 7T1990 , is in substantial conformity with the TRIPS Agreement. Nigeria adheres to
the Paris text of the Berne Convention, as required under Article 9 of TRIPS. 
Computer programmes and compilations of data are protected as literary works174 
(Article 10). The Act also provides for rental rights175 (Article 11). Literary, musical 
and artistic works (other than photographs) are protected for 70 years after the end of 
the year in which the authors dies or, in the case of a body corporate, 70 years after 
the end of the year the work was first published. 176 This term of protection is higher 
than the 50 years required under Article 12 of the TRIPS.
The Act protects related or neighbouring rights, including performances, sound 
recordings and broadcasts177, as required under Article 14 of TRIPS. Owners of 
copyright in sound recordings and broadcasts have the exclusive rights, inter alia, to 
prevent the direct or indirect reproduction, broadcasting and re-broadcasting or
172 See document IP/C/M45
173 The Act was originally promulgated as the Copyright Decree of 1988, and was later amended
through the Copyright (Amendment) Decrees 1992 and 1999. Nigeria joined the Beme Convention in
September 1993, the Rome Convention (Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting
Organisations) in October 1993, and has been a member of the Universal Copyright Convention (ICC)
since November 1961.
174 See s.39 o f the Copyright Act.
175 S. 37 (4). See also the Copyright (Video Rental) Regulations of 1999.
176 See First Schedule of the Act
177 See Part II of the Copyright Act
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1 78communicating to the public of their works (Article 14.1). And Cinematograph 
films and photographs, sound recordings, and broadcasts are each protected for fifty
1 7 0years (Article 14.5). In the case of broadcasts, the minimum term of protection 
required by TRIPS is 20 years.
In terms of retroactive protection of copyrighted works, which is required under 
Article 18 of the Berne Convention and under Article 14.6 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
the Nigerian Copyright law is in full compliance. Paragraph 1 of the Fifth Schedule of 
the Copyright Act provides that the Act applies “in relation to works made before the 
commencement of this Act as it applies in relation to works made after the 
commencement of this Act”. Furthermore, s. 12 of the Copyright Act protects the 
droit de suite provided for in Article 14ter of the Berne Convention, while s. 35
establishes a Berne-compatible presumption of subsistence and ownership of
1 80copyright. It thus appears that the Nigerian copyright law satisfies the essential 
provisions of Articles 9 to 14 of the TRIPS Agreement.
However, the Act provides for broad exceptions and limitations to the exclusive rights
181conferred by copyrights and provides for broad conditions for the grant of
1 87compulsory licences in translations and reproduction of certain works. These broad 
exceptions and the provisions that allow compulsory licenses to be granted in a wide 
range of circumstances are arguably inconsistent with Article 13 of TRIPS, which 
provides that members “shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to 
certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and 
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holders” . 183 Thus, 
while the Nigerian Copyright Act is technically consistent with the letter of Articles 9
178 See sections 6 and 7 of the Act
179 See First Schedule of the Act
180 According to s. 35, in any action for an infringement of copyright in a work, the following, inter 
alia, shall be presumed in the absence of any evidence to the contrary: that copyright subsists in a work 
which is the subject matter of an alleged infringement; that the plaintiff is the owner o f copyright in the 
work; and that the name appearing in a work purporting to be the name of the author is the name of 
such author
181 See the Second and Third Schedules of the Copyright Act.
182 See the Fourth Schedule of the Act
183 The panel in US-Section 110(5) o f the Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R decided that these conditions 
run cumulatively.
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to 14 of TRIPS184, the broad exceptions to copyright protection and the provisions for 
compulsory licences are arguably inconsistent with the spirit of these articles.
Trademarks
The obligations to protect trademarks are established in Section 2, Articles 15 to 21, 
of the TRIPS Agreement (See Table 1 above). Nigeria’s pre-TRIPS trademark law is 
the Trade Marks Act of 1990, which conforms to the TRIPS Agreement in some 
respects. For instance, trademarks are registered initially for a period of seven years 
and are renewable indefinitely, in accordance with Article 19.1. Furthermore, the 
trademark law grants the trademark owner exclusive right to prevent unauthorised
1 RSusers from infringing a registered trademark. Nigerian law also reflects the 
flexibility in Article 16.1 of TRIPS by recognising existing prior rights.
The Nigerian trademark law is nevertheless TRIPS incompatible in some areas. With 
respect to the scope of protection, the Trademark Act does not allow combination of 
colours to be registered as trademarks, contrary to Article 15 of TRIPS. There are no 
provisions for protection of collective marks or of service marks, as required under 
Article 15.4 of the TRIPS Agreement. Furthermore, Nigeria does not currently protect 
well-known service marks or well-known marks and, thus, does not conform to 
Article 6 bis of the Paris Convention (1967), incorporated by reference in Article 16.2 
of TRIPS.
Although article 15.4 also requires trademark to be published promptly, this 
publication requirement is not met in Nigerian domestic law and practice. The Trade 
Marks Journal is rarely published and there is no statutory provision to ensure its 
regular publication. The registration of trademarks or the issuance of Trade Marks 
Certificates depends on the publication of the Trade Marks Journal. The infrequent
184 According to Adebambo Adewopo, the Director-General of the Nigerian Copyright Commission, 
"Nigeria's law on copyright is noted to be one of the best in the world in grant of rights to copyright 
owners", paper delivered at a seminar organised by the US Consulate in Nigeria, May 16,2005.
185 Nigerian courts have generally given protection to trademark owners, where the plaintiff is able to 
establish that the action of the defendant infringes or threatens to infringe the right. See, e.g. Seven-Up 
Co and Seven-up Bottling Co. ltd v Warri Bottling Co. Ltd [1984] F.H.C.L.R 183, where the defendant 
named its soft drink “Thump-UP”, and the court held that this could be confused with Seven-Up. The 
courts will, however, also protect the right of a prior user before registration, see, e.g. American 
Cyanamid Co v Vitality Pharmaceutical Ltd [1991] 2 N.W.L.R
186 See S. 7 of the Trademarks Act. A Nigerian Supreme Court decision has also given judicial validity 
to this provision. See American Cyanamid Co. v. Vitality Pharmaceuticals Ltd (1991) 2 N.W.L.R
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publication, coupled with other institutional factors, results in a situation whereby “it
1 8 7takes over ten years to obtain trademarks in Nigeria”.
Nigeria's trademark law is also ambiguous on the conditions for cancellation of
trademark for non-use. Article 19 of TRIPS requires that valid reasons for non-use
must be accepted, including, circumstances that arise independently of the will of the
owner of the trademark which constitute an obstacle to use of the trademark, such as
import restrictions on or other government requirements for goods or services
protected by the trademark. However, although the Trade Mark Act provides for five-
year period of continuous non-use, it only allows for "special circumstances in the 
188trade". It is not clear whether these "special circumstances" include those induced 
by government measures as envisaged in Article 19 of the TRIPS Agreement. 189
Geographical indications
Article 22 of TRIPS requires members to provide legal means for protecting 
geographical indications, as defined in Article 22.1. Article 23 requires members to 
provide additional protection for geographical indications for wines and spirits. 
Geographical names are not registrable under Nigeria’s Trademark law . 190 However, 
section 43 of the Trade Marks Act provides for the registration of certification 
trademarks, which refer to “a mark adapted in relation to any goods to distinguish in 
the course of trade goods certified by any person in respect of origin ... from goods 
not so certified”. As noted earlier in the case of South Africa, this would not amount 
to full compliance with Articles 22 and 23 of TRIPS. In fact, Nigeria confirmed 
during the review of its legislation that its existing laws did not protect geographical 
indications or provide special protection for wines and spirits. 191 Compliance with the 
TRIPS provisions on industrial designs is considered next.
187 Oladele Jegede, a former Registrar of Trade Marks, Patents and Designs in Sodipo and Fagbemi 
(1995). The situation has not changed as interviews with Nigerian IP lawyers have shown.
188 S. 31 of the Trade Mark Act.
189 Given the Appellate Body’s strict textual interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, any ambiguity in 
national law may be deemed inconsistent with the relevant TRIPS provisions. See the India -  Mailbox 
case (WT/DS50/AB/R) for an example of how the AB adheres to the text of the TRIPS Agreement.
190 See section 9 of the Trade Marks Act of 1990.
191 See documents IP/Q-Qs 2,3,4/NGA/l of 8 June 2004
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Industrial Designs
Articles 25 and 26 of the TRIPS Agreement establish substantive obligations with 
respect to the protection of industrial designs. Article 25 requires members to protect 
independently created industrial designs that are new or original. Article 26 requires 
members to grant the owner of a protected design the right to prevent unauthorised 
third parties from performing certain infringing act. While members may provide for 
limited exceptions to protection, these must not unreasonably conflict the normal 
exploitation of the protected design and must not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the owner of third parties. Article 26.3 requires members to 
protect industrial designs for at least 1 0  years.
In Nigeria, industrial designs are protected under the Patents and Designs Act of 
1990. An industrial design is registrable if it is new and is not contrary to public order
1 Q9or morality. The rights conferred on owner of a registered industrial design are 
similar to those required under Article 26 of TRIPS . 193 However, industrial designs 
are subject to the exhaustion of rights, such that the rights conferred in the Act would 
not extend to acts done in respect of a product incorporating a registered design after 
the product has been lawfully sold in Nigeria. 194 As for duration and renewal of 
registration, protection is provided in the first instance for five years, and, on payment 
of the prescribed fee, renewable for two further consecutive periods of five years, 
totalling a period of 15 years. 195 This is more than the minimum period of 10 years 
required under Article 26(3) of the TRIPS.
Patents
The Patents and Designs Act of 1990 conforms to the provisions of Section 5 of the 
TRIPS Agreement in some areas. For instance, patents are granted for both products 
and processes196 (Article 27 of TRIPS). Although plants and animals and essentially 
biological processes are not patentable, “microbiological processes and their
i Qn
products” are (Article 27.3(b)). The rights conferred on the patentee in s. 6  of the 
Act conform to those set out in Article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement. The provisions on
192 See s. 13 of the Patents and Designs Act.
193 See s. 19 of the Act.
194 See s. 19 (2)(b) of the Patents and Designs Act.
195 See s. 20(1) of the Patents and Designs Act.
196 See s. 3(3) of the Patents and Designs Act.
197 See s. l(4)(a) of the Act.
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dependent patents in paragraph 2 of the First Schedule of the Act also broadly accord 
with Article 31(1) of the TRIPS. Patents are protected for 20 years198, as required 
under Article 33 of TRIPS. Section 25(3) provides for a reversal of burden of proof in 
process patent in accordance with Article 34 of TRIPS.
Nigerian patents law also reflects many of the flexibilities inherent in the substantive 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. For instance, s.3 (b) of the Act provides for 
parallel importation based on the doctrine of national exhaustion of rights. The section 
states that the rights under a patent shall not extend to acts done in respect of a 
patented product "after the product has been lawfully sold in Nigeria". This is 
different from international exhaustion of rights, which covers lawful sale anywhere 
in the world. The Act also provides for an early working or "Bolar exception", as well 
as "prior use" exception (s.6(4)).
However, while the pre-TRIPS patents law reflects some of the provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement and many of its flexibilities, there exist a number of discrepancies. 
First, Nigeria does not provide for patent protection "in all fields of technology", as 
required under Article 27.1 of TRIPS. In particular, pharmaceutical products are not 
patentable. 199 Furthermore, plant varieties are not protected either through patent or a 
sui generis system. Compulsory licence can be granted on the ground of non-working 
in Nigeria or where the degree of working does not meet on reasonable terms the 
demands for the product or where local working is hindered or prevented by 
importation. 200 Although compulsory licenses granted at the request of third parties 
are governed by conditions, which appear broadly to meet the requirements of Article
*70131 of TRIPS, the situation is different with respect to use by government.
198 See s. 7 of the Act.
199 The law neither expressly includes pharmaceutical products in the list of patentable inventions nor 
expressly includes them in the list of non-patentable inventions. As a result, according to Nigeria’s 
former Registrar of Trade Marks, Patents & Designs, the “patentability of pharmaceutical inventions in 
Nigeria is still an open issue” (see: Jegede in Sodipo and Fagbemi (eds), 1994). However, some argue 
that unless an invention is specifically mentioned as unpatentable, it should be patentable (see Sodipo 
and Fagbemi (eds), 1994, at pi 19). There is clearly lack of clarity in the law.
200 See paragraph l(a-d) of the First Schedule of the Patents and Designs Act.
201 For instance, paragraph 6 of the First Schedule requires prior negotiations between the parties and 
the payment of adequate compensation. The court will be involved in the process to mediate between 
the parties and can fix terms, which will be binding on them. Furthermore, the licence granted is non­
exclusive, and the licensee is prevented from importing the product under a compulsory license and 
from granting further license.
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Any minister can grant compulsory licenses on any product or process patent if the 
products or processes are declared to be of vital importance for the defence of the
909economy of Nigeria or for public health, and may also permit importation. 
Furthermore, any minister may, on public interest grounds, grant a compulsory
90^licence to a third party for the service of a government agency. This can be done 
without the authorisation of or consultation with the rights holder. When a minister 
grants a compulsory licence for the service of a government agency, the government 
or any person so authorised to use the licence is exempted from “liability to make any 
payment to the patentee by way of royalty or otherwise” .204 This is clearly a violation 
of TRIPS provisions regarding judicial review and adequate remuneration.
Article 31 (b) of the TRIPS Agreement allows WTO members to grant compulsory 
licences and, particularly, to waive prior negotiations with the patentee in certain 
circumstances. The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health goes even further 
and gives each member “the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency 
or other circumstances of extreme urgency”. However, neither the waiver of prior 
negotiations nor the Doha Declaration appears to extinguish the requirement that
9 / \ c
adequate compensation in the circumstance be paid to the patentee or the 
requirement that the legal validity of any decision relating to the grant of compulsory 
licenses and to the remuneration provided in respect of such a grant “shall be subject
9 A / J
to judicial review or other independent review by a distinct higher authority”.
In sum, although Nigeria’s patent law conforms to some of the provisions of TRIPS. 
It remains deficient with respect to some key obligations. Nigeria has to date not 
introduced any amended Patents Act even though the existing legalisation is 
inconsistent in some important areas with the TRIPS obligations. The law has not 
been formally changed or clarified, for instance, to grant patent protection for 
pharmaceutical products.
202 paragraph 13 of the First Schedule. This effectively allows the Nigerian government to import cheap 
generic drugs from other countries. This placed Nigeria in violation of Article 31(f) of TRIPS before 
the August 2003 Declaration of the WTO Ministerial Council, which allows this practice, subject to 
strict conditions.
203paragraph 15 and 16 o f the First Schedule
204 paragraph 17 of the First Schedule.
205 Article 31 (h) of TRIPS. See also UNCTAD-ICSTD, 2005, p.472.
206 Article 3 li&j of TRIPS
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Jfl“7Layout-Designs o f Integrated Circuits
Articles 35 to 38 of the TRIPS establish compliance obligations in respect of layout- 
designs. However, no law in Nigeria currently protects this area of intellectual 
property. Nigeria confirmed in its response to question on this during its TRIPS 
Council review exercise that its legislation did not protect topographies. To date, no 
implementing legislation has been passed.
Protection o f  Undisclosed Information
No statute in Nigeria protects undisclosed information. The protection of know-how 
or trade secrets is still based on the common law of confidence, although it would 
appear that Article 39 of TRIPS requires some form of statutory protection. The 
Drugs and Related Products (Registration etc) Act of 1979 provides for protection of 
test data regarding pharmaceutical products submitted to the government in order to 
obtain marketing approval in Nigeria, but it is not clear whether this protection covers 
agricultural chemical products and whether the data are protected against “unfair 
commercial use” as required under Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement.
Control o f  Anti-competitive Practices
<%AO
Nigeria currently has no competition law. However, contractual licences in patents 
or designs are regulated so that any clause in such contracts that imposes restrictions 
which do not derive from the relevant patent or industrial design or that are 
unnecessary to safeguard those rights will be null and void.209 Furthermore, the 
National Office of Technology Acquisition and Promotion (NOTAP) Act of 1983 
empowers the NOTAP to register commercial contracts and agreements dealing with
91 ntransfer of foreign technology. Such registration targets anti-competitive practices.
207 This is not one of the classical or traditional IP areas with which most developing countries are 
familiar, and therefore could pose greater implementation challenges. See report o f the meeting of 
African Trade Ministers: document MM/LIB/WS3/ES of 15 November 2000.
208 Although there is a draft competition bill, it has remained un-enacted for several years.
209 See s. 23 of the Patents and Designs Act.
210 Every such contract is registrable if its purpose or intent is in the opinion of the National Office 
wholly or partially for or in connection with any of the following purposes: the use o f trademarks, the 
right to use patented inventions, the supply of technical expertise or any form of technical assistance, 
the supply of basic or complex engineering, and the provision of operating staff or management 
assistance and the training of personnel. However, in addition to the above, NOTAP is shifting 
emphasis to the promotion of local research and development (R&D) invention. With the assistance 
from WIPO, NOTAP has established a patent information and documentation centre for the 
dissemination of technology to end-users.
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Table 5: A synopsis of Nigeria’s compliance with TRIPS substantive obligations
TRIPS obligations Compliance
status
Comments
Copyright
Art. 9:
Art. 10
Art. 11
Art. 12
Art. 13
Art. 14.1
Art. 14.2
Art. 14.6
Nigeria adheres to the Paris text of the Berne Convention 
Computer programmes and databases protected as literary works 
Rental rights provided in computer programs 
Copyrights protected for at least 50 years
Broad limitations to protection, including compulsory licensing of 
works
Performances, sound recordings and broadcasts are protected
Term of protection for broadcasts is at least 50 years
Rights of performers etc protected retroactively. Berne compatible
presumption.
Trademarks
Art. 15
Art. 15.4
Art. 16
Art. 16.2
Art. 18
Art. 19
No protection for combination of colours, collective or service marks 
Trademarks not published promptly 
Exclusive rights granted to owners of trademarks 
Well-known trademarks not protected.
Protection for 7 years and renewable indefinitely
No TRIPS compliant provision. Lack of clarity about compliance
Geographical
Indications
• Art. 22
• Art. 23
May be protected as certification mark, but not in the context of Art.22. 
No special protection for wines and spirits.
Industrial Designs
• Art. 25
• Art. 26
Protected provided for industrial designs. Textiles can be protected as 
aesthetic designs
Rights owners granted TRIPS compliant rights; however there are 
broad compulsory licence conditions. Protection for 15 years________
Patents
Art. 27
Art. 27.1 
Art. 27.3b 
Art. 28 
Art.29 
Art.30 
Art. 31 
Art. 33 
Art. 34
No protection "in all fields of technology", i.e. pharmaceutical products
not patentable in current law, but patent products and processes are.
Lack of clarity regarding local working conditions
Plant varieties are not protected, but microorganisms may be protected.
Exclusive rights granted to patentee
Provisions compatible with TRIPS
TRIPS flexibilities reflected, but lack of clarity remains
Provisions on compulsory licensing largely inconsistent with TRIPS.
Term of protection (20 years) TRIPS compliant
Burden of proof in process patents reversed
Layout Designs 
•  Art. 35 -38 Layout-designs are not currently protected
Undisclosed
Information
• Art. 39.2
•  Art. 39.3
No statutory protection for confidential information; only common law 
Test data protected in respect of pharmaceutical products but not for 
agricultural chemical products. Protection may not cover unfair 
commercial use.
Competition measures 
•  Article 40 The conditions on repatriation of royalty may be deemed to go beyond 
the provision of Article 40______________________________________
In sum, Nigeria’s compliance record (see table 5) with respect to the substantive 
obligations of the TRIPS Agreement shows that although some of its pre-TRIPS IP 
laws conform to certain provisions of the agreement, there still exist many 
discrepancies, and Nigeria has passed no legislation to ensure that its laws are full
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compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. The failure, to date, to take any legislative 
step in this regard means that intellectual property rights in non-traditional areas of IP, 
such as geographical indications, plant varieties, layout designs of integrated circuits, 
and undisclosed information, are not protected at all. Even in respect of traditional IP 
areas, such as patents and trademarks, Nigerian laws fall short of the obligations 
established by the TRIPS Agreement, although it is observed that the copyright 
regime is substantially TRIPS compatible. The focus now shifts to the enforcement 
obligations.
Compliance with the TRIPS Enforcement Obligations
The purpose of this section is to examine the implementation of the TRIPS 
enforcement obligations by Nigeria. The section follows the same descriptive and 
analytic structure as that on South Africa, and focuses on the following broad heads of 
obligations: civil and administrative procedures and remedies; provisional measures; 
special requirements relating to border measures; and criminal procedures (table 3).
Civil and Administrative Procedures and Remedies
The main obligations under Section 2, Part III of TRIPS, relate to: standing and 
protection of confidential information (Article 42), the court’s authority to order 
parties to produce evidence (Article 43), injunctions (Article 44), payment of 
damages, including by an innocent infringer (Article 45), other remedies, such as 
destruction of infringing goods (Article 46), the court’s authority to order an infringer 
to identify third persons (Article 47), liability against abuse of procedures and of 
public authorities and officials who did not act in good faith (Article 48), and 
administrative measures (Article 49).
In Nigeria, intellectual property right owners, such as copyright owners, patentees and 
registered proprietors of trademarks, as well as licensees, have standing to assert their 
IPRs. There is no requirement for mandatory personal appearance before the courts,
although the courts have the power to order the attendance of any person for the
• ^11 purpose of being examined or to produce any document. The courts have the power
to order the production by any party, upon oath, of any documents in his possession or
211 See Order 41 Rule 14 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules: http://www.nigeria- 
law.org/Federal High Court (Civil%20Procedure) Rules 2000-Order 4.
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919power relating to any matter in question in any action. There is no specific 
provision that protects confidential information or evidence given in court. According 
to Order 41(31) of the Civil Procedure Rules states that, “all evidence taken at the 
hearing or trial of any cause or matter may be used in any subsequent proceedings in
91  *5
the same cause or matter”.
All the main IP laws provide for remedies in cases of IP infringement. The relief 
available is usually by way of “damages, injunction, accounts or otherwise” 214 The 
Copyright Act empowers the court to award additional damages in appropriate 
circumstances, particularly having regard to the “flagrancy of the infringement” .215 
The plaintiff in an infringement action is not entitled to any damages against the 
“innocent infringer”, but is entitled to account for profits in respect of the 
infringement. 216 Other remedies include consequential orders for the destruction or 
delivery-up of any infringing copyright material. The Act also creates conversion 
rights in favour of the copyright owner.217
There is, however, no provision requiring the court to order an infringer to inform the 
right owner of the identity of third persons involved in the infringing acts, although 
such an order can be made within the inherent jurisdiction of the court. Furthermore, 
there is no provision relating to the indemnification of defendants wrongfully
91 0
enjoined; again, such powers would be available at the discretion of the court. In 
Nigeria, public authorities and officials are generally immune from liability for any
9 1Qlegitimate action taken in the discharge of their official responsibilities. This is 
contrary to the provision of Article 48.2 of TRIPS, which require that public 
authorities and officials be subject to appropriate remedial measures where, although 
they act legitimately, their actions are not taken or intended in good faith.
212 Order 33 Rule 13.
213 Order 41 Rule 31. This may, however, not satisfy the requirement of Article 42 of TRIPS, since 
there are no explicit provisions protecting any confidential evidence.
214 See, for example, section 15 of the Copyright Act. The same applies in the case o f patent or design 
infringement. The court may at its discretion order the plaintiff or the defendant to give such security 
for the plaintiffs costs or the defendant’s costs of any action as it thinks just (CPR Order 52 Rule 1). 
The court also has the discretion to order cost between party and party (CPR Order 52 Rule 3).
215 Section 15 (4).
216 See s. 15.3 o f the Copyright Act.
217 See s. 16 (1) of the Copyright Act.
218 See Nigeria’s responses to the checklist of issues on enforcement; document IP/N/6/NGA/1 of 28 
November 2001.
219 Ibid, at p. 9.
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Provisional Measures
Article 50 of TRIPS requires WTO members to grant their judicial authorities the 
authority to order “prompt and effective provisional measures” to prevent an 
infringement and to preserve relevant evidence in regard to the alleged infringement. 
Where any delay is likely to cause irreparable harm to the right holder, or where there 
is a demonstrable risk of evidence being destroyed, the provisional measures must be 
adopted inaudita altera parte. Under the laws of Nigeria, there is the general remedy 
of interlocutory or interim injunction, which serves to preserve the subject matter of 
an action. Injunctions and common law Anton Piller (search and seize) orders are 
available to the right holders in all IPR cases. However, the Copyright Act makes 
provisions for statutory Anton Piller orders. Interlocutory orders may be made 
inaudita altera parte, where the court is convinced about the extreme urgency of the 
matter.220
Special Requirements Related to Border Measures
Article 51 of TRIPS requires members to establish in their laws special requirements 
that allow the suspension of the release of imported counterfeit trademarks or pirated 
copyright goods. There are general powers under the s i49 of Customs and Excise 
Management Act of 1990 conferred on the Nigerian Customs Service to impound 
goods that they reasonably suspect to be in contravention of the Act. Furthermore, 
under s.36 of the Copyright Act, the owner of copyright in any published literary, 
artistic or musical work or sound recording can give notice in writing to the 
Department of Customs requesting the Department during a period specified in the 
notice to treat as prohibited goods, copies of such works. The scope of this provision 
appears to be limited to pirated copyright goods, and, thus, excludes counterfeit 
trademark goods, as defined in the footnote to Article 51 of TRIPS.
The Act does not authorise the competent authorities to act on their own initiative. 
Indeed, customs officers who identify pirated imports are not allowed to impound the 
offending materials unless the copyright owner has filed a complaint against a
220 See CPR Order 34. In the case of real emergency an application may be made ex parte on affidavit. 
The Supreme Court of Nigeria in Nathaniel Kotoye states that a “self-induced emergency”, i.e. where 
the applicant should have acted promptly but failed to do so, would not warrant the granting of an 
application ex parte, (see Nathaniel Adedamola Kotoye v. Central Bank o f Nigeria & Others, 1989, 
SC. 118/1988).
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991particular shipment, which happens rarely. Customs authorities have no statutory
999power to order any remedies. For instance, there are no provisions giving the 
relevant authorities the authority to order the applicant to pay the importer, the 
consignee and the owners of goods compensation for any injury caused to them 
through the wrongful detention of goods, as required under Article 56 of TRIPS.
Furthermore, in respect of any request to restrict the importation of pirated copyright 
goods, the Department of Customs and its officers are exempted from liability for
991
“any act or omission” . Section 149(3) of the Customs and Excise Management Act 
states that, “[n]o officer ... shall be liable to any prosecution or action at law on 
account of any stoppage or search in accordance with the provisions of this section”. 
These provisions are contrary to that of Article 58 (c) of TRIPS, which provides that 
members must not exempt their public authorities from liability for actions not taken 
or intended in good faith. In sum, Nigeria is not currently applying TRIPS compliant 
border measures.
Criminal Procedures
Article 61 of TRIPS obliges members to provide for criminal procedures and penalties 
in respect of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy when undertaken on 
a commercial scale. The remedies available must include imprisonment and/or 
monetary fines “sufficient to provide a deterrent”. Furthermore, the courts and judges 
must have the power to order, in appropriate cases, the seizure, forfeiture and 
destruction of the infringing goods and the materials used in producing them.
In Nigeria, the Federal and State High Courts, as well as Magistrates Courts, have 
jurisdiction over criminal offences arising from infringements of patents, designs and 
trademarks, all classified as industrial property. However, only the Federal High 
Court has exclusive jurisdiction on criminal trials relating to copyright and related 
rights. Nigerian IP enforcement laws create different criminal remedies for different 
areas of IP. For instance, the main provision for criminal enforcement in the case of
221 See US Department of State 2005 Report on the investment climate in Nigeria
222 WTO document IP/N/6/NGA/1, 28 November 2001.
223 See s. 36(4) of the Copyright Act.
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trademark counterfeiting is the Merchandise Marks Act of 1990. S. 3(1 )(a) states, that 
“every person who forges any trademark .. .shall be guilty of an offence”.
Criminal prosecution is, however, rare under the Act. This is partly due to the various 
defences in the Act (e.g. intent to defraud is required), as well as the meagre penalty 
provided by the law. For instance, on conviction before a High Court, the penalty 
is an imprisonment for two years or fine or both, while a summary conviction before a 
Magistrate would attract a penalty of imprisonment for six months or a fine of N 100 
(less than US$1). There are no criminal provisions dealing with patents and designs, 
as s. 3 of the Merchandise Marks Act refers only to trademarks.
Copyright and related rights are, however, treated differently. The Copyright Act 
imposes relatively higher penalties for copyright infringement offences. For instance, 
a person who commits a primary offence, which involves, inter alia, making any 
infringing copy of a protected copyright, is liable on conviction to a maximum of 
N 1 0 0 0  for every copy of an infringing goods dealt with or to a maximum jail term of 
five years or both. A person who commits a secondary offence, such as selling or 
distributing infringing goods is liable on conviction to a fine of N 1 0 0  for every 
infringing copy or to a maximum jail term of two years.
In 1999, the Copyright (Amendment) Decree No 42 of 1999 was introduced to amend 
the Copyright Act so as to strengthen the anti-piracy law, given the rampant nature of 
piracy in Nigeria. The decree inserted a new s. 18A in the Copyright Act, which 
imposes heavy penalties for anti-piracy offences, including a maximum fine of N500, 
000 or a term of imprisonment for up to 5 years, or both (s. 18.A (3)). The decree 
also introduced a criminal liability in respect of infringement of folklore. A convicted 
individual can be fined up to a maximum of N 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  or sent to jail for up to 1 2  
months or to both such fine and imprisonment. In the case of a body corporate, the 
penalty is a fine of N500, 000. Clearly, the copyright enforcement law is the strongest 
IP enforcement legislation in Nigeria, especially with respect the special treatment it 
gives to anti-piracy measures and the protection of folklore.
224 Kayode in Sodipo and Fagbemi (1996).
225 See s. 18 of the Copyright Act of 1990
226 Ibid.
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Table 6: A synopsis of Nigeria's compliance with TRIPS enforcement obligations
TRIPS Obligations Compliance
status
Comments
Civil/administrative 
procedures and measures
V• Art. 42 Right holders have access to courts; no requirements for mandatory personal
• Art. 43 X appearance
No provisions giving courts the power to order a party to produce evidence in
• Art. 44 V his possession, but courts have inherent powers
• Art. 45 V Courts have statutory powers to grant injunctions etc
Courts have statutory authority to order the infringer to pay damages, but
• Art. 45.2
• Art. 46
• Art. 47
• Art. 48
X 
X
award of costs is discretionary.
Courts have statutory authority to order recovery of profits by an innocent 
infringer, but not order to pay pre-established damages 
Courts have statutory powers to order the destruction o f infringing goods 
Courts have no statutory powers to order an infringer to identify third persons 
Courts have no statutory powers to order a party or public authorities to 
indemnify a party wrongfully restrained
Provisional measures
• Art. 50 V Courts have inherent powers to grant common law Anton Pillar order. Statutory 
orders available in the Copyright Act
Border measures
• Arts. 51 to 61 X Existing law is broadly incompatible with the provisions o f TRIPS
Criminal procedures
• Art. 61 ? Remedies for infringements other than in respect o f piracy and folklore paltry, 
and may not be deemed to be sufficient to provide a deterrent.
In sum, although the Nigerian enforcement laws examined above conform to some of 
TRIPS provisions, there are clear deficiencies. All the laws, apart from the anti-piracy 
provisions introduced in 1999, predate the TRIPS Agreement. Furthermore, Nigeria 
creates differential treatment in respect of criminal remedies for IP infringements. 
Enforcement is weak in the patent and trademark areas. As a result, few companies 
have secured trademark and patent protection in Nigeria.
Conclusion
The most obvious difference in the experiences of South Africa and Nigeria, as the 
foregoing study has shown, is that while South Africa has made significant changes in 
its IP laws and regulations since the TRIPS Agreement entered into force, Nigeria has 
introduced no post-TRIPS changes to date, other than the 1999 amendment to the 
Copyright Act, designed to strengthen the anti-piracy law and the rules against the 
infringement of folklore. However, while Nigeria’s case is one of non-compliance, 
South Africa’s can only be described as one of partial or incomplete compliance. 
Despite the significant legal changes, there are areas of obvious non-compliance, as 
well as areas where compliance is unclear.
227 USTR (2004).
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The overall compliance behaviour of South Africa and Nigeria will be explained in 
chapter 7, the general explanatory chapter. However, for completeness, and in order 
have a broader picture of the compliance records of both countries, it is necessary to 
go beyond the two main case studies already examined. Thus, the next chapter is 
devoted to a general case study of these countries’ implementation of and compliance 
with a few other WTO agreements.
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CHAPTER 6
Compliance with WTO Rules on Trade Remedies and NTBs
The purpose of this chapter is to complement the more detailed case studies examined 
in the previous chapters. This is necessary for completeness and to provide a more 
comprehensive picture of the compliance behaviour of South Africa and Nigeria 
across a range of WTO agreements. The chapter should also confirm the patterns of 
compliance behaviour identified in the previous case studies. Given the number of 
agreements considered in this chapter, what is provided is only a snapshot of the 
compliance records of the two countries in respect of the agreements.
The chapter is divided into two parts. Part one covers the implementation record of 
South Africa and part two focuses on Nigeria. Each part consists of two sections. 
Section 1 discusses compliance with the rules on non-tariff measures, and specifically 
focuses on quantitative restrictions and import licensing, state trading enterprises, the 
SPS and TBT agreements, the agreement on trade-related investment measures 
(TRIMs) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Section 2 
examines compliance with the trade remedy and safeguard rules, namely the anti­
dumping agreement, the agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures (SCM), 
and the agreement on safeguards. The case studies examine whether, and to what 
extent, both countries have implemented and complied with the substantive and 
procedural obligations of these agreements.
South Africa’s Implementation Experience 
Non-tariff Measures
Non-tariff barriers cover a wide range of non-tariff-related measures that restrict 
international trade. A number of WTO rules and disciplines apply to these non-tariff 
measures, aiming to limit their trade restrictiveness. 1 The main rules discussed in this 
section are those relating to quantitative restrictions (QRs), import licensing, state
1 The WTO maintains an Inventory of Non-Tariffs Measures, developed from over thousands of 
notifications (see WTO document TN/MA/S5 of 11 September 2002). Furthermore, the Doha 
Declaration (paragraph 6) mandates negotiations on NTMs in the context of the Doha Round. These 
negotiations take place under the ambit of the Negotiating Group on Market Access, NGMA, (see 
WTO document TN/MA/35) Although the mandate provides virtually no guidance as to what 
negotiators should be considering as NTMs, a number of non-tariff barriers have been proposed for 
negotiations in the NGMA (see WTO document Job (05)/85/Rev.l).
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trading, standards and technical regulations, investment measures, and trade in 
services.
Quantitative Restrictions and import licensing
The GATT expresses a general preference for tariffs over quotas among forms of 
border protection.2 Article XI. 1 of GATT 1994 prohibits the use of QRs to restrict 
either imports or exports, but Articles XII and XVIII:B allow their temporary use to 
safeguard balance of payments (BOP). The Understanding on BOP has, however, 
clarified these provisions. Members are to refrain from introducing or maintaining
■5
QRs but rather to give preference to “price-based measures” and phase out existing 
BOP measures. Further, Members using QRs for BOP reasons have to meet stringent 
notification and documentation requirements4, and are required to submit themselves 
to reviews by the Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions5.
The scope of Article XI: 1 also includes “import or export licences”6, although it is the 
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures7 that specifically regulates the 
administrative procedures used for the operation of import licensing regimes. The 
Agreement does not prohibit licensing per se but regulates their application and 
administration. 8 Article 1(2) states that licensing procedures must prevent trade 
distortions. Article 1(3) provides that the rules and other procedures must be neutral in 
application and administered in a fair and equitable manner, while Article 1(4) 
requires licensing rules and list of products subject to import licensing to be published
2 According to the Panel on Turkey-Textiles, “(t)he prohibition on the use of quantitative restrictions 
forms one of the cornerstones of the GATT system. A basic principle of the GATT system is that tariffs 
are the preferred and acceptable form of protection . . .” See Panel Report, Turkey -  Restriction on
Imports o f Textiles and Clothing Products, WT/DS34/R, adopted 19 November 1999
3 These include import surcharges, import deposit requirements or other equivalent trade measures with 
an impact on the price of imported goods.
4 See paragraphs 9 to 12 of the BOP Understanding.
5 See paragraphs 5 to 8 of the BOP Understanding.
6 See the Panel on India-Quantitative Restrictions, which confirms the broad scope and coverage of 
Article XI: 1 (Panel Report, India -  Quantitative Restrictions on Imports o f Agricultural, Textile and 
Industrial Products, WT/DS90/R, adopted 22 September 1999, as upheld by the Appellate Body 
Report, WT/DS90/AB/R, DSR 1999:V.
7 The Agreement has its origins in the Tokyo Round Code on Import Licensing,
8 See the EC -  Bananas III case in which Appellate Body held that the focus of the Licensing
Agreement was on the application and administration of import licensing procedures rather than the 
introduction of licensing per se (Appellate Body Report, European Communities -  Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, DSR 1997:11, adopted 25 September 
1997.
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and notified to the Committee on Import Licensing. In the context and spirit of these 
obligations, how compatible is South Africa’s import regime?
South Africa imposes export controls and import prohibitions for a number of 
reasons, although not for balance of payments. 9 In 1995 the Committee on Balance- 
of-Payments Restrictions (BOP Committee) had consultations with the new South 
African government on its surcharge on imports and exchange controls introduced for 
balance of payments reasons. 10 The surcharge was subsequently abolished, as South 
Africa had promised to do during the consultations, while the exchange controls were 
later relaxed. However, export controls, import prohibitions and licensing existed 
under the 1963 Import and Export Control Act.
Although the International Trade Administration Act (ITAA) of 2002 has repealed the 
1963 Act, South Africa continues to operate an import-licensing regime for import 
and export controls. Under the new Act, the International Trade Administration 
Commission (ITAC) is charged with considering all applications for import and 
export permits. 11 However, the Minister of Trade and Industry, to whom IT AC 
reports, has broad discretion under the Act to regulate the imports and exports of
1"7 ♦goods. Furthermore, a permit issued under the ITAA can be subject to the conditions 
set out in section 27.2 (a) to (g), as well as to “any other related conditions” under 
s.27.2 (h). S.29 grants ITAC powers to suspend or cancel a permit issued under the 
Act.
The Panel on India -  Quantitative Restrictions13 held that “(t)he scope of the term 
‘restriction’ (in Article XI. 1) is broad, as seen in its ordinary meaning, which is ‘a 
limitation on action, a limiting condition or regulation”. The Panel on EC -  Poultry14
9 Several developing countries invoked Article XVIII:B since their accession to the GATT and a 
number of them, including Bangladesh, Nigeria, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, were still consulting in the 
WTO BOP Committee as at the first five years of the WTO (Roessler, 1998).
10 See WTO document WT/BOP/R/1BOP/R/224 of 15 June 1995.
11 See sections 26 (l)(a) and 27 of ITAC Act.
12 Ibid.
13 Panel Report, India -  Quantitative Restrictions on Imports o f Agricultural, Textile and Industrial 
Products, WT/DS90/R, adopted 22 September 1999, as upheld by the Appellate Body Report, 
WT/DS90/AB/R, DSR 1999:V.
14 See Panel Report, European Communities -  Measures Affecting the Importation o f Certain Poultry 
Products, WT/DS69/R, adopted 23 July 1998, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, 
WT/DS69/AB/R, DSR, 1998:V.
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also found that licensing procedures should be viewed in the light of the preamble to 
the Licensing Agreement and Articles 1.2 and 3.2, which stress that the object of the 
agreement is to prevent licensing procedures that could have trade restrictive effects. 
In the light of these rulings, it is arguable that the South African licensing procedures 
and conditions, as described above, could have such trade restrictive effects. 15 Indeed, 
the US has said that its companies have frequently cited import permits as one of the 
barriers to trade in South Africa 16
There appear to be general difficulties with monitoring compliance with the 
agreement. This is because of the failure of most WTO members to provide annual 
responses to the Questionnaire on import licensing procedures. According to the 
WTO, “(t)his unsatisfactory situation with respect to compliance with the notification 
obligations of the Agreement has seriously undermined the ability of the Committee 
on Import Licensing to carry out its main function of reviewing Members’ 
implementation of this Agreement” . 17 South Africa itself has fallen behind in 
providing annual replies to the Questionnaire. 18
State Trading Enterprises
The attention given to state trading enterprises in the GATT qualifies the subject to be 
included in this section. For instance, while government procurement was not 
addressed in the GATT and remains, even in the WTO, a plurilateral agreement, 
disciplines were included in the GATT 1947 to deal with state trading enterprises 
(STEs) from the start. Article XVII of the GATT requires that STEs act in a manner 
consistent with the general principles of non-discrimination in respect of 
governmental measures affecting imports or exports by private traders. Further, STEs 
are required to make purchases or sales solely in accordance with commercial 
considerations. 19
15 Article 2 of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures specifically provides that licensing 
procedures should not result in “trade distortions that may arise from an inappropriate operation of 
(the) procedures”.
16 See USTR 2005 Report on Foreign Trade Barriers.
17 WTO (2005)
18 For instance, South Africa’s last notification regarding import licensing was in 2002. Updates on 
South Africa’s notifications are available at: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/countries south 
africa e.htm.
19 Throughout Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII, the terms “import restrictions” or “export 
restrictions” include restrictions made effective through state-trading operations.
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The GATT 1947 did not, however, define “state trading”. This omission was 
addressed by the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of GATT 
1 9 9 4 20 The Understanding also introduced certain transparency requirements, 
including notifications of STEs to the Council for Trade in Goods, which is required 
to review such notifications through a Working Party. Each Member is obliged to 
ensure the maximum transparency possible in its notifications, and any Member that 
has reason to believe that another Member fails to make adequate notification may 
make a counter-notification to the Council after first raising the matter,
9 iunsuccessfully, with the member concerned.
Prior to the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, South Africa operated an 
elaborate system of Control Boards, originally set up under the Marketing Act of 
1937, as well as allied legislation for specific industries. The aim was to protect these 
industries against foreign competition and to ensure income parity with the urban 
economy. 22 As a result, the marketing of most agricultural products was regulated by 
statute largely under the 22 marketing schemes introduced under the Marketing Act.
South Africa’s notification to the Council for Trade in Goods in 199524 enumerated 
these STEs25 and stated the “reason and purpose for maintaining” them. However, in 
response to questions by the United States26 and Canada27, South Africa promised 
changes to the nature and functions of the STEs. In July 1997, it notified the Working 
Party on State Trading Enterprises of new legislation, the Marketing of Agricultural 
Products Act of 1996, introduced to implement reform in the agricultural marketing 
sector. Furthermore, it gave several estimated dates in 1997 for the termination of the
98functions of the marketing boards.
20 Article 1 of the Understanding defines STEs as “Governmental and non-governmental enterprises, 
including marketing boards, which have been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, 
including statutory or constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they influence through their 
purchases or sales the level or direction of imports or exports”
1 Paragraph 4 of the Understanding.
22 Kirsten (2006).
23 Ibid.
24 See WTO document G/STR/N/1/ZAF
25 The marketing boards included the Milk Board, the Fruit Board, the Egg Board, the Maize Board, the 
Oilseeds Board, the Tobacco Board, the Wheat Board, the Wool Board, the Cotton Board, and 
Sorghum Board (Ibid)
26 See WTO document G/STR/Q1/ZAF/3.
27 See WTO document G/STR/Q1/ZAF/1
28 See WTO document G/STR/N/3/ZAF of 6 August 1997.
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In November 2000, South Africa notified the Working Party that it “does not maintain 
any state trading enterprises”, adding that “(a)ll the state trading enterprises (earlier 
notified) have been completely abolished”. In subsequent notifications , South 
Africa has affirmed that it maintains no STEs within the meaning of the working
i
definition in paragraph 1 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII.
South Africa’s compliance behaviour in respect of the STE agreement has its roots 
partly in the country’s unilateral domestic reform agenda. The deregulation and 
liberalisation of the agricultural sector began in the 1980s and were intensified in the 
1990s. These reforms were informed by the desire to open up the highly protected 
agricultural sector and enhance its international competitiveness. South Africa’s 
Uruguay Round commitment was designed to lock-in the domestic reforms, 
particularly in agricultural sector. For instance, as a result of its Uruguay Round 
undertaking in agriculture, existing quantitative restrictions, specific duties, price 
controls, import and export permits, and other regulations were replaced by tariffs. 
The dismantling of the STEs was inspired by these domestic reforms, but also by 
South Africa’s obligations under Article XVII of GATT and the STE Understanding.
9 9
Sanitary Measures and Technical Regulations
The WTO agreement on application of sanitary and phytosaniatry measures (SPS) and 
the agreement on technical barriers to trade (TBT) aim to ensure, respectively, that 
sanitary measures and technical regulations and standards, when applied, do not 
create unnecessary barriers to international trade. Thus, while the SPS agreement 
allows the use of SPS measures to protect human, animal or plant life or health, it 
requires that such measures be based, inter alia, on scientific principles and evidence
29 See WTO document G/STR/N/4-6/ZAF of 14 November 2000.
30 See, for example, WTO documents G/STR/N/7/ZAF of 3 August 2001 and G/STR/N/8/ZAR of 18 
March 2002
31 STEs are, however, different from state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which continue to play a 
significant role in South Africa’s economy. The authorities see the SOEs as a vehicle for strengthening 
infrastructure and public service delivery. Therefore, rather than increasing the pace of privatisation, 
the government has indeed de-emphasised the role of privatisation as a way of enhancing efficiency, 
focusing instead on the operational restructuring of large enterprises, together with the sale o f the non­
core assets (IMF, 2005)
32 Kirsten (2006)
33 The treatment of the SPS and TBT agreements is not meant to be detailed or extensive, but rather to 
give a general feel about South Africa’s compliance with some of the substantive and procedural 
obligations in the agreements.
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(Article 2:2) and on existing international standards, guidelines or recommendations 
(Article 3).
The Appellate Body held in the EC-Hormones case34 that the repeated references in 
the SPS agreement to the relevant international standardising organisations meant that 
SPS measures, in order to be GATT consistent, must be “based on” relevant
•3 r  'y/r
international standards (Article 3.1). In the Australia -  Salmon case , the Appellate 
Body also emphasised the importance of basing an SPS measure on scientific 
evidence (Article 2:2) and on risk assessment (Articles 5:1). In addition to these 
substantive obligations, the agreement also imposes a number of transparency 
requirements, including publication and notification requirements, as well as the 
establishment of enquiry points (Article 7).
The TBT agreement focuses on technical regulations and standards. While such 
regulations, which include packaging, labelling and certification requirements, may be 
adopted and applied to achieve legitimate objectives , the agreement requires that 
they are not more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil any legitimate objective, 
and must not discriminate against imported products. Consequently, technical 
regulations are to be based on relevant international standards (Article 2:4). In the EC- 
Sardines case38, the Appellate Body stressed the importance of basing technical 
regulation on relevant international standards.
In that case, the EC, in a 1989 Regulation, provided that one species of fish, Sardina 
pilchardus, could have the word “sardines” as part of the name on the container, while 
another, Sardinops sagax, could not, notwithstanding that the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission has adopted a standard, Codex Stan 94, which listed Sardinops sagax
34 See: Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) -  
Complaint by the United States, WT/DS26/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998.
35 A member is, however given the right to set its own standard at a level that is higher than the existing 
international one, provided the higher level of SPS protection is based on a scientific justification or 
introduced following a risk assessment in accordance with the provisions o f Article 5. See the 
Hormones case.
36 Appellate Body Report, Australia -  Measures Affecting Importation o f Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R, 
adopted 6 November 1999, DSR 1999:VIII.
37 Such as national security regulation, the prevention of deceptive practices, protection of human or 
safety, animal or plant life or animal, or the environment (Article 2:2 of the Agreement).
38 Appellate Body Report, European Communities -  Trade Description o f Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, 
adopted 26 September 2002
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among sardines or sardine-type products. The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s 
finding that Codex Stan 94 is a “relevant international standard” under TBT 
Agreement Article 2:4. It held further that since Codex Stan 94 was not used “as a 
basis for” the EC Regulation in question, it was inconsistent with Article 2:4. It is 
evident from these cases that international standards will play a central role in SPS 
and TBT cases.
How, then, has South Africa fared with respect to these obligations? South Africa has 
made several notifications to the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosaniatry Measures, 
suggesting compliance with the notification obligations, under which SPS measures
'in
are to be notified promptly. It also suggests that South Africa frequently adopts SPS 
measures, but this does not amount to a violation provided the measures are consistent 
with the harmonisation or evidentiary obligations of the SPS Agreement.
In this respect, the evidence suggests that South Africa’s SPS measures generally 
follow internationally recognised scientific (CODEX) guidelines. The Directorate of 
Food Control of the Department of Health is South Africa’s national notification 
authority, its national enquiry point, and its representative at the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission. Furthermore, SPS regulations and other measures are frequently 
published in the Government Gazette. However, notwithstanding the general 
compliance with international standards, as well as compliance with the SPS 
Agreement’s transparency obligations, South Africa’s trading partners still complain 
about “various South African phytosanitary barriers” and “unnecessary SPS 
requirements” .40
With respect to the TBT Agreement, South Africa also appears to be applying a large 
number of standards and technical regulations for a variety of purposes. The South 
African Bureau of Standards (SABS), established in 1945, develops standards at the 
request of interested parties. The use of SABS standards is normally voluntary but can 
be made obligatory if a government department so declares. In 2002, there were 6,980
39 Article 7 and Annex B of the Agreement.
40 See USTR 2005 Report on Foreign Trade barriers. These complaints do not indicate that South 
Africa has violated WTO law but that in trade policy, rather than trade law terms, the measures are 
market access barriers.
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standards, with 72 declared obligatory.41 As the EC-Sardine case has shown, 
however, the key test is whether these standards are based on international norms. The 
evidence suggests this to be generally the case.42
Investment Measures
Investment measures, to the extent that they restrict importation or exportation or 
impose certain mandatory requirements, are often regarded as non-tariff barriers to 
trade. The GATT 1947 was not explicit enough on the conformity or otherwise of 
some of these measures. However, the agreement on trade-related investment 
measures (TRIMs) clearly reaffirms that GATT disciplines apply to investment 
policies in so far as they directly affect trade flows. The Agreement establishes in 
Article 2(1) that “no member shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the 
provisions of Article III (national treatment) or Article XI (prohibition of QRs) of 
GATT 1994”.
Article 2 (2) refers to Annex 1 to the Agreement, which contain “(a)n illustrative list 
of TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment ... and the 
obligation of general elimination of quantitative restrictions ...”. With respect to NT, 
Annex 1 prohibits, inter alia, local content or sourcing requirements, as well as trade 
balancing requirements. As in the case of QRs, the Annex prohibits restrictions on 
importation to the value or volume of local production exported or for foreign 
exchange purposes. The Panel on Indonesia-Autos43 held that local content 
requirements or other requirements that favour the use of domestic products over 
imported products are necessarily trade-related, and, therefore, inconsistent with the 
TRIMs agreement.
In addition to the substantive obligations, the TRIMs agreement imposes transparency 
requirements. For instance, Article 5 requires members to notify, within 90 days of 
the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, all their TRIMs, which were not 
in conformity with the provisions of the TRIMs Agreement, and to eliminate such 
TRIMs within two years of the entry into force of the WTO Agreement (Article
41 Trade Policy Review of South Africa, WTO (2003).
42 Ibid
43 Panel Report, Indonesia -  Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R, 
adopted 23 July 1988, DSR 1998:VI.
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5:2).44 Article 6 commits members to the obligations on transparency and notification 
in Article X of GATT 1994 and requires each member to notify the WTO Secretariat 
of the publication in which TRIMs may be found, “including those applied by 
regional and local government authorities within their territories”.
South Africa does not have a specific investment law, although various bilateral trade 
agreements contain investment protection clauses, while sector-specific acts establish 
the conditions for foreign and domestic investment.45 In 1995 South Africa notified 
the Council for Trade in Goods of all its measures that were not in conformity with 
the provisions of the TRIMs Agreement, as required under Article 5.1. However, 
although these notified TRIMs were to be eliminated by 1997 under Article 5.2 of the 
agreement, the WTO noted in its 1998 trade policy review that some of them were 
still extant.46 In 2001, South Africa informed the WTO that the TRIMs notified in 
1995 had been phased out.47 It is evident, however, that local-content requirements 
of various kinds still apply.48 The existence of local-content or sourcing requirements 
thus suggests lack of full compliance with the TRIMs obligations.
Trade in Services
Trade in services was excluded from the legal framework of the world trading system 
until 1995. This was due to the fact that services were viewed as non-tradable because 
of their supposed intangibility or invisibility, as well as their non-durable or transitory 
nature 49 However, recognition that international trade in services, in fact, accounted 
for at least 20% of recorded world trade, coupled with pressure from developed 
countries with comparative advantage in this form of trade, forced trade in services on 
the negotiating agenda during the Uruguay Round. The result was the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
44 Developing countries were given five years within which to do this, while the least-developed 
countries and a transition period of seven years.
45 Trade Policy Review (WTO, 2003)
46 WTO (1998).
47 See WTO document G/TRIMS/N/2/Rev.9 of 28 September 2001.
48 South Africa operates a number of local content schemes. For instance, exporters qualify for credit 
facilities by using a minimum of 70% of South African products and services. Also, local-content 
considerations are taken into account when comparing tenders for government procurement purposes. 
Minimum local-content requirements are established for TV and sound broadcasters and a South 
African company and other business entity that is 75% or more foreign-owned is subject to local 
borrowing restrictions (WTO, 2003).
49 ITC/Commonwealth Secretariat, 2000.
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The GATS general obligations and disciplines are modelled in large part on those 
under the GATT, except that while GATT obligations are extended only to goods 
being exported or imported, GATS obligations are extended to both the services and 
service suppliers. The general obligations apply to all Members on any measures50 
affecting trade in services. These obligations include: the Most-Favoured-Nation
r i C'y
Treatment (art. II), Transparency (art. Ill), Domestic Regulation (art. VI), General 
Exceptions (art. XIV) and Security Exceptions (art. XIV bis).
Each Member is expected to make specific liberalisation commitments through a 
process called ‘scheduling’, whereby a member first identifies the services sectors in 
which it is willing to make commitments. Under the GATS ‘positive list’ approach, if 
a Member does not elect to submit a schedule of commitments for a particular 
services sector , then it is not bound by any GATS obligation in the excluded sector, 
except for the transparency obligation in Article III. At the second level of the 
scheduling process, each Member that has submitted a schedule of commitments for 
any services sector is expected to specify in its Schedule the terms, limitations and 
conditions that it intends to impose in that sector with respect to market access and 
National Treatment commitments concerning the four modes of supply.54
Unlike the GATT, there is no general obligation under the GATS for members to 
extend either market access or national treatment to other members. These obligations 
are negotiated on a sector-by-sector basis and are inscribed in the Member’s Schedule
50 Measures affecting trade in services are defined broadly. The Panel on EC-Bananas III states that 
“[n]o measures are excluded a priori from the scope o f the GATS ... The scope encompasses any 
measure ... to the extent that it affects the supply of a service regardless of whether such measure 
directly governs the supply of a service or whether it regulates other measures but nevertheless affects 
trade in services”. (Panel Report, European Communities -  Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution o f Bananas, WT/DS27/R, adopted 25 September 1997, para. 7.285). Generally, however, 
measures include laws, regulations, rules, procedures, decisions, and administrative actions.
51 All laws affecting service provision must be publicly available.
52 Domestic regulations must be reasonable, objective, impartial and not more burdensome than 
necessary.
53 The WTO Secretariat has divided services into the following 12 areas: business (including 
professional and computer services); communications; construction and engineering; distribution; 
education; environment; fiance (including insurance and banking); health; tourism and travel; 
recreation, cultural and sporting services; transportation; and other services not included elsewhere. 
These 12 areas are, however, further subdivided into 155 sub-sectors (ITC/Commonwealth Secretariat, 
2000, pp 163 -169). Importantly, however, binding commitments exit only for those sectors selected by 
each member for Scheduling.
54 Article I of the GATS provides for 4 modes of supply of services, namely: cross-border supply 
(Mode 1), consumption abroad (Mode 2), commercial presence in the territory of any other Member 
(Mode 3) and presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other member (Mode 4).
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of Commitments. However, with respect to the terms, limitations, conditions and 
qualifications on market access and national treatment, the ‘negative list’ rule applies. 
As a result, no market access or national treatment restriction is deemed to exist in 
respect of any mode of supply for any scheduled or listed service sector unless such 
restrictions are specifically inscribed in the Member’s Schedule.55 So, what are the 
nature of South Africa’s GATS commitments and the extent of its compliance to 
date?
South Africa scheduled commitments in nine of the twelve service areas, excluding 
education, health and recreation, cultural and sporting services, where it made no 
commitments. When broken down into the 155 sub-sectors, South Africa made 
commitments in 91 of these sub-sectors.56 Furthermore, South Africa is a signatory 
to the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services (the Fourth Protocol) and 
has adopted the Reference Paper for basic telecommunications on pro-competitive 
and transparency practices. It also took part in the WTO GATS negotiations on 
financial services, and accepted the GATS Fifth Protocol.57
South Africa is, however, arguably in breach of many of its GATS commitments. The 
two areas often highlighted are the health and telecommunications sectors, where 
certain domestic laws and regulations appear to put South Africa in violation of the 
market access and national treatment obligations of the GATS. The situation with the 
health sector is particularly curious because South Africa did not make any scheduled 
commitment in the health services sector, and South Africa’s trade officials have 
consistently denied that the country’s health services are covered under the GATS.58
However, although South Africa made no commitments in the health sector, its 
commitments under the professional services sub-sector, in the business category, 
bring a large swath of its health services under the GATS. For instance, under 
professional services, South Africa made market access and national treatment 
commitments in respect of medical and dental services, services provided by 
midwives and nurses, as well as services provided by physiotherapists and
55 See Articles XVI and XVII of the GATS.
56 WTO (2005).
57 WTO (2003).
58 Sinclair (2005).
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paramedical personnel. As Sinclair argues, “almost all human health services 
delivered outside of hospitals by doctors, dentists, nurses, midwives and other health 
professionals are covered by South Africa’s GATS commitments”.59 South Africa 
clearly omitted to impose limitations on these commitments during the Uruguay 
Round, and, as a result, given the negative list approach, no limitations are legally 
assumed to exist.
In 2003, however, South Africa enacted the National Health Act, designed to combat 
the country’s public health crisis.60 Certain provisions of this Act are, however, 
apparently in conflict with the GATS market access and national treatment rules. 
Section 36 (i)(a-d) of Chapter 6 of the Act introduces the requirement for “certificates 
of needs”.61 The Act requires every health establishment in South Africa to obtain 
within two years a certificate of needs in order to operate. This is a policy instrument 
designed to regulate the entry of service suppliers based on an assessment of the needs 
of certain areas or populations. However, this measure appears to be in conflict with 
the market access provision of Article XVI.2(a) of the GATS, which prohibits 
“limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the form of ...the 
requirements of an economic needs test”.
The Act contains other provisions, which appear to be in conflict with other GATS 
market access obligations. For instance, the Act gives the Director-General of the 
Department of Health broad discretion to use the certificate of needs to limit the 
growth in health establishments, types of medical procedures, licensing of equipment 
and other services in certain areas until more needy areas or populations are better 
served.62 These provisions appear to conflict with those of Articles XVI.2 (c), (d) and 
(e) of the GATS, which prohibits limitations of different sorts, including quantitative 
restrictions and local incorporation requirements, unless such limitations have 
specifically been listed in a Member’s Schedule.
59 Ibid, p.20.
60 The Act became effective in July 2004.
61 The National Health Act, 2003, is available at: http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2003/a61-03.pdf.
62 S.36(3)(a-m) of the Act list several “needs” that the D-G must take into account before issuing or 
renewing a certificate of need.
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Furthermore, the provisions of the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 
of 2003 and of the draft Charter for the health sector63, which sets ambitious targets 
for black ownership in the health sector, are likely to conflict with the GATS national 
treatment rules. Article XVII (1) of GATS provides that, in its Scheduled or listed 
sectors, “each Member shall accord to service and service suppliers of any other 
Member ...treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like services 
and service suppliers [italics added]. The Panel on EC-Bananas III held that “to the 
extent that entities provide like services, they are like service suppliers”.64
South Africa is also believed to be in breach of some of its obligations under the 
GATS Basic Agreement on Telecommunications (or the Fourth Protocol) and the 
Reference Paper on Regulatory Principles (RP). These are post-Uruguay Round 
GATS commitments undertaken by South Africa. The Fourth Protocol is designed to 
liberalise trade in basic telecommunications. Parties to the Protocol undertook to 
dismantle, over varying time frames, the state monopoly provision of basic 
telecommunications and satellite services, open entry to foreign suppliers, and adopt 
pro-competitive and independent regulation in the sector. The Regulatory Reference 
Paper sets out safeguards for market access and foreign investment in domestic law.
However, although South Africa is a signatory to both the Protocol and the Reference 
Paper, there is “apparent inertia” with respect to its compliance with the obligations 
and principles of these GATS annexes.65 Under the Protocol, South Africa agreed, 
inter alia, to break the monopoly of Telkom, its publicly owned telecommunications 
parastatal, on all facilities and basic voice services by December 2003. However, 
Telkom continues to enjoy monopoly powers over basic public switched 
telecommunications services with licensees and private value-added network services 
(VANS) suppliers being required to use Telkom’s infrastructure.66
63 The draft charter on July 11 2005 set an immediate target of “at least 26% ownership or control by 
black people”, rising to 35% by 2010 and 51% by 2014. See “The Charter of the Public and Private 
Health Sectors of the Republic of South Africa, Draft”, South African Department of Health, July 
2005, para 3.4.1 to 3.4.3.
64 See: Panel Report, European Communities -  Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution o f  
Bananas, WT/DS27/R, adopted 25 September 1997, para. 7.322.
65 Cohen (2001).
66 WTO (2003).
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Articles VIII and IX of the GATS prohibit a state monopoly firm from generally 
abusing its monopoly position or engaging in any anti-competitive practices. 
However, Telkom, which enjoys some exclusivity, under the Telecommunications 
Act, was often accused of anti-competitive behaviour. In 2000, the US threatened a 
WTO action against South Africa following Telkom’s refusal to provide facilities to 
AT&T Global Networks, an American telecommunications company and VANS 
license holder.67
The US claimed that Telkom’s refusal was contrary to South Africa’s WTO 
obligations to provide market access and national treatment for VANS. The USTR 
later withdrew the threat of WTO action as out-of-court negotiations between the
/JO
parties resulted in Telkom agreeing to restore AT&T’s access to its network. South 
Africa was also in breach of the competitive safeguards under the Reference Paper.69 
The foregoing suggests that South Africa has not fully complied with its obligations 
under the GATS. Attention now shifts to other WTO agreements.
Trade Remedy and Safeguard Rules
The policy justification for trade remedies is the discouragement of unfair competition 
in the forms of injurious dumping and subsidies. Article VI. 1 of the GATT 1994 
recognises “dumping” as a practice that “is to be condemned if it causes or threatens 
material injury to an established industry ... or materially retards the establishment of 
a domestic industry”. GATT law thus permits the imposition of an anti-dumping duty 
to offset or prevent such injurious dumping (Article VI:2). The same article permits 
the imposition of a countervailing duty where a subsidy causes or threatens injury 
(Article VI:3)
The WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA), however, interprets, elaborates, and 
provides procedures for the application of Article VI of the GATT with respect to 
anti-dumping measures, while the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (ASC) does the same with respect to subsidies. There are certain provisions
67 The Act granted the Minister of Communications discretionary powers to grant or refuse the grant of 
licences.
68 AT&T Global Network Services SA (Pty) Ltd et al, v Telkom SA Ltd, Unreported Case No 2763409, 
28 October 1999. South Africa telecommunications regime was also placed under review by the USTR.
69 Cohen (2001, p.738).
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that are common to both the ADA and the ASC. These include: conditions of injury 
determination and causality (a causal link), the definition of domestic industry; 
procedures for initiation and conducting investigations; the application of the anti­
dumping and countervailing duties; the condition of a sunset clause; provisions for 
due process and judicial review; as well as the notification requirements.70 There are, 
however, some differences in the detail of both agreements, which relate, inter alia, to 
the nature of obligations that can be imposed or must be satisfied by a member, as 
well as the factors that the investigating authorities should consider in determining
• • 71injury.
Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards (AoS) both make 
provisions for situations where increased imports, rather than dumped or subsidised 
imports, cause dislocation to domestic industries. Unlike the GATT provisions on 
dumping and subsidisation, Article XIX and the AoS concern imports that come in 
legitimately and fairly, but which nevertheless, because they enter in increased
* • 77quantities, cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers. In such 
circumstances, members are permitted, in respect of the affected product, “to suspend 
(their) obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify (their) concession”.73
The Agreement on Safeguards clarifies and strengthens Article XIX by requiring that 
members can only apply a safeguard measure following investigations and due 
process. The Appellate Body in the US-Wheat Gluten case stresses the “central role” 
of the interested parties in the investigation, as required under Article 3 of the
70 The importance o f these requirements has been stressed by WTO panels and the Appellate Body. For 
instance, the Appellate Body held in Thailand -H-Beams that failure to comply with the overarching 
substantive obligation in Article 3:1 of the AD Agreement regarding injury determination will 
undermine the validity of an injury determination (See Appellate Body Report, Thailand -  Anti- 
Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections o f Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland, 
WT/DS122/Ab/R, adopted 5 April 2001). In Guatemala -  Cement II, the Panel emphasised the 
important of due process, and access to information by all interested parties (see Panel Report, 
Guatemala -  Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico, 
WT/DS156/R, adopted 17 November 2000)
71 See Qureshi (2000, p20, note 4).
72 Unlike in the cases of dumping and subsidisation, where the test is “material injury”, the test with 
regard to safeguard measures is “serious injury”. In US-Lamb, the Appellate Body states that “the 
word ‘serious’ connotes a much higher standard of injury than the word ‘material’” (Appellate Body 
Report, United States -  Safeguard Measures on Imports o f Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat and 
Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted 7 June 
2000)
73 Article XIX: 1.
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Agreement.74 Injury and causality must also be established, and the application of 
safeguard measure must conform to certain conditions.75 In addition, members must
nfssatisfy a number of notification, transparency and consultation requirements. What 
is South Africa’s implementation record with respect to the trade remedy and 
safeguard rules?
South Africa’s Anti-Dumping and Subsidy Countervailing Laws and Regulations 
In 1996, South Africa notified the WTO of its existing anti-dumping and subsidy 
countervailing laws and procedures, but admitted that they did not fully reflect the 
rules of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures Agreement.77 South Africa was not a signatory to the 1979 Tokyo Round 
Anti-Dumping and Subsidies codes, and the first time it introduced a definition of 
“dumping” and “subsidised export” in its laws was when it amended the Board of 
Tariff and Trade (BTT) Act in 1992.
In 1994, the National Economic Forum (NEF) recommended that South Africa should 
have national legislation on anti-dumping and countervailing measures, and establish 
an anti-dumping authority.78 This led to further amendment of the 1992 Act in 1995 to 
bring the definition of dumping more in line with Article VI of the GATT and the AD 
Agreement by introducing for the first time a definition of “normal value” and “export 
price”.
However, these were small amendments and several deficiencies remained. The Act 
did not provide for WTO compatible procedural framework or regulation for 
conducting anti-dumping investigations. For example, while Article 6.2 of the AD 
Agreement states that “there shall be no obligation on any party to attend a meeting”, 
s. 12 of the BTT Amendment Act 1995 allowed the authorities to summon a party, 
with possibility of a penalty for non-appearance. The provision of s. 17 of the act on 
confidential information did not conform to that of Article 6.5 of the AD Agreement. 
There was no provision in the law for the prompt termination of investigations in
74 See Appellate Body Report, United States -  Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports o f Wheat 
Gluten from the European Communities, WT/DS166/AB/R, adopted 19 January 2001.
75 See Articles 5 to 8.
76 Article 12.
77 See WTO documents G/ADP/W/395 and G/SCM/W/405 of 4 June 1996.
78 Joubert in Gallagher et al eds (2005)
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circumstances of insufficient evidence. The BTT Act did not provide for review and 
sunset provisions, contrary to the requirements of Article 11.3 of the AD Agreement 
and Article 21 of the SCM Agreement.
Furthermore, there were no provisions requiring the refund of provisional duties in the
Of\
event of no finding of injury. Also, the BTT Act contained no provisions on price 
undertakings , and there was no automatic review or appeal of substantive issues of
07
anti-dumping or countervailing measure investigations. In responses to questions 
posed by several WTO members on the notifications of its trade remedy laws and 
regulations, South Africa indicated that the BTT Act would “be restructured to ensure 
full compliance with the WTO Agreements”.84 Indeed, in 1996, the Trade Minister 
appointed “an international trade lawyer” to lead the restructuring of the anti-dumping 
and countervailing system “in accordance with the requirements of the WTO”.85
The restructuring process, however, took several years, and the legal transformation 
of the trade remedy and safeguard regimes of South Africa did not take place until the 
enactment of the International Trade Administration Act of 2002, the introduction of 
the accompanying Anti-Dumping Regulations in 2003, the Safeguards Regulations of 
2004, and the amendment of the Customs and Excise Act of 1964. These laws and 
regulations, South Africa’s main trade legislation, were notified to the WTO in 
January 2004.86
There are two possible approaches to implementing the WTO trade remedies 
agreements. A member could simply incorporate through an enabling domestic 
legislation the relevant provisions of the agreements or, alternatively, draft the 
legislation de novo}1 Furthermore, a member would need to decide whether or not to
79 Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement and Article 11.9 of the SCM Agreement.
80 Article 10.4 of the AD Agreement and Article 20.4 o f the SCM Agreement.
81 Article 8.2, 8.4 and 8.5 of the AD Agreement and Article 18.2, 18.4 and 18.5 of the SCM Agreement.
82 Article 13 of AD Agreement and Article 23 of the SCM Agreement.
83 Questions were posed by Argentina, Australia, the European Community, Hong Kong, India and the 
United States.
84 See WTO documents G/ADP/W/395 and G/SCM/W/405 of 4 June 1996.
85 See Government Gazette of 15 March 1996.
86 See WTO documents G/ADP/N/l/ZAF/2 and G/SCM/N/ZAF/2 of 20 January 2004.
87 Qureshi (2000). As the author points out, however, while drafting legislation afresh arguably allows 
the adaptation of the ADA to national circumstances and policy inculcation, “the range of national 
policy options is considerably limited by the ADA” (p.20). A national implementing legislation that
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combine in a single legislation both the anti-dumping and countervailing measures. 
With respect to these issues, South Africa adopted a de novo approach, and combined 
both antidumping and countervailing measures in a single legislation.89
The South African authorities claim that the ADA was used as a model for drafting 
the Anti-Dumping Regulations, and that the International Trade Administration 
Commission (ITAC) looked at the anti-dumping regimes of the EU, the US, New 
Zealand and Australia as examples in drafting the regulations, in addition to receiving 
inputs from several lawyers from these countries, as well as from local lawyers and 
academics.90 However, to what extent do the provisions of these domestic 
implementing laws conform to the provisions of the relevant WTO agreements?
As noted earlier, the ITAA is the Main Act; however, detailed provisions on the 
operation of the anti-dumping regime are to be found in the Anti-Dumping 
Regulations of 2003. Chapter 4, sections 26 to 47, of the Main Act contains 
provisions on investigations, evaluation and adjudication procedures for applications 
by firms for the imposition of anti-dumping, countervailing or safeguard duties, or for 
the imposition of safeguard measures other than a customs duty. The International 
Trade Administration Commission (ITAC), established under the Act, is required to 
“evaluate the merits” of every application91 and make recommendation to the Tariff 
Board.92
does not conform to the ADA would amount to a brief of the compliance obligation of the WTO 
Agreement.
88 Ibid.
89 However, the Anti-Dumping Regulations of 2003, which cover investigations and related issues, deal 
only with anti-dumping measures, with no separate references to countervailing measures. This 
integrationist approach does not appear to give adequate attention to many of the differences between 
the two agreements, such as those relating to the nature of evidence required (Art. 5.2 of ADA and Art 
11.2 of ASC), different rules for the application and maximum duration of provisional measures (art 7 
ADA and art 17 ASC), differences in factors to be considered in examining the impact on domestic 
industry (art 15.4 ASC and art. 3.4 ADA), different rules on retroactive application (art. 20 ASC and 
art. 10 ADA). These differences are likely to be taken into account in the interpretation of the 
agreements (see Qureshi, 2000).
90 Joubert (2005), citing interview with Professor Colin McCarthy, acting head of ITAC.
91 Section 2.
92 Institutionally, ITAC is responsible for administering the entire trade remedies system. Unlike the 
old BTT, ITAC is independent of the Department of Trade and Industry, and reports directly to the 
Minister.
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With respect to the consideration of alleged dumping and subsidised exports, section 
32 provides definitions of terms that are broadly consistent with those provided in the 
AD and SCM agreements. The definition of domestic industry reflects the fact that 
South Africa is part of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU); thus a “SACU 
industry” is the equivalent of a domestic industry.
Section 33 establishes the right of informants to claim confidentiality and a specific 
provision on breach of confidence is contained in section 50. Final determination as 
to whether any information is confidential lies to the Supreme Court of Appeal.94 The 
role given to the courts in the anti-dumping and countervailing system is one of the 
key features of the new legal framework. Section 46 provides that any party may 
apply to a High Court for a review of a determination, recommendation or decision, 
while section 47 provides that appeals against a High Court decision in terms of 
section 46 lies to the Supreme Court of Appeal or the Constitutional Court.
The Customs and Excise Act, as amended, compliments the ITAA. Chapter VI 
(sections 55-57A) deals with anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard duties. Such 
duties can only be imposed by the Minister of Finance, through the Commissioner of 
Customs, at the request of the Minister of Trade and Industry under the provisions of 
the ITAA.95 Far more detailed provisions on the administration of the anti-dumping 
system are, however, contained in the Anti-Dumping Regulations.
The Regulations contain 68 sections, and deal with virtually all the relevant rules in 
the AD agreement and many of the provisions of this agreement are inserted almost 
verbatim in the Regulations. More importantly, the discrepancies in the BTT Act have 
largely been addressed. Thus, for example, with respect to summoning of parties, 
section 6.10 now provides that “(t)here shall be no obligation on any party to attend a 
meeting, and failure to do so shall not be prejudicial to that party’s case”.96
93 See Part A (1) of the Regulations. This conforms to the provision of Article 4.3 of the ADA and 
Article 16.4 of the ASC, both of which allow industries in a customs union to be taken as a domestic 
industry.
94 Section 36.3
95 Section 56 of the Customs and Excise Act.
96 This repeats verbatim the provision of Article 6.2 of the A-D Agreement
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Confidential information is protected, provided such information is so indicated, and 
provided a non-confidential version is made available.97
In the circumstances of insufficient evidence, the investigating authority is required to 
terminate investigations, either initiated ex officio or upon a written application by an 
industry. The substantive obligations regarding the determination of injury and 
causality, as set out in the AD agreement, are also reflected in the Regulations. For 
instance, section 14 states that “a determination of threat of material injury shall be
QQ
based on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility”. 
Furthermore, the Regulations, unlike the BTT Act, now make explicit provisions for a 
sunset clause99, interim and sunset reviews100, price undertakings101, as well as 
judicial reviews102 and refunds.103
With respect to the choice between imposing a full or lesser duty as provided for in 
Article 9 of the ADA, South Africa adopts the lesser duty rule, provided both the 
corresponding importer and exporter have cooperated fully with the Commission.104 
The ADA also offers members a choice between a prospective and retrospective duty 
assessment under certain circumstances.105 South Africa opts for the retrospective 
approach. Section 32(2) of the Regulations allows the authorities to impose definitive 
anti-dumping duties with retroactive effect.106
97 This is in accordance with Article 6.5.1 of the A-D Agreement, which states that “(t)he authorities 
shall require interested parties providing confidential information to furnish non-confidential 
summaries thereof’.
98 This section inserts verbatim the provisions of Article 3.7 of the A-D Agreement. Sections 13 to 16 
of the Regulations deal with the determination of injury and causality.
99 Section 38 provides that definitive anti-dumping duties will remain in place for a period of five 
years.
100 Sections 41 and 53
101 Section 39
102 Section 64. Paragraph of 3 of section 64 also specifically states that “(a)ny Commission decision 
may be varied to give effect to a ruling of a Dispute Panel or the Appellate Body under the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism”, which further suggests that the domestic legal reform is undertaken 
with compliance with WTO law in focus.
103 Section 65 of the Regulations
104 Section 17 of the Regulations
105 See Article 9 of the ADA allows retroactive assessment in the case of a violation of an undertaking. 
Article 10.2 also allows definitive anti-dumping duties to be levied retroactively to substitute for 
provisional measures, where a final determination of injury is made.
06 See also s. 57A of the Customs and Excise act, 1964, as amended.
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The above rather comprehensive legal changes broadly conform to the provisions of 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement. There are few areas of ambiguities or flexibilities in 
the agreement. Some of the obligations are qualified with the phrase “whenever 
practicable”, a sort of constructive ambiguity, providing for institutional flexibilities. 
South Africa’s anti-dumping regulations reflect these flexibilities. For instance, with 
respect to the requirement to provide relevant information or documentation to all 
interested parties, particularly, exporters, the Regulations appear to make this 
dependent on “when practicable”.107
However, there are specific areas where compliance is not clear. Article 6.2 of the AD 
Agreement provides that all interested parties must have a full opportunity for the 
defence of their interests, and, in particular, requires the authorities to provide, on 
request, opportunities for all interested parties to meet those parties with adverse 
interests or to present information orally. However, the anti-dumping regulations 
allow the Commission to refuse a request for an oral hearing or for an adverse party
i nsmeeting if granting such requests may result in undue delays.
Another possible area of discrepancy in the implementing regulations is with respect 
to the treatment of countervailing measures. Although the ITAA allows the authorities 
to impose countervailing duties, there are no specific provisions in the Regulations 
dealing with the investigative process with respect to countervailing measures. This is 
important given that, as stated earlier, there are some differences in the detail of the 
ADA and SCM. For instance, an application for a countervailing measure 
investigation must include “sufficient evidence” of the existence of a subsidy, injury 
and causality.109 Also, there is a requirement for pre-initiation consultations.110
Safeguard Measures
With respect to safeguards, the Safeguard Regulations of 2004 cover procedures for 
investigation and application of safeguard measures. These procedures are broadly in
107 Section 28.4 states that “(a)ll interested parties shall be deemed to have received notice of the 
investigation once it has been duly initiated (i.e. published in the Government Gazette”. Section 28.5 
provides that all relevant documentation would be made available “unless the number of interested 
parties makes it impracticable”.
08 Sections 5 and 6.
109 Art. 11.2 SCM contra Art. 5.2 ADA
110 Article 13 SCM.
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conformity with the provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards (AoS), particularly 
with respect to determination of injury, causality, application, and duration. The 
power of the Commission to refuse a request for oral hearing111 may, however, limit 
the role of the interested parties in the investigation.
Article 3 of the AoS requires that the investigations must include “public hearings or 
other appropriate means” for the interested parties to present evidence and their 
views, The Appellate Body in US-Wheat Gluten112 affirms this by stating that the 
interested parties must play a central role in the investigation and should be a 
primary source of information for the competent authority. It does not appear from the 
Regulations that such centrality is accorded to interested parties.
South Africa’s trade remedies laws and regulations were reviewed at the Committee
on Anti-Dumping Practices, with questions posed by the EC, the US, Venezuela and
Turkey on various aspects of the legislation and regulations. South Africa responded
1 1 1
with explanations addressing the concerns expressed by these countries. The 
interest shown by some WTO members in South Africa’s trade remedy regime is not 
surprising given its reputation as one of the leading initiators of anti-dumping 
actions.114 Indeed, South Africa has been a subject of two requests for consultations, 
regarding its antidumping practices.115
In sum, South Africa’s record of implementing the WTO agreements examined in this 
chapter shows that although WTO law has largely shaped government policies, South 
Africa’s compliance has been partial or imcomplete. But what is the implementation 
experience of Nigeria? This is the focus of the next part of this chapter.
111 Section 5.1 of the Safeguard Regulations.
112 Appellate Body Report, United States -  Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports o f Wheat Gluten 
from the European Communities, WT/DS166/AB/R, adopted 19 January 2001.
113 For detailed questions and answers during the review, see WTO documents: G/ADP/Q1/ZAF/1-5.
114 For instance, as o f 2004, South Africa was the fifth biggest user of antidumping measures after 
India, the US, the EC, and Argentina (see WTO, 2005). 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/adp e/adp statab7 e.xlsl.
115 See South Africa -  Anti-Dumping Duties on Certain Pharmaceutical Products from India, Request 
for Consultation by India, WT/DS168/1, April 1 1999, and South Africa -  Definitive Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Blanketing from Turkey, Request for Consultations by Turkey, WT/DS288/1, April 9 
2003. In both cases, no panel was established and no settlement was notified.
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Nigeria’s Implementation Experience 
Non-Tariff Measures
As with the part on South Africa above, this section focuses on the following non- 
tariff measures: quantitative restrictions and import licensing and prohibitions; state 
trading; sanitary measures and technical regulations; investment measures; and trade • 
in services. To what extent has Nigeria complied with these WTO obligations?
Quantitative restrictions and import licensing
From the mid-1970s onwards, Nigeria’s main trade policy instruments shifted 
markedly away from tariffs to quantitative import restrictions, particularly import 
prohibitions and import licensing.116 Nigeria continues to apply import prohibitions to
117 118protect domestic industries ; to achieve economic development objectives ; and 
for security, health, or moral concerns. Nigeria is among a few developing countries 
that have invoked article XVIII:B (for balance of payments reasons) since their 
accession to the GATT.119 However, in the BOP Consultation with Nigeria in 
February 1996, the Committee on BOP Restrictions declared Nigeria’s import 
restrictions to be inconsistent with WTO rules.120
191Although Nigeria was requested to remove the restrictions “without further delays” , 
it merely notified the Committee on BOP Restriction in February 1998 of a “five-year 
time schedule” for their elimination.122 In another consultation in April 1998, the 
Committee told Nigeria that it was in breach of its WTO obligations as long as it
19^maintained import restrictions. Nigeria responded with another notification in
116 Oyejide et al (2005).
117 For instance, the almost permanent ban on the importation of textile and clothing since the late 
1970s can be explained primarily in terms of protecting local industries (Oyejide et al, 2005). In late 
2004, Nigeria banned imports of cocoa powder and cake in order to encourage the use of locally 
processed cocoa (IMF, 2005). Indeed, most import bans are introduced at the behest of local 
manufacturing interests, and, therefore, serve defensive protectionist purposes.
118 The import prohibition of gypsum, kaolin, bentonites and barites reflects attempt to promote local 
sourcing o f raw materials (Oyejide et al, 2005). Also, to encourage rice production, Nigeria introduced 
an import ban on rice starting in January 2004 and introduced an import ban on recharge cards in order 
to ensure a larger domestic share of value added in the booming cellular phone industry (IMF, 2005).
119 Others include Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia (see Roessler in Krueger ed. 1998).
120 WTO document WT/BOP/R/13
121 WTO document WT/BOP/R/13
122 Ibid
123 See WTO document WT/BOP/N/32.
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December 1998, stating that the proposed time schedule had been revised from five to
i 124three years.
In that notification, Nigeria averred that “(t)he revised three-year time schedule is a 
sign of flexibility and a demonstration of the Government’s commitment to fulfil
19^Nigeria’s obligations in the WTO”. Nigeria also submitted to the General Council a 
schedule for the elimination of restrictive trade measures maintained for BOP
1 OA 197reasons , and later notified the Committee of the removal of these measures.
While the foregoing might suggest that sustained pressure by WTO institutions, such 
as the councils and committees, could help induce compliance, it also demonstrates 
the tension that could be produced between international obligations and domestic 
policy objectives.128 Nigeria’s response did not amount to full compliance, because, 
although it no longer imposed import restrictions for BOP reasons129, import bans are 
still widely used to protect domestic industries.
According to the WTO, “since 1998, there has been a 10-fold increase in products 
covered by import bans”.130 Indeed, the Nigerian President told the media in 2003: 
“we are certainly going to ban more products. The idea is to protect our local
191industries and boost our manufacturing capacity substantially”. However, according 
to the EU, “Nigeria’s import ban was not compatible with, and indeed, forbidden by, 
WTO rules”.132
124 See WTO document WT/BOP/N/44 of 10 March 1999
125 Ibid.
126 WTO document, WT/BOP/N/45, 11 March 1999.
127 WTO document WT/TPR/S/147.
128 The pressure on Nigeria to remove the import restrictions under Article XVIILB of the GATT was 
particularly strong. The BOP Committee suspended consultations four times in a two-year period to 
allow Nigeria to bring its measures into conformity with WTO rules. The EC indicated that it gave 
“high priority to the correct application of the WTO BOP provisions”, adding that “the full respect of 
GATT Articles XII and XVIII and the UR Understanding is of great importance”, and urged Nigeria to 
“bring this element of its trade policy into conformity with WTO rules” (WTO document 
WT/TPR/M/39/Add.l).
129 This is difficult to establish. For instance, although Nigeria notified the WTO in 1999 that certain 
import bans imposed for BOP reasons would be lifted in 2000, the bans were still in effect as of end- 
2004 (IMF, 2005). Oyejide et al (2005) argue that Nigeria’s proposal to remove all import prohibitions 
was undermined by the upsurge in the use of import prohibitions during 2001-2004. Nigeria’s failure to 
make regular notifications makes its trade regime particularly opaque.
130 WTO document, WT/TPR/M/147 of 14 June 2005.
131 The Guardian newspaper, Nigeria, December 18, 2003.
132 Claude Maerten, Guardian newspaper, 21 July 2001, pp 1-3.
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With respect to import licensing, Nigeria abolished the general import licensing 
system in 1986, as part of the structural adjustment programme. Both in its 
notifications133 to the WTO and its replies to the questionnaire134 on import licensing 
procedures, Nigeria stated that it no longer maintained import licensing procedures as 
a general trade policy instrument. However, specific licensing requirements remain in 
place for a number of restricted products. Nigeria has, however, made no notifications
♦ nssince 1998, although the questionnaire is required to be completed annually . This is 
a clear violation of its procedural obligations under the agreement.
State Trading Enterprises
As part of its structural adjustment programme (SAP), launched in 1986, Nigeria 
abolished commodity marketing boards, privatised some public enterprises, and put 
others on a commercial footing. Consequently, in February 1998, Nigeria notified the 
Working Party on State Trading Enterprises that it “no longer maintains any State 
Trading Entity”.136 In November 2002, Nigeria notified the WTO again, stating that it 
did not maintain any STEs and that “the situation has not changed since its new and 
full notification was made in 1998”.137 No counter-notification has been made by any 
WTO member, as is possible under Paragraph 4 of the Understanding.
There are 1,500 state-owned enterprises in Nigeria, accounting for about 50 percent of 
GDP. The share of public consumption in GDP increased from 10% in 1997 to almost
30% in 2003, whereas the share of private consumption declined from 70% to around
1^0
40%. Although state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are not prohibited under Article 
XVII of the GATT and the STE Understanding, Nigeria would arguably be in breach 
of WTO rules if any of the state-owned enterprises were to enjoy privileges, which 
enable them to “influence through their purchase or sales the level or direction of 
imports or exports”.139
133 See, for example, WTO documents G/LIC/N/2/NGA/1 of 25 July 1996 and G/LIC/N/3/NGA/2 of 
18 February 1998.
134 WTO documents G/LIC/N/3/NGA/1 of 25 July 1996
135 Article 7 of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures states: “Members undertake to complete 
the annual questionnaire on import licensing procedures promptly and in full”
136 See WTO document G/STR/N/3/NGA of 19 February 1998.
137 See WTO document G/STR/N/8/NGA of 19 November 2002.
138 WTO (2005)
139 Paragraph lo f  the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII.
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The Panel on Korea -  Various Measures on Beef made it clear that “a conclusion that 
a decision to purchase or sell was not based on a ‘commercial considerations’, would 
suffice to show a violation of Article XVII”.140 Given that Nigeria uses differential 
exchange rates to value “official” and private sector imports, and some of the SOEs 
benefit from this preferential treatment141, it is argued that Nigeria is not in full 
compliance with the provisions of Article XVII of the GATT.
Sanitary Measures and Technical Regulations
Nigeria actively controls and regulates food, drugs, cosmetics etc. The Standards 
Organisation of Nigeria (SON) and the National Agency for Food and Drug 
Administration and Control (NAFDAC) are responsible for standard setting, control 
and regulation. Nigeria’s rules concerning sanitary and phytosanitary standards are 
well-defined.142 However, according to the WTO, “in the absence of established 
Nigerian standards, international standards are adopted, such as those set by the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission”.143
The preference for “established Nigerian standards” over available international 
standards is arguably inconsistent with the harmonisation obligations.144 Nigeria’s 
trading partners have also claimed that NAFDAC “has occasionally challenged 
legitimate food imports” as a result of “an occasionally heavy-handed or arbitrary 
approach to regulatory enforcement”.145 Furthermore, despite the prevalence of SPS 
regulations, Nigeria has made no notification under the SPS Agreement since 1998. 
The transparency of SPS regulations is stressed in Annex B of the SPS Agreement, 
which sets out the notification obligations. The failure to notify the SPS measures is a 
clear violation of the SPS transparency obligations.
140 Panel Report, Korea -  Measures Affecting Imports o f Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, 
WT/DS161/R, WT/DS169/R, adopted 10 January 2001, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, 
WT/DS161/AB/R.
141 Trade Policy Review of Nigeria, WTO (1998)
142 USTR (2005).
143 WTO (2005)
144 Developing countries are not granted exemption from the harmonisation obligations, which is why 
they are encouraged to participate actively in the relevant international standardising organisations. The 
developed countries are enjoined to assist them in this regard (Article 10.4 of the SPS Agreement). 
However, a developing country may, upon request, be granted “specified, time limited exceptions from 
the SPS obligations by the SPS Committee (Article 10.3).
145 USTR (2005). Nigeria’s agricultural exports have also been rejected in foreign markets due to 
failure to meet certain SPS requirements. Several export consignments were refused between July 2001 
and May 2002 (WTO, 2005).
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With respect to the TBT Agreement, Nigeria has established a wide range of 
standards, covering several products. All the standards and technical regulations are 
mandatory. Nigeria suspended its membership of the International Standardisation 
Organisation (ISO) in the 1980s and early 1990s, but is currently a member of the 
organisation. The Standards Organisation of Nigeria (SON) is the sole statutory body 
responsible for standardising and regulating the quality of all products in Nigeria.
In the absence of established Nigerian standards, international standards, set by ISO 
and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) are adopted. The TBT 
Agreement aims to allow the preservation of indigenous technology and technologies 
appropriate to developing countries’ development needs. Thus, Article 12.4 provides 
that developing country members “should not be expected to use international 
standards as a basis for their technical regulations or standards, including test 
methods, which are not appropriate to their development, financial and trade needs”.
However, this flexibility does not seem to exempt developing countries from the 
general obligation not to use standards for protectionist purposes, and may be 
interpreted narrowly by a WTO panel or the Appellate Body.146 In this regard, the 
tendency to give preference to “Nigerian established standards” over international 
standards could be found to be inconsistent with the provision of Article 2.4 of the 
TBT agreement.147 With respect to the transparency requirements of the TBT 
Agreement, Nigeria has made no notification since 1998.
Investment Measures
In 1996, pursuant to Article 5.1 of the TRIMs Agreement, Nigeria notified the 
Committee on TRIMs that it had no local content laws or regulations, but added that 
“there exist some incentives for the use of local raw materials, on a non- 
discriminatory basis, under the Industrial Policy of Nigeria”.149 No further notification 
has been made in this regard since 1996. However, local-content requirements have
146 Roessler in Krueger ed (1998)
147 See the Appellate Body ruling in the EC-Sardines case.
148 In 1996, Nigeria notified the WTO of the process of preparation and adoption of technical 
regulations and standards, as well as details of its enquiry point (see WTO document G/TBT/2/Add.20 
o f 2 August 1996.
149 See WTO document G/TRIMS/N/NGA/1 of 31 July 1996.
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assumed increasing role in Nigeria’s industrial policy.150 For instance, a tax credit of 
20% is granted for five years to industries that use certain minimum level of local raw 
material.151 Foreign oil companies are under “significant pressure” to increase
1 Oprocurement from indigenous firms. The government also requires local bread 
producers to use a flour mix containing 10% cassava. Local-content or sourcing 
conditions are an integral part of Nigeria’s industrial policy framework. This appears 
to place Nigeria in conflict with some of the TRIMs obligations.
Trade in Services
Nigeria made scheduled commitments in 32 out of the 155 sub-sectors recognised by 
the WTO.153 The sectors are financial services (banking and other financial services), 
telecommunications services, tourism and travel services, and transport services. In 
the post-Uruguay Round financial services negotiations, Nigeria made additional 
commitments covering insurance services and transactions in securities. It also signed 
the Fifth Protocol to the GATS. Telecommunications and financial services have, 
indeed, been the subject of ambitious liberalisation commitments under the GATS.154
However, with respect to telecommunications, the National Carrier, NITEL, has 
monopoly of all public switched and international services, and has the responsibility 
for network infrastructure expansion. The National Insurance Corporation of Nigeria 
(NICON) also enjoys monopoly over the insurance of government properties. Nigeria 
schedule provides that “Guarantees and commitments are subject to regulations,”155 
and several of the commitments are unbound. Clearly, with commitments in 32 out of 
possible 155 services sub-sectors156, Nigeria’s services sector, like its industrial and 
agricultural sectors, is highly protected. Foreign involvement in Nigeria’s services
150 To be sure, developing countries generally have tended to use performance requirements in their 
economic policy making, which is why many of these countries, led by India and including Nigeria, 
opposed the extension of GATT disciplines to investment measures during the Uruguay Round. Indeed, 
a significant number of developing country members of the WTO did not notify their TRIMs- 
inconsistent measures within the transition period, and many still maintained local content and trade 
balancing requirements after this period (see Footer, 2001 at p. 80).
151 The minimum levels of local raw materials are, by sector: agric-allied (70%); engineering (60%); 
chemicals (60%); and petrochemicals (70%).
152 USTR (2005).
153 In contrast, South Africa has 91 GATS services sector with commitments (WTO, 2005).
154 See WTO document GATS/SC/65/Suppl.l of 26 February 1998 for Nigeria’s Schedule of 
Commitments.
155 Ibid.
156 This compares less favourably to South Africa, which made commitments in 91 sub-sectors.
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sector is also very limited. As a result, compliance with the GATS obligations has not 
been an important issue.
Trade Remedy and Safeguard Rules
Nigeria’s Anti-Dumping and Subsidy Countervailing Rules and Regulations 
Under the Nigerian Customs and Excise Management Act and the Customs Duties 
(Dumped and Subsidised Goods) Act of 1958, the power to impose quantitative 
restrictive trade measures or vary duties on imports is vested in the President. By 
giving the President unfettered powers to impose trade remedy and safeguard 
measures, these laws are inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the WTO 
Agreements, which, inter alia, provide for investigative procedures, the establishment 
of injury and causality, sunset clauses, and judicial review.
At its Trade Policy Review in 1998, Nigeria admitted that its trade remedy laws were 
inconsistent with WTO rules but also pointed out that it did not have the institutional 
and regulatory capacity to investigate anti-dumping issues.157 As a result, Nigeria has 
not imposed any anti-dumping duty since the last one was introduced in 1998. 
However, all the previous anti-dumping duties on certain products were incorporated 
into the customs duty on these products and applied on an MFN basis. Given that 
these previous anti-dumping duties were imposed in the first place without 
investigations into dumping, injury and their causal relations, incorporating them into 
customs duty amounted to a violation of Nigeria’s WTO obligations.159
Safeguard Measures
Although Nigeria has not applied any trade remedy measure since 1998, it has 
continued to resort to the use of safeguard measures, even though it has no formal 
legislative procedures on safeguard actions. Article 11 of the AoS provides that a 
Member must not take or seek any emergency action on imports of particular products 
as set forth in Article XIX of GATT 1994, unless such action conforms to the
157 See WTO document WT/TPR/M/39/Add.l, 12 November 1998.
158 This issue was taken up by some WTO members during Nigeria’s Trade Policy Review meeting. Its 
response was that this was done as a general review of its tariff structure and that there was “no 
expressed purpose to incorporate anti-dumping duties into the customs duty” (Ibid).
159 Article 10.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides for a refund in the event of a finding of no 
injury, while Article 11 provides for a sunset clause under which an anti-dumping duty should be 
terminated after five years unless dumping and injury are likely to continue or recur.
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provisions of the Agreement. The WTO members with substantial export interests in 
Nigeria, notably the EU160 and the US161, have constantly challenged the WTO 
compatibility of Nigeria’s use of import prohibitions for safeguard reasons.
For instance, several communications were exchanged between Nigeria and the 
United States on this issue, with the latter questioning Nigeria’s adoption of safeguard
1 fOmeasures in the absence of a formal WTO-compatible legislative framework. At its 
Trade Policy Review in 1998, Nigeria told the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) 
that no new safeguard measures would be taken “until an appropriate domestic 
legislation is enacted”.163 Notwithstanding this promise, in 2004, Nigeria imposed 
import bans on over 40 products mainly for safeguard reasons.164
Nigeria’s traditional practice of banning imports to protect domestic industries has 
only marginally been tempered by its WTO obligations, and has, indeed, become 
more prevalent in recent years, with major expansions in the list of prohibited 
products taking place in 2001, 2003, and 2004.165 At its Trade Policy Review in June 
2005, Nigeria told the TPRB that there were draft Bills, “prepared with assistance 
from relevant international organisations”, and which “have fully taken into account 
Nigeria’s rights and obligations in the WTO”.166 However, these bills have gestated 
for several years, since 2001, with no apparent urgency to pass them into law.
In sum, Nigeria’s record of implementing its WTO obligations, as examined above, is 
evidently very poor. There is a remarkable divergence between Nigeria’s policy
160 The EU accounted for 33% of Nigeria’s imports in 2003. Nigeria’s imports from the EU in 2003 
consisted mainly of embroidered textile fabrics (28.4%); frozen fish (17.2%); milk and cream products 
(9.5%); tobacco and tobacco products (5.6%); malt extract and food preparations (4.5%); and 
electricity generating sets and rotary converters (4.0%).
161 The US accounted for 16% of Nigeria’s imports in 2003. Nigeria’s main imports from the US in 
2003 consisted mainly of agricultural products (32.6%), transportation equipment (28.7%), electronic 
products (13.4%), machinery (9.5%0, and chemical and related products (6%).
62 See, for example, WTO document G/SG/Q2/NGA/3 of 8 April 1998, which contains a summary of 
the communications between the US and Nigeria on the latter’s safeguard actions.
163 See WTO documents G/SG/Q2/NGA/4, 10 November 1998 and WT/TPR/M/39/Add. 1, 12 
November 1998.
164 WTO (2005); IMF (2005).
165 Ibid. Nigeria uses import prohibitions rather than price-based measures, because import bans are 
considered to be administratively easier to monitor, since the presence of banned products on local 
markets is, in principle, sufficient for enforcement (Oyejide et al, 2005).
166 See WTO document, WT/TPR/M/147 of 14 June 2005. There is little evidence that Nigeria’s 
bureaucrats and legislators attach any priority to passing the bills into law.
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1 f k lstatements and actions. Promises made during its 1998 Trade Policy Review were 
not kept, and quotas, import bans and licensing restrictions have, in fact, increased 
since 1998, in violation of WTO law. Furthermore, several notifications remain 
outstanding since that year. This can only suggest that WTO law is having only 
marginal impact on Nigeria’s trade governance.
Table 1: Trade remedy and NTM rules: Compliance records of South Africa and Nigeria
South Africa Nigeria
Non-T ariff Measures
•  Quantitative restrictions 
and import licensing
Laws largely conform but ministers 
have wide discretionary powers
QRs still widely used for BOP and 
other reasons
• State trading Full compliance. STEs abolished No STEs, but SOEs still enjoy 
preferential treatment
•  SPS and TBT Largely compatible Largely compatible, but tendency to 
prefer domestic standards to 
available international standards
• TRIMs Incomplete compliance: still 
imposes local content requirements
Incompatible: wide use local 
content requirements
• GATS Concerns about compliance: various 
domestic laws appear to breach 
market access and national 
treatment obligations
Largely irrelevant because of 
insignificant commitments
Trade Remedies
• Anti-dumping agreement
• Agreement on subsidies
Several laws enacted or revised to 
bring trade remedy regime into 
compliance, but due process 
provisions of the WTO agreements 
may not be strictly adhered to
No WTO-compatible trade 
remedies rules to date
Safeguards
• The Agreement on 
safeguards
Safeguard regulations broadly in 
conformity, but due process 
obligations may not fully complied 
with
No WTO-compatible safeguards 
law or regulation, but Nigeria 
widely and frequently imposes 
safeguard measures
Procedural Obligations
•  Notifications Notifications largely made, but 
some still outstanding
Most notifications last made in 
1998. Several still outstanding.
Conclusion
This chapter concludes the case studies on the implementation of WTO obligations by 
South Africa and Nigeria. Its main purpose was to complement the earlier more 
detailed case studies. The chapter shows a consistent pattern of behaviour by both 
countries. For instance, considering the raft of legislation introduced to date by South 
Africa, it is clear that the country has made significant efforts to comply with WTO 
rules on non-tariff measures and trade remedies. Yet, its compliance record is mixed. 
This is particularly so with respect to the GATS, where there is evidence of non- 
compliance or where compliance is not clear. This mixed picture, characterised by
167 Nigeria’s trade policy is reviewed by the WTO every seven years.
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substantial yet incomplete compliance, is consistent with the findings in the earlier 
more detailed case studies on the customs valuation and TRIPS agreements.
This chapter also confirms the earlier trends established in the case of Nigeria. Ten 
years since WTO law entered into force, Nigeria has introduced no WTO compatible 
trade remedy and safeguard laws and regulations. However, it continues increasingly 
to introduce import bans for safeguard reasons. Nigeria is also in breach of the 
transparency obligations, having made no notification since 1998. Both in terms of 
substantive and procedural obligations, Nigeria’s compliance record is significantly 
poor across all the WTO agreements examined in this chapter and in the previous case 
studies. There is thus a consistent pattern of substantial non-compliance.
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 have now examined the implementation and compliance records 
of South Africa and Nigeria in different areas of WTO obligations. The remaining 
task now is to explain the behaviours of these countries in the light of their underlying 
motivations and determinants. This explanatory task is taken up in the next chapter.
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PART III: EXPLANATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER 7
Explaining the Compliance Behaviour of South Africa and Nigeria
At the heart of this thesis are two empirical questions: how and to what extent have 
South Africa and Nigeria implemented their WTO treaty obligations to date, and what 
factors have influenced their behaviour? The first question was explored extensively 
through the case studies in chapters 4, 5 and 6, which, respectively, examined the 
implementation by these countries of the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement, the 
TRIPS Agreement, and WTO rules on trade remedies and non-tariff measures. These 
were essentially legal analyses, which focused on the formal implementation of these 
agreements by South Africa and Nigeria, as well as on the conformity of the national 
implementing legislation with the substantive obligations of the various agreements.
The focus of the present chapter is an attempt to answer the second question, by using 
socio-legal analysis systematically to explain the compliance behaviour of the two 
countries. The chapter begins with a brief summary of the findings of the case studies. 
Section 2 briefly revisits the theoretical argument and explanatory theory. Section 3 
then attempts to explain the experiences of these countries in the light of the 
explanatory variables developed in chapter 2 and the indicators discussed in chapter 3 
about the social, economic, political and institutional contexts of trade governance in 
the two countries. As mentioned previously, both chapters 2 and 3 provide an 
essential backdrop and context for a proper understanding of the analysis and 
explanations in the present chapter. Section 4 summarises and concludes.
Impact of WTO law on Trade Governance: A Brief Overview of the Findings
Tables 1 and 2 show broadly the compliance records of South Africa and Nigeria with 
respect to the WTO agreements examined in this thesis. The findings show that South 
Africa has introduced a raft of new and amended laws since 1997 to bring its trade 
and trade-related regimes into compliance with WTO obligations. This demonstrates 
the seriousness with which South Africa has approached WTO implementation
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efforts, and suggests, prima facie, that WTO law has had significant impact on trade 
law reforms in South Africa.
Table 1: Compliance with WTO trade and customs rules
SOUTH AFRICA NIGERIA
Agreement Pre-WTO Post-WTO Pre-WTO Post-WTO
Import Licensing • I&ECA, 1963 • ITAA, 2002 • CEMA, 1990 X
Anti-Dumping • BTT, 1992
• C&EA, 1964
• ITAA,2002
• A-DR, 2003
• C&EA, 2003
• CEMA, 1990
• CD(D&SG), 1958
X
Subsidies and 
countervailing 
Measures
• BTT, 1992
• C&EA, 1964
• ITAA, 2002
• A-DR,2003
• C&EA, 2003
• CEMA, 1990
• CD(D&SG), 1958
X
Safeguards • BTT, 1992 • ITAC, 2002 • CEMA, 1990
• CD(D&SG),1958
X
Customs
Valuation
• C&EA, 1964
• C&E Rules
• C&EA (a)
• C&E R (a)
• VG, 2003
• CEMA, 1990
• CD(D&SG), 1958
• PSI Decree, 1996
C&EMAA,
2003
(not yet in 
force).
Keys: I&ECA: Import & Export Control Act; BTT: Board of Tariff & Trade Act; C&EA: Customs and Excise 
Act; ITAC: International Trade Administration Act; A-DR: Anti-Dumping Regulations; VG: Valuation Guide; 
CEMA: Customs & Excise management Act; CD(D&SG): Customs Duties (Dumped & Subsidised Goods) Act; 
PSI: Pre-shipment Inspection Decree; C&EMAA: Customs & Excise Management (Amendment) Act.
Table 2: Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement
SOUTH AFRICA NIGERIA
IP Area Pre-TRIPS Post-TRIPS Pre-TRIPS Post-TRIPS
Copyright • CA, 1979
• PPA, 1967
• IPLAA, 1997
• CAA, 2002
• PPAA, 2002
• CA, 1990 • CAD, 
1990
Trademarks • TA, 1993 • IPLAA, 1997 • TA, 1990 X
Geographical
Indications
• TA, 1993
• MMA, 1941
• LPA, 1989
X • TA, 1990 
(collective mark)
Industrial Designs • DA, 1993 • IPLAA, 1997 • P&DA, 1990 X
Patents • PA, 1978
• PBRA, 
1976
• IPLAA, 1997
• PBRAA, 1996
• M&RSA, 2002
• P&DA, 1990
Layout-Designs • DA, 1993 • IPLAA, 1997 X X
Undisclosed
Information
• 1965 and 
1946 acts
X X X
Control of Anti­
competitive Practices
• PA, 1978
• MPCA, 
1976
CA, 1998 • P&DA, 1990
• NOIPA, 1992
X
Enforcement • MMA, 1941
• CA, 1978
CGA, 1997 • MMA, 1990
• CA, 1990
• CAD, 
1990
Keys: CA: Copyright Act; PPA: Performers’ Protection Act; MMA: Merchandise Marks Act; LPA: Liquor 
Products Act; PBRA: Plants Breeders’ Rights Act; IPLAAA: Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act; CGA: 
Counterfeit Goods Act; P&DA: Patents and Design Act; CAD: Copyright Amendment Decree.
However, as the case studies have also shown, the substantial legal changes do not 
necessarily mean that South Africa’s trade laws are fully in conformity with the WTO 
obligations in the agreements covered. There are still areas of non-compliance or 
areas where compliance is not clear. For instance, the lack of post-TRIPS laws on the 
protection of geographical indications and undisclosed information, and the non-
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protection of computer programmes as literary works, would amount to non- 
compliance. Equally, the ambiguity about the civil enforcement procedures and 
remedies, where most powers only exist in the inherent jurisdiction of the courts, also 
suggests lack of full compliance. Furthermore, some provisions of the National Health 
Act of 2003 appear to be at odds with South Africa’s legally binding commitments 
under the GATS. The conclusion, therefore, is that WTO law has had significant 
impact on trade governance in South Africa; however, compliance is mixed or partial.
With respect to Nigeria, the findings show significant non-compliance. As tables 1 
and 2 show, Nigeria has made virtually no post-WTO changes in its laws. First, as 
made clear in chapter 3, Nigeria has not ratified the WTO treaty, even though, as a 
dualist state, no treaty is effective in its domestic law unless ratified by Parliament. 
This casts doubt on the status of the WTO Agreement and its annexes in Nigeria’s 
domestic law.
Secondly, Nigeria’s existing trade remedy and safeguard laws are completely 
incompatible with the WTO agreements on anti-dumping, subsidy and countervailing 
measures, and safeguards. Nigeria’s customs valuation rules are also inconsistent with 
WTO law. New valuation legislation was passed in 2003, but has not been brought 
into effect or notified to the WTO. The amendment Act itself is inconsistent with the 
ACV in some important respects, including the lack of appeal procedures.
In the case of TRIPS, Nigeria’s copyright laws conform substantially to the provisions 
of the TRIPS agreement, and the legislation was furthered strengthened with changes 
introduced in the copyright amendment decree of 1999. However, in the other IP 
areas covered by the TRIPS agreement, there are significant discrepancies in 
Nigeria’s existing laws. The mere absence of any post-WTO implementing legislation 
suggests that, unlike South Africa, Nigeria has approached WTO implementation 
efforts with no degree of seriousness. The conclusion, on the basis of these findings, 
is that WTO law has had no significant impact on trade law reform in Nigeria.
Revisiting the Theoretical Argument and Explanatory Variables
As set out in chapter 1, the main hypothesis of this thesis is that notwithstanding the 
fundamental principles of pacta sunt servanda and good faith fulfilment, international
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trade law has no independent compliance pull: its impact or effectiveness is a function 
of a complex interplay of legal and non-legal factors. Thus, compliance is not 
unconditional. The foregoing findings support this thesis. While South Africa has 
substantially complied, its behaviour still represents partial, rather than full, 
compliance. Nigeria, on the other hand, has virtually ignored its WTO obligations.
The task in this chapter is to explain South Africa’s significant, yet partial, 
compliance and Nigeria’s virtual non-compliance. Significant reliance is placed on 
official government statements, interviews with senior government officials, trade 
diplomats and non-governmental actors, as well as news accounts, reports and data 
from international organisations and independent research institutes.
Determinants of the Compliance Behaviour of South Africa and Nigeria
Table 3 highlights the key legal and non-legal explanatory variables, derived from the 
literature survey in chapter 2. Table 3 also contain some indicators, discussed in 
chapter 3, about the domestic structures of trade governance in the two countries. 
These variables and indicators are used to explain the behaviour of the two countries.
Legal Determinants:
Compliance under the “shadow o f WTO law”
Neither South Africa nor Nigeria has been a subject of full dispute settlement 
procedures in the WTO. However, this is not to say that certain actions of these 
countries have not been taken in the shadow of WTO law, that is, as a result of 
concerns about litigation and legal sanctions. For instance, in 1996, the US made 
series of complaints at the TRIPS Council meetings against some developing 
countries regarding the implementation of Articles 70.8 and 70.9 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. The US put enormous pressure on these countries1 and eventually 
requested consultations with Pakistan and India.
1 The countries listed by the US were Guatemala, India, Kuwait, Madagascar, Morocco, Myanmar, 
Nicaragua, Pakistan, Qatar, Tunisia, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
2 See Pakistan -  Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, 
Consultation Request by the United States, WT/DS36/1, 30 April 1996
3 See India -  Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, Consultation 
Request by the United States, WT/DS50/1,2 July 1996
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Table 3: Variables, selected indicators and sources
Variables South Africa Nigeria Source
Legal Variables:
1. “Shadow of the law” variables
•  Requests for consultations
•  Requests for panel
•  Panel and Appellate Body rulings
•  Trade Policy review
• Normative pressures by WTO 
bodies
2 Reputational factors
• Concern about loss of reputation
3. Endogenous preference:
•  Ex ante preference, perception of 
fairness, legitimacy, ownership etc
4. Normative commitment
• (value of the regime argument)
5. The “new sovereignty” variable
• Desire to be credible actor in the 
process
•  Concern for rule abidance
6. Regime type variable:
•  Domestic rule of law and legality
7. Autopoiesis4:
•  conflicts of legal norms/culture
0.32 -1.41
WTO
WTO
WTO
WTO
WTO councils and committees
Perception-based; interviews; 
news account
Perception-based; interviews; 
Uruguay round positions
Perception-based; interviews
Perception-based; interviews; 
news accounts etc
Kaufman et al (-2.5 to 2.5) 
Perception-based; interviews
Perception-based; interviews; 
Reports; case law etc.
Non-legal Variables
1. Domestic circumstances: economic 
factors:
• Index of economic freedom 
(overall)
•  Trade openness
• Trade and Development Index
2. Regime linkages:
• Donor conditionality
• Concerns about globalisation, 
market forces, trading partners, 
investors etc
3. Institutional variables:
• Government effectiveness
• Bureaucratic quality
• Executive constraints
• Government intervention
• Regulation
4. Interest group variables:
• Societal constraints
• Compliance constituency/
_________institutional supporters_______
“mostly free’ 
“mostly free’ 
41/110
“repressed’
“repressed”
109/110
0.74
2
7/10
“mostly free” 
“mostly un-free”
2/10
- 1.02
1
5/10
“repressed”
“repressed”
2/10
Heritage (2006) 
Heritage (2006) 
UNCTAD, 2005
IMF, World Bank, WIPO, 
WCO, Paris Club, interviews, 
news accounts etc
Kaufmann et al (2004) 
UNCTAD (0-4), 2005 
Polity IV 
Heritage, 2006 
Heritage, 2006
Polity IV
Interviews, news accounts etc.
Although Nigeria was not mentioned among the non-compliant members, its 
delegation promptly notified the TRIPS Council of the government agency in charge 
of receiving patent applications for inventions in the field of pharmaceutical and
4 This suggests that a legal system is operationally closed to other systems. While it may become open 
as a result of structural coupling, there are likely to be internal constraints that make mutual 
constitution incomplete. See chapter 2 for the theoretical overview.
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agricultural chemical products.5 At the Council meeting of 18 September 1996, the 
US "thanked" Nigeria but suggested that but for the legal pressure, Nigeria would 
probably not have voluntarily complied with the TRIPS provisions.6 Given Nigeria’s 
customary lethargic attitude to its WTO obligations, it is evident that the threat of 
legal action may have contributed to its compliance in this case.
There is, however, little evidence that concerns about litigation and sanctions have 
played any significant role in shaping Nigeria’s overall compliance behaviour, as 
evident from its virtual non-compliance with the substantive, and, indeed, much of the 
procedural, obligations. Although there have been several criticisms of Nigeria’s non-
n
compliant behaviour at various WTO bodies , no WTO member has, so far, 
considered it worthwhile to invoke the dispute settlement procedures against the
Q
country. Nigeria clearly has no expectation of being subjected to the enforcement 
procedures, and this may have led, in part, to the seeming impunity with which its 
treats WTO implementation efforts. On the other hand, South Africa has approached 
such efforts with some seriousness. What role have the “in the shadow of the law” 
variables played in this?
South Africa has been a subject of two requests for consultations under the DSU9. It 
was also threatened with WTO litigation by the US during the Medicines Act saga, as 
well as for alleged violation of its market access and national treatment obligations 
under the GATS. Given the levels of foreign involvement in its economy, which is far 
more sophisticated and diversified than that of Nigeria, South Africa is more prone to 
threats of legal action and possibility of sanctions than Nigeria. As a result, there is far 
greater awareness of international trade law considerations by South Africa than 
Nigeria. This is evident from the attitude of South Africa’s trade officials.
5 See document IP/N/l/NGA/1 of 17 September 1996.
6 See document IP/C/M/9 o f 30 October 1996 at p.7
7 See, in particular, reports of Nigeria’s Trade Policy Review.
8 A Member has broad discretion in deciding to bring a case against another Member under the DSU. 
Indeed, article 3.7 DSU states that “[b]efore bringing a case, a member shall exercise its judgment as to 
whether action under these procedures would be fruitful”. The term “fruitful” would arguably 
includes“worthwhile”.
9 These were pursuant to the Anti-Dumping Agreement. See: WT/DS168 and WT/DS288. However, 
Nigeria was a Third Party in the Shrimp Turtle case, Appellate Body Report, United States -  Import 
Prohibition o f Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November, 1998, 
DSR 1998: VII, 2755.
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For instance, when asked why there is a reasonable level of compliance with the 
customs valuation agreement, senior valuation officials said, “we have to play by the 
international rules”.10 Virtually every customs officer has the “Valuation Guide”, 
which contains the provisions of the WTO agreement, as well as corresponding 
provisions in the Customs and Excise Act and Rules. Most of the trade laws 
introduced since 1997 were explicitly designed to implement South Africa’s WTO 
obligations.
The attitude of government officials is that notwithstanding the implementation
challenges, South Africa is “obliged” to meet its WTO obligations, because “if we
don’t we can be challenged”.11 Alan Hirsch, a senior economic adviser to the
government, noted that South Africa stopped its subsidy programme partly because “it
was more likely that we would be punished by one of our major trading partners using
the anti-dumping or countervailing-duty measures”.12 Indeed, officials confirm that a
11number of disputes have been resolved bilaterally.
The enforcement or shadow of the law variables are not limited to direct enforcement 
through litigation and legal sanctions, but also include indirect means such as 
monitoring and reviews.14 What role has the review process played?15 There is 
evidence that the WTO review mechanisms have played some, albeit limited, role in 
inducing compliance. For example, the review process at the TRIPS Council had an 
impact on the behaviour of South Africa and Nigeria, particularly with respect to the 
procedural obligations. The practice of keeping a country's review on the agenda until 
that country has satisfactorily responded to all outstanding questions served as a 
"name and shame" strategy that helped to induce compliance with the procedural 
obligations, although this was clearly helped by the Council's flexibility with respect 
to deadlines.16
10 Interview, Pretoria, 2003
11 Ibid.
12 Hirsch in Krueger ed (1998, p.392)
13 Interview, Pretoria, 2003.
14 Chayes and Chayes (1995); Victor, Raustiala and Skolnikoff eds. (1998).
15 Qureshi (1995/1999) argues, for instance, that the WTO Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) is 
an instrument of enforcement, with capacity to influence the course of state behaviour.
16 The reviews of both Nigeria and South Africa were on the agenda for nearly three years.
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The peer review and pressure at the Committees on Safeguards, Anti-Dumping 
Practices, and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures clearly also increased 
awareness about WTO legality of the domestic laws of these countries, and, in 
particular, played a major role in ensuring that South Africa took greater care in
1 7drafting its trade remedies legislation. The consultations at the Balance of Payments 
Committee forced Nigeria to undertake to stop imposing import bans for balance of 
payment reasons, although Nigeria rarely frilly honoured promises made at the WTO. 
This is evident from the fact that several notifications are still outstanding, and no 
post-WTO legislation has so far been passed despite several promises.
Nigeria has, to date, been the subject of three Trade Policy Reviews -  respectively, in 
1991, 1998 and 2005. Each highlighted the GATT/WTO incompatibility of several 
trade measures, yet little attempt has, so far, been made to bring these measures into 
conformity with WTO rules. In the 2005 Trade Policy Review, the WTO noted that 
“Nigeria’s trade laws have remained unchanged and the trade policy has become even 
more restrictive”.18 With respect to the TRIPS Agreement, the WTO said: “since the 
last TPR of Nigeria, legislation on intellectual property rights has remained 
unchanged”.19
In sum: with respect to Nigeria, the role of the “shadow of the law” variables, whether 
defined narrowly in terms of direct enforcement or broadly in terms of surveillance 
and implementation reviews, is negligible. Nigeria has not acted with any significant 
awareness of WTO law considerations or concerns about possible WTO litigation or 
sanctions. On the other hand, South Africa appears to have acted more in the shadow 
of WTO law. However, while concerns about litigation and finding of violation may 
have contributed to South Africa’s compliance behaviour, they are not the decisive
17 In 1996, South Africa’s pre-WTO trade remedies laws were subjected to close scrutiny by other 
WTO members at the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices. Several discrepancies were highlighted, 
and South Africa promised to make relevant changes in its laws (see WTO documents G/ADP/W/395 
and G/SCM/W/405 of June 1996). The knowledge that the amendment legislation would still be the 
subject of detailed review also appeared to have led South Africa’s legal drafters to take the efforts to 
use the AD and SCM agreements as a model and in looking at the trade remedy regimes of some major 
WTO members (see Joubert, 2005).
18 See document WT/TPR/S/147
19 Ibid, at p. 45.
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determinant. This leads to another variable: reputational factors , which have often 
been given a theoretical centrality as an extremely important variable in the
91compliance literature.
The Reputational Impact o f  WTO law
To the extent that reputation refers to desire for being seen as a reliable and credible 
partner, this variable has played virtually no role in shaping Nigeria’s behaviour in 
respect of WTO law. The evidence bears this out: Nigeria has introduced no post- 
WTO legislation to date, and did not pay its financial contributions to the WTO for 
five years, between 2000 and 2005. This was so despite the “social opprobrium” that
99it faced in the organisation. Nigeria only paid up after enormous pressure and when 
it became clear that it was going to be denied some organisational benefits.23
Nigeria’s behaviour in the WTO is largely characterised by rhetoric and “cheap talk”, 
that is, saying what others want to hear.24 Frequently, Nigeria’s delegates speak one 
way in Geneva, while its trade officials act another at home. Oyejide et al note that 
“there is a divergence between policy statements and policy action in Nigeria”, and
9 5cite examples of promises made to WTO bodies that were not kept. This is not the 
behaviour of a country that craves a reputation for reliability and consistent 
international behaviour.
Yet, this does not mean that Nigeria has no reputational concerns in international law 
generally. For instance, it is a very active member of the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) and appears to value its relationship with the IMF and
20 Unlike sanctions or retaliation, which can be an immediate response to defection, reputational 
expectation concerns how others see an actor in relation to the future. Reputation affects an actor’s 
image and perception about its reliability. For a discussion of the role of reputation in rule compliance, 
see, e.g., Keohane (1984)
21 Downs and Jones (2002).
22 One WTO official remarked that “no one likes Nigeria here”. A Nigerian is one of the Divisional 
Directors in the WTO. He applied to become a Deputy Director-General under the Mr Pascal Lamy, 
the new DG, but lost to a Rwanda’s WTO ambassador. It was generally believed that Nigeria’s attitude 
to the WTO did little to help his candidature.
23 The Nigerian Trade Minister was appointed as the Vice-Chairman of the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Conference, but it was made clear to him that if Nigeria did not pay up its dues, he would be stripped of 
the position.
24 See Goldsmith and Posner (2002) and Posner (2002) for a discussion of the problem of “cheap talk” 
in international relations.
25 Oyejide et al (2005).
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the World Bank. This supports the view that a country may maintain different
97reputations in different areas for different reasons. Nigeria’s multiple reputations are 
clearly driven by cost-benefit calculations. While the benefits of a good reputation 
within the OPEC and the international financial institutions appear to be high , there
90
is a sense that the costs of compliance with WTO rules are higher than the benefits.
Reputation matters to South Africa generally. In a recent study by Judith Kelley , the 
author shows how South Africa refused to yield to pressure from the United States to 
sign a bilateral Article 98 Agreement, which would effectively undermine the Rome
91Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court. South Africa’s argument was, 
inter alia, that "(t)o sign ... would be going against the obligations of South Africa to 
fully cooperate with the ICC as contained in Article 86 of the ICC Statute ..."32 On the 
other hand, Nigeria, although a signatory to the ICC treaty, signed the same bilateral 
agreement.33
South Africa generally has the same attitude to its WTO obligations. According to 
Dot Keet, South Africa’s approach to the WTO is generally driven by a desire not to 
destabilise the rules-based system and to project itself as a responsible and reasonable 
partner.34 This attitude is largely driven by calculation of interests. As will be shown 
later, the desire to send the right signals to its trading partners and the international
26 For instance, in July 2001, Nigeria was placed on the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) list of 
non-cooperating states because of substantial non-compliance with the global anti-money laundering 
rules. The Nigerian government became exceedingly concerned about the damaging effects of this 
listing on its reputation in its global financial world, particularly on its ability to receive debt relief and 
attract foreign investors. As a result, the government went to great lengths to pass the required 
legislation and create the required institutional framework to ensure that Nigeria was de-listed. When 
Nigeria was eventually de-listed in June 2006, the President was described as “elated” and quoted as 
saying that “Nigeria is now free of encumbrances that have the capacity to stifle the flow of investment 
and economic growth” (see Press Release: “Nigeria Removed from International Financial Black-list, 
Obasanjo Elated” available at http://www.njgeria.gov.ng/Aso%20Rock%20News Removed 
From/FBlacklist.aspx (date accessed: 26/6/2006).
27 See Downs and Jones (2002) for a discussion of the concept of “multiple reputations”.
28 For instance, Nigeria’s economy is nearly entirely dependent on oil exports, as the world’s sixth 
largest oil producer. Its active membership of the OPEC is thus linked to its interest as a major oil 
trader. In the same vein, Nigeria’s debt situation meant that it relied on the IMF and the World Bank to 
support its desire for debt rescheduling. Recently, through the support of these institutions, Nigeria was 
able to pay off all its sovereign debt.
29 See chapter 3 for a discussion of Nigeria’s attitude towards the WTO.
30 Judith Kelley, 2004
31 Kelly (2004).
32 The South African Foreign Minister, as reported in ICC Monitor (February 2003) and cited in 
Kelley, 2004
33 Kelly (2004)
34 Keet (2005, p. 11).
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markets means that South Africa is often concerned about the international effect of 
its domestic legal and regulatory environment.
In sum: reputational concerns appear to have played a significant role in inducing 
South Africa’s substantial level of compliance, but insignificant role in moving 
Nigeria towards compliance with WTO law. The underlying motivation in both cases 
appears to be the calculation of costs and benefits. Yet, while the logic of 
consequences may underpin compliance, one cannot discount the logic of obligation 
and normative commitment.
Compliance induced by normative commitment
A country may generally adhere to the principle of pacta sunt servanda because of 
shared beliefs in the values and norms that a treaty regime embodies. The value 
attached to a regime may thus engender a sense of obligation. Evidently, Nigeria has 
no strong normative commitment to the WTO. There is little evidence from official 
statements that Nigeria feels the necessity or a sense of obligation to fully uphold 
WTO rules and disciplines; rather there is general antipathy to the WTO among the
i f
policy, bureaucratic, political and even business elite in Nigeria.
Nigeria is less a multilateralist than South Africa. In March 2006, Nigeria withdrew 
from over 40 international organisations, claiming that it was deriving little benefits 
from membership of those organisations, while it was faced with heavy outstanding 
membership dues. Indeed, it appeared from the ministerial statement that Nigeria 
felt that it had to remain in the WTO only for political and diplomatic reasons.37 
Prominent politicians and law-makers have often asked the government to withdraw 
from the WTO.38
35 The Nigerian official government website mentions OPEC, IMF, World Bank, the UN, the African 
Union, the Commonwealth and ECOWAS as the international organisations that Nigeria “belongs to 
and plays active role in”, but leaves out the WTO. Further, it provides links to many of these other 
organisations but none to the WTO. See http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/foreignrelations.aspx (date 
accessed: 25/6/2006).
36 See: “Nigeria withdraws from 43 International Organisations”, This Day newspaper of 23/03/2006.
37 Ibid.
38 For instance, in 2003, the then national chairman of the Peoples Democratic Party, Nigeria’s ruling 
party, declared that “membership of the WTO is not helping matter”, and convened meetings to call for 
reconsideration of Nigeria’s WTO membership (This day, “Nigeria to Review WTO membership, Says 
Ogheh”, 21 October 2003).
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As for South Africa, although its attitude to the WTO is largely driven by self-interest, 
there is a normative dimension too: it has a normative commitment to the WTO 
system. South Africa is an advocate of multilateralism and a rule-governed 
international trading system, and therefore has a stake in the effectiveness of the 
system. Statements of government officials and ministers support the “value of the 
regime” argument. As one senior official put it, “we are struggling to meet our 
obligations to show that we are committed to the system”.
The general attitude is that, despite its imperfections, membership of and active 
participation in the WTO is in South Africa’s vital national interest and that it is 
appropriate to support the multilateral system.40 Thus, while normative commitment 
appears to have played a role in the compliance behaviour of South Africa, the 
absence of such commitment seems to have played a major role in Nigeria’s non- 
compliant behaviour. However, an important variable that cannot be ignored is 
endogenous or ex ante preference.
Compliance as a function o f  Endogenous Preference
The position taken by a state during original negotiations is a good indicator of its 
initial preferences. As discussed in chapter 3, South Africa and Nigeria took different 
negotiating positions during the Uruguay Round and viewed the outcomes differently. 
While the South African trade minister argued that the Uruguay Round agreement 
would “stand South Africa in good stead”41, his Nigerian counterpart complained that 
Nigeria was being required to “make contributions inconsistent with our level of 
development” 42
It is evident that South Africa’s offer during the Uruguay Round was endogenous, 
arising from self-selection.43 As one senior trade official explains: “[a]ll the WTO
39 DTI official, Interview, June 2003. Officials frequently also cite former President Mandela’s speech 
at the 50th Anniversary o f the GATT/WTO multilateral trading system in Geneva in 1998 to illustrate 
the country's attitude to WTO law.
40 In persuading other developing countries to support the launch of the Doha Round in 2001, South 
Africa invoked the argument that developing countries could not afford to be bystanders in the 
multilateral system (see Business Day, Editorial, Johannesburg, 7/03/2002).
41 See GATT document MTN.TNC/MIN(94)/ST/99.
42 See GATT document MTN.TNC/MIN(90)ST/34.
43 Although the ANC was not in power at the time of the Uruguay Round negotiations, it was formally 
involved in the major government decisions through the Transitional Executive Council since
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obligations that we assumed were those that as a result of our own understanding 
needed to be done internally, and that we were going to do. So, in effect, what we did 
was that we locked in what we thought we needed to do as a country at that point”.44
Even with respect to the TRIPS Agreement, South Africa negotiated against the 
background of its long history of IP protection and enforcement45 and the belief that 
the country had a sophisticated legal system to deal with IP issues 46 As a result, it 
was willing to take on developed-country level of obligations, which required it to 
bring its IP legislation in line with the TRIPS Agreement within one year, i.e. by 1 
January 1996. Although it did not, in fact, introduce the necessary legislation until 
1998, there was a strong sense of obligation, flowing in part from ownership of the 
agreement.47
With respect to customs valuation, South Africa was one of the few developing 
countries that acceded to the Tokyo Round Valuation Code. However, South Africa 
did not accede to the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Codes. The contrasts 
in its implementation of the Valuation Agreement and the trade remedy rules are 
interesting. While South Africa has had relatively little difficulty in implementing and 
adhering to the provisions of the Customs Valuation agreement, it did not implement 
the trade remedy agreements until 2003, and has a reputation as one of the big users 
of anti-dumping measures.48 South Africa’s initial willingness to accept the Tokyo 
Round Valuation Code and unwillingness to accept the anti-dumping and subsidies 
codes, and the variation in its subsequent compliance behaviour in respect of these 
agreements, appear to confirm the hypothesis that ex ante preference induces better ex 
post compliance, and vice versa.
December 1993 and had its allies, COSATU, in the National Executive Forum, where South Africa’s 
negotiating positions were discussed.
44 DTI official, Interview, June 2003.
45 South Africa's first Patent Act was enacted in 1860, and the first reported instance of copyright 
infringement injunction was in 1861: Dickens v. Eastern Province Herald (1861) 4 Searle 33; while the 
first trademark case was in 1863: Mills v Salmon (1863)4 Searle 230. Edison-Bell sued for patent 
infringement in South Africa as early as 1899: Edison-Bell Phonographic Co v. Garlick (1899) 16 SC 
543.
46 Representative of PMA, Interview, June 2003.
47 However, post-Uruguay Round, due to the outbreak of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, South Africa 
became less enthusiastic about the TRIPS Agreement, and has called for its re-negotiation.
48 South Africa was a very early and prolific user of anti-dumping measures. By 1958, there were a 
total of 37 anti-dumping decrees in force across all GATT member countries, 22 of them in South 
Africa (GATT 1958, p. 14 cited in Finger ed. 1993, p.26). In 2004, South Africa was the fifth biggest 
user of antidumping measures among WTO members (WTO, 2005).
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Nigeria was unhappy with virtually all the WTO agreements. With respect to TRIPS, 
it stated during the Uruguay Round that, “no regime of protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights should impose an unbearable burden on us and stifle our 
aspirations towards access to technology”.49 It also felt, as pointed out in chapter 3, 
that the negotiations on customs valuation and pre-shipment inspection were not in its 
national interest.50 That Nigeria is giving no priority to implementing any of the WTO 
agreements is thus largely due to the lack of endogenous preference for them.
In sum: the endogenous preference and ownership variable has a strong explanatory 
power.51 It has played a major role in explaining South Africa’s significant 
compliance and Nigeria’s significant non-compliance. However, there are important 
legal variables derived from the nature of the domestic regime rather than of WTO 
law itself. These are considered below.
Domestic Legalism and the Rule o f  Law
Table 3 above shows that on the key indicators of rule of law and legality, South 
Africa has better scores than Nigeria. According to the US State Department, "the use 
of the courts (in Nigeria) does not automatically imply fair and impartial 
judgements".52 Furthermore, although section 287(3) of the Nigerian Constitution 
requires state authorities to obey and enforce court orders, the Chief Justice of 
Nigeria’s Supreme Court lamented in 2006 “the disposition of the Executive to
Cl
wanton disobedience of and non-compliance with the orders of the court”. This 
suggests that Nigeria is not a strong rule-of-law state.
The absence of strong commitment to the rule of law at home appears to translate into 
how Nigeria treats its international commitments. There is generally no great 
awareness of international law considerations among government officials, especially 
with respect to treaties that Nigeria does not attach any significant importance or
49 Ibid, section on Nigeria
50 Ibid.
51 The explanatory power of the endogenous preference variable is also demonstrated by Kusumadara 
(2002) who found that “the reluctant and bitter acceptance of the TRIPS Agreement without a genuine 
intention to give better intellectual property protection within the country could explain why the TRIPS 
Agreement has largely failed to improve IP protection in Indonesia” (p. 186).
52 See US Department of State 2005 Investment Climate Statement on Nigeria: 
http://www.state.gove/e/eb/ifd/2005/43036.htm.
53 Guardian Newspapers, Nigeria, June 01, 2006.
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value. Despite frequently affirming its “commitment to the WTO principles and 
objectives”54, Nigeria has not given recognition to the WTO in its domestic law more 
than ten years since the treaty entered into force. This can only suggest lack of respect 
for its treaty obligations.
This general lack of respect for treaty obligations is not limited to the WTO. For 
instance, although Nigeria has signed many bilateral trade agreements, most of these 
are simply not being implemented.55 Some of Nigeria’s regional partners have also 
complained about its violation of the ECOWAS treaty, particularly with respect to 
import prohibitions.56 With respect to environmental treaties, Emeseh points out that 
although Nigeria has several environmental laws, “there has been no enforcement 
whatsoever”.57 All of this supports the view that Nigeria’s poor rule-of-law and 
legality credentials affect its attitude to international law.
By contrast, South Africa is a constitutional state, with a relatively strong 
commitment to the mle of law. The constitution provides for an elaborate Bill of 
Rights, and for “just administrative action”.58 The domestic pressure for international 
rule compliance comes from the constitution, the active and increasingly litigious and 
rights-conscious civil society actors,59 and a judiciary that is largely independent from 
executive influence. One of the reasons that South Africa gave for not signing an 
Article 98 Agreement with the US, despite enormous pressure, was "domestic legal 
concerns".60
The courts are willing to hold the government to account in respect of its international 
and constitutional obligations under the doctrine of legality.61 This creates a
54 As Nigeria did during its 2005 trade policy review, see WTO document WT/TPR/M/147 of 14 June 
2005
55 Interview with a senior official of the Ministry of Commerce, December 2003.
56 See: Oyejide et al (2005), where the authors cite Ivory Coast’s complaint about Nigeria’s ban on 
textiles.
57 Emeseh (2004).
58 See section 33 of the Constitution.
59 For instance, in 2001, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) challenged on constitutional grounds 
the government's HIV/AIDS treatment policy and secured a court judgement ordering the government 
to make anti-retroviral drugs available to all pregnant women.
60 Kelley (2004), p. 39
61 The Court has declared this principle as central to the conception of the constitutional order (see 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex parte President of the RSA 2000 (3) BCLR 
241; 2000 (2) SA 674 CC) para. 50.
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consciousness or general awareness about constitutional and legal rights among 
government officials. For example, the fear of losing cases in courts is partly 
responsible for the general willingness of South Africa’s valuation officers to accept
fOon face value the declarations made by importers.
In sum, while commitment to domestic rule of law and legality appears to be 
significant in shaping South Africa’s compliance behaviour, the general lack of strong 
commitment to the rule of law in Nigeria can be said to have contributed to that 
country’s poor response to its WTO commitments as with many of its other treaty 
obligations
However, as the case studies have made clear, South Africa is not in full compliance 
with its WTO commitments. This is consistent with the view in the literature that 
there is no such thing as fu ll compliance with international law. Consequently, 
some scholars refer to "acceptable level of compliance"64 or "equilibrium 
behaviour".65 While South Africa is close to this threshold, Nigeria, by enacting no 
implementing laws to date, is clearly far away from it. Yet it is important to explain 
South Africa incomplete compliance. The last legal variables, namely autopioesis and 
treaty ambiguity, may provide some explanations.
The Clash o f Legal Cultures and Institutions
The notion of autopoiesis suggests that even a rule-of-law state may, in some cases, 
construct images of an international legal system through its own distorting lens, i.e. 
its own established legal culture or tradition. Most rule-of-law states appear to be in 
this situation.66 South Africa's compliance with the TRIPS Agreement appears to be 
limited in some respects by constitutional constraints, the role of the courts, and legal
62 As one officer explains: “we actually have lost cases even before we go to court as our legal section 
gets legal advice from a state attorney, saying ‘you don’t have a case here, you have to withdraw that 
determination” (interview, Pretoria, 2003). A number of cases that went to court were actually lost. 
See, e.g. The Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v. Delta Motor Corporation 
(Proprietary) Limited 2002 SA 292 (SCA).
63 See Chayes and Chayes (1993), Simmons (2000) and Bednar (2005).
64 Chayes and Chayes (1993)
65 Bednar (2005).
66 For instance, the United Kingdom has refused to ratify the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for International Sale of Goods (CISG) because it believes that its own Sale of Goods Act of 1979 is a 
better instrument, even though many commercial law scholars argue that there are “overwhelming 
advantages” in ratifying the convention (see Goode, 1995, p. 926)
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tradition. For instance, for constitutional reasons the Government is unwilling to give 
its courts the authority to grant certain orders in civil proceedings such as asking an 
innocent infringer to pay damages to the rights owner, or ordering an infringer to 
identify a third person.
Even if these powers were to be given, it is not certain that the courts will use them, 
considering their conservative attitude to granting common law ex parte Anton Piller 
orders. In the criminal context, the role of the court is vital too, as the A M  Moolla
c * j
case has shown. The court will interpret penal statutes, such as the Counterfeit 
Goods Act, narrowly in the light of constitutional guarantees and the Bill of Rights. 
Attachment to certain legal principles can also explain South Africa's reluctance to 
make certain TRIPS compliant changes, such as granting retroactivity in copyright or 
protecting computer programmes as literary works.68
This is not to suggest that South African courts would deliberately depart from the 
country’s international obligations in their rulings. Actual practice shows that South 
African judges generally enforce intellectual property rights in accordance with the 
country's international obligations. As Mr Justice Louis Harms, Judge of Appeal, 
Supreme Court of South Africa, puts it: "The South African judiciary has been able 
and willing to give effect to IP rights and the country's international obligations".69 
Yet the courts are likely to adhere to some long-held tradition and legal values, which 
may not necessarily support the objective of full compliance with a particular 
international law obligation.
Treaty Ambiguity
Ambiguities in the WTO Agreements, particularly the TRIPS agreement, appear also 
to have led to a situation where compliance is not clear. South Africa’s trade officials
70claim to have implemented “most of our obligations” , and put any dispute down to 
differences in interpretation. The ambiguities in most of the agreements make it 
difficult to distinguish between genuine differences in interpretation and self-serving
67 See chapter 5 for a discussion of the case.
68 Ibid.
69 See speech to the Second Session of the Advisory Committee on Enforcement, June 28 to 30, 20004: 
document WIPO/ACE/2/4 Rev.
70 Interview, Pretoria, 2003
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interpretations. Cohen argued that the ambiguity and vagueness of the GATS 
Reference Paper was partly responsible for South Africa’s apparent non-compliance
n i
with the principles.
Autopoiesis and treaty ambiguity are not relevant in explaining Nigeria’s compliance
nobehaviour, given the near-absence of the rule of law and the substantial non- 
compliance. What is clear from the foregoing is that legal considerations, broadly 
defined, play major roles in influencing state compliance behaviour. As the following 
section shows, however, non-legal factors can also have significant explanatory 
powers.
Non-Legal Determinants
Domestic Circumstances and Policy Responses
Policy makers’ perception and assessment of their actual domestic conditions and 
circumstances and the appropriate policy responses to them play a major role in 
determining how they respond to external legal constraints. For instance, perception 
of the national interest and the calculation of costs and benefits may either lead a
n * i
country to adhere to or defect from international agreements. The growing concern 
about the lack of "policy space" suggests that some states want to be able to use a 
range of policy instruments to deal with domestic issues without the limitation 
imposed by the behavioural constraints of international economic law.74
Domestic circumstances have played a role both in influencing South Africa’s 
substantial compliance with its WTO obligations, as well as Nigeria’s substantial non- 
compliance. They can also partly explain South Africa’s incomplete compliance. The 
Economic Freedom Index (see Table 3) shows that South Africa is classified, both 
overall and in terms of trade policy, as “mostly free”, while Nigeria is described as 
“repressed”, which is the worst category.
71 Cohen (2001).
72 It is difficult to talk o f legal cultures or tradition in absence of strong commitment to the mle of law 
and legality.
73 For instance, Kusumadara (2002) found that the TRIPS Agreement was not being implemented in 
Indonesia because “it is inconsistent with Indonesia’s social, economic and cultural situation and does 
not confer any clear benefit to most Indonesian people” (p. 245)
74 See UNCTAD, 2005.
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Since 1994 South Africa has pursued increasingly liberalised outward investment and
*yc
trade policies, with export orientation a key aspect of its growth strategy. During the 
Uruguay Round, South Africa agreed to a twelve-year phase-down of duties on 
textiles and apparels; however, it actually unilaterally moved to a seven-year phase- 
down process. By contrast, Nigeria is still stuck in the import-substitution 
industrialisation policy framework, with the main policy thrusts being: protection of 
local industries, reduction of the perceived dependence on imports, and promotion of 
local sourcing of raw materials.77
South Africa generally looks to WTO law as a market access mechanism and as a tool 
for economic efficiency. Its domestic circumstances and perception of the national 
interest, therefore, dictate a policy choice that favours more positive engagement with 
the WTO system. Nigeria, on the other hand, does not appear to see such benefits 
flowing from adherence to WTO rules and disciplines, given the weak performance 
and structure of its economy and external trade.78 The “there is little (if anything) in it 
for us” feeling is thus strong.
The general observation about the role of domestic circumstances and policy 
objectives applies in varying degrees to the specific agreements examined here. For 
instance, since the early 1990s, the role played by tariff revenue (customs duties) in 
South Africa’s fiscal policy has declined due to trade liberalisation. While the average 
tariff revenue in Africa was 19.6 % in 1990, falling marginally to 17% in 1998, in 
South Africa, tariff revenue fell significantly from 9% in 1990 to 4.2% in 1998, and 
fell further to 3.5% of total revenue in 2002.79 In the case of Nigeria, customs duties 
accounted for 21% of total federal government revenue in 1995, coming second after
OA
petroleum profit tax, which accounted for 46%. Thus, customs duties assume 
greater relevance in Nigeria’s fiscal policy than in South Africa’s.
75 Wakeford (2005).
76 IMF (2005).
77 See Oyejide et al (2005).
78 Other policy and institutional differences between South Africa and Nigeria include the fact that 
South Africa enjoys greater political and macro-economic stability and has far more sophisticated hard 
and soft infrastructure.
79 IMF, OECD, 2004.
80 Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Reports, 2003.
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The Nigerian customs administration is tasked annually to collect a substantial 
amount of revenue in accordance with targets set by the Ministry of Finance. Given 
the level of fraud among Nigeria’s importers and the role of customs duties in 
Nigeria’s fiscal policy, it is apparent that concerns about revenue loss and the capacity 
of customs to deal with valuation malpractices are at the heart of Nigeria’s reluctance 
to implement the Customs Valuation Agreement. On the other hand, South Africa is 
able to implement the agreement relatively smoothly partly because customs duties no 
longer play any major role in its fiscal policy. Also, nearly 25% of South Africa’s 
products are excluded from the ambit of the Customs Valuation Agreement, as these
O I
products are subject to non-ad valorem duties.
Domestic circumstances have also played significant role in the implementation of the 
TRIPS agreement. In the case of South Africa, while the government has introduced 
substantial legal reforms since 1997 to implement the TRIPS Agreement, there 
appears to be less enthusiasm to make certain TRIPS compliant changes. For instance, 
South Africa is defensive and sensitive on the issue of protection of geographical 
indications for wines and spirits. This appears to be dictated by its domestic 
circumstances. As one senior South African IP official put it, “we have to do what is 
in the best interest of our economy”.82
South Africa currently has 100200 hectares under vines for wine production. It 
harvested about 593.1 million of litres in 2005, down from 696.80 million litres in 
2004, and is the ninth largest wine producer in the world. The wine industry 
employs some 257,000 people.84 The gross output value of wine industry related firms
81 For instance, section 71(2) of the Customs and Excise Act provides that the transaction value 
method may not be applied to motor vehicles imported for personal use. By keeping 25 percent of its 
tariff lines, mostly sensitive products, outside the scope of the Customs Valuation Agreement, South 
Africa is able to adhere to WTO valuation rules without much feeling of revenue loss. Indeed, South 
Africa’s authorities claim that the Customs valuation Agreement “works well with no major problems 
arising in the administration thereof and no discernible increase or decrease in revenue which can be 
attributed to it” (see the Customs and Excise Valuation Guide, February 2002, p.l). This, however, 
supports the domestic circumstances and endogenous preference arguments.
82 Interview (2003) with a senior official o f the Company and Intellectual Property Registration Office, 
CIPRO, South Africa’s administering body for intellectual property.
83 See Wines of South Africa: http://www.wosa.co.za/SA
84 Ibid
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is put at R14.6 billion, and there has been an explosion of wineries and wines
o r
produced, with over 100 new wineries established between 1999 and 2001.
The wine producers in South Africa are mainly white migrants from Europe, who 
consequently have used European-sounding brand names. Providing special 
protection for geographical indications for wines and spirits would threaten the use of 
some of South African wines brands. It was precisely these concerns that led to South 
Africa’s unwillingness to accept EU demands on the protection of geographical 
indications for wine and spirits, which would require South Africa to rename many of 
its established wine brands. As a result, negotiations on the EU-S Trade, Development 
and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) took seven years and almost broke down.
In the end, South Africa accepted EU demands largely because of incentives and side- 
payments. In return for agreeing to phase out several brand names86, South Africa was 
granted an annual duty-free quota of 42 million litres. In addition, the EU gave South 
Africa €15 million “to establish a programme on the restructuring of the wine and 
spirits sector and to ensure the marketing and distribution of South African wines and 
spirits”.87 The deal was very controversial and was criticised by South Africa’s wine 
producer groups.88 However, the specific compensation and incentives were sufficient 
to induce South Africa to accept, albeit grudgingly, the EU demands. South Africa is, 
however, unwilling to provide such special protection in a multilateral, MFN-based, 
setting that may threaten its wine brands without explicit trade offs or concessions.
Domestic circumstances and perception of the national interest also play a major role 
in shaping South Africa’s attitude to the protection of pharmaceutical patents. As 
noted earlier, South Africa retains, at least in the statute book, fairly broad scope for 
issuing compulsory licences, including a modified local working requirement and an 
apparent discrimination between imported and locally produced drugs. This has led
85 See South Africa’s Wines and Spirits Board: http://www.wsb.za.co.
86 Under separate wine and spirits protocols of the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement 
(TDCA) South Africa agreed to phase out the use of wine names “port” and “sherry”, and for spirits, 
names “grappa”, “ouzo” etc, and to protect them as EU geographical indications.
87 See http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/rl2201.htm
88 The South African Port Producers Association (SAPPA) and the association of generic wine 
producers, Wines of South Africa (WOSA) were particularly critical of the deal, (see article entitled 
“Cape © Copyright Wars” in http://www.wine.co.za)
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the pharmaceutical industry to question the TRIPS compatibility of South Africa’s 
patent regime.
In 2003, PhRMA, the US lobby group, in its trade submission to the US Trade 
Department, expressed concerns about “inadequate intellectual property protection for
OQ
pharmaceuticals in South Africa”. Although relations with the government have 
improved since the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) of South 
Africa withdrew their court action in 2001, the PMA stills raises concerns about the 
regulatory environment in the country. Despite South Africa’s willingness to 
implement its TRIPS obligations, domestic circumstances and political difficulties 
have made full compliance difficult to achieve.
Section 27(1) of the Bill of Rights provides that everyone has the right to have access 
to health care services, and that the state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this 
right. However, the situation in South Africa, perpetuated by decades of apartheid 
rule, was such that while many in the ‘first’ economy had access to medical insurance 
and were mainly using the private sector, the uninsured, i.e. those without medical 
cover, accounted for 95% of public health facilities.90
This put enormous pressure on the public health sector even before the outbreak of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic. Given the government’s belief that patent protection and 
particularly importation of patented drugs created affordability and access problems, 
its policy response was to promote local working of patented inventions and to put 
downward pressure on the prices of medicines. For instance, the objectives of the 
National Drug Policy of 1996 were inter alia, “to promote the availability of safe and 
effective drugs at the lowest possible cost” and "to support the development of the 
local pharmaceutical industry and the local production of essential drugs".91
Yet, since 1997, the domestic production of pharmaceutical products has been 
declining. For instance, in 1996 South African pharmaceutical manufacturing catered
89 See PhRMA 2003 Annual 301 Report to the USTR
90 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of South Africa, Annual Report, may 2001 -  April 2002.
91 See "National Drug Policy for South Africa", 1995, p. 4
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for over 70% of local pharmaceutical demand, but by 2000 this had fallen to 57%,
Q7with imports accounting for 43%. This situation made government officials uneasy 
about importation of drugs, which is linked to their "excessive" prices. Since that the 
public sector caters for the indigent and government’s resources are limited, high 
prices of medicines became associated with a denial of the right of access to health 
care.
Government’s legislative responses, through several amendments to the Medicine and 
Related Substances Act and subsequent regulations, were designed to facilitate access 
to medicine and by extension access to health care. However, aspects of the 
legislation and regulation were criticised by industry groups for their perceived 
TRIPS incompatibility. For instance, the PMA argued that the regulations excluded 
the safeguards and due process requirements of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement 
by failing, inter alia, to provide for payment of compensation and for an appeal 
mechanism for challenging the grant of an authorised use of a patent.94
The dominance of the pharmaceutical sector by foreign patent holders is arguably 
another factor affecting government’s attitude to patent protection. Government 
officials believe that, despite the consistent increase in research and development 
(R&D) spending95, there is an underproduction of local patents, with South Africa’s 
annual patent rate estimated to be only 2.5 patents per million people.96 The majority 
of the pharmaceutical firms in South Africa are subsidiaries of foreign companies,
07which have no listings on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.
92 See The Status o f South African Pharmaceutical Manufacturing: A PMA Perspective, a paper by the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa, 2003
93 The Minister of Health made it clear that the establishment o f the Pricing Committee was to send a 
message to the pharmaceutical companies that the government would not tolerate "excessive" prices. 
See “Fair pricing, drugs safety form basis of Act”, The Star newspaper, 8/5/2003.
94 See Annual Report, May 2001 -  April 2002
95 R&D spending in South Africa increased from 0.76% of GDP in 2002 to 0.81% in 2004, with the 
target being 1% of GDP n 2008. See Media briefing by the Economic, Investment and Employment 
Cluster, 27 June 2005: http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/05062716151001.htm.
96 According to the chief operating officer of the department of science and technology, Adi Paterson, 
the low patent rate is due to lack of skills at tertiary institutions, insufficient incentives and the absence 
of a solid regulatory framework. See “South Africa patently failing to cash in on research”, Business 
day, 09/09/2004.
97 See The Status o f South African Pharmaceutical Manufacturing: A PMA Perspective, a paper by the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa, 2003
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According to WIPO figures, out of 90, 655 patent applications in 2002, 90,471 were
QQ
by non-residents, while only 184 were by residents . The estimated static rent 
transfer from TRIPS-induced strengthening of patent for South Africa is put at a net 
loss of $168 million." The predominant foreign ownership of patents, coupled with 
perception of excessive prices of essential drugs in the face of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, has not generated domestic support or political pressure for strong patent 
protection, although, as will be shown later, the government has been careful not to 
lurch into direct violation of patent rights.
Domestic policy preference is also at the heart of the Patents Amendment Act of 
2005, which requires every patent applicant to furnish information relating to any role 
played by an indigenous biological resource, a genetic resource or traditional 
knowledge or use.100 The aim of this statute is to introduce in patents the three 
requirements of disclosure, informed prior consent and benefit sharing.101
According to one activist, who lobbied for the relaxation of the level of patent 
protection in South Africa, the Act “puts domestic need first and the interests of 
private enterprise subject to that need”.102 The Copyright Act already contains strong 
provisions on the protection of folklore. Thus, in implementing the TRIPS 
Agreement, South Africa is not only reflecting the flexibilities inherent in the 
agreement, but also giving strong protection in its national IP laws in areas where it 
has offensive interests but in which there are currently no consensus in the WTO to 
offer protection through the multilateral system.
Perceptions of the national interest are driving some of these changes. In general, the 
policy preference in South Africa is to offer only minimum protection to IPRs, where
98 See WIPO website: http://www.wipo.int.
99 See Maskus, 2000 at p. 184.
100 The Act is available at: http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2005/a20-05. pdf.
101 The issue of the relationship between TRIPS and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
has formed part of the main discussions at the TRIPS Council for many years. While most developing 
countries, notably India, want such conditions as evidence of prior informed consent and benefit- 
sharing and disclosure in patents to be incorporated in the TRIPS Agreement, the developed countries, 
notably the US, argued that bio-diversity conditions should not form part of the patent system but that 
national systems, independent from the patent system, should be adopted to regulate the issues. See, for 
example, WTO documents IP/C/M/3 6/Add.l and IP/C/W/420/Add.l for some of the arguments on the 
subject.
102 Jonathan Berger, head of the Law and Treatment Access Unit, AIDS Law Project, article in 
Business day, 01/9/2005.
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important domestic issues such as those with social and health implications are 
concerned. For example, as Mr Justice Harms of the Supreme Court of Appeal, who 
has delivered judgments in many IP cases, put it, while final injunctions are likely to 
be granted as a matter of course in many IP cases in South Africa, the situation is 
likely to be different in pharmaceutical patent cases, where the rights holder may only
1Mbe awarded damages instead of a final injunction.
The policy goal of redressing historical economic and social injustices of apartheid is 
the motivation behind domestic laws such as the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
the National Health Act of 2003, the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
Act of 2003 and the various BBBEE charters, even though some provisions of these 
laws and regulations appear to be in conflict with South Africa’s market access and 
national treatment obligations under the GATS and the TRIMS Agreement.104
The situation described above is not different in Nigeria, where there is inadequate 
appreciation of the benefits of IPR protection among regulatory officials and among 
the general public.105 As a Nigerian delegation to a WIPO meeting put it, “the 
repeated assertion that IP could be used for the creation of wealth” meant nothing to 
vast majority of Nigerians, whose preoccupation was “not with wealth creation, but 
the struggle for survival from one day to the next”.106
Nigeria’s view on patent protection is, perhaps, reflected in the statement of the chief 
analyst in NOTAP to a WIPO conference in 2001:
“... we should not fail to see the problems that developing countries will face in the future 
with the stringent protection of IPR. This is likely to create marginalisation and vulnerability
103 See speech to WIPO’s Advisory Committee on Enforcement: document WIPO/ACE/2/4 Rev. of 
May 19, 2004. Indeed, in the criminal context, according to the Pharmaceutical manufacturers’ 
Association (PMA) of South Africa, there had only been one successful conviction involving 
pharmaceutical crime (theft and counterfeiting) in nearly 10 years, and in that case, the Adlam case, the 
prosecution failed to complete the case but entered into a plea-bargain agreement with the accused. See 
PMA, Annual Report, May 2001 -  April 2002.
104 See chapter 6 for a discussion of South Africa’s compliance with these agreements.
105 A senior official of the National Office for Technology Acquisition and Promotion (NOTAP) noted 
in a speech at a WIPO-organised conference in 2001, that “the pace of awareness on IP protection is 
still very low compared with the rapid global changes taking place in respect of the subject matter”. He 
blamed inadequate “financial resources to embark on awareness building programme”. See document 
WIPO/ECTK/SOF/Ol/2.7 of May 2001.
106 See WIPO document PCIPD/4/3 Pro.2 at p.45.
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of developing countries to the dictates of the owners of IPR, who most times are not ready to 
transfer their technology at affordable prices. Most developing countries have a very low 
bargaining power and technology capacities and the exorbitant prices of the new areas of high 
technology which have profound implications for basic human needs like food, security and 
health”.107
The above view, perhaps, further shows why Nigeria has so far been reluctant to bring 
its IP laws into conformity with the TRIPS Agreement. Yet, Nigeria has strengthened 
the IP regime in areas in which there is a strong perception of the national interest. 
For instance, the criminal liability in respect of infringement of folklore is the highest 
under Nigerian IP laws after the penalties for piracy.
In sum: there is strong evidence that domestic circumstances, policy considerations, 
and cost-benefit calculations are impacting on whether and to what extent these 
countries adjust to certain international legal constraints, such as the WTO 
obligations. Clearly, to a large extent, international legal obligations would be viewed 
through the prism of the policy objectives that governments believe it is in their 
national interest to pursue. If there is a major clash between domestic policy 
objectives and a country’s international obligations, compliance is unlikely to be 
routine, voluntary or complete. However, the perception of the national interest may 
be shaped by exogenous factors.
Exogenous Factors: Regime Linkages, Globalisation and Market Forces 
Enforcement of international law can occur through perturbations108 and linkages. 
External events, caused by globalisation and market forces, can induce better 
compliance in states that need to send the right signals to foreign investors and 
international markets. Policy recommendations, conditionalities, and technical 
assistance from international economic institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, 
the World Customs Organisation (WCO), and the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO) can work complimentarily to induce better compliance with 
WTO law by countries over which these organisations have economic leverage. 
Further, an economically powerful state may seek to pursue improved levels of
107 See document WIPO/ECTK/SOF/01/2.7 at p. 6
108 Or, as Teubner (1992) prefers, “productive misreading”; where responsiveness of one discourse to 
another occurs not only because of perturbation but because one system productively misreads the 
other as a source of norm production, (p. 1447).
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compliance in weak countries through its own unilateral decision, which may include 
the use of diplomatic and economic pressure, rather than through the WTO system.109
These essentially non-legal phenomena -  economic exigencies, power pressures and 
market expectations and trust relations -  can serve as perturbating events and linkage 
institutions that connect otherwise operationally closed governments more tightly to 
international legal norms and make them more responsive to those norms. In these 
instances, international law plays no direct or independent binding role, but provides 
the normative underpinning for the non-legal pressures. How do all these play out in 
respect of rule compliance by South Africa and Nigeria?
In the case of South Africa, the influence of the international markets and of the EU 
and the US, its largest trading partners, are strong in shaping the foreign economic 
and trade policies of the government. The argument that globalisation constrains the 
policy choices of governments is taken more seriously in South Africa than in 
Nigeria, given the former’s relatively higher level of integration into the global 
economy,110 although Nigeria's desire to attract foreign investment has meant that its 
policies have increasingly been shaped by concerns about investor confidence.111
Having suffered a currency crash twice and a wave of disinvestments in the mid- 
1990s, which some foreign investors blamed on the unfavourable legislative and 
regulatory climate, the South African government is generally concerned about the 
signalling effect of its policies and regulations on foreign and local investors, as well 
as on its major trading partners. For instance, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association (PMA) of South Africa believes that the government has not granted a 
compulsory licence or allowed parallel importation, despite providing for these 
measures in its law and despite frequent threats by ministers, and pressure from
109 See Ierley (2002)
110 It has also been argued that given South Africa’s considerable distance from its main trading 
partners (the EU, the US and Japan), this lack of proximity makes South Africa particularly vulnerable 
in the global economy, and needs to compensate for this by being sensitive to the needs of its trading 
partners and international markets (see Wakeford, 2005).
11 A typical example is how Nigeria responded to its blacklisting by the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) over its inadequate anti-money laundering rules. See note 26 above.
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activists, to use them, because it is concerned about the possible adverse reactions
119from foreign investors and of its main trading partners, the EU and the US.
The EU is South Africa’s largest trading partner and the main source of its foreign 
direct investment (FDI), while approximately 90% of South Africa’s exports to the 
US enter duty free under the Generalised System of Preference (GSP) and the AGO A. 
Most of the pharmaceutical firms in South Africa are subsidiaries of EU and US 
companies. Thus, IPRs are a key offensive market access interest for both the US and 
the EU, and the EU is particularly a strong demandeur on protection of geographical 
indications. Clearly, it is difficult for South Africa to blithely ignore the interests of its 
major trading partners with respect to IPR protection.
In 1998, the USTR placed South Africa on the Special 301 Watch List because of 
problems in the patent system. Some eighteen months later, South Africa and the US 
came to a written "understanding" regarding the importance of IPR protection, with 
South Africa re-affirming its commitment to comply with the TRIPS Agreement. The 
IPR section of the EU-SA Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA), 
notes that "it is essential to ensure adequate protection of intellectual property", and 
makes provisions for "urgent consultations where necessary, as well as technical 
assistance for South Africa".113 Thus, while South Africa may be tempted, for purely 
domestic reasons to limit the enjoyment of exclusive rights by patent owners, 
concerns about the likely responses of international investors and its major trading 
partners are powerful restraining forces.
Despite the huge challenges posed by the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the government’s 
constitutional responsibility to address the health needs, South Africa has stopped 
short of using TRIPS flexibilities, such as producing or importing cheaper copies of 
patented medicines.114 The government rejected, in March 2001, the request by 
CIPLA, the Indian generic manufacturer, for a compulsory licence to produce an 
antiretroviral drug, and turned down Thailand’s offer of cheap generic drugs to reduce
112 Representatives of the PMA, Interview, June 2003.
113 See http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/rl2201.htm for the TDCA.
114 Some commentators argue that the government approach of tackling retail pharmacists and their 
pricing strategies is a “cop out” for it failure to introduce generic competition, which is capable of 
bringing down drug prices considerably (see Tayob 2006).
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the prices for HIV/AIDS medicine. A Thailand government official was reported as 
saying “there is a lack of political will in South Africa”.115 Most of the antiretroviral 
drugs are currently under patent in South Africa, and the government is aware that 
patent holders would view compulsory licensing, parallel importing or even 
importation of generic drugs as a violation of their rights.
With respect to the implementation of the customs valuation agreement, it seems also 
that regime linkages have played a role. For instance, Mr Pravin Gordhan, the 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services, (SARS), which controls 
customs matters, has been the Chairman of the World Customs Organisation (WCO) 
since 2000. Although the Commissioner is widely known to be revenue-conscious and 
for shifting the orientation of Customs towards revenue generation, his chairmanship 
of the WCO is believed to have led him to focus increasingly on trade facilitation. As 
one customs officer put it, “since he became the WCO chairman, we have been 
getting a lot of support from him”.116
What role have regime and issue linkages played in shaping the compliance behaviour 
of Nigeria? Given Nigeria’s debt burden, both the IMF and the World Bank have 
some leverage over its economic policy. Both have frequently offered technical and
117policy advice. In particular, the World Bank has given Nigeria loans to promote
1 i q
trade liberalisation. However, despite the role of these institutions, Nigeria has 
displayed poor commitment to trade and trade-related reforms.119 The linkage- 
variable has been weak arguably because both the IMF and the World Bank have not 
used their economic leverage to impose on Nigeria conditionalities explicitly
17Hsupportive and consistent with the WTO obligations.
115 See: “South African Government refuses Thailand’s offer of cheap drugs”,
http://www.actupnv.org/reports/thaigenerics.html.
116 Interview, 2003.
117 For the World Bank’s policies towards trade and trade policy reforms, see Krueger and Rajapatirana 
(1999).
118 Oyejide et al (2005).
119 Castillo (1993) cited in Oyejide, et al (2005).
120 Article III. 5 of the WTO Agreement calls for greater economic coherence in global economic 
policy-making between the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, and to this effect, Agreements have 
been signed by the WTO with the IMF and the World Bank, see Annex 1 to WTO document WT/L/195 
for the WTO-IMF Agreement, and Annex II to WT/L/195 for the WTO-World Bank Agreement. 
Generally, however, policy coherence and coordination have not been fully achieved between these 
organisations, even though both the IMF and the World Bank have mandates to promote trade (see, e.g. 
Sutherland et al, 2004).
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Both WIPO, on intellectual property, and the WCO, on customs matters, have been 
involved in technical assistance and capacity-building efforts in Nigeria. Indeed, 
Nigeria states that its draft IP bills and draft customs valuation bills were produced 
with support from WIPO and the WCO respectively, in addition, in both cases, to
191technical assistance from the WTO. But, apparently, none of these efforts have 
yielded any tangible results, given that, to date, Nigeria has enacted no WTO- 
compatible laws. As WIPO has noted, although it could offer legal and technical 
assistance relating to the TRIPS Agreement, “sovereign member states make the final
1 99decisions”. Evidently, despite technical support from these organisations, Nigeria 
has not shown the political will to pass the bills into law, which clearly shows that 
lack of political will can limit the impact of technical assistance.
Unilateral external measures and self-help appear, however, to have had some impact. 
With respect to intellectual property, the strongest foreign influence on Nigeria is the 
United States, which is Nigeria's main trading partner, the largest purchaser of its oil. 
However, the US's IP principal interest in Nigeria is mainly in the area of copyright 
and related rights. Unlike in the case of South Africa, external interest in other IP 
areas in Nigeria appears to be limited.
In nearly 30 years, between 1972 and 2000, only 12, 707 trademarks were registered 
in Nigeria, of which 8, 874 were foreign, while 3, 843 were domestic. During the 
same period, 6,099 patents were registered, out of which 5, 752 were foreign and 347
19Twere local. These figures are so insignificant considering that in South Africa there 
were nearly 100,000 patent applications in 2002 alone. It probably explains why 
foreign interest and pressure on patent and trademark protection in Nigeria are not 
that strong.
However, the US has a strong interest in the protection of copyright, given the 
prevalence of copyright piracy in the country. Nigeria is believed to be the largest 
African market for pirated products. According to the International Intellectual
121 See, for example, WTO document IP/Q1-4/NGA/1 at p.2.
122 See http://www.wipo.int/cfediplaw/en/trips/index.htm.
123 See paper delivered by the assistant chief analyst for the National Office for Technology 
Acquisition and Promotion (NOTAP) at the WIPO Conference of May 2001. See document 
WIPO/ECTK/SOF/01/2.7.
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Property Alliance, the US-based copyright industry lobby, sound recording piracy is 
at a level of approximately 85% in Nigeria. The IIPA also claims that "pirates have 
completely overrun the book market", and "there has been a proliferation of optical 
disc manufacturing plants".124 The pressure on the government to reform the 
copyright regime has thus come partly from the US and its corporate actors, including 
Microsoft, which has been actively involved in stemming the tide of software 
piracy.125
The Copyright Act of 1990, which is largely TRIPS compliant, was based on US 
copyright law. The US’s role is, however, not only limited to putting pressure on 
Nigeria for reform but also in providing technical assistance, through its Commercial 
Law Development Programme (CLDP), run by the Department of Commerce and the 
US Agency for International Development (USAID). As will be shown later, 
however, the indigenous copyright industry has also been at the forefront of the 
campaign. What this shows is that the combination of sustained external and domestic 
pressures can lead to an improved protection of IPRs.
In sum, in the case of South Africa, external factors and linkages play a major role, 
but less so in the case of Nigeria, where external pressure, driven mainly by the US, 
appears to be limited to the protection of copyrights. South Africa’s economy is so 
tied to the global economy that it cannot ignore global market forces and the powerful 
influence of its major trading partners. One of the strategic goals of the ANC 
government since 1994 is the "global repositioning of South Africa", particularly with 
respect to the country’s foreign economic relations. The emphasis is on tapping "trade 
and investment potential for South Africa across a range of markets". As a result, 
the government recognises that the appropriate and inevitable response to the 
challenges posed by globalisation is to comply with existing international rules.
As the Minister of Trade and Industry puts, it, "whatever you do domestically, you 
have to make sure that it is in keeping with the rules that govern the global trade
124 See: http://ww.iipa.com/pdft2005SPEC301fflSTOWCALSUMMARY.pdf (Accessed 
16/11/2005)
125 For instance, several raids into business and private premises have been carried out at the instigation 
o f Microsoft Nigeria, which is very concerned about software piracy.
126 Parliamentary Briefing by the Minister of Trade and Industry on 12 February 1998.
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environment".127 This attitude is not shared by Nigeria, which has a reputation in 
Africa for showing "how a country can put its interests first and damn the 
consequences".128 This is partly because external factors and linkages are not playing 
a significant shaping role, given the limited and oil-dominated international 
involvement in Nigeria’s economy. Yet, one cannot ignore institutional factors 
relating to capacity and government effectiveness.
Capability and Institutional Quality
Capacity and institutional deficits are relevant in explaining South Africa’s 
significant, yet partial, compliance, as well as Nigeria’s significant non-compliance. 
Both South Africa and Nigeria have capacity problems, although, as Table 3 shows, 
South Africa performs better than Nigeria on the different components of government 
effectiveness. As discussed in chapter 3, there are serious problems of government 
ineffectiveness, poor bureaucratic quality and legislative inefficiency in Nigeria. That 
Nigeria needed the help of WIPO to draft its IP laws and the WCO its customs laws 
clearly shows the depth of the capacity problems.
Yet, even with the technical assistance, draft bills for various IP areas either still 
remain with the Ministry of Justice or are held up in the Parliament for several years. 
Bureaucratic politics assumes a great role in public governance in Nigeria. Senior 
bureaucrats opposed to proposed reforms in a bill can effectively kill it off or delay its 
approval.129 Furthermore, legislators give little priority to passing into law essential 
bills unless arm-twisted by the Executive or even paid bribes by ministers.
In South Africa, although the situation is not as acute as that of Nigeria, there are 
capacity problems in the civil service, particularly at the middle level cadre, and 
policy implementation is problematic at the local government level. To an extent, this
127 See "SA Trade Minister warns that globalisation can hurt" 
http://www.tralac.org/scripts/content.php?id=2925 (accessed 26/10/2005).
128See" Ex-Trade Minister Lauds Nigeria's Ban"
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=91081 (accessed
26/10/2005)
129 In an interview with a senior Nigerian trade diplomat in Geneva, he said that a trade policy 
document formulated in 2001 is being replaced because of disagreements among the relevant ministries 
as to the appropriate policies.
130 In 2004, some senators demanded and received money from the Minister of Education to approve 
the ministry budget. When this became known, the President sacked the minister and the Senate 
President was forced to resign.
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has affected South Africa’s implementation of some of its WTO obligations. For 
instance, South Africa undertook to implement the TRIPS agreement within a year, 
given its developed-country status, but eventually took three years to introduce the 
implementing legislation in 1998; and its review at the TRIPS Council took over three 
years, from 1996 to 1999. Furthermore, South Africa did not introduce its new trade 
remedy regulations until 2004 even though it started the process of restructuring its
131anti-dumping and countervailing system in 1996.
Senior South African officials attribute these delays to “problems of coordination and
1 1 0  1 3 3capacity” and generally difficulties of “an institutional nature”. Capacity 
constraints, therefore, play a role in explaining South Africa’s incomplete compliance, 
but it is not a significant role. There was always the political will, and the legislative 
process works far better in South Africa than in Nigeria, with hundreds of bills passed 
into law since 1994. Government officials have far greater awareness of international 
trade law considerations and are better institutional supporters of compliance than in 
Nigeria, where only few officials and legislators have even read the WTO 
agreements.134 The focus now shifts to the role of domestic interests.
Compliance Constituency, Resister Group, and Government Officials 
In South Africa, global pharmaceutical, software and recorded entertainment 
industries and their local subsidiaries are the compliance constituencies, with great 
commercial interests in compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. These global
1 3^corporate actors , which were the demandeurs for the TRIPS Agreement, have, as 
Duncan Matthew puts it, “re-invented themselves as guardians of TRIPS
1 3 fkimplementation”. The resister groups, opposed to strict compliance with the TRIPS 
Agreement, however, consist of international and local NGOs, especially those 
involved in the HIV/AIDS campaigns.
131 See WTO document G/ADP/W/395 and G/SCM/W/405 of 4 June 1996.
132 DTI official, Interview, June 2003.
133 South Africa’s response at a TRIPS Council meeting, see WTO document IP/C/M/18 at p.4.
134 When interviewed in 2003, a member of Commerce Committee of the Nigerian House of 
Representatives said: “we are still studying the WTO agreements”.
135 The International Trademark Association (INTA), the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC) and 
the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturing of America (PhRMA), both of which represent 
proprietary pharmaceutical industries, as well as the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), 
an industry group for copyright and related rights, are the key US-based interest groups active in 
monitoring compliance with the TRIPS Agreement.
136 See Matthews (2002).
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The conflicting pressures from these groups are often mediated constitutionally
1 ^ 7through the courts. However, the court's general attitude, as mentioned earlier, has
been in favour of defending the constitutional guarantee of property rights and for this
1^0
purpose they treat intellectual property rights like any other property. Frequently, 
too, the battle has been taken to the political arena, and this is where the role of 
government officials in ensuring compliance with the TRIPS Agreement can be 
important.
For several years, the pharmaceutical firms in South Africa fought hard to try to 
prevent the Government from introducing laws and regulations on compulsory 
licenses, parallel importation, generic substitution, price control, and price 
minimisation. However, they were unable to prevent the introduction of these laws, 
although they succeeded, through a court injunction, in preventing the coming into 
force of the legislation for three years. The industry’s failure to stop the introduction 
of the laws stemmed from the government’s belief that they were necessary to achieve 
its policy objectives. As the Minister of Health put it:
“When all is said and done, our basic motivation for this legislation (the Medicine Control 
Amendment Act) is: to bring down the cost of medication and to make health care more 
affordable in both private and public sector; to protect the public by ensuring the safety, 
quality and effectiveness of drugs; to further protect the public by creating conditions for 
good pharmaceutical practices. We have consistently taken the position that we can fulfil all 
of these objectives and still adhere to our international obligations in terms of IPRs”139
Having taken this strong policy position, the government effectively neutralised the 
pressure from the domestic industry lobby groups and their foreign backers. However, 
despite the equally strong pressure form the AIDS campaigners, it is also evident that 
these laws were not introduced at the behest of the NGOs. The attitude of the 
government to the some of the NGOs is reflected in the statement of the Minister of
137 On a number of occasions, NGOs such as the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) have sought 
through the courts or the Competition Commission to force the government to grant compulsory 
licenses or have joined court actions involving the government and pharmaceutical sector as amicus 
curiae.
138 See, for example, Laugh It Off Promotions CC v. South African Breweries International (Finance) B 
V T/A Sabmark International, 2004, SC A, 242.
139 Parliamentary Briefing, 13 September 2001:
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2001/010913252p 1001 .htm.
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Health, who argues that, "some interest groups will always put their narrow interests 
before the common good"140.
Although South Africa has a well-developed capacity to manufacture generic 
drugs141, the pressure on the government to issue compulsory licenses does not, 
surprisingly, come from this sector. Indeed, the view of the generic sector is not 
different from that of proprietary drugs manufacturers, namely that today’s patents are 
tomorrow’s generics; therefore, the government should protect the patent system, 
which would act as a conduit to bring about imitative competition in the form of 
generics.142 The pressure on government to issue compulsory licences has come 
mainly from AIDS campaigners.
However, government officials have rebuffed and denied access opportunities to these 
NGOs143, and have instead assured the pharmaceutical companies that the laws would 
not be used to grant compulsory licenses. After the furore surrounding the enactment 
of these laws and the subsequent court action by the pharmaceutical companies, the 
government has reached out, through series of consultations and dialogue, to the drugs 
firms. As the PMA noted in its 2002 Annual Report, the “government largely 
honoured its post court-case undertakings, particularly in limiting application of 
Section 15C of (the Medicines Act) to parallel importation rather than a broader use 
of compulsory licensing”.144
The government’s rhetoric has also changed. For instance, although the Minister of 
Health still insists that “Government will not be distracted from pursuing its goal of 
improving access to affordable, quality medicines for all South Africans”, she also 
adds: “We are also very much conscious of the fact that access to medicine is
140 See The Star newspaper, 8/5/2003.
141 South Africa’s total generic market (by value) is among the largest in the world, accounting in 2001 
for 38% of total manufacturing market, compared to the US (8%), Japan (8%), Germany (27%) and the 
UK (21%).
142 See PMA, Annual Report, May 2001 -  April 2002. According to Stavros Nicolau, the head of 
strategic trade for Aspen Pharmacare, South Africa’s biggest generic drug company, “compulsory 
licences are not practical (and) will scare off foreign investors (“Continent urged to respect patents”, 
Business Day, 3/6/2005).
143 As one puts it, “we are seen as enemy. There is an incredible hostility to the pressure groups. They 
don’t listen to us” (An AIDS activist, Interview, June 2003). According to a news item in Business day 
of 25/3/2003, "key actors are excluded from official discussion of AIDS because they are not 
sufficiently loyal to the African National Congress, ANC".
144 PMA, Annual Report, May 2001 -  April 2002, p. 4.
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dependent on a viable manufacturing and retail pharmacy industry to deliver the 
medicine to our people”145
The relationship between the government and the pharmaceutical companies has 
become less antagonistic, although deep suspicion remains. One factor that seems to 
have influenced the government’s attitude is the role of the courts, which have shown 
a willingness to strike down any measure that ’unreasonably’ undermines patent rights. 
For instance, in the Pharmaceutical Society o f South Africa case146, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal heavily criticised s. 22 G of the Medicine Act and declared as 
"invalid and of no force and effect" the regulation which sought to set a "single exit 
price" for all drugs sold in South Africa even by retail pharmacists.
Another factor forcing the government not to use the TRIPS flexibilities, including 
parallel importation even though the law provides for such measures, is the fear of 
foreign investors and South Africa’s major trading partners. The government claims 
that as a result of its successful macroeconomic policies “business confidence has 
escalated” and that the economic performance “has boosted foreign investor 
confidence”.147 Government officials are aware that this confidence could be 
destroyed if South Africa were to grant a compulsory licence or permit parallel 
importation.
Thus, while business interests have not captured the government’s legislative and 
regulatory agenda with regard to pharmaceutical patent protection, the government 
has been reluctant to enforce compulsory licenses or permit parallel importation, 
despite the HIV/AIDS pandemic, for fear of jeopardising investment and trade 
preferences from wealthy nations.
In other areas of intellectual property, such as copyright, foreign and local business 
groups have consistently put the South African government under pressure to comply 
with its TRIPS obligations. For instance, the International Intellectual Property
145 Parliamentary Briefing, 18 February 2005:
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/050218151001 .htm.
146 See: Pharmaceutical Society o f South Africa and Others and the Minister o f Health and Another, 
2004, SA 543 (SCA).
147 Media Briefing by the Economic, Investment and Employment Cluster, 7 September 2005. See 
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/05090716451001.htm.
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Alliance (IIPA) has, in its annual Section 301 report, constantly asked the US 
government to withdraw trade preferences from South Africa because of "weak" 
copyright protection.148
A local body, known as Southern African Federation Against Copyright Theft, headed 
by James Lennox, former chief executive of South African Chamber of Business 
(SACOB), is also active in lobbying the government to improve copyright protection 
and enforcement in South Africa. Equally active in lobbying the government are local 
musicians, many of whom, as the media put it, “live and die in poverty despite their 
success”.149 These lobby groups were the instigators of many of the amendments 
made in 2002 to the Copyright Act and the Performers’ Protection Act.
In the case of Nigeria, there is little evidence of interest group pressure, domestic or 
external, with regard to IP protection outside the copyright sector, although given the 
rise of HIV/AIDS in Nigeria, new NGOs have sprung up, putting pressure on the 
government to use the TRIPS flexibility allowing parallel importation of patented 
drugs.150 However, it is in the area of copyright protection that international and local 
business groups have actively lobbied the government. For instance, the indigenous 
copyright industry has been an active lobby group since the early 1980s when piracy 
grew to such scales that the business of publishers and other copyright holders such as 
musicians were being jeopardised.151
Nigeria has produced world-renowned writers, such as Chinua Achebe and Wole 
Soyinka, the first black Nobel-prize winner in literature. The Nigerian film industry 
is ranked among the fourth largest in the world. The music industry is also vibrant. 
Nigerians are also venturing into the software industry at some rapid pace.152 Thus, 
Nigeria has very active indigenous lobby groups to push for strong copyright
148 The International Intellectual Property Alliance has constantly called on the US government to 
withdraw trade preferences from South Africa, arguing that South Africa could not continue to enjoy 
such preferences while it failed adequately to protect US IPR interests.
149 See “State steps in to protect musicians”, Business Day, 20/09/2001.
150 Some of these NGOs are Journalists Against AIDS (JAAIDS) and the Centre for the Right to 
Health.
151 See Sodipo and Fagbemi, 1995.
152 According the a senior official of NOTAP, business methods and software obtained from developed 
countries are being restructured to suit local operations and new ones are being developed locally, 
especially in the banking sectors, hotels, manufacturing etc See document WIPO/ECTK/SOF/Ol/2.7 at
p.6
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protection. Indeed, it was pressure from these groups and their US counterparts that 
led to the enactment of the Copyright Decree of 1988, later renamed Copyright Act of 
1990. Domestic interest groups were also behind the new stringent provisions in the 
Act on protection of expressions of folklore. Government officials and government 
policies have merely tracked these domestic realities rather than driving them.
There is little evidence that interest groups play any role in the implementation of the 
customs valuation agreement in South Africa. Customs-business relations are 
particularly poor in South Africa due to the low levels of compliance with customs 
laws. However, rather than use the valuation system to “clean up the ‘Customs 
Industry’ of all misconduct and fraudulent activities that are associated with it”153, 
South Africa’s customs uses other policy instruments.154 In the case of Nigeria, 
revenue concerns and customs’ mistrust of importers are at the heart of the reluctance 
to implement the customs valuation agreement.
In sum, in the interaction between the three key actors identified earlier, it can be said 
that there is strong compliance constituency for TRIPS in South Africa, and an 
equally strong resister group, but government officials and domestic institutions 
largely mediate in favour of the former. In the case of Nigeria, there is lack of strong 
compliance constituency outside the copyright sector; there is also lack of strong 
resister groups. Non-compliance has, thus, been due to lack of institutional supporters 
within government.
On customs valuation, while interest groups have no significant impact on South 
Africa’s implementation of the agreement, customs’ mistrust of business interests has 
been one of the major reasons for Nigeria’s reluctance to embrace and implement the 
agreement. In both countries, there is evidence of interest group influence with respect 
to trade remedy and safeguard measures, although this is extremely strong in the case 
of Nigeria, where vested interests built around the use of import prohibition as a trade 
policy instrument have acquired tremendous powers with no effective counterweights.
153 See the SARS “leaflet on the Accreditation Scheme, available at: http://www.sars.gov.za.
154 These include the accreditation and penalty regimes, which many businesses consider to be onerous.
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Conclusion
This chapter set out to explain why South Africa and Nigeria have behaved the way 
they have with respect to the implementation of their WTO obligations. In doing so, 
both legal and non-legal variables were considered. It is evident (see table 4) that 
while the “shadow of the law” variables have had a significant impact on the 
behaviour of South Africa, they have not led to compliance on the part of Nigeria. 
Lack of ownership of the WTO Agreement plays a strong role in influencing 
Nigeria’s behaviour, as is the domestic regime type. Lack of ownership does not 
feature as a strong factor influencing compliance in South Africa, largely because 
most of the agreements represent its ex ante preferences.
Table 4: Relative Roles of Variables in Explaining the Behaviour of South Africa and Nigeria.
Variable South Africa Nigeria
Legal Variables:
Shadow of the law significant insignificant
Reputational concerns significant insignificant
Normative commitment significant Lack of commitment significant in 
explaining non-compliance
Endogenous Preference 
e.g. ownership o f rules
Very significant in 
explaining compliance
Lack of ownership is very significant in 
explaining non-compliance
Domestic Rule of Law significant Significant in explaining non-compliance
Legal Autopoiesis/treaty 
ambiguity
Significant in explaining 
partial compliance with 
TRIPS and GATS
insignificant
Non-legal variables
Domestic circumstances 
and policy preference
Very significant in 
explaining both compliance 
and incomplete compliance
Very significant in explaining non- 
compliance
External factors and 
linkages
Very significant in 
explaining compliance
Insignificant in explaining compliance but 
plays some role with respect to TRIPS
Capacity and 
Government 
Effectiveness
Significant in explaining 
partial compliance
Very significant in explaining non- 
compliance
Special interests Largely insignificant but 
plays a role in compliance 
with TRIPS
Largely insignificant but relevant in 
explaining the strong copyright regime, 
and plays a role in non-compliance with 
trade remedy and safeguard rules
Domestic rule of law and legality came up as a strong force for compliance in South 
Africa. However, legal autopoiesis or conflict of norms and treaty ambiguity appear to 
have played a role in limiting full compliance by South Africa. With respect to the 
non-legal factors, domestic circumstances and policy objectives play a significant role 
in different ways in explaining the behaviour of South Africa and Nigeria. However, 
external factors and linkages have greater influence on South Africa’s compliance
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behaviour than that of Nigeria. There are far greater pressures, domestic and 
international, on South Africa to comply with its obligations than there have been on 
Nigeria. In dealing with the conflicting pressures for compliance and non-compliance, 
the role of government officials has been pivotal in the case of South Africa, as state 
officials broadly favour and push for compatible measures. There are clearly few 
institutional supporters of compliance in Nigeria. The concluding chapter of this 
thesis, chapter 8, attempts to highlight the lessons learned from the case studies and 
the implications for international trade law rule- making and implementation.
261
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION: 
Understanding WTO Law Compliance - Lessons from the Study
This thesis has examined empirically national compliance with international trade 
law, with the central purpose of establishing whether and to what extent some states 
have implemented, to date, their WTO treaty obligations, and to identify the factors 
that have shaped their compliance behaviour. The aim of this last chapter is to pull 
together the main insights and conclusions from the previous chapters, and to draw 
out the key lessons and implications of the study for theoretical and empirical 
understandings of WTO law compliance.
The chapter has three sections. The first section reviews and sums up the argument. 
Section 2 discusses the key propositions flowing from the findings, and particularly 
their implications for the WTO. Section 3 examines and draws out the lessons of the 
thesis for the future of international economic law scholarship.
Overview of the Thesis
Following the introduction of the thesis in chapter 1, chapter 2 focused on the 
historical development of international trade law and on the theories as to the 
effectiveness of international law. It was noted that, with the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round, international trade regulation has become bound up with law and 
lawmaking, with the trend being towards imposing binding negative and positive 
obligations on state actors in the world trading system. However, it was argued that 
notwithstanding the move to law, national compliance cannot be fully understood 
from a legal purely perspective: it will be shaped not only by legal considerations but 
also by a variety of non-legal factors.
Chapter 3 then went on to examine the domestic structures of trade governance in 
South Africa and Nigeria, focusing on the social, economic, political, and cultural 
contexts. The aim of the chapter was to identify the underlying policy assumptions 
and objectives, as well as the institutional frameworks, of the trade regimes of two 
countries. The chapter was based on the premise that to understand a state’s legal and
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regulatory responses to WTO law, it is necessary, first, to understand the political 
economy, culture and institutional environment of that state.
The analyses showed that while South Africa and Nigeria nearly converged on macro- 
economic policies and management1, their trade policies were underpinned by 
different motivations and policy objectives: South Africa is largely a trade liberaliser, 
Nigeria a protectionist. Equally, South Africa has stronger external links, in terms of 
integration into the global economy, than Nigeria, and, therefore, greater market and 
market access considerations. There were also clear differences in their institutional 
structures, with South Africa having better scores on key indicators, such as rule of 
law and government effectiveness.
These differences in their domestic structures, it was argued, would lead to some 
divergences in these countries’ regulatory responses to the WTO obligations. The 
contents of chapter 2, which surveyed the literature on compliance, and of chapter 3, 
which examined the political economy, institutional and normative structures of trade 
governance in South Africa and Nigeria, foreshadowed the analysis and explanation 
in chapter 7 as to the determinants of the behaviour of these countries.
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 examined respectively three sets of case studies: the first looked at 
the implementation of the Customs Valuation Agreement; the second examined 
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, and the third, a general case-study, focused 
on the implementation of the WTO rules on trade remedies and some non-tariff 
measures. The aim of this last case study was to complement the earlier more detailed 
ones and to provide a rather complete and comprehensive picture of the compliance 
behaviour of the two countries. In each of these cases, it was shown that South Africa 
went to some lengths to adjust to its WTO obligations, while Nigeria did virtually 
nothing to implement the agreements.
The conclusion drawn from the findings was that, in general, WTO law had 
significant impact on trade governance in South Africa, while its impact on the 
behaviour of Nigeria had been negligible. Yet, it was also shown that compliance by
1 Macroeconomic reforms in South Africa are, however, far more consolidated that those in Nigeria, 
which are more recent and yet to be underpinned by firm legislative and institutional structures.
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South Africa had been partial rather than full or complete. For instance, with respect 
to the TRIPS Agreement and the GATS, there were areas of obvious non-compliance 
and areas where compliance was not clear. South Africa’s partial compliance thus 
needed to be explained.
Chapter 7 took on the task of explaining the overall compliance behaviour of both 
countries. Here, a socio-legal methodology was adopted, focusing on assessing the 
relative roles played by legal and non-legal variables in shaping the compliance 
behaviour of these countries. The findings confirm the central theoretical argument of 
this thesis, namely that states’ compliance with WTO law is likely to be shaped by a 
complex interplay of legal and non-legal considerations.
The chapter showed that no single factor can explain the compliance behaviour of any 
of the two countries. However, legal considerations played significant roles in 
differing ways in shaping the behaviour of the countries. South Africa acted more 
under “the shadow of WTO law” than Nigeria. It demonstrated greater awareness of 
the need for WTO compatibility of its trade laws and regulations, and appeared to 
have a higher level of loyalty and support for the WTO than Nigeria. However, legal 
qualities, such as perceptions of legitimacy and ownership played a very significant 
role in influencing the responses of Nigeria, as the country appeared to be more 
concerned about issues of legitimacy, fairness and equity.
Domestic rule of law and legality also played a major role in South Africa’s 
substantial compliance, while lack of strong commitment to the rule of law and 
legality appeared to have played a major role in Nigeria’s significant non-compliance. 
There is, however, evidence that legal autopoiesis (conflict of legal cultures, traditions 
and institutions) and treaty ambiguities were partly responsible for South Africa’s 
incomplete compliance with some of the agreements, particularly the TRIPS 
Agreement, where there appeared to be less willingness to introduce certain TRIPS- 
compliant provisions in the domestic IP laws or to comply fully with the GATS.
Non-legal factors, however, also came up strongly in explaining the behaviour of 
these countries. Here, rational choice considerations, based on the calculation of 
interests, have strong explanatory power. For South Africa, domestic circumstances
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and policy objectives coupled, with exogenous factors, such as concerns about market 
forces and investor perception, helped to induce better compliance. Globalisation as a 
variable played a significant role.
Yet, perception of the national interest also led to non-compliance or partial 
compliance with some agreements, particularly aspects of the TRIPS Agreement. 
Indeed, with respect to the GATS, where South Africa appeared to be in breach of 
many of the market access and national treatment commitments, this had been driven 
by domestic circumstances and policy imperatives.
Nigeria’s attitude to the WTO and to the implementation of the WTO agreements had 
more to do with perceptions of the costs and benefits of implementation than with 
external concerns. There was relatively little pressure from foreign economic actors 
and international organisations, including the WTO itself, to force Nigeria towards 
compliance with its WTO obligations. And government officials are less persuaded 
that it is in the country’s best interest to give any priority to the implementation of 
WTO agreements. It is more the case of “there is little in it for us”. These cost-benefit 
considerations are coupled with institutional deficits of significant proportions.
In sum, chapter 7 concluded that the behaviour of these countries was shaped by 
complex interplay between legal and non-legal factors. In the case of South Africa, 
enforcement and reputational concerns, endogenous preference, normative 
commitment, domestic rule of law, economic trust relations, and the exigencies of 
rational economic calculation came up as strong factors that induced compliance, 
while, with respect to agreements such as TRIPS and the GATS, legal autopoiesis and 
treaty ambiguity, but, more significantly, domestic circumstances and competing 
policy goals were strong factors that hindered full compliance.
In the case of Nigeria, the key determinants were: the absence of endogenous 
preference for, or ownership of, the WTO agreements, lack of strong normative 
commitment to WTO principles, absence of enforcement and reputational concerns, 
lack of sustained external pressure, the near-absence of domestic rule of law and 
legality, as well as institutional factors, such as weak governance structures.
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The findings showed that where there was compliance, as with South Africa in most 
cases, this was not influenced solely by the imperatives of WTO law but also by 
complementary forces, such as concerns about investor perception and likely 
responses of trading partners. Where there was no compliance, as with Nigeria in 
virtually all cases, WTO law did not matter at all. Politics and other non-legal 
phenomena prevailed over legal imperatives. So, then, what are the main propositions 
flowing from these findings, and what are their implications for the WTO?
Implications for future of rule making and implementation in the WTO
To understand the systemic challenges of lawmaking and implementation in the WTO 
one has to recognise the three fundamental shifts that the Uruguay Round brought 
about and implanted in the WTO system. First, the breadth and depth of the 
substantive legal rules have been substantially increased, with more detailed, 
elaborate and specific commitments, many of which are of a positive and institutional 
nature. Secondly, the concept of single undertaking effectively creates a one-size-fits- 
all straitjacket for all WTO members, with few exit options. Thirdly, public 
international trade law has become more legally binding, at least in the formal sense, 
with compulsory and automatic dispute settlement procedures, and the possibility of 
trade sanctions in the event of non-compliance.
If the objective of this fundamental shift away from the flexible, “soft law” approach 
of the old GATT system to the rigid, “hard law” approach of the WTO system is to 
constrain the behaviour of states with respect to their external trade policy and cause 
them to bring their trade and trade-related policies, laws and practices into conformity 
with international trade rules, this thesis has shown that this objective or predicted 
effect has not been achieved in all cases or fully achieved in any case. There is little 
evidence that states are routinely adhering to the principle of good faith fulfilment of 
the WTO treaty obligations, while some states appear not to be implementing many of 
the agreements at all.
For instance, Nigeria’s trade policy and regulatory framework has hardly changed 
from what it was before the WTO agreements entered into force. More than ten years 
since the WTO was established in January 1995, Nigeria has introduced virtually no 
law to implement its WTO obligations. Nigeria is not alone in this non-compliant
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situation. It was pointed out in chapter 4 that, as of December 2005, nearly 50 
developing countries had not notified their national implementing legislation on the 
Customs Valuation agreement to the WTO, a possible indication that they were not 
implementing the agreement.
Even among the major developing countries, such as India, Brazil and Mexico, there 
is evidence of some self-serving interpretations of the agreement. Also, while China 
has enacted or revised over 1000 laws and regulations to help bring its trading system 
into compliance with WTO rules, the view, at least from the perspectives of the EU 
and the US, is that its compliance record is profoundly mixed, with the persistence of 
rampant infringement of IPRs and the growth of regulatory barriers.
Chapter 5 showed that developing countries generally had problems with 
implementing the TRIPS Agreement. Most of these countries found it quite 
challenging to comply with the basic procedural obligations, such as notifications and 
participation in the review of their national legislation. Kusumadara states starkly that 
“[t]he TRIPS Agreement has failed and will continue to fail to be implemented in 
Indonesia” because the government considered the IP law reform required by the 
TRIPS Agreement to be less important than other domestic reforms.
In October 2005, Zambia, on behalf of the Least-Developed Country Members of the 
WTO submitted a proposal requesting an extension of the transitional period under 
Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for “a further 15 years”, i.e. up to 2020, citing 
“serious economic, financial and administrative constraints”.4 After much 
deliberation, the TRIPS Council agreed to extend the implementation period5, by a 
further seven and a half years to 1 July 2013, a decision described by the LDC group 
as a “painful compromise”.6
2 See “Chinese voices that oppose reform grow louder”, article by Susan Schwab, the US Trade 
Representative {Financial Times, December 11 2-006 at p. 19). See also “Slow Chinese reform ‘is 
straining US ties’” (FT, 11 December, 2006, p. 6).
3 Kusumadara (2002, p245).
4 See WTO document IP/C/W/457 of 21 October 2005.
5 See http://www.wto.org/english/news e/pres05 e/pr424 e.htm for the text o f the decision.
6 See http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php7p-l 57&print-1024 ff&print= 1 (accessed 
30/11/2005)
267
The foregoing reflects the compliance and implementation costs of the WTO 
agreements. Evidently, some developing countries have not been prioritising the issue 
of compliance with the WTO obligations or adhering to the international law 
principles of pacta sunt servanda and good faith fulfilment. Any notion of a smooth 
transition from existing domestic trade governance structures to new ones through a 
process instigated by WTO law has proved to be unrealistic. International trade law 
alone has not been producing substantial compliance results, at least in many 
developing countries.
Lukashuk argues that while there is a fairly high level of compliance with the norms 
of international law in general, international law “has proven to be insufficiently 
reliable” to induce consistent behaviour when states are safeguarding such paramount 
values as peace and security.7 This thesis has shown that such “unreliability” extends 
beyond the high politics of security to the low politics of trade. Close to security 
concerns on the sensitivity radar of states are trade and trade-related issues, given
O
their distributional consequences and their linkages with other domestic values, 
including the perception of national interest and sovereignty.9
Thus, states’ compliance with international trade rules is unlikely to be routine or 
even voluntary if such rules clash with more powerful national policy objectives. 
States are unlikely robotically to implement international trade rules that they 
perceive to be inconsistent with their national priorities and needs. Perceptions that 
international trade rules are unfair and inequitable will continue to dampen the 
enthusiasm to comply. Without the “internal point of view”, as HLA Hart put it10, a 
state is unlikely to feel a compelling sense of obligation to comply with its 
international law commitments. The value that states place on the outcomes of 
international negotiations and on the legal processes that produce the outcomes can 
play a significant role in shaping their compliance behaviour.
7 Lukashuk (1989, p. 513).
8 Trade liberalisation is not painless; it creates winners and losers, and can, at least in the short-term, 
result in real and social dislocation that causes severe hardship to individuals and groups (see Rodrik, 
1997; OECD, 1998, Kapstein, 2000; Fasan, 2001)
9 Barfield (2001); Rabkin (1999).
10 Hart (1961)
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To be sure, enforcement mechanisms can, to some extent, help induce compliance, 
but as Chayes and Chayes have pointed out, sanctioning authority “is rarely granted 
by treaty, rarely used when granted, and likely to be ineffective when used”.11 For 
instance, although sanctioning authority exists in the WTO, it has never been invoked 
against some developing countries, such as Nigeria, notwithstanding the high levels of 
non-compliance by these countries. In effect, although the WTO treaty is often 
regarded as a hard law instrument, it is, with respect to some developing countries, a 
rigid law with lax enforcement, as, evidently, many of these countries can get away 
with doing nothing.
In practice, trade concerns rather than legal criteria are central to the surveillance and 
enforcement mechanisms in the WTO. In other words, the trade effect of non-
1 7compliance is viewed with greater concern than a breach of obligation per se. A  
persistent rule-violator may continue to do so for as long as its trading partners 
consider its behaviour to be commercially insignificant to warrant a legal action or
serious threat of one. This is because, as Fukunaga argues, the primary purpose of the
/ ?WTO dispute settlement system is not to secure compliance in abstracto ; its 
compliance function is exerted only when the dispute settlement procedures have 
been invoked by a complainant.14
Although the purpose of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) is, inter alia, 
to contribute to “improved adherence” to WTO law by all Members, and “to the
11 Chayes and Chayes (1995, pp. 32 and 33).
12 The situation is different, however, when a case actually goes before a WTO Panel or Appellate 
Body. In many cases, the precise effect of a breach of obligations need not be known; what is required 
is a demonstration that there is a de jure violation of a WTO provision. This is in consonance with 
Article 3.8 of the DSU, which provides that there is a presumption that benefits are nullified or 
impaired -  i.e., there is a presumption of “harm” -  where a provision of a WTO agreement has been 
violated (see Panel Report, Argentina -  Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports o f Ceramic 
Floor Tiles from Italy, WT/DS189/R, adopted 5 November 2001). The quantification of trade effects 
may, however, be necessary in subsidy cases or in calculating the actual loss resulting from a WTO 
inconsistent measure (WTO, 2005).
13 Fukunaga (2006).
14 The concept of “nullification and impairment of benefits” means that only individual members can 
invoke the WTO dispute settlement mechanism against another member. There is no mechanism for 
the WTO Secretariat to compel a state to comply with their WTO obligations, although normative 
pressure can and is often exerted by the political bodies of the WTO. The present system appears to see 
non-compliance or violation mainly as a “breach of contract” between a member concerned and any 
other member (s) affected rather than as a systemic issue, with implications for the multilateral trading 
system and the integrity of international trade rules. A systemic approach would require a more active 
role by the Secretariat, such as through a trade ombudsman, and the possibility of denial of benefits and 
privileges of membership to persistent non-compliant member.
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smoother functioning of the multilateral trading system”15, it is also more concerned 
about the impact of national trade practices on the multilateral trading system than on 
rule adherence per se. As Qureshi puts it, the TPRM is more concerned about the de 
facto multilateral trading system than the “multilateral juridical trading system”.16
The foregoing shows that neither the WTO enforcement mechanism nor its 
surveillance or monitoring system is designed to induce rule compliance by a 
persistent rule violator whose behaviour nevertheless causes no serious concern to any 
other member or to the multilateral trading system. From legal and systemic 
perspectives, however, non-compliance and lack of effective compliance mechanisms 
undermine the integrity of the WTO legal order because the effectiveness of 
international law depends on whether states routinely observe its rules and principles.
To be sure, some scholars view the problems of non-compliance less in terms of weak
enforcement and surveillance mechanisms but more as a result of inadequate state
capacity. Thus, to these scholars, the solution lies in enhanced technical and
financial assistance and support for capacity building. Yet, even with respect to
technical assistance, the fact is that the WTO is not in any effective position to
facilitate the implementation of the agreements. For instance, no aid for meeting
18implementation costs has, to date, been channelled through the WTO.
Although there have been some multilateral initiatives, these are limited to legislative 
drafting and training on WTO agreements; they do not address the acute institutional 
deficits in many developing countries. Indeed, some multilateral donors, such as the 
World Bank, do not view the implementation and adjustment costs generated by 
WTO obligations as directly related to development because these obligations “arise 
from a trade negotiation, not from a country-based assessment of priorities”.19 As for 
bilateral initiatives, these are too often donor-driven, and are viewed with suspicion
15 See Paragraph A (i) of the TPRM
16 Qureshi (1999,p.323).
17 See, e.g. VanDeveer and Dabelko (2001)
18 Phillips et al (2005).
19 Cali et al (2006).
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by many developing countries as attempts to force them to implement WTO or 
“WTO-plus” obligations intended to benefit the donors.20
In December 2005, at the Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, WTO members
adopted a Declaration with Paragraph 57 on “Aid for Trade”, aimed, inter alia, to
91assist developing countries “to implement and benefits from WTO Agreements” , 
and subsequently, in February 2006, the WTO Director-General established the task 
force on Aid for Trade. However, like most of the Special and Differential Treatment 
provisions in the WTO agreements, the Aid for Trade initiative is likely to be based 
on best endeavours, and not legally binding. In the Uruguay round, “developing 
countries took on bound commitments to implement in exchange for unbound 
commitments for assistance”.22 The Aid for Trade initiative could become a similar 
unbound commitment for assistance in exchange for bound commitments to accept 
and implement new obligations emanating from the Doha Round.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is argued that, in the final analysis, compliance by 
sovereign states cannot rest solely on enforcement and surveillance mechanisms,
9^including sanctions or threat of sanctions, or, indeed, on technical assistance , but 
rather on a sense of obligation, which arises from a state’s respect for the legitimacy 
of the international law in question, its ownership of the law, and its perception that 
the rules are fair, equitable and just, and that they track its developmental objectives, 
priorities and needs.
The principle of pacta sunt servanda requires good faith fulfilment of peremptory 
international norms by states, including a duty to refrain from acts that prevent full 
implementation of international legal commitments, even when contrary to their 
immediate, short term interests. However, in reality, the effectiveness of this principle 
depends on its interaction with other principles of international law, including
20 Ibid.
21 See WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Document: JOB(05)/298/Rev.l, paragraph 57.
22 Finger and Schuler (2000, p.514).
23 For instance, even though Nigeria received some technical assistance with respect to the drafting of 
WTO compatible IP and customs valuation laws, it has not demonstrated the willingness to pass the 
relevant bills into law. Technical assistance is insufficient without the political will or support in 
implementing an international commitment in the national context.
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consent, justice and fairness, as well as on the existence of some non-legal, yet 
complementary, factors, including, crucially, cost-benefit considerations.
These propositions have far-reaching implications for the WTO system. Perhaps the 
most obvious is that one-size-fits-all blueprints cannot be ideal in a hugely 
asymmetrical organisation such as the WTO.24 The Single Undertaking principle 
departs from the well-established treaty doctrine of reservations. It has created a 
situation in which some developing states do not feel a sufficient sense of duty to 
implement certain WTO obligations, since they perceive that these commitments were 
forced on them during the Uruguay Round negotiations. Several commentators have 
highlighted this anomaly in the international trade law-making process , and the 
Consultative Board set up by former Director-General of the WTO, Dr Supachai 
Panitchpakdi, has recommended what it described as “variable geometry” in WTO 
commitments or a multi-speed WTO.27
Differentiation in WTO law will allow genuine state consent and ownership of 
agreed-upon rules, which is essential for faithful implementation. It will also address 
the present situation, whereby developing countries with poor records of 
implementing existing rules are in a position, under the consensus rule, to block 
negotiations or progress on new commitments that are favoured by the developed 
countries. Those unwilling to assume greater commitments are preventing those 
willing from doing so, precisely because the latter group insists on such commitments 
being equally mandatory and binding on the former. There is clearly a strong 
argument in favour of not forcing all countries to sign up to the same agreement at the 
same time, but only when they are able and willing to assume legally binding 
obligations.
24 The notion of legal symmetry that underpins WTO law, whereby all countries are essentially 
assumed to be formally equal under the law of the WTO ignores the actually reality of economic 
asymmetry that characterises WTO membership.
25 On the one hand, WTO law is similar to a contract because it creates rights and obligations as 
between members. On the other hand, it can be analogised to a charter or a constitution because of the 
limited exit options and one-size-fits all blueprints.
26 See, e.g. Hindley (2002) and Abbott and Snidal (2002).
27 See Sutherland et al (2005)
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This thesis has shown that forcing trade commitments on unwilling countries 
produces resentment and non-compliance, which cannot be remedied by a strong 
enforcement or punishment regime or even by provision of technical assistance. The 
principle of good faith fulfilment of treaty obligations derives from, and is kept in 
force by, the voluntary agreement or consent of states. Endogenous or ex ante 
preference is, thus, essential to ensure better ex post compliance. The single package 
idea removes the exit options that are normally part of public international law.
The best model for the future, it is contended, is one based on differentiation in WTO 
law and a staged acceptance of WTO commitments by members. In this regard, the 
modalities for negotiations on trade facilitation, agreed under the July 2004 Package, 
appear to reflect this flexible model. The modalities state, crucially, that “the extent 
and timing of entering into commitments shall be related to the implementation
98capacities of developing and least-developed members” [italics added]. This will not 
prevent the agreement from containing institutionally demanding substantive 
obligations or commitments (for those who are willing and able to assume such 
commitments) but for developing countries that lack necessary capacity, and where 
support for capacity building and technical assistance is not forthcoming,
90“implementation will not be required”.
Essentially, the modalities allow developing countries to accede to parts of the future 
WTO trade facilitation agreement only when they are able to do so, i.e. when they 
have the necessary capacity to implement it. Unlike the customs valuation and 
TRIPS agreements, which merely allowed for the traditional transition periods for 
implementation, the modalities for negotiating a WTO trade facilitation agreement are 
based on genuine differentiation and a multi-speed approach.
This rather flexible, bottom-up, approach is likely to reduce the costs associated with 
negotiating highly legalised agreements, that is, agreements that are too precise, rigid 
and legally binding. These costs often arise from the extreme care that states normally
28 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dda e/draft text gc dg 31iulv04 e.htm.
29 Ibid.
30 Another model o f the bottom-up approach being suggested here is the GATS’ ‘positive listing’ 
principle, which allows members to ‘opt in’ to substantive market access and national treatment GATS 
commitments only when they feel ready and able to do. The GATS, however, makes the transparency 
obligations mandatory and binding on all WTO members.
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exercise in negotiating and accepting such agreements because of implementation 
concerns as well as concerns about the potential impact of such agreements for their
■5 -I
economies and policy autonomy.
To preserve the integrity of international trade law and ensure that the legal 
commitments that governments make are as dependable as their binding legal form 
would suggest, it is essential that some elements of voluntarism is embedded in the 
international trade law making process. In the absence of genuine consensus, 
substantive international economic law rules that require positive harmonisation and 
institutional transformation by national governments cannot always be achieved 
through legal diktat, such as binding WTO law. Such an approach can, indeed, 
provoke dissatisfaction or create a backlash at the domestic level.
This is not an argument for turning WTO law into non-binding instruments or for 
subordinating WTO law to the constructs of political reality. Clearly, WTO rules 
should have an economic basis or an economising orientation, and need to reflect core 
principles such as non-discrimination and transparency32. Furthermore, given that 
trade agreements are more prone to defection and opportunism, trade commitments 
must have legal value and be backed by a strong, independent dispute settlement 
mechanism.
The argument is, however, for voluntarism.33 Countries should be able to belong to 
the WTO and participate in its negotiations without having to accept all the 
obligations at the same time.34 While this may be seen as a soft law approach; it is, in
31 This is why little progress has been made in negotiating post Uruguay Round commitments in the 
WTO. Trade facilitation is the only one of the four so-called Singapore issues to survive the collapse of 
the WTO ministerial conference in Cancun in 2003, and that is after the modalities were watered down 
considerably. The other Singapore issues are investment, competition and transparency in government 
procurement.
2 Every member must at a minimum accept the basic procedural obligations, such as transparency 
(including publication and notification of national laws and regulations), due process and access to 
remedies at the domestic level on a non-discriminatory basis.
33 This is a contractarian approach or, in law and economics terminology, methodological 
individualism. It suggests that each state is a rational evaluator of its preferences and should have the 
individual choice as to when to enter or agree to an arrangement that imposes constraints. See Dunoff 
and Trachtman (1999) and Trachtman (2002) for a discussion of this law and economics approach.
34 The EU Maastricht Treaty, perhaps, provide a model for this approach. The UK was part of the 
negotiations ab initio but opted out of the single currency obligation while accepting other aspects of 
the treaty. The UK has also opted out of a few other EU treaty obligations and yet remains an active 
member of the Union.
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fact, a different element of soft law.35 The kind advocated here differs from hard law 
only in terms of its mandatory nature.
It is argued that although this approach suggests some party autonomy, rule and 
policy convergence would eventually be attained through non-legal factors, such as
7^economic realities, market forces, and positive network externalities . The seeming 
autonomy is likely, with time, to yield to inevitable extemalisation through a process
"JO
induced by perturbations , socialisation and experience. While international law 
provides a common reference point and sets the boundaries of acceptable or 
permissible national behaviour, it is non-legal phenomena such as economic interests, 
market forces and network externalities that are likely to serve as more powerful 
forces for compliance or convergence.
For instance, as more and more developing countries come to realise that high 
transaction costs of cross-border trade are hurting their trade and economic 
development, deterring foreign investors, and creating friction with their major 
trading partners, they are likely to reorder their domestic priorities and pay more 
attention to trade facilitation measures that conform to the requirements of the 
agreement. The same applies to other aspects of trade and trade-related policies. In a 
spontaneous order system, actors constantly adapt to changes in their immediate and 
external environment, including, for instance, market changes and the actions of 
others with whom they have to deal.
35 For a discussion of the different elements of soft law, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of 
international soft law instruments, see: Snyder (1990), Gold (1993/1996), Abott and Snidal (2000), 
Mistelis in Fletcher et al (2001), and Kirton and Trebilcock (eds) (2004).
36 The substantive rules should be negotiated and agreed by all the parties, but with freedom to defer 
accession to such agreements. However, once a country makes an effective choice o f accepting the 
substantive rules in its national context, the “hardness” kicks in; and the law becomes legally binding. 
In the private law context, many commercial laws remain “soft law” until specifically incorporated into 
commercial agreements.
37 A positive network externality occurs when a critical mass o f users adopt a policy or rule, thus 
increasing its attractiveness to others. The gold standard became so widely used in the 19th century 
largely because o f such attractiveness (see Eichengreen, 1996)
38 External shocks, which led to financial and economic crises in developing countries in the 1970s and 
1980s led to the unilateral financial and economic liberalisation in many of these countries. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union and of communism also led to a sea change in economic thinking by many 
developing countries and engendered their outward orientation. Without these perturbating events, no 
single economic treaty could have independently achieved the same results. The ‘crisis’ explanation is 
popular in political economy literature (see, e.g. Williamson, 1994 and Rodrik, 1996).
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Thus, while WTO law provides the normative pressure for such a convergence, the 
real determinants will be economic interests and globalisation constraints. As a result, 
what began as soft law because of its non-mandatory nature could eventually develop 
into hard law, as countries voluntarily accept binding obligations in specific issue 
areas. Willing consent, inspired by domestic and external realities, is more likely to 
induce better state compliance with binding international law than perceptions that 
such binding obligations are imposed, inappropriate, unfair and unjust, as many 
developing countries and commentators are wont to describe some of the Uruguay 
Round agreements.
One of the contributions of this thesis is to offer an empirical support for the 
theoretical argument that the ultimate reasons that impel states to uphold the 
observance of international law cannot be explained by a strictly legal analysis. It has 
done this by highlighting the legal and non-legal factors that can affect a state’s 
compliance behaviour. This is not a proposition that international trade law is 
ineffective, but rather that its compliance pull depends on complementary legal and 
non-legal factors. It is the interplay and linkages among these factors that induce 
better compliance or limit compliance. As shown above, these propositions have 
implications for the WTO system, but they also have implications for interdisciplinary 
scholarship and research in international economic law.
Implications for International Economic Law Scholarship
There is general acceptance among international economic law scholars that 
international economic law is an interdisciplinary, even multidisciplinary, field. 
Professor Jackson argues that, “there is necessarily a strong component of 
multidisciplinary research and thinking required for those who work on international 
economic law projects”.39 He also notes that “[w]ork on international economic law 
matters often seems to necessitate more empirical study than some other international 
law subjects”.40 For Petersmann, “international economic law and practice cannot be
39 Jackson (1998, p. 10). He lists among the core disciplines, “economics, political science (and its 
intersection with economics found generally in the ‘public choice’ literature), and many other 
disciplines, such as cultural history and anthropology, geography, etc”.
40 Ibid
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understood without a good knowledge of economic theory and without taking into 
account the political processes from which they result”.41
Despite this wide acceptance, however, international economic law scholarship is still 
insufficiently interdisciplinary, to the extent that the economic or political economy 
dimensions are less evident in the literature 42 There are arguably two flaws. First, 
trade lawyers all too often discuss the effects of WTO law in language and arguments 
that are based on unsupported empirical assumptions. For instance, on the one hand, 
there is the claim that because more countries are acceding to the WTO, “a habit of 
obedience to the WTO system is developing” 43 On the other hand, according to some 
legal scholars, the WTO lacks “a high enough level of loyalty and support”.44
These are causal arguments relating to the impact or effects of the WTO system on 
state behaviour. However, they can only be verified through observational evidence 
and positive or negative correlation between cause (WTO law) and effect (state 
behaviour). An empirical analysis of the actual behaviour of targeted WTO members 
and of the factors and circumstances shaping their behaviour is, therefore, often 
necessary. This study has adopted an empirical approach in assessing the effects of 
WTO law on the behaviour of certain states. It is suggested that legal impact studies, 
based on empirical methods, rather than mere conceptual theories, are necessary to 
understand the nature and impact of international economic law.45
The second flaw in international economic law scholarship is the seeming bifurcation 
between law and other social science disciplines 46 The Uruguay Round result is 
widely seen as a victory for trade legalists over trade pragmatists 47 Legalists or 
constitutionalists represent significant and influential segments of the international
41 Petersmann (1991, p. XXVII).
42 Some scholars have, however, focused on the economic and political economy dimensions of 
international law. For works on the economic dimensions of international law, see: Bhandari and Sykes 
(eds) (1998); Cass, R A (1998) in Bhandari and Sykes (1998), Dunloff (1999), Dunloff and Trachtman 
(1999), Tratchman (2002). For political economy dimensions, see Kennedy and Southwick eds (20020
43 Cass (2005, p.54)
44 Pauwelyn (2005, p. 339).
45 Empiricism, in legal philosophy, is an approach to legal theory that rejects all judgements of value 
and regards only those statements which can be objectively verifiable as being true propositions about 
the nature o f law.
46 But see footnote 35 on current law and economics literature.
47 See, e.g. Goldstein et al 2000.
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economic law scholarship. As legal positivists, they tend to stress the need for 
formal, precise and detailed rules, and assume that law can cover everything and that 
every issue is justiciable.49 They also share the view that as the global economic 
system becomes more complex the rules governing it must necessarily be centralised 
and complex,50 although this goes against Richard Epstein’s injunction of “simple 
rules for a complex world.”51
Qureshi argues that “it is not for lawyers to define what, in the end, is not their 
disciple, that is, the economic terrain”. However, law necessarily entails a normative 
dimension, and, as Dunoff argues, “international trade is an economic, political and 
legal phenomenon”. Given the increasing interaction between international trade and 
international law, international trade law scholars will need to incorporate insights 
from the economics and political economy disciplines.
For instance, the economic approach can give valuable insights into the behavioural 
impact of the law, that is, how states and individuals are likely to react to it, as well 
the costs involved in different legal approaches and, indeed, the value of non-legal 
alternatives. This ex ante cost-benefit approach contrasts with the pure legal analysis, 
in which all too often lawyers discuss economic law in language that implies that 
costs are irrelevant or that a goal can be achieved at no cost and with no sacrifice of 
other goals.54
Another flaw of the efficiency approach to law is that it focuses exclusively on 
efficiency of outcomes, and assumes that the processes by which they are achieved 
are not valued by individuals. The law is treated as a factor of production, which 
maximises economic efficiency, and thus legal processes and intangible factors such
48 See Cass (2005) for an in-depth discussion and critique of these institutional forms.
49 Wild (1938).
50 For instance, Cottier (1997) argues that “the world trade system is bound to develop constitutional 
doctrines in structures and in case law in order to cope with the complexities of interfacing different 
policies”. The dependency assumption, which derives from the market-based or efficiency approach to 
law, is that international economic relations, like commercial transactions, are greatly dependent on 
and governed by legal forms and rules (see Williamson in Burrows and Veljanovski, 1981, p.40)
51 See Epstein (1995); see also Zywicki (1998).
52 Qureshi (1999, p. 14).
53 Dunoff (1999, p.736)
54 Burrows and Veljanovski, (1981, p. 15)
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as justice, equity and fairness are subsumed within the efficiency calculation.55 Yet, as 
Oran Young argues, a purely legal approach to international law may generate 
perverse substantive outcomes.56 It thus follows that the value people or states place 
on the legal processes and on the substantive outcomes is likely to play a crucial role 
in shaping their compliance behaviour, as the experiences of Nigeria and many other 
developing countries have, indeed, shown.
Finally, the legalist or constitutionalist approach is not truly interdisciplinary in that it 
tends to ignore many non-legal influences on a nation’s purposive behaviour, 
including domestic level structures and processes, distributional and political 
concerns,57 rational choice considerations58 and the strategic behaviour of states. 
Understanding these non-legal influences is essential to having a better understanding 
of the pre-conditions for the effectiveness of international economic law.
One lesson from this study is that international economic law scholarship can benefit 
from economic analysis, whose central tenet and most important operative principle is 
to ask of every move (i) how much will it cost; (ii), who pays; and (iii) who ought to 
decide both questions.59 At the heart of this economic approach are the need to choose 
and the costs and benefits of alternative choices.60 In Lonrho Exports, an English case, 
the court held that, “when negotiating a treaty the State must represent the national 
interest and take account of the widest range of considerations”.61 While, in economic
55 Ibid; Shams (2004).
56 Young ed (1999).
57 Traditional legal scholarship tends to ignore the role of non-legal factors. For example, Professor 
Jackson referred to “traditional and historical meaning of general international law obligation” in 
justifying his view about the binding nature of WTO rulings (Jackson, 1997; cf. Hippier Bello, 1996, 
who adopted a “law-and-politics” approach). Indeed, with respect to compliance with WTO rulings, 
only legal considerations, and not extraneous matters relating to domestic economic and political 
factors, will normally be taken into account by arbitrators in deciding on the reasonable time to comply 
(see Canada -  Patent Protection o f Pharmaceutical Products, Award of the Arbitrator, 
WT/DS114/13).
58 For instance, Goldsmith and Posner (2002) argue that international lawyers fail to use rational choice 
methodologies because of the belief that rational choice explanations, which largely focus on non-legal 
factors, denigrate the significance of international law. See also Dunloff and Trachtman (1999).
59 Leff (1974) cited in Burrows and Veljanovski eds. (1981).
60 Burrows and Veljanovski eds. (1981).
61 Lonrho Exports Ltd v Export Credits Guarantee Department [1996] 4 All ER 673 at 688.
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treaty making, such national interest considerations should be driven by efficiency 
concerns, they cannot automatically exclude non-economic goals or values.62
This thesis has also shown that there are merits in adopting a more nuanced 
understanding of international trade law and regulation and acceptance of the limits of 
legal rules. An alternative to the nirvana approach of the efficiency theory of law is 
the transaction cost approach. According to this view, rather than adopt a single or 
predominant type of governance structure in all situations, regulations should be 
matched to transaction cost problems in a discriminatory way.63 The nature of the 
transaction cost problem, the exchange relations and the contracting purposes to be 
served should dictate the governance structure, legal and otherwise, required.
In policy terms, this means, for instance, that if some developing countries pose lower 
levels of systemic risk or derive insignificant gains from the world trade regime or the 
global economy, it is not optimal to subject them and the developed countries to the 
same set of one-size-fits-all straitjacket of substantive rules. Given the reality of 
economic asymmetry, shaped by different distribution of income, wealth and 
resources between developed and developing countries, a single or predominant type 
of legal structure is unlikely to produce socially efficient outcomes. The transaction 
cost approach allows the matching of legal rules to the initial position of actors.
This transaction-specific approach also relates to the question of institutional choice 
or subsidiarity64, that is, whether some trade measures are better regulated nationally, 
bilaterally, internationally, or, indeed, left to the discipline of the market place.65 The 
literature on global legal pluralism66 offers a useful insight here. It posits that the 
global economy is governed by “a multiplicity of institutional, normative, and
62 Dunoff and Trachtman (1999, p8). The authors argue that the law and economics methodologies do 
not have a “bias” against government regulation and/or in favour of the market. This is in response to 
the criticism of the efficiency theory of law that elevates the market.
63 See Williamson (1981) for a discussion of transaction cost approach to law.
64 The Sutherland Report argues that “the concept of subsidiarity is worth holding onto even in the area 
of international trade”. However, the test, according to the authors, is “whether the balance between 
some loss of ‘policy space’ at the national level and the advantages of cooperation and the rule of law 
at the multilateral level is positive or negative” (Sutherland et al, 2005, p. 34).
65 Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1987), Dunoff and Trachtman (1999) and Tranchtman (2002)
66 See, e.g. Teubner (1992) and Snyder (1999),
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processual sites throughout the world”.67 In the context of multilevel governance, it is 
necessary to see the WTO not solely in its own terms, but with respect to the relative 
institutional competencies and capacities of other institutional alternatives.
In sum, this thesis has shown that WTO law does not induce the same level of 
compliance in all member states. While some states, such as Nigeria, have barely 
adjusted to WTO rules and disciplines, others, such as South Africa, have 
substantially adjusted to the rules, but, nevertheless, have failed to achieve full 
compliance. The behaviour of these countries thus shows the limits of WTO law. If 
many WTO members behave like Nigeria, then the findings of this study have far- 
reaching implications for rule making and rule implementation in the WTO. It is 
absolutely important, for the integrity of WTO law and legal system, that the 
conditions exist that can enhance the compliance pull of international trade rules.
One of the “bottom-line” conclusions of this study is that any regulatory approach that 
focuses exclusively on rule-making or regulatory design without paying sufficient 
attention ex ante to questions of how the contracting parties are likely to respond to 
the rules as well as the implementation and compliance costs involved is flawed. As 
this study has shown, the WTO agreements that developing countries are not fully 
complying with, and which some even appear to be ignoring, are those that did not 
represent the initial preferences and interests of these countries during the Uruguay 
Round negotiations. These findings, thus, support the proposition that ex ante 
preference for an agreement induces better ex post compliance with it, and vice versa.
The findings also pose challenges for the study of the interface between commitment 
and compliance in international economic law scholarship. There is certainly a need 
for further research into how to promote genuine interdisciplinary scholarship in 
international economic law in order to ensure that the law and economics (and 
political economy) dimensions of the discipline are fully complementary to one 
another. This will ensure that legal policy recommendations are based on 
economically justifiable and politically realistic assumptions.
67 Snyder (1999, p.371)
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Although the findings of this study are representative of the likely compliance 
behaviour of a large number of developing countries, further in-depth research into 
how some other developing countries and, indeed, the developed countries, give effect 
to the WTO treaty obligations in their domestic contexts and why they behave as they 
do will help increase understanding of the real effect of WTO law and the pre­
conditions for its effectiveness in shaping domestic reform of trade and trade-related 
laws and institutions. After all, the main level of analysis with respect to international 
rule compliance is the domestic level.
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Appendix: Interviews
Interviews with government officials, academics, trade lawyers, diplomats and 
practitioners, representatives of private enterprises, and civil society actors
SOUTH AFRICA:
Peter Draper 
Research Fellow,
South African Institute of International Affairs (S AHA)
26. 06. 2003, lhr. 30mins 
Johannesburg
Stephen Gelb 
Executive Director,
The Edge Institute
4. 07. 2003, lhr.
Johannesburg
Mr Edward Little,
Executive Director,
South African Association of Freight Forwarders (SAFF)
8. 07. 2003: lhr.
Johannesburg
Mr Reg Rumney,
Executive Director,
Business Map
9. 07. 2003: lhr.
Johannesburg
Mr Rod Lichkus,
Chairman, International Trade Committee,
South African Chamber of Business (SACOB)
10. 07. 2003: lhr. 20mins 
Johannesburg
Dr Maureen Kirkman 
Head of Regulatory Affairs
The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of South Africa, PMA
10. 07.2003: lhr. 30mins
Johannesburg
George G Djolor 
Chief Economist, PMA
10.07.2003 
Johannesburg
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Professor J.J van Wyk 
Chief Operating Officer, PMA,
10.07.2003
Johannesburg
Mr Andre Erasmus 
Senior Manager 
Deloitte
11.07. 2003: lhr.
Johannesburg
Francois Dubbelman
Trade and Investment Solutions
Deloitte
11.07.2003: 30mins 
Johannesburg
Mr Jonathan Berger
Centre for Applied Legal Studies,
University of Wits
11.07. 2003: lhr.
Johannesburg
Dr Rashad Casim
Director, Department of Economics,
University of Wits
11.07. 2003: lhr.
Johannesburg
Mr Richard Linnell,
RJ Linnell Associates
15.07. 2003: lhr. 30mins 
Johannesburg
Mr Alan Hirsch 
Chief Director,
Economic Sector Policy Coordination and Advisory Services,
Office of the President
21.07. 2003: lhr.
Pretoria
Mr Xavier Carim 
Chief Director,
Multilateral Trade Negotiations/ former Head of Delegation to the WTO 
Department of Trade and Industry
21.07. 2003: lhr.
Pretoria
Mr J.P.M (Bobby) Cronje
Deputy Director, Valuation
South African Revenue Service (SARS)
22. 07. 2003: lhr. 30mins 
Pretoria
Mr T D (Tommy) Cremore 
Assistant Director, Valuation 
SARS,
22.07.2003 
Pretoria
Ms Patricia Jones 
Policy Analyst, SARS
22.07.2003 
Pretoria
Mr Rajesh Mohanlall 
Policy and Legal Adviser,
SARS
22.07.2003: 30mins 
Pretoria
Mr Stoffer Van Rensburc 
Trade Policy Analyst,
SARS
22.07.2003: 30mins 
Pretoria
Mr Erich Kieck 
Senior Manager 
Strategy and Planning, SARS
22.07. 2003 
Pretoria
Ms Elena M Zdravkova
Assistant Registrar, Trademarks
Companies and Intellectual Property Office (CIPRO)
24.07. 2003: lhr.
Pretoria
Mr Siyabulela Tsengiwe
Director, Customs Tariff Investigation,
International Trade Administration Commission, ITAC
25.07. 2003: lhr.
Brendan Vickers,
Deputy Director 
Office of the President,
25.07.2003: lhr.
Pretoria
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Mr Francis Moloi,
Director, Trade Negotiations/WTO,
Department of Trade and Industry,
31.07.2003: lhr.
Pretoria
Mr Dirk van Seventer,
Senior Economist,
Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS)
8. 8. 2003: lhr.
Johannesburg
Dr Garth le Pere 
Executive Director,
Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD)
6.08.2003: lhr. 30mins 
Johannesburg
NIGERIA:
Mr Goodie M Ibru 
Principal Partner
G.M Ibru & Co. Legal Practitionaers
3. 12. 2003: lhr 
Abuja
Mr D Taunu
Principal Assistant Registrar, Trademarks
Commercial Law Department, Federal Ministry of Commerce
4. 12. 2003: lhrs 
Abuja
Mr T. A. Ogunfemi 
Deputy Director,
Bilateral Trade Relations Division,
External Trade Department, Federal Ministry of Commerce
5. 12. 2003: lhr 
Abuja
Dr F Obafemi 
Deputy Director 
Multilateral Trade Division 
Federal Ministry of Commerce 
5.12.2003: lhr.
Abuja
Dr S E Udo
Comptroller of Customs 
Nigerian Customs Service 
8. 12. 2003: lhr, Abuja
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Mr A .1 Ogilo
Deputy Comptroller General
Economic Regulations, Research and Planning,
Nigerian Customs Service
8. 12. 2003: lhr
Abuja
Dr J Nwaiwu
Deputy Comptroller-General,
Tariff and Trade Division, Nigerian Customs Service
9.12. 2003: lhr.
Abuja
Mr B. A Adeniyi 
Public Relations Officer,
Nigerian Customs Service 
9.12.2003: lhr.
Mr Bayo Aiyegbusi
Deputy Director
Nigerian Copyright Commission
10.12. 2003: lhr.
Abuja
Mr Sani Badamosi 
Area Manager,
The Nigerian Stock Exchange 
10.12.2003: lhr.
Abuja
Dr Bankole Sodipo 
Senior Partner,
G. O Sodipo & Co 
Barristers and Solicitors
16.12.2003 
Lagos
Mr Y F Agah
Nigerian Ambassador to the WTO
24.10.2005: lhr
Geneva
Mr S. A Audu 
Senior Counsellor
Nigerian Permanent Mission to the WTO
25.10.2005
Abuja
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